

Ancient
Commentators
on Aristotle

GENERAL EDITOR: RICHARD SORABJI

ASPASIUS:
On Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics
1–4, 7–8

Translated by
David Konstan

B L O O M S B U R Y



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On Aristotle

Nicomachean Ethics 1-4, 7-8

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Contents

Conventions	vii
Abbreviations	viii
Preface	ix
Textual Emendations to Heylbut's Text	xi
Translation	1
Book 1	3
Book 2	37
Book 3	57
Book 4	96
Book 7	128
Book 8	158
Notes	189
English-Greek Glossary	210
Greek-English Index	219
Index of Names and Titles	231
Subject Index	232

For David Sider and Phillip Mitsis

Conventions

[...] Square brackets enclose words or phrases that have been added to the translation or the lemmata for purposes of clarity.

<...> Angle brackets enclose conjectures relating to the Greek text, i.e. additions to the transmitted text deriving from parallel sources and editorial conjecture, and transposition of words or phrases. Accompanying notes provide further details.

(...) Round brackets, besides being used for ordinary parentheses, contain transliterated Greek words and Bekker pages references to the Aristotelian text.

Abbreviations

- Alberti-Sharples = Alberti, A., and R.W. Sharples, eds, *Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics*, Peripatoi 17 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999)
- Bywater = Bywater, I., ed., *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea*, Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894)
- FHSG = Fortenbaugh, W.W., P.M. Huby, R.W. Sharples, and D. Gutas, eds, *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought, and Influence*, Philosophia Antiqua 54 (Leiden: Brill, 1992)
- Giannantoni = Giannantoni, G., ed., *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae*, 4 vols (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990)
- Heylbut = Heylbut, G., ed., *Aspasii in Ethica Nicomachea Quae Super-sunt Commentaria*, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 19.1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1889)
- Kannicht = Kannicht, R., ed., *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*: vol. 5, *Euripides*, 2 vols (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004)
- LSJ = Liddell, H.G., and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, rev. H.S. Jones (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940)
- Snell = Snell, B., ed., *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta: Supplementum* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964)
- SVF = *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, ed. H. von Arnim, 4 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903-24)

Preface

In the summer of 1996, a group of scholars met in Siena to discuss Aspasius' commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, the earliest ancient Greek commentary on any work of Aristotle to survive, if not entire, then at least in large part (the commentaries on six, less a bit, of the ten books are extant). The participants in that colloquium presented papers that were later published in the volume, *Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), edited by Antonina Alberti and Robert W. Sharples. They also divided up among themselves the task of producing draft translations of the commentary, each taking a portion of the whole; although I did not attend the colloquium, I sent my own translation of Book 8, subsequently published in *Michael of Ephesus/ Aspasius/ Anonymous: On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 8-9* (London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

In 2001, Richard Sorabji, the general editor of the Duckworth/Cornell translations of the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, asked whether I would be willing to take the versions prepared by the colloquium and edit them into a unified translation of the entire work. I consented to do so. The versions I received did not quite cover the entire commentary; in addition, some were in English, others in Italian, and they differed considerably in style, vocabulary, and method, some sticking close to the original text, others rendering it more freely in the interest of greater fluency and intelligibility. But beyond that, it immediately became apparent that the only responsible way to proceed was to do my own translation from scratch, beginning to end, consulting at each stage the versions that had been put at my disposal. At the same time, I had to make a decision concerning the overall style of the translation. As will be apparent, I opted for the literal approach, which I had followed also in my earlier version of Book 8, on the grounds that readers of an ancient commentary on Aristotle would wish to know, as closely as possible, to what extent words and phrases in Aspasius corresponded to those in Aristotle's text. This has made for a certain stiltedness, which is not to the liking of all those who have assisted me in one way or another in the preparation of this volume.

Once I had completed my translation, and checked it carefully against the versions I had been given, it was sent out to a new set of readers, one for each of the six books. These readers did a splendid job, suggesting

many improvements and saving me from more mistakes and infelicitous expressions than I care to think about.

The present translation is, therefore, rather in the nature of a collective project. Although I am responsible for the final version, including any errors of interpretation or style that may remain, my debt both to the scholars who prepared the earlier drafts that I consulted, and to those who offered comments on my subsequent versions, is enormous. I have acknowledged in the notes those places where I have adopted emendations that one or another of them recommended, but what I owe to their learning and care extends much further. In listing their names here, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to these generous collaborators in the present translation.

For the early drafts, my thanks to Antonina Alberti, Jonathan Barnes, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Paul Mercken, Carlo Natali, David Sedley, Gerhard Seel, Robert Sharples, and J.O. Urmson. For their comments on my own versions, I am grateful to Roger Crisp, Margaret Howatson (for a helpful note), Pamela Huby, Christopher Kirwan, Alan Lacey, Donald Russell, and Christopher Taylor. I wish also to thank Ilaria Ramelli for her advice on several difficult points, and John Sellars for his meticulous editing of the entire text.

Owing to the length of this volume, there is not room for a detailed introduction to Aspasia's role as a critic and transmitter of Aristotle's ethical doctrines. For a general introduction to Aspasia see the collection of essays by Alberti and Sharples mentioned above and especially Jonathan Barnes' contribution, 'An Introduction to Aspasia'.

Textual Emendations to Heylbut's Text

Note: textual problems abound. I have been conservative in emending the text, and have noted further difficulties in the notes; these are indicated in the following list by an asterisk. Where words are supplied in a lacuna, the supplement is to be understood as *exempli gratia*. For details of the MSS (including N, R, and Z) see Heylbut, pp. v-x.

- 1,11: deleting *theôrêtikê*.
- 3,17: inserting *de* after *hê*.
- 4,4: reading *kuriôteron* (MSS) instead of *kuriôtaton* (Heylbut).
- *4,4: read *autês* instead of *autou*.
- *4,19: read *poiêtikai* instead of *poiêtika*.
- *5,4: read *autas* instead of *hauta*.
- 5,15: reading *diatêrêsas* with Z instead of *diathrêsas* (Heylbut).
- 7,1: inserting ellipsis before *gumnastikê*.
- 7,8: reading *en* with Z instead of *kai* (Heylbut).
- *8,21: read *tautêi* instead of *toutôi*.
- *8,21: read *doxan* instead of *praxin*.
- 8,24: reading *telos* with MSS instead of *teleian* (Heylbut).
- 10,21: inserting *kai* before *tên timên*.
- 11,6: deleting commas after *men* and *diakeimenôi*.
- 11,7: reading *legei* instead of *legô* (MSS; *legetai* Heylbut).
- 11,7: reading *haploun* (N) instead of *haplôs*.
- *11,8: insert *to* before *allou* and delete punctuation after *haireton*.
- *12,17: read *tôn* instead of *toutôn*.
- 12,19: reading *hekaterôi* instead of *hekaterai*.
- 13,4: reading *horismous* (MSS) instead of *arithmous*.
- 13,7: punctuating with a comma after *aisthêtais* and deleting comma after *tinias* and raised stop after *ousias*.
- 13,30: punctuating with a raised stop after *aretês* instead of a comma.
- 14,5: reading *tautá* instead of *taûta*.
- 14,16: reading *hêmôn* (MSS) instead of *hêmin*.
- 15,5: marking a lacuna after *katholou*, and reading *esti* (MSS) instead of *eti*.
- 16,19: inserting *ou* after *zôiou*.

- 16,26: inserting *ei* after *kai*.
 16,26: punctuating with a raised stop after *ekgonoi*.
 17,4: inserting *ou* before *panta* (Heylbut in app. crit.).
 17,4: inserting *gar oukh* before *hairêtôtera*, and deleting *ta* (Heylbut in app. crit.).
 *17,21: read *to to eu proslambanon* instead of *to eu proslambanon* and transpose to follow *telos*.
 18,1: reading *to ... einai* (MSS; deleted by Heylbut).
 19,18: reading *proagagein* instead of *periagagein*.
 19,20: reading *eirêmenoïs* (MSS) instead of *heurêmenoïs*.
 20,18: reading *mê* (MSS) instead of *gê*.
 20,19: supplying *sumbebêke* in the lacuna.
 *21,12: read *tas* instead of *tous*.
 22,8: supplying *doxa autou en hosôï legousin tên* in the lacuna.
 *22,28: delete *kala* or transpose to follow *kat'aretên*.
 22,32: reading *hêdonês* instead of *energeias*.
 23,12: reading [*kai*] *all' ou kath' autas oudamôs* instead of *kai allou kath' autas oudenos*.
 24,5: reading *pateras* instead of *dia ploutou* (bracketed by Heylbut).
 *25,21: supply *kai dê* (*kai* Heylbut).
 28,4: reading *to mê einai empodistikon tês eudaimonias* (MSS) instead of *to mê <teleion> einai [mê on] empodistikon*.
 28,34: reading *eudaimona* instead of *eudaimôn* (Z, Heylbut).
 *29,4: insert *ê kalos* after the second *plousios*.
 29,10: retaining *kai mê kakian* (bracketed by Heylbut).
 29,12: retaining *kai tên ousian* (bracketed by Heylbut).
 29,21: inserting *hoi* after *makarioi*.
 30,28: supplying *eudaimona legein, toutesti* in the lacuna.
 31,8: reading *en hôï teôs elenkhei* instead of *en hôï teôs ankhei* (MSS; Heylbut marks a crux).
 32,2: inserting *hoti hoi tethneôtes metekhousi tou agathou ê kakou kai hoti esti* after *kai*.
 32,7: reading *ei kai* (MSS) instead of *ei de*.
 32,7: reading *hôte ê* (MSS) instead of *hôte mê*.
 32,8: supplying *tês eudaimonias* in the lacuna.
 32,25: reading *houtôs* (MSS) instead of *pôs*.
 33,26: inserting *tôi theôi* (Heylbut in app. crit.) after *exomoiôthênai*.
 *34,27: read *anthrôpôn* instead of *anthrôpinôn*.
 *36,1: insert *to* before *pan*.
 36,4: inserting *oukh hôs epi ta mathêmatikôn; hegoumetha gar ta mathêmatika logon ekhein* after *logon*.
 36,14: punctuating with a raised stop after *bouletai* and inserting *ho* before *ouk an* and *eiê* following it.
 37,4: reading *logon* instead of *logou*.
 *43,25: read *pathêtikai* instead of *psukhikai*.
 46,10: supplying *enontôn* in the lacuna.

- 50,10: reading *epikheirôn* (Heylbut in app. crit.) instead of *kheiron*.
 52,24: reading *auton* with Z² (deleted by Heylbut).
 55,8: inserting *mê* before *êi*.
 55,24: reading *dustragiais* instead of *eupragiais*.
 56,3: marking a lacuna after *tôn akrôn* (Heylbut marks a crux at *phantazetai*).
 *56,32: read *kata* instead of the first *kai*.
 59,19: deleting *ei* and reading *eiê* instead of *êi* (Heylbut in app. crit.).
 59,28: reading *éstin* instead of *estin*.
 60,2: reading *sunônumos* instead of *homônumos*.
 62,22: insert *hekousioi* before second *hekousioi*.
 63,9: punctuating with full stop (and no parenthesis) after *hekousion*.
 63,13: reading *akousion* instead of *hekousion*.
 64,22: reading *apophainomenous* instead of *anaphainomenous* (Z, Heylbut).
 65,35: inserting *dei* after *touton*.
 68,14: inserting *oukh* before *houtôs*.
 70,19: inserting *ei* after *epei* and reading *hotioun* instead of *hoti ou*.
 71,15: reading *tin' anoêta* instead of *hina noei*.
 71,17: punctuating with a full stop after *agennêtos gar* and deleting the comma after *aidios*.
 71,30: inserting *ê phusei* before *ê kai*.
 *71,31: read *ataktotera* instead of *ataktoteran*.
 72,5: reading *boulêsis* (N) instead of *bouleusis* (Z, Heylbut).
 *72,10: mark a lacuna after *autarkeis*.
 73,27: reading *bouleuomenos* instead of *boulomenos*.
 *76,16: read *hote on* instead of *hotioun*.
 79,32: reading *phaulon telos* (*phaulon*, ZN) instead of *telos*.
 *81,14: retain *mellonta*.
 *83,27: read *ésti* instead of *eti*.
 84,12: reading *autêi* instead of *hautê*, and punctuating with a full stop after *andreia*.
 84,12: reading *to* (N) *de* instead of *tôi*.
 84,20: reading *hê* instead of *têi*.
 86,28: reading *kathoson* (Heylbut in app. crit.) instead of *ê ison*.
 87,3: inserting *tôi* before *to*.
 *88,8: mark lacuna after the second *psukhê*.
 *90,6 mark lacuna before and after *aphrodisiôn*.
 *91,11: read *prosepimêkhanôntai* instead of *prosepimêkhanatai*.
 91,27: reading *ho ti d' esti dê hêmeteron* instead of *hoitines êdê hêmeteron* (obelized by Heylbut).
 92,1: reading *kai nosêmatikai tinos peri ho êdê idioi eien* instead of *kai noein gar ti kai diatheseôs peri ho êdê idioi eien*.
 92,8: reading *to* instead of *ta* and *tetagmena* instead of *tetagmenôn*.
 92,18: reading *haí* (pronoun) instead of *hai* (article).
 93,6: inserting *haireisthai has dei ê* after *haireisthai*.

93,7: read *hupo* instead of *huper*.

93,14: deleting the second *mê*.

97,13: reading *kai toiouton hoion ti einai tôn khrêsimôn* (Heylbut in app. crit.) instead of *kaitoi auton hoion te einai tôn khrêsimôn* (Heylbut marks a crux).

100,33: punctuating after *metriôs de*.

101,12-13: deleting punctuation after *huperballein* and *dêlonoti* and inserting commas after *lambanein* and *mikrois*.

103,18: inserting *lêpsin, kai an êi kathorthôtikos kata tên* after *kata tên*.

105,10: inserting *hoiai* after *hoion*.

105,11: inserting *hai hexeis* after *tines*.

105,20: reading *autais* instead of *auta*.

105,21: reading *pragmatôn* instead of *aretôn*.

105,24: punctuating with a raised stop instead of a comma after *khreia*.

106,3: placing parenthesis before *enesti* instead of before *mikron*.

106,1: inserting *hoia legomen* after *phêsi*.

*106,32: read *parexei* for *hexei*.

107,4: marking a lacuna after *anathêmata* and inserting *dôreais eoike*.

*107,33: read *tôi pelas* instead of *tôn pelas*.

108,9: inserting *ho megalopshukhos dê axios esti megalôn. ho men oun megalopsukhos* after *hôte*.

110,3: reading *axios* (Diels in app. crit.) instead of *anaxios*.

*110,21: delete *khaunos*.

110,22: omitting *mikropsukhos* (inserted by Heylbut).

111,24: inserting *aretên* before *kai*.

112,6: reading *tôn allôn* instead of *autôn*.

112,9: reading *sunainôn* instead of *sumbainein*.

112,13: inserting *ê* after *dunastai*.

*112,18: delete *autos*.

112,30: reading *kinduneuteon einai* instead of *kinduneuta eneinai*.

113,14: reading *eipen* instead of *eipein*.

113,23: reading *tous hêgemonas* instead of *ta idia* (R, Heylbut).

113,30: reading *en axiômati* instead of *en megethei* (Z, Heylbut), and punctuating with a full stop.

113,31-2: reading *megalopsukhou tou pantôn antipoioumenou* instead of *megalopsukhou tou pantôs hen ti poioumenou*.

114,19: reading *iskhuos* instead of *ê misthous*.

*114,27: delete *pros*.

115,6: reading *aspora* instead of *apora*.

*115,6: delete *metriôs*.

115,7: inserting *ê* after *anieis*.

115,13: reading *eustathês* instead of *eustathôs*.

116,6: punctuating before *aei* instead of after.

116,28: reading *to philotimon* instead of *ton philotimon*.

116,31: inserting *mê* before *psektos*.

117,8: reading *to te eu kai to mê eu* instead of *tôi te eu kai tòi mê eu*.

- 118,19: inserting *mesai* after *aretai*.
 118,21: reading *praxessin* instead of *hexessin*.
 119,2: inserting *anônumous legôn* before *onomazei*.
 *119,11: mark a lacuna before *ou mên*.
 119,13: inserting *ê* after *emphainein*.
 120,33: reading *deitai* instead of *de esti*.
 121,4: reading *anankê* instead of *anankêi*.
 121,9: reading *estokhasmenos* (N) instead of *estokhasmenôs* (Z, Heylbut).
 *121,10.18: read *to sunêdunein* instead of *to sun hêdonêi*.
 121,13: reading *epi* instead of *eti*.
 121,23-4: deleting the raised stop after *homilein* and inserting a comma after *pasi* and *de* before *harmotton*.
 *121,32: insert *ousôn* after *euskhêmonôn*.
 *122,29: insert *ôn* after *alêtheutikos* instead of before it.
 123,13: inserting *proairetikos* after *alêtheutikos*.
 123,18: reading *homologiais* instead of *homiliais*.
 124,2: inserting *ê* after *ploutôi*.
 125,1: reading *homilian* instead of *homilia*.
 125,2: reading *ti* (unaccented) instead of *tí* and punctuating with full stop instead of question mark.
 *125,10: insert *toutesti, tas kinêseis* after *êthous*.
 125,13: deleting *kai hoia dei*.
 125,24: reading *geloion* instead of *pleon*.
 126,5: reading *ton horon* instead of *to akron*.
 127,9: reading *akousai* (MSS) instead of *parakousai*.
 127,23: punctuating with a comma instead of a question mark.
 129,30: reading *eti* instead of *epei*.
 130,4: reading *all' ho ephthartai ekei ouk ekhei* instead of *all' ephthartai kai ouk ekhei*.
 130,19: supplying in the lacuna *hekateron kakion pôs horômen gar k' an to thêrion dokêi*.
 131,7: supplying in the lacuna *ho akratês tous ponous pheugôn diôkei*.
 131,21: inserting *ouk anankaiai de hai huperbolai, homoiôs* (Heylbut in app. crit.).
 131,27: supplying in the lacunas *phusin. khrê gar* and *ou mên*.
 132,12: supplying in the lacuna *homoiôs*.
 132,13: deleting *tas* (inserted by Heylbut).
 133,18: supplying in the lacuna *ei tis tôn lupôn hêttatai hôn*.
 133,19: supplying in the lacuna *ê tôn*.
 134,12-13: supplying in the lacunae *auto paskhein homoiôs de* and *isk-huros ôn, halous*.
 134,25: inserting a comma after *endidonai*.
 135,16-17: reading *touto ge* (MSS) instead of *touto gar ouk*.
 135,17: reading *oietai gar* instead of *ha oietai*.
 135,20-1: placing *houtoi ... propeteis* in parentheses.
 135,25: reading *arkhên* instead of *akrasian* (MSS; Heylbut marks a crux).

- 135,26: reading *ê* instead of *hoi*.
 135,31: inserting *ê* (Diels in app. crit.) after *hamartanontes* and deleting raised stop.
 135,33: reading *poteron* instead of *proteron*.
 136,1: reading *ê peri* instead of *êper*.
 136,3: reading *ekstatikoi* instead of *exetastikoi*.
 136,20: retaining *kai* (bracketed by Heylbut).
 137,1: reading *agathês* instead of *agathê*.
 137,12: reading *menôn* (MSS) instead of *monon* (Heylbut).
 138,5: reading *tês* (MSS) instead of *tas* (Heylbut), marking a lacuna after *epithumias*, and inserting *ta aitêmata kai*.
 138,10: inserting *oietai agathon einai* after *toutesti*.
 138,34: inserting *hoi* before *idiognômones*.
 139,6: reading *akratous* (MSS) instead of *akrateis*.
 139,26: reading *epethumei* (MSS) instead of *epithumei*.
 *140,3: read *hêdonêi* instead of *mêde*.
 140,18: reading *au tais* instead of *tais*.
 140,33: inserting *hôs* before *paskhôn*.
 *141,7: read *boulêsîn* instead of *bouleusin*.
 141,25: punctuating with a comma instead of a question mark.
 *142,12: insert *kai* after *tomai*.
 142,17: reading *epei mê êsti <tên hêdonên mê>tini tauton [tini] <einai> agathôi* instead of *epei mê êsti † tini tauton tini agathôi* (crux marked by Heylbut).
 142,22: inserting *to* before *tôi mête*.
 142,23: reading *genei* instead of *genê*.
 143,20: reading *peripherousi* (MSS) instead of *epipherousi*.
 144,28: reading *kathaper* instead of *hôsper*.
 145,3: closing the parenthesis after *dunamin* instead of after *energeia*.
 145,12: reading *en autôi* instead of *en autêi*.
 145,13: inserting *hôte* after *potôn* (Diels in app. crit.); Heylbut marks a crux.
 146,8: reading *hôsper ... kai kata phusin* instead of *hôsper kai † pros tattô, hoti hêdea kai kata phusin*.
 147,10: inserting *hêdonai* after *pasai*.
 149,2: deleting *eisin* after *agathôn tinôn*.
 150,28: inserting *to lêmma* and reading *autou* (Diels in app. crit.) instead of *autên*; Heylbut marks a crux.
 *150,30: read *agathon* for *mê kakon*.
 150,33: supplying in the lacuna *kalên, autên tên hêdonên*.
 *151,1: read *enistatai* instead of *enistantai*.
 152,22: marking a lacuna after *gnôrimon*.
 152,30: reading *kata* instead of *para*.
 153,6: reading *legei* instead of *legonta*.
 *153,8: insert *pas* before *tis*.
 153,22: inserting *toutôn on oude tis hôs* after *gar* and emending *enantioun* to *enantion*.

- 155,8: reading *apartômenoi* instead of *apatômenoi*.
 155,19: reading *tas d' aitiás* (Heylbut in app. crit.) *tautês tês apatês* instead of *ap' autês*.
 155,26: retaining *dokousi* (bracketed by Heylbut), and punctuating before instead of after it.
 *155,27: read *hopôsoun* instead *hotioun*.
 155,28: reading *meta* instead of *mê*.
 155,29 reading *to* (MSS) instead of *tôi*.
 155,31: punctuating with a full stop after *hêdonai* instead of a comma.
 155,32: marking a lacuna after *atelês*.
 156,11: inserting *dokei einai* ... after *lupêron*.
 157,1: inserting *kata* after *eoike de* (Heylbut marks a crux).
 159,17: reading *ésti* instead of *esti*.
 162,8: reading *haplôs to* instead of *to haplôs*.
 162,25: inserting *agatha* after *eniote*.
 162,31: inserting *to de tini* before *agathon*, and deleting (*to de spanion*).
 162,32: reading *taúta* instead of *tauta*.
 166,19: reading *tês erôtikês* instead of *tois erôtikois*.
 166,24-5: reading *tês toutôn erôtikês* instead of *tois toutôn erôtikois*.
 166,28: reading *tois erôtikois* (Aldine) instead of *tês erôtikês*.
 166,29: reading *tois erôtikois* (Aldine) instead *tês erôtikês*.
 168,7: inserting *pisteusantes* before *allôi*.
 168,14: reading *hómoia* instead of *homoía*.
 172,28: reading *tôn de tou opsou* instead of *tou de tou opsou*.
 176,8: transferring *kai gar estin allotriôtera* (*allotriôteron* Heylbut) to the end of the lemma in the preceding line.
 178,13: reading *gunaiki de <kai> andri amphoterois esti philian einai* instead of *gunaika de <kai> andra amphoterous esti philous einai*.
 180,24: reading *koinônia* instead of *philia*.
 180,24: reading *stratiôtai* (MSS) instead of *sustratiôtai*.
 181,1: reading *autois* (MSS) instead of *tois autois*.
 181,24: no lacuna (contra Heylbut).
 182,4-5: no lacuna (contra Heylbut).
 182,15: reading *tês tôn basileôn* instead of *kai basileôn*.
 182,23: inserting *huperekhei* after *tekna*.
 183,6: omitting Heylbut's supplement *hêkista*.
 183,17: omitting Heylbut's supplement *all' ou philousin*.
 *183,18: read *hautôn* instead of *autôn*.
 184,34: inserting *ei* before *oukh*.
 185,21: reading *dôiên* rather than *dôiê*.
 185,31: reading *didonta* instead of *deonta*.
 186,20: reading *timan* (Heylbut in app. crit.) instead of *timasthai*.
 186,22: bracketing *kai lambanonta*.
 186,25: bracketing either *poiêsas* or *dedrake*.

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ASPASIUS
On Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics 1-4, 7-8

Translation

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The Comments of Aspasius the Philosopher on Aristotle's *Ethics*

On Book 1 of the *Ethics* of Aristotle

The treatment of ethics and especially politics is prior to contemplative philosophy in respect to necessity, but subsequent in respect to value. Insofar as it is impossible for people to live nobly if they are not temperate, just, and in general well ordered in their character, having settled the emotions of their souls in some sort of equilibrium, the political and ethical treatise would seem necessary and therefore prior (for even if a person should acquire total knowledge and contemplative wisdom, it is of no use if he has not been educated in regard to character). But insofar as wisdom treats the most valuable and divine things, and contemplates the works of nature and, beyond that, other things far better and greater than those constituted by nature, which pertain to first philosophy,¹ contemplative philosophy may be said to be prior and more valuable. For as the subjects stand to one another, so too the sciences of these subjects; the things that wisdom deals with are more valuable and greater than those that fall under political and ethical science; thus, wisdom is far more valuable than those sciences. For in fact, if we were without bodies, there would be no need for our nature to have any other work than contemplation. As it is, however, the nature of the body, which is yoked to bodily pleasures and pains, necessarily causes us to be concerned with temperance, self-control, and many other such virtues which do not plausibly pertain to god because he has no share in bodily pleasures and pains. It is because of the necessity of the body, then, it seems, that we take greatest concern for ethics, since even justice and practical intelligence, in which the divine is believed to share, are far inferior to god. We, however, need them because of the injustices and aggressions that are committed by us against each other, whereas it is plausible that the divine, at all events, exercises only contemplative justice in regard to us and is continually in this state.

One may perceive, then, from these and similar considerations that wisdom is more valuable than political philosophy, whereas ethical philosophy, as has been said, is the most necessary. It is fitting that we practise this latter first of all, both in word and deed, as Socrates too believed – not that he failed to value knowledge of divine things and dismissed the science of naturally constituted things as otiose, but rather because he believed that concern for character is necessary. The Pythagoreans too educated their adherents in ethics and argument.

Aristotle seems to value this teaching most highly: he says that it concerns the goal of mankind, which is happiness. What he says is as follows.

1094a-1096a17 'Every art' <to 'prefer the truth'>.

- 15 First, then, one must speak about art and method, then about action and choice. Among them [i.e. the Peripatetics], 'art' is spoken of in three senses. For example, the genus of all the arts is called 'art': for they distinguish the arts, calling some productive, some theoretical. One might define an art in this sense as a system of propositions leading to
- 20 a single end. In another sense, they call an 'art' the common genus of active art and productive art: for here they distinguish by calling the one 'art' and the other 'science', labelling all theoretical art 'science'. One might describe such an [active and productive] art as a system of propositions leading to actions or productions. They are also accustomed to call productive art in particular 'art'. Aristotle provides a definition of it, when he says 'an art is a productive state (*hexis*)
- 25 accompanied by reason' (6.4, 1140a7-8); he means neither inductive nor syllogistic reason, but rather simple, artistic reason, such as craftsmen in the arts employ. For there are also products made by non-rational creatures, for example the honeycombs of bees and what are called
- 3,1 spiders' 'webs'. But none of these produces in a way accompanied by reason; rather, animals employ natural instinct. Artistic products, however, are products made by rational creatures who make use of reason. Let this, then, suffice concerning art.

- As for 'method' [or 'methodical inquiry'],² some have supposed that it
- 5 is used in the same way as 'art' and parallel to it, while others suppose that it is an ability that is similarly disposed toward opposite things that fall under it: for it is possible to take each of the rational arts as a science of opposites, for example medicine as the science of healthy and sick things. But it is not similarly disposed toward both, but rather chooses the one deliberately, while it merely knows the other. Rhetoric and dialectic are both argumentative arts, however, and they in fact are
- 10 similarly disposed in arguing for opposites. But since Aristotle seems to call politics or ethics too a 'method' and not just rhetoric and dialectic, some have said that every ability or skill in general is called a method. They too seemed to have misunderstood the use of the term. For he calls both metaphysics and the science of proof a 'method' [or 'methodical inquiry']: thus he said that a theoretical skill over the things that fall
- 15 under it, accompanied by inductive or syllogistic reason, is a method. Let me call the enthymeme too a 'syllogism', speaking generally, and so too let me call proof by example 'induction'. It is plausible, then, that every such ability is called a 'method', while³ proof by syllogism and by induction are also method in the true sense, as has been said elsewhere.

Some have interpreted 'action' as 'rational activity'; in accord with this, theory might be called an 'action', for it is a rational activity. But

activity in accord with an active science is also called 'action'. In general, 20
all those arts are called 'active' which have no other product apart from
an action, for example dancing and flute-playing. But more particularly
the political and ethical arts are called active, and activities that
concern what is noble and shameful are called actions.

Concerning 'choice', Aristotle himself will say more further on. We
may assume this much in advance, that a choice is also a deliberative 25
desire. For whenever a person deliberates and then chooses, and desire
follows upon calculation, or contrariwise when a person desires and
deliberates and then chooses, such a thing is a choice. Therefore the
virtues and vices are kinds of choices, for the calculation and desire
involved in virtues are good, while those involved in vices are the
reverse.

'Every art', says Aristotle, 'and every method [i.e. methodical in- 30
quiry], action and choice' aims at 'some good' (1094a1-2). For the arts
and methods aim at their particular end as the good. And indeed actions
and choices too desire some good. For in fact wicked choices and wicked 4,1
actions occur because of a wish for a good – on the part, however, of
people who have gone astray in acting and choosing. 'Therefore they
rightly affirmed that it is the good that everything aims at' (1094a2-3).
If he takes the good to be the first and more authoritative⁴ cause, then
it is well said, since everything aims at this, and both plants and 5
animals desire that and a resemblance to that. That is how one must
understand 'aiming at', in the sense that everything is equipped by
nature for a resemblance to the most perfect and primary cause in the
way that it can. For each thing is eagerly drawn by its own nature to its
proper perfection. It is drawn to this because it is inclined to that which 10
is most perfect of all. If Aristotle takes 'good' in the sense of 'happiness',
then rational animals only would strictly be meant. But this⁵ is said
parenthetically; the continuous sentence runs as follows: 'Every art and
every method, just like action and choice, seems to aim at some good':
that is, its end; for the end for each art, etc., is the good that it proposes
as belonging to it [i.e. its end].⁶

'There seems to be a difference among ends' (1094a3-4). For activities 15
themselves are ends, both of active and of theoretical sciences. For
actions and theory are activities. But the ends of the productive sciences
are things other than the activities: for example, in sculpture the statue
is an end other than the activity. This is why these things⁷ are called
'productive', because they have some product other than the activities.
Since the end is the most valuable thing to each (for the rest exist for 20
its sake), where there exist some ends other than the actions, as in the
productive arts, in these arts the works, that is the products, are better
than the activities; but where the activities themselves are the ends,
there is nothing more valuable than the activities.

'Since there are many actions, arts, and sciences, there are many'
ends (1094a6-8), all those, in fact, that fall under one ability, each under 25

the next in sequence, just as the art of making bridles falls under that of horsemanship, horsemanship under generalship, generalship under the art of politics.

- 30 'In all arts the ends of the governing arts are more choiceworthy than those of the arts under them' (1094a14-15). Some arts fall under other arts, and their ends are for the sake of the arts above them and the ends of those arts. Those arts that preside over and rule the ones under them are governing arts. They are defined by the following three features: by making use of those arts that are under them and of their ends; by commanding them; and by governing them. It is obvious that arts are said to govern others by virtue of the fact that the ends of those arts that are subordinate to them exist for the sake of their end, for example the
- 5,1 helmsman's art governs the rudder-maker's art; and indeed it gives commands as to how one should make the rudder and how one governs and uses the rudder once made. It is also obvious that the rudder, which is the end of the art of rudder-making, exists for the sake of the end of the helmsman's art. Having said that the ends of the governing arts are
- 5 more choiceworthy than the ends under them (for the ends too of the arts under them⁸ are pursued on account of the ends of the governing arts), Aristotle again mentions that it makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends or products other than the activities are.

- If, then, this is how things stand, that one end always exists and is put into practice for another, then the human race would be exceedingly miserable, since it would never be able to attain what is choiceworthy
- 10 in itself nor find a surcease of desire. But since there is an end of all things that are practicable, which we choose for itself, it is obvious that this would be the good and the best one: for the other ends are for the sake of this. A knowledge of it also has enormous importance for living nobly. For those who choose different actions at different times and do not look to one thing live at random and can never attain the good. But
- 15 if one observes⁹ happiness and the human good, setting this as one's target like an archer, and directs all one's actions toward it, then it is entirely necessary that one become happy and live one's whole life nobly. Therefore, one must try to comprehend what this end is and to which of the sciences or capacities it belongs. Nor is it unreasonable that Aristotle thinks it important to grasp both what the end is and of what
- 20 it is the end. On the contrary, knowledge is necessarily among those things that are relative to something else, and at the same time an end is the end of some art or ability. Thus one must simultaneously grasp what the end is and of what science or ability it is the end.

- Capacity is spoken of in several senses among them [i.e. the Peripatetics]. For they call states [or conditions: *hexeis*] 'capacities', and sometimes too the better part of states; for they call health a capacity,
- 25 but sickness an incapacity. There are times when they term fitness a capacity, for instance a child has a capacity for boxing and they call this

same thing also a capacity.¹⁰ They also call capacities those goods that it is possible to use well or not well, for example wealth and health. Sometimes they call capacities those arts that are similarly disposed toward the opposites that fall under them, for instance rhetoric and dialectic. It seems that here he takes 'capacity' in the sense of a state (*hexis*). For since some believe that the political art and practical wisdom are a science, and some that they are not a science but rather something similar to a science, and since he is going to speak of the political art, he inquires of which science or capacity the human good is the end, as if he were to say, of which science or state.

'It would seem', he says, 'to be that of the most authoritative and most governing art: such would be the political art' (1094a26-8). For it has what pertains to the governing art, since it commands all the other sciences. For it governs what arts one must learn and practice in the city and up to what point, and the ends of the other arts exist for the sake of its end. Indeed, all the noblest capacities fall under it, for example generalship, rhetoric, and household management. Here he does not mean the virtues, generalship and household management, since he calls them capacities. The capacities are those which it is possible to use well or not well; such are rhetoric and, under household management, money-making, which he mentions here; generalship too is a kind of capacity to lead an army and be capable of conquering enemy forces. It pertains to the political art both to use those of the sciences that are active, and to make laws or command what things one should do and from what things one should abstain. And this is proof that it is the commanding and governing art in relation to the others, so that its end embraces those of the others. And if this is so, then 'this would be the human good' (1094b7-8) and end.

Since he said that the end of the political art is happiness, it appears that the end of the political art is the happiness of the city (*polis*), while the ethical art treats the particular end of each person and the happiness of each. To this he adds that happiness is one 'and the same for one person and the city' (1094b8-9): for it is the same in kind. For the happiness of the city and of each person is being active in accord with complete virtue, but that of the city is greater and more complete because it is an activity that involves greater things. He says 'greater' in this way, because there is no difference at all in kind. On the basis of its being greater, then, one must name and posit happiness as the end of the political art.

Now, the method [i.e. inquiry] that he transmits here aims to tell¹¹ and say what the human good and happiness are, since the inquiry here is a political kind. For of the kinds of political art, one, namely care of the city, is called by the general name 'political'; another is called household management, since it concerns the care of the household. Just as the household is a part of the city, so too the art of household management is a part of the political art. A third kind and part of the

30 political art is the care of each of the citizens, and this is called ethical: each citizen is a part of [all] the citizens of the city, and the ethical art is a part of the political.

Following this, Aristotle tells how ethics may be adequately talked about in accord with ethical method. For it can be talked about adequately, he says, if 'it can be elucidated in accord with its underlying subject matter' (1094b12). Of the subject matters that underlie methods
 35 and sciences, some admit of precision – he means that a necessary
 7,1 [conclusion] is derived from necessary [premises] – for instance geometry, arithmetic, and <...> gymnastics.¹² Thus, the precise and the necessary are not to be sought alike in all arguments: for there cannot even be the same precision in all crafted things. The most exacting
 5 artist will not craft in lead in the same way as in bronze or ivory because lead does not admit of that precision in the art. He says this because the political art and in general practical wisdom concern a human subject matter and human actions, in¹³ all of which there inheres what is for the most part, whereas the necessary is either non-existent or minimal. Further, the same actions, depending on the timing, on the characters
 10 who perform or suffer them, and on other factors are sometimes noble and sometimes shameful: for example returning a deposit is not always noble. And indeed what he says is true, that 'noble and just things, which the political art contemplates, contain much randomness' (1094b14-16) because things turn out¹⁴ differently for different people concerning what is just; hence people believe [that justice exists] 'by custom only, not by nature' (1094b16).

There are also, in regard to other goods, those that are not noble but
 15 are merely called goods, for instance wealth and health; Aristotle adds courage as well, which is indeed a noble thing. The randomness arises because many harms result from them. But one must not judge them in this way, but one should rather consider that the so-called instruments of virtue [e.g. wealth and health] are good because they serve for the activation of good things, and that courage is good because it is noble.

One must be content, then, in these matters, to discuss in rough
 20 terms and to derive what is for the most part from premises that are for the most part. For it was said in the *Analytics* (*Prior Analytics* 1.12, 32a12) that what is necessary is derived from necessary premises, whereas what is for the most part is derived from premises that are for the most part. Aristotle says that not only must the person who is speaking speak in accord with the underlying subject matter but also the one who is listening must receive it in this way. For it is the part of
 25 an educated person to ask for arguments that are in accord with the subject that has been proposed.

Having mentioned what the auditor should be like, Aristotle digresses to say a little about him, namely that in regard to any particular subject the person who is educated about it is a good judge. He calls 'educated about a particular thing' those people who have got involved

in it moderately, for example in the case of geometry those who have practised geometry moderately and up to a point. And he calls 'educated about everything' a person who has all the kinds of knowledge in such a way as to be involved in them up to a point. The educated person is a judge even of those who are more advanced than he because he possesses the principles, but a judge only to this extent, that he recognizes who is a geometer and who is not, and by assenting to the former in geometrical matters and not believing the latter. He likens a youth to one who is wholly uneducated. By 'youth' he means a child, and he believes that a child is not ready to listen to ethical arguments because he does not yet possess rational principles. This is why he says that a youth – that is, a child – is not a suitable auditor, for one thing because he has no experience of the actions that occur in life, and for another because he lives in accord with emotion like the other animals that have no share in reason. Except that the child differs to this extent from non-rational animals, that he has the starting point of reason in his soul. Therefore he thinks that one should train children, but not transmit to them arguments concerning the political or ethical art. For in fact they will despise it, listening to it as if it were some other, unnecessary branch of knowledge, and so they will listen to it without profit. For choice pertains to a rational being, and since they do not have good choice, neither will they perform any of the actions that are in accord with reason. Aristotle believes that a child in respect to age differs in no way from someone young in respect to character: the latter are those who live according to emotion, like people lacking in self-control. As for those who are able to form their desires in accord with reason, which naturally comes to human beings from a certain age on, it can be highly worth while for them to know something about these matters.

Before discussing what Aristotle speaks of next, it is worth raising the question of the sense in which he means that happiness is the end of the political art. For the political art is of the active kind, and the end of every practical science is an action; thus, happiness resides in an action. Yet happiness is believed to reside in contemplation, and the most important part of the end, surely, is in this.¹⁵ Does he then mean the first arguments to be in accord with the practice¹⁶ of *some* people, whence he also says 'it would *seem* to be that of the most authoritative art' (1094a26-7; cf. 6,1 above), as if he were putting forth an *opinion* concerning happiness? Then, further on, he makes the argument about it more precise and says that 'the end resides in activity in accord with virtue' (1.6, 1098a16-17);¹⁷ thus it [i.e. happiness] is the end of complete virtue. This in turn is that virtue that is made up of all the virtues, both active and contemplative. Does he then posit happiness as double, with the active being more incomplete, while that which is made up of both [i.e. the active and the contemplative] is more complete? Or can one somehow say that happiness that is simultaneously contemplative and active is the end of the political art? Therefore it commands those of the

citizens who are going to be best not only to be active but also to be
 30 contemplative.

One might suppose, at least on this reckoning, that wisdom and
 contemplative knowledge generally are inferior to political science, if
 indeed the latter commands, while the former is commanded. But he
 solves this puzzle as he proceeds, for he says that nothing prevents the
 lesser science from giving commands concerning greater things: for
 example, political science commands¹⁸ that temples of the gods be
 constructed and that we revere them, although it is certainly not
 9,1 greater than the gods. In the same way, he shows that it also commands
 in matters concerning wisdom, though the latter is, indeed, far more
 divine and honourable than it is.

Since there remains a puzzle concerning these matters, let us return
 again to the argument connected to what was said earlier. He resumes
 by citing the statement at the very beginning, namely that all know-
 5 ledge and choice desire a good; he includes science and methodical
 inquiry under knowledge, and action under choice, since actions are
 made active as a result of a choice. What, then, is the goal of political
 knowledge or [in Aristotle's words] 'the highest of the goods that are
 practicable' (1095a16-17)? He did not add 'practicable' without good
 reason, but rather because the first cause is the highest good in the
 absolute sense, whereas the highest good of things that are practicable
 10 is happiness, which is what the present inquiry concerns. Now, in
 respect to the name, the same is agreed upon by everyone, for they call
 the highest of ends 'happiness': 'they assume that living well and faring
 well are the same as being happy' (1095a19-20). In adding this he is
 laying down here the principles for his own view concerning happiness.
 For by locating it in action and activity, he here enlists the agreement
 15 of all men, as though they were induced by truth itself to affirm that
 living well, faring well, and being happy do not differ at all from one
 another. So then, 'in name', all people name it [i.e. the highest end] by
 the same term, calling it 'happiness'. 'But about happiness – what it is
 – they disagree' (1095a20-1). And not only do the many disagree with
 the wise, but they do so both with one another and with themselves,
 20 changing around happiness according to their own needs. Some [i.e.
 Plato and his followers] used to think that the good was something other
 than happiness, namely the ideal form of the good. They did not believe
 that this was human happiness, but that knowledge of it was happi-
 ness. Now, he declines to examine all opinions, since that would be
 foolish, but he undertakes to examine those that 'are most prevalent
 and seem to have some reason' (1095a29-30).

25 One ought not to overlook the fact that there is a difference between
 arguments that derive from natural principles and those that proceed
 toward natural principles. For among principles too some will be natu-
 ral and some will be with respect to us: this was also discussed in the
Physics (1.1). Plato (*Republic* 6, 511B) raised the question about whence

one should begin and what kinds of principles one should employ. But Aristotle says here that one should begin from those things that are familiar to us, and he will, as the argument proceeds, make use of certain things that are evident and familiar to us. That is why, he says, 'one who is going to attend lectures on noble and political subjects should have been nobly brought up in character' (1095b4-6). For he has *the fact that* [sc. something is noble] from his character, and if he has it, he does not further need the *because*, at least in regard to actions. For one who is persuaded that this is what the noble is will act similarly to one who also knows the reason, although such a person of course does differ in having a firmer grasp of it. And, by Zeus, by having been brought up nobly one can easily acquire the principle that temperateness is noble, while dissoluteness is shameful, and in general that virtue is noble while vice is evil. He is calling 'principles' those that have to do with *the fact that* this is noble or that is shameful or whatever principles are similar to these. 'Let him who has neither', that is, neither possesses the principles nor easily acquires them, 'listen to Hesiod' (1095b8-9).¹⁹ He likens the one who possesses these principles to the one who [in Hesiod] knows all things himself, and the one who can easily acquire but does not yet have them to one who heeds those who speak well, but he says that one who is disposed in neither way is useless and resembles him who neither understands nor listens to another.

'Let us take up the discussion', he says, 'from where we digressed' (1095b14). For since there are three ways of life, the contemplative, the pleasure-oriented, and that devoted to money-making, it is not unreasonable that, taking their point of departure from these ways of life, different people posit a different happiness in accord with each of them, since happiness is nothing other than a fulfilled life. Since the majority and most superficial people esteem the pleasure-oriented life, they posit pleasure as the end. For this [i.e. pleasure], they believe, is neither up to others nor is it easily taken away. Honour, however, is up to those who give honour, not those who possess it, and therefore it is easily taken away: for it is up to others to honour or dishonour one. Furthermore, those who are noble by nature welcome honour, and²⁰ they seem to pursue it so that, by having many witnesses and above all good men, they can convince themselves that they themselves are good.

But if honour is on account of virtue, then it is obvious that virtue would be the end, for the end is that for the sake of which. But it [i.e. virtue] is too incomplete. For who would call a person who has virtue happy if he were inactive and sleeping his entire life, as in the myth they tell about Endymion?²¹ Or who would call a person who has the greatest of goods throughout his entire life happy if he were also in distress? No one would deem him happy, even if he had all the virtue in the world, 'unless he were maintaining a thesis' (1096a2) – that is, a paradoxical argument.

- 30 Aristotle says that this has been discussed also 'in the round-about (*enkuklia*) works' (1096a3). Among them [i.e. the Peripatetics], 'round-about' problems are miscellaneous ones. They were also called 'round-about', because they sat in a circle and tried their hand at the proposed problem, or else because they listened to the lectures standing in a circle.²²
- 11,1 As for the contemplative life, he says that he will examine this later. They [the Peripatetics] call the money-maker life 'constrained', that is, small,²³ calling it, as it were, constrained in respect to happiness. For wealth is not the good that is sought, but rather is useful and for the sake of something else. They call goods 'useful' on account of their
- 5 utility, and wealth is such a good. How, then, does Aristotle speak of wealth as choiceworthy for the sake of something else, while elsewhere (cf. 4.1, 1120a5-7) he says it is good and choiceworthy for itself? It is either because, since it complements a person whose disposition is in accord with nature,²⁴ he says²⁵ that it is also an absolute²⁶ good for a good man and hence choiceworthy for itself, or else, because it is a tool for a good man (for every tool is for something else), in this way what is choiceworthy for the sake of something else <...>.²⁷
- 10 'Because men who are friends [i.e. Plato and his circle] introduced the forms (*eidê*)' (1096a13) – not as though they believed that the universal and the ideal form are the same thing, but because Aristotle himself says that the ideal form is nothing but the universal, but that those who posit ideal forms take this [i.e. the universal] and make it separable.²⁸

1096a17-1097a13-14 'Those who introduce this view' to 'And concerning these things, let this much be said'.

- 15 Some arguments that are destructive of a doctrine simply confute it, whereas others do so on the basis of what those who posit the doctrine believe; thus, not only do they confute it but they also expose those who affirm it as not being consistent with themselves. Such is the first argument against those who affirm that there is an ideal form of the good. For he says that 'those who introduced this view did not produce ideal forms' (1096a17) for those things in which there is a first and a
- 20 subsequent. For, he says, let that be [defined as] 'prior', which, if it did not exist, there could not be a subsequent, although if it does exist, it is not necessary that there be a subsequent. Therefore, Aristotle says, neither did they [the Platonists] produce ideal forms of numbers, for example number itself, because the dyad is prior to the other numbers.²⁹ For if you eliminate that, you eliminate the rest. They [the Platonists] say that the good exists both in what is, that is, in substance, and in the
- 25 other categories. What exists in itself – which is what substance is – is naturally prior to the other categories. He mentions only the category of relation, since substance is more familiarly prior to this, since it is a relationship of a substance to some other thing. This is why he com-

compares a relation to an offshoot, for every offshoot is subsequent to that upon which it grows. 'Thus, there can be no ideal form that is common to these' (1096a22-3).

The argument, taking it all together, runs as follows: those things in which there is not a prior and a subsequent have no ideal form. By way of proof of the existence of a prior and a subsequent in the good, he differentiated the number of ways in which 'the good' is spoken of, since in the ten categories too substance is self-subsistent and existent, whereas the others are accidents, and the self-subsistent is prior to accidents. Aristotle took the first premise from the view of those who proposed the ideal forms, while he himself posited the next one. For they would not have conceded that the prior and the subsequent are in eternal things, but supposed rather that they were associated with nature. <...>³⁰ of the good, having the good in as many ways.

The next argument is set out hypothetically³¹ as follows: if the good is spoken of in as many ways as what exists, then it is obvious that the good cannot be universal and one. It follows upon this that there is no single ideal form of the good. Categorically³² it can be described as follows: of things that are spoken of in many ways, there is not a single ideal form; good things are spoken of in many ways; therefore it is not possible that they have a single ideal form. This argument and the previous one seem the same, for they seem to produce the demonstration from a division among goods and the fact that these are spoken of in many senses. But they are not the same, but rather the former is derived from the fact that there is not a common ideal form of those things in which there is a prior and a subsequent, but there is a prior and a subsequent in goods, whereas the latter has entirely different premises. For on the basis of the fact that there is no ideal form of things³³ that are spoken of in many ways, the fact that the good is spoken of in many ways implies the conclusion. But for each³⁴ of them the second premise achieves the solution from a division among goods.

The third argument too is set out hypothetically. The statement, 'of those things that accord with a single ideal form, there is also a single science' (1096a29-30), is equivalent to this: 'there is no single science of goods'. He suggests this, for he says that there are many sciences even of those things that fall under a single category, as, for example, that of the right moment in the category of 'when'. Thus, in war the science of generalship is that of the right moment, while for sickness it is medical science. So too, proportion is in the category of quantity or rather of relation, but in nurturing it is in the province of medical science, while in exercise it is gymnastic. That there is a single science of those things that fall under a single ideal form is also easy to understand, for there is one science of 'man' and another of 'horse'. But if someone claims that there is not one science of health, even though it is spoken of with reference to the single term 'health', but there is one science of health for human beings, another for horses, one must reply that there is a

single medical science, which has two parts: for in fact there is a single health, of which there are two forms, but there are indeed two healths in the sense that they pertain to different things.

What follows this poses a puzzle in general terms to one who affirms ideal forms, and shows how the definition of 'mankind in itself' and of 'mankind', qua mankind, will not differ at all in this regard, and thus
 13,1 neither will the good in itself differ from the particular good, qua good. Nor will they differ because the good in itself and mankind in itself are eternal; for though they will indeed differ in this regard, they will not differ qua good or qua mankind. So too what is longlasting is not whiter than what is short-lived.

'The Pythagoreans seem to speak more plausibly' (1096b5), since
 5 they say that definitions³⁵ come from ideal forms, as one can infer from their sayings. For it follows that they should say that there are definitions of ideal forms as well, since those who introduced ideal forms [i.e. the Platonists] appear to have arrived at the notion of ideal forms through an intense veneration of the one. For they thought that things that are multiple and perceptible severally are in flux and perishable and do not really exist, but that these others do, i.e. those that are knowable beyond individual things and are not perceptible but really
 10 existent. This is why they invented ideal forms. But Aristotle says that, if indeed one must venerate the one, then the Pythagoreans did this more plausibly. For having posited two series, one a decad of good things, the other of evils, they located the one in the former, that is, in the series of good things. Their [two] series are the following: good and
 15 bad, limit and limitlessness, odd and even, one and not one, right and left, male and female, at rest and moving, straight and crooked, light and darkness, and square and oblong. For they both venerated the one and yet they did not [like the Platonists] posit certain substances that were in the same class as perceptibles,³⁶ but rather knowable substances <...>³⁷

* * *

21 'A kind of controversy shows through in what has been said' (1096b8-9).³⁸ For those who explicate ideal forms could say that those arguments mentioned here by Aristotle are meant as though the ideal form of the good were the same for all goods, but this is not so, for there are
 25 differences among goods: some are good in themselves, whereas others are so on account of other things. These latter are called good because they are productive of goods in themselves or 'are preservative of them or preventative of their contraries' (1096b11-12). These are not among the goods in themselves, but only those are that are choiceworthy on their own account, for example virtues and honours. But medicine and all such things are good on account of other things. Perhaps they would say that health and wealth and all such things are goods on account of

other things (for they are instruments of virtue).³⁹ Of these [i.e. goods on account of other things], all those that are productive of goods in themselves are productive goods, for example what is pleasant is productive of pleasure, and gymnastics of health, if indeed health is among things that are good in themselves, while learning and training and hard work are productive of virtue. The preservative ones are those that are maintainers of goods in themselves, for example the things that doctors traditionally provide, which they call healthful, are maintainers of health. Since perception is good in itself, those things that are maintainers of perception and preventative of its contraries would, in a way, be the same things,⁴⁰ that is, both preservative of goods and preventative of their contraries. The medical sciences are also in a way preventative of the contraries of health and perception.

Since the good is spoken of in two ways, one of them being choice-worthy for itself, the other on account of another thing, he says: 'let us separate goods in themselves from what is beneficial and consider whether they are spoken about with reference to a single ideal form' (1096b14-16). They [the Peripatetics] specifically call 'beneficial' goods that are on account of other things. He then defines as goods in themselves 'those things that are pursued even when they are isolated' (1096b17), for example understanding, seeing, harmless pleasures, and honours: for these things, even if they are choiceworthy on account of something else – for instance, the happiness of human beings – are also so for themselves.⁴¹

After this Aristotle comments on their argument. For they believe that knowledge of the ideal form of the good bears on those of the goods that are practicable. For if we have that knowledge as a model, we will also know our own⁴² goods,⁴³ just as one who knows Socrates will also recognize someone who is similar to Socrates. He says that this argument is plausible, but that the sciences are not consistent with it. For they all pursue some good, but the good for each is its specific end, and none seeks the ideal form of the good. And in fact there is no need for a weaver, builder, doctor, or general to gaze at the ideal form in order to recognize his own end. Indeed, even a doctor does not inquire about health in general but rather that of a human being, or rather, perhaps, that of this particular human being, for example, that of Socrates: for he heals the individual. Or is it that the other arts are not about goods [i.e. in themselves], but rather middle kinds of ends, and their ends are not [simply] good; but the political and ethical art is about the goods of human beings? Thus, it might need knowledge of the good or, if not this, then at least of the ideal form in respect to which the end of each art is named: for example, health is the end of the medical art, and health in itself is, one supposes, an end. But, he says, a doctor has no need of knowledge of health in itself in order to become more medical: he seems not even to inquire about what universal health is, but that of mankind, or rather that of this specific person. For since he heals the individual,

he considers the health of each one. So far is he from inquiring about the ideal form of health.

15,1 **1097a15-1098a20** 'Resuming again' to 'or a short time'.

He returns to the statement at the beginning, and inquires into what the human good is. Consistent with his method,⁴⁴ he makes use of the cause of more familiar things with a view to those things that are less familiar. The good of the arts is more familiar than that of mankind, and so too the good of things taken severally is more familiar than that of a universal <...>.⁴⁵ [For the political art] is⁴⁶ the one that contains the end of all these arts, for the sake of which all the other things are done. Thus, the end of a human being too, insofar as he is by nature a human being, [is the highest end].⁴⁷ It is necessary that this be the end of all practicable actions, for it was said earlier (1094a15) that an [intermediate] end is different from that other end for the sake of which it is. The end of the end of the political art is the human being qua human being, for the sake of which all other things are done. Therefore this good would be the end of all practicable human actions. For this is the kind of thing that is being investigated here: for 'the practicable good' (1097a23) is to be investigated. If happiness is not in this alone but also in something else, for example in contemplation, then the same thing ought to be investigated, namely what things fulfil the end.

15 'The argument shifts' (1097a24) and arrives at the need to investigate whether happiness resides in one thing or in several. Which of the two ways is the case <...>⁴⁸ what comes next follows. For he says that one must be clear about these things, and after this he distinguishes how an end and a most final [or complete] end differ, so that he can demonstrate that happiness is an end, properly speaking an end, and a most final end. For in every art and action, he calls generally that for which the rest is done the end. Where there is not an end that is choiceworthy for itself, but invariably for something else, such an end is not a final one. For it is acted upon for the sake of other things, and this, he says, is not a proper end but rather one of those that look toward the end. All tools are such, for example wealth and flutes: for flutes are the end of the flutemaker's art, but exist for the sake of the art of fluteplaying and its end, while wealth is the end of the art of money-making, but is choiceworthy on account of its usefulness for liberality. The end of the fluteplaying art is more final than that of flutemaking.

And not only is it more final, but everything that is choiceworthy in itself would also be an end, even if it were also so on account of something else, for example virtue, harmless pleasure, and honour. For each of these is choiceworthy both for itself and on account of happiness. All things that are choiceworthy in themselves are more final than those that are only choiceworthy on account of something else, and of these [i.e. things choiceworthy in themselves], in turn, what is never

choiceworthy on account of something else is more final than things that are choiceworthy both for themselves and on account of that which one may call the most final thing. Happiness is such a thing, for it is more choiceworthy than those things that are choiceworthy for themselves and for it, and hence it is the most final end, absolutely and properly speaking, since all other things are done for the sake of this. 5

In addition, he demonstrates also on the basis of self-sufficiency that happiness is the most final end. For what is self-sufficient is final [or complete], and happiness is a self-sufficient thing; therefore happiness is final. That what is self-sufficient is final is obvious, for that which, when isolated and separated from other things, makes life choiceworthy is self-sufficient. And it is necessary to agree that such a thing is final [or complete].

Having said that happiness is self-sufficient he distinguishes in what sense he means that it is self-sufficient, and for whom. For it is not for someone who lives an isolated life or so as to have happiness concerning himself, not caring at all whether his parents or children or city or friends are in the greatest of calamities. For if he were a solitary animal like a wolf or lion, perhaps his happiness would be of such a kind; but since man is a social and communal animal, first of all, if he were to live alone and by himself in a desert, even if he had everything in unstinting measure, there is no way that he would be happy. Next, even if he were in a city, but witnessed great sufferings on the part of his wife, children, parents and country, his life would still not be self-sufficient. For the self-sufficiency of a social animal is <not>⁴⁹ circumscribed by his body and soul, but it is somehow necessary that he share in the misfortunes of his dearest ones. Perhaps he will not share in unhappiness on account of others, but he will not be happy if he does not have the happiness of a social being. 10 15 20

One might perhaps raise a question in respect to these points by inquiring what the limit is of the things that were mentioned, for instance, if only one's parents should be doing well, or if one's parents' parents and all those before them should also be, and only one's children are not doing well, will one's happiness not be impeded? Or whether it will not be impeded <if>⁵⁰ one's children's children and one's descendants in general [are not faring well];⁵¹ and if, once one has died, one changes frequently, now in the direction of happiness, now of unhappiness, depending on the successes or failures of one's descendants. And whether it is necessary that just one's friends fare well or also one's friends' friends. Or is there rather a limit to all these, but with some latitude, so that, let us say, as far as one's parents and closest friends and children, their happiness is to be hoped for and it contributes to one's happiness, but these things do not go on to infinity. Concerning these things, he says, 'we must inquire later' (1097b14). 25 30

He adds that happiness is most choiceworthy of all, but it is not reckoned in. What he means is something like this: he passes along the

17,1 commonplace that more goods are more choiceworthy than those in a given number – more choiceworthy than one or two, just as wealth and health and virtue are more choiceworthy than any one of them. This commonplace is challenged, for if goods have an end,⁵² and what is for the sake of it [i.e. the end] is added in, then all <are not>⁵³ more
 5 choiceworthy than one or two, <for they are not>⁵⁴ more choiceworthy than the end [alone]: for example, healthful things together with health are not more choiceworthy than health. Thus, indeed, wealth and health and the rest together with happiness are not more choiceworthy than happiness alone. For if we have happiness we have everything.

So here he makes use of this commonplace, for goods are said to be reckoned in with goods, if they are such that, when added, the total is
 10 more choiceworthy than one or a few. But goods may not be reckoned in, if they are not numbered along with the others, but are more choiceworthy even if they are taken by themselves. Such are all the ends in relation to those goods that are productive of them. He says, in fact, that happiness 'is most choiceworthy but it is not reckoned in' (1097b16-17), that is, it is not of such a nature as to be reckoned in to the other
 15 goods, as has been said. 'Reckoned in, however', that is, in the class of things added up, it would be 'more choiceworthy together with the least of goods' (1097b18), which is not the case with happiness, because it is 'most choiceworthy of all'.

But supposing they would agree that happiness is the most final and best good, one must still grasp clearly what it is. He then passes along
 20 a third method by which we shall always discover what any end that is being sought is. For the end of anything – one that adds a good⁵⁵ – is believed to reside in its work [or product], for example the end of the art of shoemaking is in the work [that is the result] of shoemaking. If, then, the work of the shoemaking art is a sandal, but we are investigating what the end of mankind is, one would have to grasp the work of mankind qua mankind. That there is a work of mankind qua mankind,
 25 he renders plausible first on the grounds that it is unreasonable to agree that there is a product of a builder and a shoemaker and that there are works [or functions] of the parts of a human being, for example seeing in the case of the eye, walking in the case of the foot, grasping and giving in the case of the hand and any other of the things that pertain to a hand [and not of the whole]. If there is a work pertaining to each of his parts, there should be one of the human being as well.

What, then, is this work, qua human being? Would it be to live? But
 30 this is common even to plants, and in any case it is not his work to have a share in life: this, rather, belongs to him by nature. If living then is common not only to animals but also to plants, and the work of each thing is specific, one would have to separate out nutritive life, on the grounds that the work of a human being does not reside in this. Similarly, neither would it reside in growth-related life, for this too is
 35 common to plants. But nor again would it reside in perceptive life, for

this is common also to non-rational animals. The productive and rational life, then, is left to be⁵⁶ the work of a human being, that is, to live as a rational being. In this resides what is specific to a human being, namely the rational part of the soul. He calls it 'rational', separating it out in relation to the nutritive and perceptive parts and the other capacities that are common to the other animals. Of this same rational part, one part is so called as being naturally so constituted as to obey reason, while another part is so naturally constituted as to contain reason in itself. Elsewhere (1102b25-34) he calls the part that is so constituted as to obey 'non-rational', because it does not contain its own reason; from this it is clear that this non-rational and emotive part differs from that of animals: for the one is obedient to reason, whereas that of animals is not obedient. 5

Since the rational life is spoken of in two senses, the one potentially, which we have even when we are sleeping and, when awake, when we are not acting as rational beings, and the other actively, in accord with which, when we are acting consistently with what is rational, we are said to be living rationally, he says that the work of a human being must be posited as being an actively rational life. Having discovered the work of a human being, he moves on next to discuss the end and happiness. 10

'For if the work of the soul is activity in accord with reason or not without reason' (he added this latter because of the emotive part of the soul, which even if it does not have its own reason nevertheless is active not without – at all events – the reason that is in the rational part of the soul) 'we say that this man here [i.e. any man] and this excellent person have work that is the same in kind' (1098a7-9). For the work of an excellent person is the same in kind, but not in number nor in form, as that of just any man in any work at all: for example a sandal is the work both of an excellent shoemaker and of one who is not excellent; thus, it is the same in kind, for 'sandal' is the kind. But the excellent sandal and the inept one are [different] sorts. In all things, simply, the excellent item has the same proposed [object],⁵⁷ but also has superiority in respect to it. If, then, the work of a human being is a rational life, and this is the activity of the soul together with reason, and 'it is the part of an excellent man to do these things well and nobly' (1098a14-15)⁵⁸ and to do each thing in accord with its specific virtue, then 'the human good would be the activity of the soul in accord with virtue' (1099a16-17). Taking it all together, one may express the argument as follows: if the work of a human being and of an excellent human being are the same, with the addition [in the latter case] that it is well done, and the work of a human being is a rational life in accord with activity, and that of an excellent man is to do these things well and nobly, and each will be accomplished according to its specific virtue, then the human good is the activity of the rational soul in accord with virtue. 15 20 25 30

'But if the virtues are several, then in accord with the best and most complete' (1098a17-18), that is, the contemplative, concerning which he 19,1

will speak later – provided, of course, that a noble character already exists.

- ‘And further, in a complete life’ (1098a18). This too is reasonable. For if happiness is life, and a life is extended activity and composed of many activities, so that there cannot be happiness in a single day or in a brief time but rather in a complete life, and this cannot be taken in an exact sense but rather in outline, as far as a human being goes,⁵⁹ and further, if happiness must be active in accord with all the virtues, then it would require a complete life. And if a human being is a social animal in the sense of treating his partners well, he would need a complete life for this, too, so that he could do the maximum amount of good. To sum up, happiness is the activity of the rational soul in accord with complete virtue in a complete life.

1098a20-1099a31 ‘Now, let this stand as an outline of the good’ to ‘we say that happiness is the best’.

- Just as painters first make a rough outline, and then fill in each part exactly, so too Aristotle says that the definition of happiness has first been outlined – using the term metaphorically – and then announces that he will later render it more exact. It is difficult, as he says, to discover [in the first place], but everyone can articulate and develop⁶⁰ things that have already been done well in outline – or rather, it is not that just any chance person or layman at all can, but rather that someone not wholly competent can in fact do so. For even one who is not perfect in some pursuit and discourse can add something to what has already been said.⁶¹ In fact, ‘time itself’ is a ‘collaborator’ in this. For in the course of time, experience of things discovers what has been overlooked, and it is due to this that advances in the arts have occurred: those who first made discoveries exercised an awesome natural ability, but time, and the experience that comes with it, cooperate in their advancement.
- One must not, as he said earlier, seek exactitude in all things alike, ‘but rather in conformity with the underlying subject matter’, so that ‘the incidentals do not become more numerous than the works themselves’ (1098a28.33). For if one relinquishes what is proper to the underlying subject matter itself and investigates something more exactly than what accords with it, he will spend more time with incidentals – for example, if a builder leaves off making use of a right angle insofar as it is useful for his work, and investigates instead what a right angle is, which suits the art of geometry, the real observer of the truth. It makes no difference to a builder if a straight angle is slightly more acute or if it has some extra [obtuseness], since it makes no difference to perception. For an angle [good enough] for perception is sufficient for a builder. He says this because neither is it possible to

make an exacting argument straightaway in the case of things relating to the end.

As for the statement, 'activity in accord with complete virtue', it is not possible to capture exactly with a definition which this activity is. For if someone should say that it is the mean between excess and lack, it is not even possible to determine exactly in a definition to what degree it is a mean, or how, or whether it is a lack or excess; rather, practical wisdom must define for each action the balance and the midpoint. Similarly too, it is possible to grasp broadly 'in a complete life', but it is not possible to say exactly what it is. 5

He says next that one must not demand 'the reason in all things' (1098b1), that is, that one must not think similarly about matters so as to demand reasons for all of them. This is obvious too in the case of mathematics. For in fact the geometer inquires into why a triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles, but he does not inquire into the cause of why that which has no part is a point. It is a principle that temperateness and justice are a noble thing, that one must honour one's parents, and similarly in mathematics that there is a triangle, but we do not inquire as to why. 10 15

How then does he show that 'it is sufficient in some things for the "the fact that" to be shown in a good way' (1098b1-2) (for the 'the fact that' is a principle [or starting point]: thus it does not have to be shown)? Is it that sometimes the 'the fact that' is shown by a syllogism, as he said in the [*Posterior*] *Analytics* (for instance the eclipse of the moon when it does not produce a shadow in what is beneath it)?⁶² This now <has happened>⁶³ to the moon, therefore there is now an eclipse of the moon. For this is not why there is an eclipse, but rather the fact that there is one. And this somehow becomes a principle, although it is grasped by a syllogism, in regard to finding the reason for the eclipse. Or is it that it is possible for principles to be shown somehow, not however by a syllogism but rather by induction or in general by a kind of mention? 20

That one must not demand a reason in all things, for example in principles, was not said unreasonably, but rather because in matters of action and production happiness is the end. Just as a doctor, then, does not show what health is, but rather, having [taken as] defined what health is, he thus does everything relating to it, so too it would perhaps be reasonable to say that one should assume what happiness is as an indemonstrable, and thus do all things relating to it. One should do this when what the end is, is uncontroversial, but when it is controversial, it is necessary to suggest in what way it may be possible. Therefore, since what happiness is, is controversial, he has tried to show it. And he says concerning all principles that one must provide them in whatever way is possible by observing each one: on the one hand by means of induction, for instance, that every human being is rational or that every human being breathes is observed on the basis of a hidden induction,⁶⁴ that is, on the basis of the study of individual human beings. 25 30 21,1

Virtually all principles come about through induction or through perception. For things are perceptible individually [and hence are a basis for induction]. The kinds of principles that are chiefly provided through perception are those that are grasped by it, for example that a
 5 blend [of colours] is black. Other principles are observed by habituation: for it is as a result of being habituated in noble habits that people grasp certain noble principles, for example that such-and-such a way of life is noble, whereas such-and-such is shameful, and by Zeus that temperateness is a noble thing, but dissoluteness is a shameful thing. Some principles are grasped by the mind, for example that that of which there is no part is a point: for the very discovery of this is such a principle. Some principles are grasped by experience, such as those that have
 10 often been found by doctors, for example that such-and-such a medicine suits such-and-such a disease. One must try to provide each set of principles in the way they are by nature: those that are perceptions by perception, inductions by induction, and for others⁶⁵ producing their solution by some other of the ways mentioned. And once one has produced them, one must make every effort that they be well defined.
 15 These things too, for him, contribute to the making of an effort to define the end well. For they are a principle, and a principle [or beginning] is more than half [of the whole].

‘One must inquire about it’ (1098b9), he says, meaning either about the principle as being that of the end, or about happiness: for it is toward this that we are driving, whichever way we may understand the word. But he says that, concerning happiness, one must inquire what it
 20 is ‘not only on the basis of the conclusion’ (1098b9) and those things from which the definition derives (that is, from the premises from which the definition comes about), on the basis of which he showed what happiness is. For the premise and the conclusion were hypothetical in this case too. Not only, then, on the basis of that conclusion must one grasp what happiness is but also on the basis of what the ancients have said
 25 about it. He uses, as is his custom, generally accepted confirmations as well. What seems so to the many and to the wise are things he considers generally accepted.

The view of those who philosophized before him he takes to be something like this: given that good things are defined in three ways, some concerning the soul, some concerning the body, and some external, all will agree that those concerning the soul are above all good and good in the most proper sense. Actions and activities, in fact, pertain to
 30 nothing other than the soul: they are, then, of the soul. For even if we use the body as a tool for actions, we must not believe that they [i.e. actions] pertain to it but rather to the soul that uses it. It is thus reasonable to locate the greatest of goods, that is happiness, in the soul, in which goods in the most proper sense and most of all reside. He rightly calls, then, actions and activities the end and happiness, for ‘in
 22,1 this way it becomes part of the goods concerning the soul’ (1098b19-20).

And so he admitted the view of those who philosophized earlier as bearing witness for him in the way mentioned, and he admitted the view of most people, or rather of all, because all human beings seem to say that living well and acting [or faring] well are the same thing as happiness. For they seem to locate happiness in activity. 5

After this he tries to reconcile his own view and those prior to him – of any who affirmed a view concerning happiness. For with those who said that happiness is virtue or practical intelligence or wisdom his <view> is in agreement <insofar as they mean>⁶⁶ activity in accord with virtue. For it is obvious that ‘activity in accord with it [i.e. virtue]’ (1098b31) is a property of it [i.e. of virtue]. But the word ‘activity’ has been supplied. For it is more complete to locate happiness in use rather 10 than in possession. Just as, in the Olympics, it is not the most handsome and strongest who are crowned, but rather those who have honestly contended and won, so too those people become possessors of the noble and good things in life, that is of happiness, who have been active in a noble way, for they are like those who have contended and won. And the example seems to be in agreement with 15 activity in accord with virtue.

In accord with what has been said, then, Aristotle has associated his own definition with those who say that only virtue is happiness. And he reconciles his own view with those who say that happiness accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure is these things, that is, is all the virtues or one of them, whether philosophy or practical intelligence, by the following: there is a certain difference between ‘accompanied by pleasure’ and ‘not without pleasure’. Those who say ‘accompanied by 20 pleasure’ make pleasure a part of happiness, whereas those who say ‘not without pleasure’ do not say that pleasure is a part but rather that it is one of the things without which there cannot be happiness. His definition fits these latter: for even if it was not posited in advance that happiness is an activity in accord with complete virtue accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure, it is nevertheless clear that pleasure invariably accompanies noble actions. That is why he says that a life of 25 activities in important matters⁶⁷ in accord with virtue is in itself pleasant. For feeling pleasure pertains to the soul: for in fact the so-called bodily pleasures are of the soul by way of the body, and for everyone who loves justice, it is necessary that he take pleasure in saying or doing just things, and in general for everyone who loves virtue, that he take pleasure in saying or doing noble⁶⁸ things in accord with virtue.

Now, if what is pleasant were not in the activities themselves but rather it were necessary for one who is to be happy to provide it from 30 outside, it would be necessary to add to the definition, stating that happiness is the activity of the soul in accord with virtue accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure, with pleasure⁶⁹ being an addition to them [i.e. the activities]. But since what is pleasant is sufficiently in the

noble actions themselves, he has made it clear that happiness is the most pleasant life, once he has said that it is activity in accord with virtue.

- 35 One must everywhere understand in addition 'in important matters'.
 23,1 For in fact for the majority of human beings 'pleasant things for the most part conflict [sc. with pure pleasure], because they are not pleasant by nature' (1099a12). For what is most pleasant for them is drinking or eating more than is needed or the excessive enjoyment of sex. All these things come to be responsible for pain in them, and indeed they suffer pain when they come to feel regret. In both respects, then,
 5 pleasant things are in conflict for them, if these things seem both painful and responsible for grief. For what is grievous and painful conflicts with what is pleasant. 'But they are pleasant to those who love what is noble' (1099a13), for activities in accord with virtue are pleasant by nature. For man is a social and communal animal and a lover of what is noble, so that he takes pleasure both if he does good for his fellows and if in general he is conscious of producing something noble. Such pleasure does not have conflict, for never does pain
 10 follow upon it.

'Thus', he says, 'they [i.e. these activities] are pleasant both to these people and in themselves' (1099a14-15). For the pleasures of base people are pleasant only to them but <not pleasant> in themselves <at all>.⁷⁰ For even pleasures that are contrary to nature have conflict in themselves by nature. For dissolute satieties beyond what is needed are contrary to nature, but the pleasures of worthy people, which he says
 15 attend noble activities, are not only pleasant to them, that is, to the worthy people, but also are naturally pleasant in themselves. Hence the life of happy people does not need pleasure from outside, but has in itself noble actions and their enjoyment in accord with virtue, since a person who does not enjoy noble activities is not good at all.

- Actions in accord with virtue, then, are pleasant, but they are also good and noble, and 'each of these things especially' (1099a22), that is,
 20 these are the most noble pleasures. That they are such is evident from the fact that the worthy person judges them to be such. For one should trust in nothing so much as the judgement of a worthy person. 'Happiness, therefore, has what is best and noblest and most pleasant' (1099a24-5). And the person who inscribed at Delos, 'what is most just is noblest', etc.,⁷¹ did not do so rightly; for he seems not to have attributed all these qualities [i.e. what is noblest, best, and most
 25 pleasant] to a single thing, but in fact all belong to the best activities: either one must posit that happiness is all these [activities] or the best of them. He intimates here that perhaps activity in accord with wisdom is most of all happiness, but he is now producing definitions as one inquiring into the end in regard to action. Therefore he does not draw a distinction concerning happiness in respect to contemplation, but later he will be more exact concerning it.

1099a31-b32 'It seems nevertheless [to need in addition] external goods as well' to 'and productive of noble things'. 30

He posits that happiness also needs external goods – external goods are those concerning the body. He calls them external because in regard to the soul they are all external <...> how they will be <...> the definition.⁷² 24,1

For the dispute among some is about these [i.e. external] things as contributing nothing to happiness, rather than about bodily things [as such]. But happiness needs external goods not as parts nor as replenishments of itself but rather as instruments. For in just this way the flute player's art needs instruments for its end, so that it can achieve its own end. For, he says, 'it is impossible to do noble things when one is deprived of resources' (1099a32-3). It is not possible to do medical things when one is deprived of medical instruments and medicines. He then enumerates the external goods at the same time as he shows how virtue uses them as instruments for happiness. 'For many things are done through friends as though through instruments' (1099a33-4), for example undoings of tyrannies have occurred through friends, and if someone is in need of [money for] expenses, his friends confer it, and what people cannot foresee by themselves their friends foresee and take care for and join in doing. Those who have friends, as Xenophon says (*Cyropaedia* 8.2.10), have four eyes instead of two and four ears instead of two, and the same proportion obtains for the other parts. And in fact by means of wealth some have saved their countries during famines, 5 and have rescued <fathers>⁷³ from enemies, and have restored the livelihoods of friends. And what of political power? Surely it contributes greatly to noble actions. For it is impossible for someone who has no power in the city to perform political activities in a noble way, but one who has no political power must be content to lead a private life and keep still. Otherwise, it is necessary that he be tripped up as he advances. All those who have performed great actions in their city did 10 so not without power, for example Lycurgus, who was entrusted with the control of the affairs [of Sparta] and through the power of the king drew up its laws, and Solon and Zaleucus, each of whom was very powerful in their respective countries.⁷⁴ 15

Some believe that what follows is said too loosely. For he says that when people are deprived of some things they taint their success, 'for example [when they are deprived of] good birth, abundant offspring, beauty' (1099b3). For some would say that it is possible even for someone who is of low birth and not handsome and has no children to be active in important matters, and if he is active, it is necessary that he be happy. Against these, one must say that Aristotle too praises such people, inasmuch as they make good the lack of lineage or looks or any other such things of which they are in need, but nevertheless there inheres in them a kind of blemish by virtue of their excessively low 20 birth, for example if one should be the son of a man who has prostituted 30

himself.⁷⁵ For how would this not be a taint, which perhaps a noble
 25,1 person might indeed wash away, but nevertheless it would be an
 obstacle sometimes in regard to noble activities. For cities do not
 authorize such people to carry out their greatest affairs.

He is calling 'ugly' not a person who is moderately deprived of beauty
 but rather, as he says, someone who is wholly hideous and monstrous
 in form, for whom it is perhaps impossible to become sagacious. For
 5 such people, for the most part, turn out monstrous [in character] as
 well. But neither can one who is 'solitary' or 'childless' be happy.
 Perhaps a solitary person is not even worthy, and not just not happy:
 for to live alone for a human being is contrary to nature. Still less will
 someone be happy if he 'has thoroughly bad children', for example
 children who prostitute themselves,⁷⁶ or who, 'although they are good,
 have died' (1099b5-6). One must be aware, concerning all that has been
 10 said, that magnitude of virtue transcends these things, so that a virtu-
 ous person is not unhappy. But if all the above-mentioned misfortunes
 should be present, they become an obstacle to happiness. A happy
 person also needs, accordingly, 'this kind of prosperity' (1099b7), that
 is, good fortune. That is why some people say that good fortune and
 happiness are the same thing, while others say that virtue too is the
 same thing. For the latter, believing that virtue is happiness, say that
 15 happiness and virtue are the same thing, while the former, seeing that
 many things are produced through what is external as though through
 instruments that lead to happiness, posit happiness as the same thing
 as good fortune.

Therefore, he says, 'there is also a puzzle as to whether happiness is
 learnable' and in some other way 'acquirable through training or
 whether it arrives by some divine dispensation or chance' (1099b9-11).
 20 It is clear that this is relevant to what has been said before. For those
 who say that virtue is the same thing as happiness suppose that virtue
 <and therefore>⁷⁷ happiness are learnable or acquirable through train-
 ing; for practical intelligence is certainly a learnable thing, as is
 wisdom, and ethical virtue is for the most part acquirable by habitu-
 ation, and also has need of learning. Training is itself habit, although
 25 not entirely, but rather is endurance in exercise involving discomforts
 and pains. For some people suppose that virtue and happiness are this.

Others, who say that happiness does not reside in virtue, either say
 that it arrives by divine dispensation or by chance. 'If indeed any other
 thing' (1099b11) is god given, then happiness too would be a gift of the
 gods, as one might say the prizes, such as wreaths, are gifts of those who
 30 set up contests: for they have set them out for those who are able to
 compete outstandingly. So too happiness is a prize set out for those who
 are able to concern themselves with virtue and act in accord with it. But
 whether it is a gift of the gods 'would pertain to another inquiry'
 (1099b14), one more concerned with nature. But it appears that even if
 it is not god given, happiness is nevertheless something divine, at all

events: for virtue is a divine kind of thing, and thus so too its reward 26,1
and end are divine, and happiness would be such a thing.

As a reward for virtue, happiness would be a widely shared thing,
that is, it would be out and available to many people and able to belong
'to those who were not incapacitated in respect to virtue, through
learning and assiduousness' (1099b19-20). Incapacitated with respect
to virtue are, on the one hand, those who are born so, for example those 5
who are senseless from birth, and, on the other, those who are incapaci-
tated through bad pursuits and become incurable. If, then, it is better
that happiness should arise through virtue rather than through chance,
it is reasonable that it should be this way:⁷⁸ for in fact things that are
in accord with nature and those in accord with art, and likewise those
in accord with necessity, like for example the things in the heavens, are
all such as they can best be. If, then, it is so in the case of the best causes
and natures, it should be that one is happy through virtue rather than 10
through chance. For thus he would better make his argument in what
follows agree with these things.

For he says that what is being inquired into is clear from the
definition that has been given: what is being inquired into is whether
happiness comes through chance or through virtue. The definition was
that 'happiness is a certain kind of activity of the soul in accord with
virtue' (1099b26), that is, in important matters. 'Of other goods, it is 15
necessary that some pertain' (1099b27) to the happy person, for exam-
ple health and keen senses. For these things are necessary, without
which it is impossible to live. For a virtuous person who was sick or in
bitter and incurable conflicts would not choose to live (it seems to me
that a friend too is among the necessary goods; for the worthy person
would not choose to live without friends (cf. 8.1, 1155a5)). Wealth and
strength and repute are helpful and useful as instruments: wealth for 20
activities related to liberality, strength for those related to courage, and
by their repute with those who collaborate with them many people have
been able to accomplish many things. But these are not necessary in the
same way as the afore-mentioned, for it is possible to live even without
them.

He says further that the definition given by him agrees with what
was said in the beginning. For what is best in the political art was 25
assumed to be the end, that is, happiness. Now, the political art makes
it of greatest concern that the citizens be good and 'productive of noble
things' (1099b32). This is manifest from the best constitutions: for they
are concerned above all with the education of children, like the consti- 27,1
tution of Lycurgus, and similarly that of Minos and of Plato. The
lawcodes of the political lawgivers more resemble medical than political
methods: for they stipulated punishments for those who err, and pun-
ishments are, as it were, kinds of cures. It is better too in medical
matters to consider how bodies will be healthy than how those bodies 5
that are sick will be treated. How then are these things relevant to his

definition? It is because, if the political art is concerned with citizens being good and productive of noble things, and happiness is its end, then it is obvious that activity in accord with virtue would be the end: for it makes them productive of noble things by means of the end.

- 10 **1099b32-1101a21** 'Reasonably, then' to 'one must make distinctions concerning these things'.⁷⁹

Since the essence and definition of happiness have been given as activity of the rational soul in accord with virtue, 'it is reasonable, then, that we call neither a cow' (1099b32) nor any other animal happy. For it is not possible for them to partake of rational activity. Therefore neither is a child happy; for, he says, he is not yet capable of attending
15 to such things on account of his youth. For a child too is by nature capable of performing such actions, since he is a rational animal, but because of his youth he is not yet capable of performing them. For a child too is somehow a non-rational creature, but he differs from non-rational animals because he is rational by nature. Children who are said to be happy are congratulated by way of expectation, because it is expected that they will be active in accord with virtue.

- That children too are reasonably not called happy he shows also by
20 the following. 'For', he says, 'it requires, as we said, both complete virtue and a complete life' (1100a4-5) in which one will be happy in every way, and this is not so in the case of a child, for he does not yet have a complete life. For one who is expected [to turn out to be such-and-such] is obviously not yet such as he will be. 'For many changes' and of all sorts occur during a lifetime, 'and it is possible for the one who is
25 prospering most to happen upon great calamities in old age' (1100a5-7).

- The words, 'it requires, as we have said, both complete virtue', etc., are connected to what was previously said concerning happiness. For it was said that happiness is the activity of the soul in accord with a type of virtue, and of other goods some are necessary to have, whereas some are helpful and useful. Aristotle then supported his definition by the following, in which he says: these things are agreed. And having added
30 the other things he then returns to the definition at the beginning, saying that 'it requires both complete virtue and a complete life', perhaps suggesting, in saying 'complete virtue and a complete life', that
26,1 it is also unimpeded. For it is not possible to call a person active in accord with complete virtue – I mean by 'complete' virtue that which comes either from all the virtues or from contemplative virtue – <if the activity is impeded. This is why some, who consider a person active in an unimpeded way>⁸⁰ as happy, employ it in the definition. It is incidentally suggested, then, that there is nothing that is impeding of
5 happiness.⁸¹ He says that he mentions this because of the many changes and different sorts of fortunes that occur during a lifetime. But the preceding interpretation is better.

To the preceding he adds the following puzzle: whether one should deem no human being happy <unless>⁸² after death. Is it the case, then, that a person can be happy after death? Either this is absurd, that is, calling someone happy who does not exist at all, and above all for us who say that happiness is a kind of activity, or we do not say that a person who is dead is happy. Nor did Solon mean this, but rather his saying means the following: that ‘only then can one safely deem a human being fortunate’ (1100a16); and what is said is, not that he is now happy, but that he was once happy: we deem him fortunate, that is, because we are confident, and call him happy on the grounds that he is now beyond evils and misfortunes. 10 15

But this too, he says, involves a certain controversy, and he introduces a second puzzle, namely whether there is good and evil for a dead person in the way there is ‘for a living person who is not, however, perceiving’ (1100a19-20), or does it seem that there is nothing for him, whether evil or good, arising from the good action and bad action of his children and his descendants generally. He then discusses this puzzle further: for it is possible for ‘many changes to occur concerning the descendants’ (1100a23-4) of someone who has lived and died blessedly – for some of them to live well, others badly, and for them to be different in their degrees of descent, some being very close to their ancestors, while others are remote, and for either the near ones or the remote to be better or worse. But both would be odd: that the circumstances of the descendants not get to the parents, and that someone who has lived happily should change drastically along with the fortunes and decisions of his descendants. 20 25

Now, this second dilemma is postponed, and he says that ‘we must return to the puzzle that was posed earlier’ (1100a31). For perhaps, once that one has been considered, this one too will be clear. In that one, it was said that one must consider happy, after his death, a human being who has lived happily, not in the sense that he is fortunate now but that he was so earlier. This too is odd, if when a person is happy, it will not be true to predicate of him what is present, namely he is happy, but when he is not but has died, then it is true to say that he was happy. The one who predicates what is present as present seems to be saying something true: for it is possible to call him happy after his death truly because it was possible to call him happy⁸³ truly also when he was living – because he was happy. It would be ridiculous for us to refrain, because of changes of fortune and the belief that happiness is something enduring, from calling happy someone who is actually happy. For it would be just as if one shrank from saying that a person who is handsome or rich is rich⁸⁴ when he is rich or handsome, because of these changes. 30 29,1 5

Having said this he turns to solving the puzzle, saying that it is not true to follow a person’s fortunes and in accord with changes in these to call a person happy (*eudaimôn*, ‘faring well’) or unhappy (*kakodaimôn*, ‘faring badly’). For ‘well’ (*eu*) or ‘badly’ (*kakôs*) is not in one’s fortunes,

something which 'happiness' [faring well] and 'unhappiness' [faring badly] make clear from the word itself. For in the word both are included, 'well' in 'happiness' [faring well] and 'badly' in 'unhappiness' [faring badly]. Activities in accord with virtue are decisive for happiness, and not those in accord with vice,⁸⁵ while activities in accord with vice are the most decisive thing in unhappiness. The puzzle that has been posed here testifies to the argument that says that activities in accord with virtue are the most decisive thing for happiness and its essence.⁸⁶ For the puzzle was posed as to whether one should deem fortunate or happy those who are dead because happiness ought to be something stable, but those who are living often change in their fortunes. This dilemma arose from the claim that happiness must be stable: but there is no stability so great concerning anything in human affairs as that concerning actions in accord with virtue, which are more enduring even than kinds of knowledge. For one can forget knowledge, but a good person would never forget how one ought to act, because he spends his life in such actions. For in fact when he is eating and, at other times, riding and walking and doing whatever it may be, a good person is active in accord with virtue, and above all blessed people who⁸⁷ spend their time in the most honourable activities. These are the contemplative activities, and this is why they are more enduring in virtuous people.

'What is being inquired into will pertain to the happy person' (1100b18), that is, being enduring and stable, because he is stable in his noble actions. 'And he will be such always throughout his life' (1100b18-19) or even if not always, because he leaves off being happy in sleep and in certain other occasions, nevertheless of all human beings, at all events, he above all will 'produce and contemplate things in accord with virtue' (1100b19-20). The end has by now clearly been located in these things, both in action and in contemplation. He too will endure his fortunes most nobly who 'is most truly good and four-square without blame' (1100b21-2). For some people are called 'four-square' who change along with the characters of those who are with them, who with dissolute people are called dissolute, but with temperate people seem temperate (for the same people could not be both temperate and dissolute), and with unjust people unjust, whereas with just people they seem just, and in general they harmonize their characters with whom-ever they wish. These, then, are blameable. But four-square without blame are those who bear their fortunes suitably and are neither cast down by misfortune nor elated by good fortune, but rather, just as four-square stones stand on whichever side they fall, so too these people stand upright against every fortune.⁸⁸

For it is difficult to bear not only misfortune but also good fortune, and great mishaps befall those who cannot bear prosperity. Although many things happen as a result of fortune, great strokes of good fortune produce a turn of the scale so as sometimes to shake a happy person out

of his happiness, but small ones do not. For there must occur many and very great misfortunes to dislodge a person from his happiness, in such a way as to be, not ever unhappy, but not happy, either. For how is it possible for someone who is in great pains and impeded in respect to important activities to be happy? 'Nevertheless even in these there shines forth' (1100b30) virtue, when someone bears his misfortunes calmly not because of insensibility to pain but because of grandeur. On the contrary, great strokes of good fortune that happen to a good person, he says, 'will make his life more blessed' (1100b26). He meant 'more blessed' in the sense of appearing more blessed due to 'adorning', as he says. For just as added adornment does not make beautiful bodies beautiful, for they are so already, but it contributes to adorning them, so too external goods, when they are added to a noble and happy person, contribute to adorning his life, and allow a noble use of it. 10 15

If, then, noble actions are decisive for happiness, and the contrary actions for unhappiness, no one who is blessed could become unhappy and wretched, for a good person will never perform base acts, but will even bear his fortunes gracefully. 'He will not be quite blessed, to be sure' (1101a7), but neither will he be easily changeable, 'for he will not be easily moved from his happiness' (1101a9) (for he may be dislodged from it by great and many misfortunes, as we said), nor, if he has been dislodged from it, will he easily return to happiness, unless he effects many and great things in accord with virtue. Nothing, then, 'prevents us from calling happy a person who is active in accord with complete virtue' (1101a14-15) and has external resources in sufficiency in a complete life. 20 25

It is possible, then, also to say this confidently: if one must not merely <call> a person who is [currently] happy simply <happy, that is,>⁸⁹ not merely a person who *is* living this way, as has been said, but 'one who also *will* live this way and will end his life in the same degree' (1101a17), that is, similarly and proportionally to the life that has been lived – if this is so, then we would call simply blessed those who are still living and 'who have and will have' the afore-mentioned goods, that is, complete activities in accord with virtue, unimpeded by external things, in a complete life. We will call them blessed, he says, as human beings. He added this, because he believes that there is one happiness for a god and another for a human being, and likewise for virtue. 30

1101a22-1103a10 'The fortunes of one's descendants' to 'we call the praiseworthy virtues'. 31,1

He now switches to the other puzzle. This was whether the fortunes of one's descendants contribute something to those who have lived happily and ended their lives happily in respect to their happiness enduring or not enduring. He says that to say that the fortunes of one's descendants and friends contribute nothing to those who have died 'is too unsociable 5

and contrary to prevailing beliefs' (1101a23-4). He uses the common belief of all human beings in what he is presently <examining>.⁹⁰ One may hear pretty much all human beings giving the dead a share in the fortune and choice of their descendants. For in fact they call the fathers of those who are not faring well, or who are living badly, unfortunate, even if they happen to be dead, and they customarily tell those who are doing noble deeds that they are exalting their parents, and those who are acting in a bad manner that they are insulting their ancestors. These very beliefs suggest that the dead somehow have a share in the prosperity and misery of the living.

He wishes to define, then, to what degree they have a share in it, and he says: since many things happen, and they involve all sorts of differences, in general, he says, one must determine what among those things that the living do get to the dead, and what things do not get to them. For, in fact, just as some of the misfortunes relating to an individual have enough power to remove him from his happiness, while others are not such, 'so too do those relating to one's dear ones' (1101a30). And in fact we have a share in the things that befall our dear ones, and some of them are such as to impede our happiness, while some are not such. In 'these things it differs much more whether each of the incidents happens regarding those who are living or dead <than> whether unlawful and horrible things in tragedies precede <what is performed>⁹¹ (1101a31-3). 'Precede' is when messengers, on occasion, report what has happened, for example 'Oedipus was, in the beginning, a fortunate man' (Euripides fr. 157 Kannicht) and other such things; 'things performed' is when horrible things are done on the stage: for example Sophocles also brings on stage Oedipus maimed, and Ajax slaying himself. For the things that precede do not distress the spectators, but the things that are performed on the stage usually perturb and pain them. So too, indeed, misfortunes regarding the dead resemble those that happen before the events on stage, but those in life resemble those that happen on the stage.

If these things are so, then 'one should reason syllogistically about this difference too' (1101a34), i.e. what difference things that happen regarding the living and those regarding the dead make. But perhaps [Aristotle means that] one must rather reason syllogistically about the puzzle that has been posed, namely whether the dead have a share in anything good or bad. For both these things are simultaneously inferred from the suppositions, <both that the dead have a share in good or bad and that there is>⁹² a difference in what happens concerning the living and the dead as a result of the faring well and contrariwise the faring ill of their descendants. For it seems on the basis of what has been said that 'if indeed anything gets to them' (1101b1-2) that is good or bad, it is weak and trifling, and either it is simply, that is, strictly speaking, a small thing or it is small to them even if it is a big thing, since they are dead and do not perceive it, and even if⁹³ it is not [small, it is not] so

great as to either⁹⁴ make those who are not so, happy, or to deprive those who are happy <of their happiness>.⁹⁵

After this, he says, we must inquire ‘concerning happiness whether it is among the things that are praiseworthy or that are honourable’ (1101b10-11). Those things are honourable that pertain to rulership, for example rulers and gods. Other things are noble. They identify what is noble as good and praiseworthy: such are the virtues and activities in accord with virtue. Some things are potentials: these are such things among the goods that one can use well and not well, for example wealth and health and in general things relating to the body and which are called external goods, because they are a virtuous person’s instruments for noble activities. They enumerate also a fourth kind of goods, which they call specifically beneficial: such are things which are never choice-worthy in themselves but are always so for the sake of something else, for example medical treatments, operations, and cauterizations, all of which are choiceworthy for the sake of health. He does not recall these in the present discussion, but he does mention the potentials; he believes it obvious, however, that happiness is not among such goods. 10 15 20

It is disputed whether happiness is among the honourable goods or among the praiseworthy ones. He shows that it is not among the praiseworthy ones. For every praiseworthy thing is praised by virtue of being a certain kind and in a certain relation to something. He says ‘every’ not because what is praiseworthy is among relative things (for a just person and a courageous person are praiseworthy, but they are not so called as being relative things), but rather because every praiseworthy thing is praised by virtue of being in relation to something in the following way.⁹⁶ For people are praised by way of reference to deeds and actions, for example a courageous person and a just person are praised because they are of a certain kind, for each of them is praised because he has the relevant virtue – for the former is such because of courage, while the latter is such because of justice – and because they are productive, the former of courageous deeds, the latter of just ones. ‘And we praise a strong person and a racer’ (1101b16) (although they are not virtuous), perhaps because they act in co-operation with their nature, but also as being of a certain kind and because they are in a certain relation to activities, the latter to racing activities, the former to those involving strength. 25 30

‘It is obvious from the praises concerning the gods’ (1101b18-19) that some people produce, because their praises take place through reference to certain activities and actions: for some people praise them by referring to ourselves, for example they praise Dionysus because he gave us wine, and Demeter because she gave us wheat. But praise of the gods in this way is ridiculous: for their majesty and nobility does not reside in this, namely in being referred to us, but rather in their own specific nature. Such praise seems as though a person, in praising a human being, should not mention his own good qualities, that is, that 35 33,1

5 he is rational and prudent by nature and social and communal, but rather that he tends goats and cattle well and provides sufficient nourishment to the herds of them. Such praise of the gods is ridiculous, as we said, but nevertheless it is obvious that praise tends to occur through reference to some deeds, since a proper praise and hymn for them may be uttered on the basis of their own nature *and* deeds, for
 10 example that the divine is by nature noble and good *and* always does the noblest actions, and they [i.e. the gods] contemplate the things that are as they are and hold together the structure of the present [world]. For in employing such arguments one might hymn them in accord with what is required.

Since 'praise is of such things', I mean of kinds of things and through reference to other things, 'it is obvious that of the best things there cannot be praise but rather something greater' (1101b21-2). For we do
 15 not praise the gods but rather deem them blessed, and we deem blessed too the most divine of men and the most divine of goods. Such a thing too is happiness, because no one praises it, but rather deems it blessed.

He says that Eudoxus too 'advocated pleasure rightly' (1101b27-8). For he says that it is the best of all the goods on the grounds that,
 20 because it is a good thing, it is not praised. For no one praises people who are feeling pleasure, but one rather deems them fortunate. He believes, then, that pleasure is something to be deemed blessed but not to be praised, and that because of this it surpasses all other goods.

For this reason too, one should say that god and the good are something to be deemed blessed but not to be praised, because these are not referred to something else, but rather all things are referred to them. For in fact the other goods are referred to the good, I mean
 25 happiness: for things that lead to it are called good, and above all those directed toward god. For all those things that can be likened [to god]⁹⁷ are believed to have acquired some good.

After this Aristotle distinguishes praise and encomium, that is, in what respect the words differed as they were then used. For now the terms have been confounded and are applied to the same thing, but it used to be said then that praise was of virtue and in general of a
 30 disposition, whereas an encomium was of an individual deed, whether bodily or of the soul. He calls 'a bodily deed' that which occurs by way of a virtue of the body, for example a race or a wrestling match, while those of the soul are performed by way of practical wisdom or some other virtue of the soul. For an encomium was written and pronounced for each deed. But it is more proper to rhetoric to make these [distinctions] exact and it suits those who occupy themselves with praises. 'To
 35 us', he says, it is obvious 'that happiness is among the honourable and complete' goods (1101b35-1102a1); everything that is truly good and
 34,1 complete is honourable.

'It seems', he says, that 'it is most certainly so also because it is a rule [i.e. principle]'; for all rulership is an honourable thing. He seems here

to be reasoning fallaciously by means of a word [i.e. equivocating between two senses of *arkhê*]: for rulership, by which some people rule, is an honourable thing, for example gods, parents, and, in cities, kings (I say kings, but not those by decree).⁹⁸ But happiness is called a 5 political rule [or principle] in the sense of a cause. Unless, indeed, because it is responsible for the greatest goods, just like both a ruler and one who is king, it is called an honourable thing on this account.

‘Since happiness is an activity of the soul in accord with complete virtue’ (1102a5-6), perhaps one might pose a puzzle as to how it is that it is not among the praiseworthy things, since both virtue and activities 10 in accord with it are a praiseworthy thing. But happiness is not simply virtue or some one activity in accord with virtue: it is active in a complete life with the soul acting in co-operation toward effecting the good without impediment in accord with virtue. Happiness, consequently, is greater [than virtue]: for this is now something greater than what goes along with the praiseworthy. For happiness is something blessed and truly honourable.

Since happiness is, as has been said, activity in accord with complete 15 virtue, ‘we should inquire concerning virtue And the truly political person’ is most engaged with virtue, ‘for he wishes to make the citizens virtuous’ (1102a6-9). Thus, if happiness is the end of the political art, and the political art takes care for the citizens so that they may be virtuous, since it is through virtue that the end and happiness prevail, 20 a consideration of virtue suits the present investigation. For in fact the ethical art is a kind of political art.

We must inquire concerning human virtue, not divine. For in fact we are investigating human happiness. It is obvious from this that Aristotle believes that virtue and happiness for a god are one thing, for a human being another. ‘We call the virtue’ of a human being ‘not that of the body but that of the soul’ (1102a16-17). For bodily virtue is perhaps 25 more proper to non-rational creatures, for they are much stronger and more powerful than human qualities.⁹⁹ Specific to a human being is what concerns reason or what is in the soul. That is why we also call human happiness an activity of the soul and not of the body.

‘If these things are such’ (1101a18) and the virtue of a human being is in the soul, a political person would have to know somehow about the 30 soul just as it would be necessary for one who was to cure an eye or the body in general to know about the body: for thus he will procure the virtue that is proper to the body, such as health and keen perception. Thus, the political person too should know about the soul, if he is going to bring about virtue in it. Therefore neither the wise person nor the natural scientist will reflect about the soul for the sake of the same 35,1 things as the political person: for the natural scientist knows everything about the soul for the sake of contemplation itself and investigates what concerns it exactly, whereas the political person does so not for the sake of contemplation but rather in reference to virtue and for the sake of

virtue, and is not highly exact, but is so only to the extent that is sufficient for him to acquire [the relevant] knowledge of the soul.

He says that he has talked about the soul in a way sufficient for a political person in his 'exoteric treatises' (1102a26), for example that 'one part of it is non-rational, while the other has reason' (1102a28). The non-rational part is double: for one part is natural, that is the cause of growing and being nourished, which exists in plants and embryos and developed creatures. The virtue of such a power, I mean the nutritive, is not specific to a human being because it is also in another [living thing] and because such a power is active rather in sleep, when a good person and a bad person are least distinct (for sleep is idleness), unless a worthy and happy person differs from his contrary even then 'to a small extent' (1102b9), I mean in respect to their impressions [i.e. dreams and the like]. Let us dismiss, then, the non-rational part, which is such.

There is also another power of the soul that is called non-rational, 'which partakes, nevertheless, of reason' (1102b13) because it is naturally so constituted as to obey reason. 'Non-rational' seems to be equivocal: for 'non-rational' is not the same for the nutritive and the emotive power of the soul. Rather, for the nutritive it in no way partakes of reason, but for the emotive it does not partake of its own reason but rather of that in the rational portion of the soul, when it obeys it. Perhaps the non-rational and emotive part in human beings differs also from the non-rational and emotive part of animals, not to the extent that it seems to differ from the nutritive part (for their emotive part shares something with ours, since it partakes of temper and appetite and generally of pleasure and pain), but it differs in that it is not obedient to reason. Since Aristotle wishes to show what the power of the emotive part, which is called non-rational, is like, and how it is obedient to reason, it is shown by way of the self-controlled and uncontrolled person: 'for', he says, 'of both the self-controlled and the uncontrolled person' (1102b14) we praise the part of the soul that possesses reason. But there is 'something in them contrary to reason, which fights and resists reason' (1102b17-18). It is especially obvious in the self-controlled person: for even though this part is sick and resistant, nevertheless it follows and obeys reason. The same thing applies in the case of the uncontrolled person: for that it resists and disobeys makes it clear that it is different [from the rational part]. And, in fact, that the emotive part is so constituted by nature as to obey is evident: for we criticize the emotive part because it does not obey and in a way it is driven by reason, unwilling and compelled. But the emotive part of the temperate and courageous and generally virtuous person, as distinct from the self-controlled person, 'agrees with reason' (1102b28).

And from this the difference is clear between the self-controlled person and the person as well: for as a whole¹⁰⁰ the 'non-rational part is double' (1102b29), as has been said. The part, then, obedient to

reason, that is the desiring and emotive part, is said to partake of reason in that it 'is heeding of it' (1102b31), just as we also say that we take a certain account of our father, <but not as we do in mathematics; for we believe mathematics true>¹⁰¹ not by obeying mathematicians but rather by obtaining a demonstration of and the reasoning for some mathematical theorem. This is the way the rational part partakes of reason, by having reason in itself. 5

'That the non-rational part is somehow persuaded by reason is indicated also by admonition and every kind of reproach and exhortation' (1102b33-5). Reproach is a kind of intense rebuke that instils fear with a view to the excision of a non-rational impulse; admonition along with exhortation is a mild rebuke that occurs in the case of faults. Exhortation is encouragement, strictly speaking toward good things, but more generally an encouragement toward anything. Thus, we understandably say that admonition is reproach together with exhortation, except that all admonition and exhortation, in fact, wish to turn the desiring and impulsive part of the soul to what is proper when it rushes to do what it should not. <But this> would not <be so>¹⁰² if that part were not so constituted by nature as to obey reason. 10

The virtues too are distinguished in accord with the difference between these portions of the soul. For we say that some are intellectual and in the rational portion of the soul, for example wisdom and practical intelligence, while others are character-based, namely those in the desiring and impulsive part, for example temperateness and liberality. For never, when we praise character, do we say that someone is a wise human being, but rather that he is mild or temperate. But a wise person too is praiseworthy, but not in respect to character, but rather in respect to knowledge. For all the virtues are praiseworthy, and wisdom is a virtue. 15 20

On Book 2 of the *Ethics* of Aristotle

37,1

1103a14-b29 'Since virtue is double' <to> 'as we have said'.

Since there are two parts of the soul, one possessing reason, the other not, virtue too is double, the one pertaining to the part that possesses reason,¹⁰³ the other to the non-rational part. The virtue of the part that possesses reason is called intellectual: for the part of the soul that possesses reason is called intellect and mind. The virtue of the non-rational part is called character-based, since character forms in that portion, as was said earlier. This is obvious too on the basis of what he will say a little later: for by altering the word habit (*ethos*) a little we speak of character (*êthos*). 5 10

'Intellectual virtue, then, has its origin and increase for the most part as a result of instruction, whereas character-based virtue arises out of habit' (1103a15-17). This is obvious to those who consider each of the

virtues, both the intellectual and the character-based. Wisdom and practical intelligence are intellectual. Wisdom is knowledge, and all knowledge arises from instruction. In fact, one could not know even those things that are constituted by nature, concerning which wisdom
 15 inquires, on the basis of habit, but rather they must invariably come from instruction or discovery, and likewise too those things relating to first philosophy. But if one needs some practice in learning, and someone wishes to call this habit, let it be so called. But habit in the strict sense, at all events, consists in being habituated by noble pursuits.

Practical intelligence too arises from much experience and instruction:
 20 tion: for it is right reason and either a kind of demonstration or something similar to demonstration. Now, first philosophy invariably uses demonstration, but practical intelligence uses syllogism in a way similar to demonstration. Every demonstration and every syllogism that is demonstrable or near to demonstration is in a certain way instruction.

That the intellectual virtues, then, arise through learning is clear. The character-based virtues for the most part have their origin and increase from habit. For it is when they are habituated by dissolute
 38,1 deeds that human beings become dissolute, and when they are habituated by just deeds that they become just, and by courageous deeds, courageous. Practical intelligence and reason in accord with practical intelligence, it is agreed, complete these virtues. An indication that the greater part of these virtues comes from habit is the fact that many people who know the right reasoning are not able to perform noble
 5 deeds, since they are overcome by pleasures and pains. This happens to them because they have not been habituated in a noble way.

Since it is agreed that virtue arises from habit, it is evident from this, he says, 'that none of the character-based virtues inheres in us by nature' (1103a19). In order that it may become clear in what sense he says that they do not occur by nature, one must distinguish the several
 10 senses in which 'by nature' is said. For those things are said to exist by nature that are always co-present, for example everything heavy is said to be constituted by nature to be borne downwards and every light thing upwards. In another way, what is not co-present from the beginning, but after a certain time comes for the most part to be present, even though we do not busy ourselves about it whether through habit or through instruction, is said to be by nature, for example the natural
 15 growth of teeth or beards. In yet another way, that to which we are susceptible is said to be by nature. In this way even contraries are said to occur to the same object by nature, for example disease and health to a susceptible body. Further, that toward which what is susceptible is by nature more inclined and toward which it rather has impulses from its nature, is said to be by nature. Thus, health again is by nature, but disease becomes contrary to nature, since it is a kind of privation of health and the body is constituted by its nature more in the direction of

health than of disease. In the same way virtue too is more in accord with 20
nature, and vice contrary to nature, and in general what is good is more
in accord with nature, what is evil contrary to nature.

With 'by nature' said in so many senses, Aristotle seems, on the basis
of his example, to have taken 'by nature' in accord with the first that
was indicated. For he says that a stone is borne downward by nature
and therefore is not habituated to do otherwise. It is also possible, in a 25
way, to take it in accord with the second sense: for neither does virtue
come to be present in us in the way that a beard and teeth do, when we
are not at all busy about it, but does so rather from habit and instruc-
tion. Virtue, then, is not by nature in these ways, but it would be by
nature in the third and above all the fourth of the senses mentioned.
For in fact we are susceptible to virtue and vice and we have more
impulses to virtue. That is why he says that virtue is constituted by 30
nature to come to be present in us: it is neither by nature nor contrary
to nature; [rather], he has selected the expression 'is constituted by
nature' (1103a21.25) in place of the fourth meaning of 'by nature', so
that he might set it apart by the term as well.

It is clear that virtue is not present to us by nature in the sense of
being co-present to us from birth and inalterable. For none of the things 39,1
that are present by nature in this sense can be habituated to be
otherwise; for example, a stone, which is downward-tending, 'cannot be
habituated to move upward, nor fire downward' (1103a21-2). But hu-
man beings who exercise wicked habits become base and do not acquire
virtue. Furthermore, he says that for all things that come to be present
by nature we first obtain the capacities, 'and then the activities' 5
(1103a27). This is obvious in the case of the senses. 'We get the virtues
by first being active, just as in the arts, too' (1103a31-2), which are not
by nature. Hence, the virtues are not among the things that come to be
present by nature.

He also uses, as another kind of confirmation, popular belief relating
to the question, taking as witnesses the best lawgivers. For it is their 10
job that <citizens> become good; but there would be no need to habitu-
ate them if virtue were among the things that come to be present by
nature.

The next argument has its beginning in relation to the question that
the character-based virtues are not by nature, but it soon leads to
another problem. For he next investigates what virtues and noble
actions are. That this is so, we shall know from what is said. First, let 15
us see what difference there is between 'from the same things and
through the same things' (1103b7). For either he uses the expressions
as having much the same force, or, perhaps, 'from the same things'
indicates not so much¹⁰⁴ that virtue is engendered and destroyed
through the same activities, but that it has the same beginnings – not,
however, that it arises through the same things. So that it might be

20 clearer how he uses the expression ‘from the same things’, he added ‘and through the same things’.

He means that every virtue both arises and is destroyed through the same activities – the same activities in genus. For noble and wicked activities concerning pleasures are the same in genus, but they differ in species. Temperateness arises out of noble activities that concern pleasure, dissoluteness out of base ones, and similarly in the case of the other virtues. He advances the argument also on the basis of the arts: for out of an activity that is the same in genus, both good and bad cithara-players are formed, good cithara-players being habituated to do it well, bad ones badly; and likewise the same thing happens in the other arts.

These things, as I said, bear also upon the present question. For if
 30 virtuous people and base ones are formed from activities and habits, it is evident that neither virtue nor vice is by nature. But he no longer makes this inference: rather, having assumed in general what kinds of activities one should display and perform, that is noble ones and not base ones, because habitual states follow upon activities, he made the inference: ‘since, accordingly, the present treatise is not, like the others,
 35 for the sake of contemplative wisdom’ (1103b26-7) (for practically all the sciences in philosophy except for ethical and political have to do with contemplative wisdom, but we learn ethical science not so that we may understand arguments but so that we may become good), it is necessary
 40,1 (he says) to inquire about habitual states. He calls virtues and vices habitual states. And carrying the discussion forward in this way he enters upon the other problem, and inquires what kinds of actions one ought to choose. He says the following.

1103b31-1104b3 From ‘What, in accord with right reason’ to ‘we shall be most able to endure frightening things’.

Generally, he assumes that one should choose those actions which we do in accord with right reason. What right reason is will be discussed later, and ‘how it stands to the other virtues’ (1103b34). He will show that right reason is practical wisdom, and that practical wisdom stands to the other virtues in a kind of commanding role. This will be made
 10 clear when he himself speaks about it. But this should be recalled, namely that he attributes acting in accord with right reason not only to those who possess complete virtues but also to those who do not possess complete ones. For these latter act as right reason would dictate, even though they do not have demonstrative reason but rather belief-based reason, which says that this must be done and that must not be done:
 15 so to speak, they have accepted the ‘that’ on the one hand, but they are ignorant of the ‘because’ on the other. But these things will be discussed later.

Having said that one should do all things in accord with right reason, he notes that this has been said generally, not exactly. For what right

reason is is not understandable in the same way that twice two is four is; rather, 'one should act in accord with right reason' is said in outline, and it is impossible to define exactly what right reason is. Therefore he again recalls what he said earlier (1.1, 1094b12), that one must accept arguments 'in accord with the subject matter' (1104a3): 'things involved in actions and those that are advantageous have nothing stable' (1104a3-4); rather, the same things are sometimes advantageous and sometimes not. For example it is now advantageous to wage war on these particular people, but at another time not, and sometimes to maintain peace and other times not. The same argument applies also to noble things: sometimes it is noble to pay back a deposit, and sometimes not. The occasions and the persons change these things around, and activities, places, usefulness, and all such things are in relation to them [i.e. occasions and persons]. Just as, then, it is not possible to define healthful things exactly because the same things sometimes produce health, and sometimes not, so too, indeed, one cannot do so concerning those things that pertain to actions; rather, given that such is the general definition, and that it is such as not to have exactness, all the more is it the case that a definition concerning individual things does not have exactness. For in no art or set of precepts is it possible to pronounce about individual things, but those who practise them must conform to the occasions and what happens, and do as the circumstances demand, as in the case of medicine and seamanship. For in fact these arts have neither general definitions that are exact nor definitions concerning individual things; rather, both the doctor and the helmsman must heal or steer, respectively, by conforming to the occasions.

Having said this, he at once says, in outline, what comes next about actions – what kind one should choose – and enters without our noticing upon the argument concerning virtues and vices. 'First then', he says, one must consider that such things are constituted by nature so as to be destroyed by lack and excess' (1104a11-12). What such things are he makes clear later, when he says 'as in the case of strength and health' (1104a14). For in between he said 'that one must use evident things as proofs concerning non-evident things' (1104a13-14). Bodily virtues, such as strength and health, are more evident than those of the soul, and he constructs the argument on the former, stating that 'excessive and deficient exercises' destroy 'strength' (1104a15-16). Similarly, less and more food than what is sufficient destroy health too, but balanced amounts preserve it, produce it, and increase it. He says that it is the same, then, 'in the case of temperateness and courage and the other virtues as well' (1104a19). For a person who is always active in such a way as to fear and never endure becomes cowardly, and one who is habituated to fear nothing but rather approach all things recklessly is rash, and he provided similar things in the case of the other virtues. For courage and temperateness, he says, 'are destroyed by excess and

deficiency' (1104a25-6). He means by 'destroyed' not that it already exists and is destroyed, but rather he termed it destruction in accord with the fact that their formation is hindered both by excess and deficiency.

He says that not only do the origin and growth of the virtues, as well as their destruction, arise because of the same things, but their activity too is in the same things. This was clear earlier in the case of the bodily virtues: for strength is above all active in the things from which it arises. For in fact 'it arises from receiving much nourishment and enduring many' blows (1104a31-2). Similarly in the case of the virtues of the soul as well: for an activity and habitual state are most able to be active concerning those very things from which they arise. That this is evident, he himself will go through in detail.¹⁰⁵

After this he says that one must take as the sign of virtues and vices the pleasure and pain that supervene upon their activity. 'For a person who refrains from bodily pleasures and rejoices is temperate' (1104b5-6), but one who refrains but feels pain is dissolute, even if he refrains as much as can be. For he is obviously refraining because of necessity, not because of choice. The same is the case too for liberality: for a liberal person rejoices much more, even, in giving than the one who receives does [in receiving]. For one who gives but is distressed at the gift is not liberal but illiberal. In the case of courage he said that 'one who <rejoices>¹⁰⁶ as he endures terrible things or at least does not feel pain is courageous' (1104b7-8), reasonably adding 'or does not feel pain'. For one must be content that they endure terrible things without feeling pain. In general, as he said, the pleasure that occurs upon the activity of the virtues is coupled with them.

He then says 'for character-based virtue is about pleasures and pains' (1104b8-9). He does not mean that it is about pleasures and pains *because* of this, that is, *since* upon noble activities there follow pleasures in them. Rather, he posited this as a sign of virtues. But it is plausibly said that upon noble activities there follow pleasures in them since character-based virtue is about pleasures and pains. For it is characteristic of virtue both to be about pleasures and pains – when pleasures and discomforts assume an appropriate measure – and for pleasure to follow upon the activities themselves.

One might question in what sense character-based virtue is about pleasures and pains. For intellectual virtue surely is not; indeed, it is obvious that this is not about pleasures and pains. How then can character-based virtue be about pleasures and pains? Is it like the case of instruments, as one might say that the art of flute-playing is about flutes, or the art of carpentry is about the axe and the saw and other tools? Or is it rather like subject and matter, in the way that the musical art is about melody, and the geometric art is about magnitude?

Now, it would not be reasonable to call pleasure and pain an instrument of virtue, for one does not use them as instruments for anything.

They seem rather to be subjects of virtue, just as melodies are to the musical art; for virtue produces activity concerning emotions, actions, and the equilibrium among them, just as the musical art does in relation to melodies. Emotions, then, are among subjects and matter that have proportion (*logos*); and not only emotions, as we have said, but also actions. For since pleasure and pain attend on every emotion, as Aristotle will say further on, it is plausible that character-based virtue is about pleasures and pains in the sense of subjects. 25

It is worth investigating the following, too, namely how pleasure and pain are said to attend on every emotion. For some have believed that these two emotions are the most generic according to Aristotle, and generic in such a way that emotion is divided into two emotions, pleasure and pain, and all the other emotions are referred to pleasure and pain. For example anger and fear are referred to pain, while confidence is referred to pleasure, and appetite is something in common deriving from pain and pleasure. For pain is present in one who is appetitive on account of lack, and pleasure on account of hope: if a human being were completely without hope of attaining what he has an appetite for, then pain would attend on appetite as its genus. 30 43,1

This argument has some plausibility, but it is debatable. For since it is agreed that a kind of pleasure and pain are in the species of emotion – for example when we rejoice in the fact that we ourselves are faring well or that our dear ones are, such a thing is called pleasure, and pain is that for our own misfortunes or those of our dear ones – by what will we distinguish generic pleasure and pain from those mentioned [i.e. pain and pleasure as species of the genus]? For if there is the same account of every pleasure, namely that pleasure is the unimpeded activity of what is in accord with nature, then it impossible to say that there are two pleasures – one the genus, the other the species – since they have the same name and the same account, and there is not some individual definition of particular pleasure beyond the one mentioned. 5 10 Unless someone will say generally that the above-mentioned account is of all pleasure, and likewise that the contrary account is of [all] pain, and that activity in a species of what is in accord with nature pertains to our own present good fortune and that of our dear ones; he will produce a differentia, indeed, by separating out pleasure and pain as the most generic emotions.¹⁰⁷

There are two species of emotion: pleasure and pain. Of pleasures, some are of the soul, some bodily; and likewise of pains. Pleasures of the soul have activity of what is accord with nature via the soul, whereas bodily pleasures become pleasures of the soul through the body. Of the pleasures of the soul, he will say that one kind is called pleasure homonymously with the genus, since it is a kind of elation due to our good fortune and that of our dear ones, because good things are present to ourselves or to our dear ones. It is synonymous with and admits of the account of the genus, for it too is the unimpeded activity of what is 15 20

in accord with nature; and it is homonymous in that it has the same name as the genus.

Another species of pleasure of the soul [beyond the particular pleasure that shares its name with the genus] is confidence, which is a pleasure and elation deriving from the expectation that one will not be in a terrible situation, or if one should be, that one will master it. The other emotions that are said to be in accord with the pleasure of the soul would be pleasures of the soul.¹⁰⁸ Some of these emotions are just wrong; some, however, when they are moderated are proper to virtue, but when they are excessive are proper to vice. So too in the case of pain of the soul.

The whole, then, is the activity of what is in accord with nature. Its species are what is called lack, which is pain in the case of our own misfortunes or those of our dear ones, because evils are already present; further, there is anger, which is pain at the thought that we have suffered something contrary to desert, accompanied by a desire to inflict pain in return on the one who pained us; and fear, which is a species of pain that arises on account of an anticipated evil.

This may suffice in regard to the primary division of emotion, being that into pleasure and pain. But since appetite seems to be something mixed out of pleasure and pain, it will seem impossible for pleasure and pain to be the most generic. For every species of emotion must be classified under its other [i.e. its genus], but must not be mixed out of them. For just as animal is divided into rational and non-rational, and all animals are either rational or non-rational but none is [mixed] out of rational *and* non-rational kinds, it is reasonable for it to be so in the case of pleasure and pain, if they are generic emotions.

This is why some people try to claim that they are not genera, and that the primary division of emotions is not into these [i.e. pleasure and pain], but rather that Aristotle says that they accompany the emotions the way a good complexion accompanies health and a bad complexion accompanies illness. We must consider these points. Appetite does have, as has been said, a certain mixture of pleasure and pain, and so too does temper: for it too seems to occur with pleasure and pain. Homer makes this clear when he says 'so that it is much sweeter than dripping honey in the breasts of men' (*Iliad* 18.109; cf. Aristotle *Rhetoric* 2.2, 1378b6-7) and so forth.

Consider whether it might not be better to take from the top what emotion is and what its species may be. For perhaps pleasure and pain will truly appear more generic than the others. The Stoics thought that emotion is a vehement impulse or a non-rational impulse, but they did not do well in assuming 'contrary to right reason' (= *SVF* 3.386). For neither is every emotion vehement nor is every emotion contrary to reason. Rather, some are proper to a good person. Certainly, we find fault with people who are impassive and stolid in character. So too, it is altogether impracticable to pluck out the desiring part of the soul, but

it is possible to make it orderly like the part that has reason. It will have been made orderly in an equilibrium of the emotions.

As to the fact that there is a desiring and emotive part of the soul, one must look elsewhere: we find no definition of emotion in any of the old Peripatetics. Among later ones, Andronicus said that emotion is a non-rational motion of the soul because of a supposition of evil or good, taking as 'non-rational' not the contrary of right reason, as the Stoics do, but rather a movement of the non-rational part of the soul. Boethus said that emotion is a non-rational motion of the soul that has a certain magnitude; he too took as 'non-rational' a motion of the non-rational part of the soul, but he added magnitude, since there also occur certain other motions of the non-rational part of the soul accompanied by a brief attraction and alienation in respect to certain people. He thought, then, that it was not worth it to name motions with a brief [attraction or alienation] 'emotions'. But I do not know how he meant this. For every motion of the emotive part of the soul, provided it is noticed, would be an emotion of the body, and not only one that has magnitude. The phrase, 'according to an alteration of something', like also 'every motion of a body not according to an alteration, provided it is noticed as being an emotion of the body', is added because a change of the soul in accord with the emotions seems to be these things.

Andronicus said, 'an emotion arises on account of a supposition of good or bad things', first of all, perhaps, because he did not know that some emotions arise from an impression itself, apart from assent and supposition. Sometimes, in fact, an emotion of the soul arises by perception itself, when something pleasant or painful appears. Thus, emotions arise not only after suppositions but also before suppositions. The appetites above all indicate this: for often, just by seeing it, a person acquires an appetite for something beautiful simply as beautiful, although no supposition [about its being good] has yet occurred. Furthermore, impressions¹⁰⁹ often arise although there has occurred no supposition at all that something good is at hand, as when the non-rational part of the soul is moved by a witty speech. For we do not suppose, then, that something good is at hand for us, but rather we are moved by what is pleasing. There are times too when being pleased does follow upon the supposition of a good, and feeling pain follows upon the supposition of an evil – obviously, when the soul is moved – since what is good is pleasing and what is bad painful. But then the emotion is a motion of the non-rational part of the soul by what is pleasing or painful. For whether the emotion follows after an impression, or whether it is after a supposition, in either case it arises upon [experiencing] something pleasing or painful, and this indicates that pleasure and pain are the most generic emotions.

The Stoics said that the generic emotions are pleasure and pain, fear and appetite. For they said that emotions arise through a supposition of something good and bad: but whenever the soul is moved at goods

that are present, there is pleasure, and whenever it is at evils that are
 20 present, there is pain. Again, when it is at goods that are anticipated,
 appetite occurs, which is a desire on the grounds that a good is imag-
 ined; but when evils are expected, they said the emotion that occurs is
 fear (= *SVF* 3.386).

It is worth inquiring why they took fear as a generic emotion,
 25 although it is a species of pain. For fear is pain at an anticipated evil,
 and not just evil of any kind: for we do not say that someone who
 anticipates poverty is afraid. Rather, fear seems to occur chiefly and in
 the proper sense whenever the anticipation is of evils that lead to
 danger concerning safety. But they omitted the emotion opposite to it:
 I mean confidence, which arises through the anticipation that there will
 not be anything bad, or else, if it should occur, then that one will
 30 surmount it. For it is on such a supposition that confidence arises: not
 that the emotion is the expectation itself, but rather the movement that
 follows it in the reason.

46,1 Though they posited appetite, they omitted anger. For they say that
 anger is an appetite, but in fact it is not an appetite, but rather it is
 under the same genus: for both are desires, but appetite is for some-
 thing that is pleasing simply, while anger is for inflicting pain in return.
 But perhaps not always for inflicting pain in return: fathers, at all
 5 events, when they are angry with their sons, do not wish to inflict pain
 in return. In general, then, anger is a motion of the soul upon thinking
 one has been wronged. And one could say much more about these
 matters.

Plato most often seems to designate the highest emotions as pleasure
 and pain, both in other passages and when he says 'for these two
 streams are let flow' (*Laws* 636D): he is speaking about pleasure and
 10 pain, as though in these emotions, being generic, all the other emotions
 were <included>.¹¹⁰ There are times when he enumerates six emotions:
 pleasure, pain, fear, confidence, appetite, and temper (cf. *Timaeus* 69D),
 enumerating, it seems to me, the most familiar ones.

Perhaps it is not unreasonable to say that pleasure and pain are the
 most generic – with pleasure being the unimpeded activity of what is in
 accord with nature, while pain occurs when being active in accord with
 nature is impeded – and to make the emotions have reference to these.

15 What is called particular pleasure and particular pain are the species
 of these, which are homonymous with the genera: the one is a cheer at
 pleasing things that are present, while pain is a confusion at painful
 things that are present. Again, confidence is a kind of pleasure on
 account of the anticipation that there will be nothing terrible or, even if
 it should occur, that one will surmount it, while fear is a pain on account
 of an anticipation of terrible things.

20 In addition to these, they customarily number as emotions love and
 hate, taking love not as good will on the part of those who feel it
 mutually, for this is already a kind of disposition [as opposed to an

emotion], but rather as a motion of the soul that occurs in accord with loving. Opposed to this is the motion that occurs in accord with hating. Loving is referred to pleasure, for it is a kind of individual attraction to the thing loved. On the contrary, in hating there is an alienation, and pain upon seeing and hearing the hated thing, or, in general, upon encountering the hated thing in any way at all. 25

Gratitude and anger are also numbered among the emotions. Of these, gratitude is referred to pleasure, since it is a desiderative motion of the soul to requite one who has done you a service. It is necessary that together with the desiring of such a requital¹¹¹ there be some pleasure. Anger is a species of pain; which in fact is pain on account of the supposition of believing that one has been wronged. One can find that the other emotions too are referred to these [i.e. pleasure and pain], for example indignation, envy, and pity under pain, and in addition to these, emulation that is classed in accord with resentment. For there is a kind of resentment also in accord with emulating and imitating <...>. ¹¹² 30 47,1

* * *

He shows this in an example: ‘for it is not the case that if for someone ten minae [worth of food] are much and two minae little’ (1106b1), a trainer will order for him six minae worth according to the arithmetic proportion; rather, the one is much and the other little, and in every science the mean is not one thing but rather specific to each thing – for example, a shoemaker does not believe that there is some one shoe that is a mean, but that the one that fits my foot is the mean one for me, while a bigger one exceeds [the mean] and one that is less than my foot falls short of it, while for you the one that fits you is the mean, and similarly for each person. And the same argument applies too in the case of the other arts. If, then, every art produces its product by looking to the mean that is proper to each thing, and ‘virtue is more exact and better than every art, as is nature, too’ (1106b14-15) (for in fact nature is better than art, for art imitates nature, and virtue is still better, for virtue is the perfection of nature and is nature corrected) – if these things are so, virtue would be ‘aiming at the mean’ (1106b15-16) in regard to us. ‘I mean’, he says, ‘character-based’ virtue: ‘for this concerns emotions and actions’, in which there is ‘excess and deficiency and the mean’ (1106b16-18). He makes it evident through these words that intellectual virtue is not a mean. For one ought not to *know* middlingly and not excessively, but rather it would be best to know to the extent possible. 5 10 15 20

The mean is about emotions and actions, picking out the mean in them with respect to us. For example, in the emotions it will be possible to fear both more and less, neither of which is good, and a mean, which is characteristic of virtue. The mean is defined by ‘feeling pleasure when 25

one should and in the things one should' (1106b21) or in accord with the other above-mentioned distinctions. Similarly concerning actions too there is excess and deficiency and a mean, for example it is possible to spend money both in excess, when one pays more than one ought, and in deficiency, when one spends less than one ought; and the mean is when one spends as much as one ought and of the kind one ought and
 30 in accord with the other distinctions, which is already characteristic of virtue. Virtue too, accordingly, is already a kind of mean because of this, since it 'aims at a mean; further, "erring" is [possible] in many ways' (1106b27-9).

That vice exists in excess and deficiency, but virtue is in the mean in respect to us, he tries to teach also through other arguments. He says that 'erring is [possible] in many ways, but being correct in one only'
 35 (1106b28-31). That erring is [possible] in many ways the Pythagoreans
 48,1 too bear witness, when they say that evil is characteristic of the unlimited, 'but the good is characteristic of the limited' (1106b30). This is why erring is easier: for it is possible for someone who is shooting to miss the target to the right and to the left and above it and below, but one does it correctly by hitting the target, and it is possible to hit the
 5 target in one way only. From this it is evident, then, that 'excess and deficiency are characteristic of vice, whereas the mean is characteristic of virtue' (1106b33-4). For the mean is one, but excess and deficiency are two modes of vices. Further, in each excess it is possible to be excessive in many ways, if the excess is intensified and slackened; similarly in each deficiency, if the deficiency is less or more. But it is
 10 possible to be correct in one way only, in accord with the mean. For the mean is one, as has been said.

'Virtue, consequently is a choice-based state, residing in a mean which is in respect to us and is determined by reason' (1106b36-1107a1). It is obvious that the definition has been rightly rendered. For in fact it has been shown to be a habitual state and to be choice-based, whether
 15 it is a choice or not; and it has also been shown to reside in a mean, not in accord with the thing but in the mean with respect to us. We have the definition of the mean from reason, by which it is determined to be neither more nor less. For reason dictates well the things that pertain to actions.

This, then, is sufficient for the argument concerning virtue, and the other things are as it were explanatory of the things in the definition.
 20 For he said that it resides in the mean that is determined by reason, and he explains by what kind of reason: by that of a person of practical intelligence and 'by which a person of practical intelligence would determine it' (1107a1-2). Again, when he says '[in the] mean', he suggests that it is a mean through being midway between two vices, that according to excess and that according to deficiency; and he also suggests how the one vice is according to excess, the other according to deficiency: for the vices are excesses and deficiencies because the latter

fall short, and the former are excessive 'in emotions and actions' 25 (1107a4-5); but virtue both chooses and finds the mean.

What he introduces next also poses a certain puzzle. For he says that virtue is a mean 'in respect to its substance and the account that describes its essence, but in respect to the best and the good it is an extreme' (1107a6-8). Or perhaps this latter pertains to it [as an attribute], but its being and substance are found in respect to the mean. For just as in demonstrations the chief thing is the reason why, which is also the middle term, so too in definitions, if one can get the reason on account of which the thing to be defined is the sort of thing it is, one will indicate what its being is. These things were discussed by him in the *Posterior Analytics* (2.10, 93b29ff.). The mean in emotions and actions is the reason for each [virtue] being a virtue; being an extreme in respect to the good resembles those things that are called by him 'conclusional definitions'. Take, for example, 'What is the square root?'¹¹³ Such a definition as 'discovery of the mean [proportion]'¹¹⁴ indicates the reason in respect to which the square root is taken, whereas someone who says that discovering a square equal to a rectangle is the square root has stated the conclusion.¹¹⁵ For a geometer who has shown that the [area] enclosed by the sides [of the square] is equal to that derived from the mean [proportion] of the sides that enclose the rectangle will infer the conclusion: therefore, the square has been found to be equal to the given rectangle. Such is also the case with the definitions of virtue: for someone who has said that it is the mean in both emotions and actions has stated its substance and that because of which it is a virtue, but the one who has said that it is the extreme in respect to the good affirms, as it were, the conclusion. For since it is a mean in emotions and actions, it would be an extreme in respect to the good. 49,1 5 10

He says that not every emotion nor every action admits of a mean. 15 For some of the emotions admit of a mean, when they occur to those whom they ought and to the extent they ought and toward whom they ought and in accord with the other distinctions. For they may be in excess when they are too much at the time [when they occur] or when they occur toward whom they ought not or in general according to some deviation from the things that have been determined concerning the mean. In the same way too, anger in deficiency is a fault by being less than the due measure. Indeed, in the case of actions too there are some that admit of a mean and an excess and a lack, for example in the giving of money: for in fact it is possible to give too much, which is the product of vice in respect to excess, and to give too little, which is that of vice in respect to deficiency, and in the middle, which is the product of virtue alone. In such emotions and actions, then, there are excess and mean and lack. 20 25

Some emotions and some actions do not admit of the mean, but rather, as he says, the emotion or the action 'is, when it has been named, immediately combined with baseness, for example', among emotions, 'pleasure in another's misfortune, envy, and shamelessness', and

among actions 'adultery, theft, and murder' (1107a9-12). For it is not possible to say that one kind of envy is a mean and praiseworthy, but
 30 another is excessive and this is blameworthy, but envy is simply bad, and likewise pleasure in another's misfortune and shamelessness. It is the same way too in the case of the above-mentioned actions. For neither in adultery nor in murder nor in theft is it ever possible to be correct, nor does the good or praiseworthy mean in them lie in 'committing adultery with the woman one ought or when one ought or how one
 50,1 ought, but rather doing any such thing is simply' (1107a16-17) a bad thing and a wrong. One must not be confused by those who say that some adulteries are praiseworthy, for example if someone seduces the wife of a tyrant and, getting close to him in this way, kills the tyrant
 5 and liberates his country. For this is not adultery, but rather adultery here implies, by the word, dissoluteness, and being overcome by pleasures, and lawlessness. In the same way, too, killing someone in any way at all is not called murder: for one can kill someone justly and praiseworthily, for instance an enemy plunderer. But in the word 'murder' is comprised killing unjustly and lawlessly.

10 Arguing¹¹⁶ for the [proposition] that there is no mean at all in the above-mentioned actions, Aristotle moves on to wicked states, demonstrating from these what he has proposed. For just as there is no excess, deficiency, and mean concerning doing wrong and being dissolute and being cowardly, but the entire such state is in error, so too in the
 15 above-mentioned actions there is no excess, mean, or lack. It is inquired in what sense he said that there is no mean, excess, and deficiency concerning doing wrong and being cowardly. For if there are slackenings and intensifications in vices, there should be intensification and slackening in cowardice, and likewise in dissoluteness, and thus nothing prevents there being one excess greater than another excess and one deficiency greater than another deficiency. But excess and deficiency in
 20 vices are spoken of in two ways, one being in the vice itself such that one exceeds more than another and one is less by more than another, but excess and deficiency are spoken of in a different way as being in respect to the mean and virtue. According to the former of the ways mentioned, then, it is possible for one vice to be exceeded by another vice and to be more intensified or slackened, but to one who considers it in
 25 respect to the mean there is neither an excess nor a deficiency of an excess. 'For thus there will be' (1107a20), he says, a kind of mean and virtue in vice itself; but this is impossible. According to this argument, then, there will neither be an excess of an excess nor a deficiency of a deficiency, so that there may not be means in vices.

Furthermore, this is clear from the virtues, too. For just as temperateness and courage and in general virtue are a mean, but there is not
 30 in the mean itself excess, deficiency, and a mean, 'because the mean is an extreme' in respect to the good and to being determined – if this is 'so, neither is there a mean or an extreme and deficiency' of vices, but

however things 'may be done' in accord with vice, 'they are at fault' (1107a23-5), and of the parts on either side of virtue the whole of one is excess, and the whole of the other deficiency. If these things are so, it is no wonder that the above-mentioned actions, adultery and theft, do not have a mean but rather the entire action is bad; and similarly too the above-mentioned emotions, however they may occur – envy, pleasure in another's misfortune, and shamelessness – are faults. 51,1

Are there emotions, then, that do not admit the good, and similarly actions too, but not also other emotions and actions that do not admit at all what is base? But it is not difficult to find such as well, for example indignation and reverence, which are praiseworthy emotions, and valourous acts and tyrant-slayings, which are praiseworthy actions that contain the good in their name. 5

Since the discussion has been about virtue in general, that it is a kind of mean, and in arguments concerning actions the 'more universal ones are general', as he says, but those that are particular are more true (for actions are about individual things) (1107a30-1), he wishes to speak about each virtue and vice and show that the virtue is a mean, whereas of the vices one is an excess and the other a deficiency. Why he says that the arguments are more universal in practical matters may be made understandable as follows. For in the sciences general arguments are not demonstrated through individual things nor from particulars – I mean in the sciences strictly speaking – but rather through the general. For the geometer does not show that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles making use of induction from individual triangles – [saying], for example, that since this triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles and this one and each particular triangle, therefore it is generally true that every triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles. Rather, he uses a general demonstration and shows that this is so. But in practical matters confirmation of the general is from particulars, as one can see too in the case of medicine. For the fact that what warms slackens and relaxes is confirmed from particular instances. It is the same way too in arguments concerning the virtues. For it does not suffice to say in general that they are a mean, but it is again necessary to proceed and show in the case of each virtue that it is a mean. Otherwise, the general arguments become empty, since they do not fit the particular and individual instances. For in fact actions are in the [category of] individual things. 10 15 20 25

For this reason, [Aristotle] described the virtues summarily, and the vices on either side of each of them, and it is right that they have been traced in outline. For he seems to wish this, and at the same time he will also go on with an account, in brief, concerning each of them. 'Concerning fears and confidence, then' (1107a33), which are emotions, the mean is courage, which chooses the mean in both emotions. The person who is classified in respect to excess is customarily called rash, for the most part, but here he calls two kinds of people excessive: one, 30 35

who is nameless, being excessive by virtue of not fearing [at all], the other – the rash person – being excessive by virtue of being confident. But how does he call the person who is excessive by virtue of fearlessness nameless? For the vice is fearlessness, and the person is called fearless. Or is it because it is characteristic of a person who had not been given a name previously [i.e. before Aristotle named this vice]? For because there are no such people, such a vice had not been named nor the person who is wicked in respect to it. Such a person would be one who does not at all fear even the greatest things, that are beyond a human being, for example an excess of earthquakes or thunderbolts. In respect to many things a brave person too is fearless, but the one who is classified under the vice is a raving kind, so to speak, and does not give in even before things beyond a human being.

It seems, then, that the rash person too is fearless, but it is possible to find a certain difference between them, namely that the rash person is also one who is eager for terrible things, whereas the fearless person is thought of in this respect only, namely in not fearing. Perhaps the rash person is also fearless, but the fearless person is not altogether rash or reckless.

He has not further contrasted two types in respect to the deficiency, one opposed to the fearless person as lacking in fearlessness, the other opposed to the rash person as lacking in being confident. Rather, he has made a single type of those under the vice, namely the coward, who is excessive in fearing, but is deficient in being confident. Although if, perhaps, it were also possible to suppose that a person who was deficient in being confident was invariably excessive in fearing, and one who was excessive in fearing was invariably deficient in being confident, then perhaps for this reason too he [Aristotle] made one contrast [instead of two], on the grounds that it is possible to produce both a single excess and a single deficiency [within the deficiency]. But it is possible also to produce two excesses and two deficiencies, if one should wish to suppose this.

He says that temperateness is a mean concerning pleasures and pains: not concerning all of them but rather bodily ones, and not concerning all bodily ones but rather those by way of touch, for example those by way of eating and drinking and sex; but it is less about pains. For the activity of a temperate person is about pleasures, and he chooses the mean in them. It is said that he¹⁷ is concerned about pains just to the extent that he is not pained at the absence of pleasures. Dissoluteness is the excess; the deficiency is nameless, because there do not occur people who are deficient, but let it be called insensibility.

Since the liberal person is one who chooses the mean concerning the giving and receiving of money, in each of the extremes, too, the one or the other person is at fault concerning both [giving and receiving]. 'They are', he says, 'excessive and deficient in contrary ways: for the profligate person is excessive in throwing away, but deficient in receiving, while the illiberal person' (1107b10-13) is the contrary. Sometimes profligacy

is simply called the excess, and illiberality the deficiency: and not unreasonably. For the liberal person is concerned with both, as has been said, with giving and receiving, but more with giving, and his primary activity is about this, whereas receiving pertains to him on assumption, if he is in great need. In respect to what the primary activity of the liberal person is about, then, the profligate person is excessive, and the illiberal person is deficient. 35

Since he will speak about them 'more exactly later' (1107b15), let the things that are discussed next concerning virtues and vices be postponed until then. But this much must be looked into here, namely in what sense Aristotle says that, in regard to anger, the mean, extreme, and deficiency have previously been nameless. But, although mildness and the mild person were named by Plato and by other philosophers of that time, and both irascibility and the irascible person, classified under the excess, are ancient terms, perhaps 'angerlessness' was named by him, although some people were called 'angerless' by the Greeks. Unless, indeed, 'mildness' was applied to a calm and angerless person, but Aristotle himself applied the name of 'mild' to the person who is at the mean in respect to anger and is angry when one should be and as one should be and so too for the other distinctions, and contrariwise is not angry when it is not appropriate, and he named this kind of virtue 'mildness'. Long ago, the irascible person was so named in respect to his natural fitness and capacity, but Aristotle transferred the name to the person who has a habitual state in accord with which he is excessively gripped by anger, and he named the deficiency 'angerlessness'. For in fact we cannot find in the case of the other vices that are named from the emotions that they are so named on account of their capacities: for example, in the case of courage the person who is deficient is called a coward, while one who is excessive is called rash (*thrasus*). This latter seems to be so called from confidence (*tharsos*),¹¹⁸ but it is not in fact so: for the word has changed and is [newly] named 'rash'.¹¹⁹ In the case of temperateness, one who is excessive is not called 'pleasure-loving' but 'dissolute', and the one who is deficient is called 'insensitive'. It is similar too in the case of the other [vices]. But in the case of mildness, since the habitual states in respect to excesses and lacks are nameless, he named them from the emotions. 53,1 5 10 15 20

After this, he says that there are three means, which 'have a certain' commonality 'with one another', but also differ 'from one another'.¹²⁰ He says that they are all 'concerned with a communication of words and actions' (1108a9-11). There is this puzzle about whether 'being about a communication of words and actions' does not concern all virtues. But the activities of the other virtues, except justice, can also occur for a virtuous person in regard to himself, for example a temperate person not only makes use of being temperate in communication with regard to another but also with regard to himself in diet, in clothing, and in other things relating to life. It is possible also in actions to make use of 30

temperateness without speaking; and similarly in the case of courage and liberality and the other virtues. For in fact a person who spends as one ought in regard to himself is liberal, or one who does not fear and is not easily perturbed by terrible things or evils that are anticipated is courageous. Justice resides in every way in communication, but it is possible to make use of it too while not speaking. The three habitual states mentioned now [i.e. below] reside invariably in communication of words and actions. This is obvious from [the states] themselves; but he creates names for most of them, and it will be evident from this too.

Given that what is true is honourable and truth is most akin to a philosophical nature, some people are correct concerning it in both word and deed, and others are in error. He calls the virtue 'truth', being a mean, and the person who is in accord with it a 'true' person, being one who shows in conversation with those around him, both in word and deed, what the things that belong to him happen to be like, exaggerating them neither in the direction of the greater or the less, because he loves and values highly the truth. Of the vices, the excess is a pretence toward the greater, both in word and in deed, which he calls boastfulness and the one who possesses it a boaster, although previously those who pretended to prophecy, or to wisdom the way the sophists pretended to it, were called boasters, and, in general, magicians bore this name. But Aristotle named all those who overstate what is theirs boasters and the vice boastfulness, and those who in their words play down what is theirs and pretend that they have less than what belongs to them he named ironical (they too are wicked: for every eagerness concerning falsehood is a [kind of] wickedness) and the vice irony.

Some believe that irony is not a vice, for they say that Socrates was ironical. But in fact Socrates was not ironical. An indication is that none of his companions named him so, but rather the many people who were wrong about him, like Thrasymachus (cf. *Republic* 1, 377A) or Meno (cf. *Meno* 98B). But he used to say, it seems, that he knew nothing, comparing human wisdom to that of the god; for this was said also in the *Apology* of Plato (21D, 23A-B). Perhaps too it was by way of avoiding what is vulgar and offensive, and not on account of love for falsehood, that he used to understate what concerned himself, and this is not irony. Or else there are two modes of irony, one blameable and characteristic of a person who has pretended and adapted himself to falsehood, while the other is similar to charm, and is characteristic of a person who avoids what is offensive in his words. One should consider how this is so.

Of the remaining two means, both of which concern what is pleasing, the one concerns what is involved in humour, and is characteristic of a serious person who jokes moderately and painlessly to those who are with him. This kind of virtue is called wittiness, and the person who has it witty. 'The excess is buffoonery' (1108a24-5), and is characteristic of one who indulges in the ludicrous excessively and neither as one ought nor toward whom one ought, but rather transgressing all the above-

mentioned distinctions. He called the deficiency boorishness, such as is wont to happen when a human being shuns all humour.

55,1

Another mean is concerned with what is pleasing in an entire life, and this is friendliness, which is particularly characteristic of a friend who enjoys a friend for what is pleasing, both at the right time and as one should. The pretence of friendliness to a greater degree, which is characteristic of one who wishes to appear pleasing always and in everything, 'if it is for nothing's sake' (1108a28), may be called obsequiousness, and the person in respect to it obsequious, but if it is for the sake of profit and benefit, then a flatterer and the vice flattery. 'One who is deficient is quarrelsome and grouchy' (1108a29-30).

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After this he says that there are certain means in the bare emotions, and while he says that they are praiseworthy he denies that they are virtues. For virtue concerns emotions and actions – for example courage concerns fears and confidence – but also resides in competing over and performing the deeds of a courageous person. What are here called means are only in the emotions themselves, not in the actions. For example respectfulness and the respectful person are the mean, but someone who reveres everything and is excessive in the emotion is 'bashful', whereas one who 'is deficient' in being respectful is 'shameless' (1108a34-5).

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Indignation too is an emotional mean, being a kind of pain at the good fortunes of wicked people, contrary to desert. The excess is envy, characteristic of one who feels pain at all who fare well, which is indeed characteristic of an envious person. In the deficiency he classifies the person who takes pleasure in others' misfortune, and says that he is 'so far from feeling pain' at the misfortunes of others 'as actually to rejoice in them' (1108b5-6). Perhaps the person corresponding to the deficiency is not such,¹²¹ but rather one who does not feel pain at all at anyone who is faring well, even if he should happen to be undeserving, whereas the person who takes pleasure in others' misfortune is rather the same as the envious person: for it pertains to the same person to feel pain at the good fortunes of his neighbours and to rejoice at their evils. Or perhaps it is possible to suppose a kind of mean analogous to indignation,¹²² that is characteristic of someone who rejoices in what happens to a wicked person in accord with desert, this person, and the habitual state corresponding to him, being nameless – the person who is excessive being one who takes pleasure in others' misfortune so as to rejoice similarly both in the ill fortunes¹²³ of wicked people and those of good people, while the person corresponding to the deficiency rejoices in nothing, even if the person happens to be deserving of the disagreeable things that befall him. Concerning these matters, then, someone may give attention. He promises to speak later 'about justice and about the rational virtues' (1108b7-10).

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He says that the three dispositions are opposed to one another, virtue, being a mean, being opposed to excess and deficiency, and these

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latter being opposed both to each other and to the middle state. Nevertheless, although these are opposed, the opposition is greatest for the extremes with respect to each other rather than with respect to the mean. There is a puzzle as to whether he has spoken rightly. For virtue is thought to be most contrary to vice. To someone, then, who considers the matter in this way, the greatest opposition is that of virtue and vice.

- 35 But if someone should consider excess and deficiency within vice, the greatest separation would be found to be that of the vices in respect to each other rather than with respect to virtue. There is an indication
56,1 that, with regard to excess and lack, the vices are much more opposite with respect to each other than with respect to the mean: for example, a profligate person imagines an illiberal person as being more opposite [than a liberal person would]. For [the person] at each of the extremes imagines <...> the illiberal¹²⁴ person being classified at the opposite
5 extreme, but more lax. For the illiberal person seems lax to the profligate, and the profligate seems lax to the illiberal person.

Aristotle uses three arguments for this kind of point, one being from a comparison: ‘for just’ as we say that ‘the big’ stands more apart ‘from the small than both do from the equal’ (1108b29-30), so too excess stands further apart from lack than from the mean. Further, [he argues] from the fact that the extremes have a similarity in respect to
10 the mean, but a total dissimilarity to one another. The third argument is from the definition of contraries: for things that are most removed from one another are defined as contraries; but the excess stands most apart from the deficiency. The rest is clear.

One should point out that Aristotle reasonably said that those things toward which we are readily prone are most contrary to virtue, too. For the things that are most contrary to us are also so to virtue. Those
15 things toward which we are readily prone in our soul are most opposite to us, just as most contrary to the body are diseases toward which the body is readily prone.

As to the statement that it is difficult ‘to grasp the mean’ (1109a25), Aristotle cited as an example not one of the means in regard to us but rather one of those in regard to the thing itself. For to grasp ‘the
20 midpoint of a circle is not the work of everyone but of one who knows’ (1109a25-6). For if in such things, in which the mean is one and the same for everyone, it is difficult to grasp the mean, it is much harder in matters of action, where what is suitable for each person is a mean. As for what he said thus – ‘that character-based virtue is a mean, and how ...’ (1109a20), and the other things – the other things are clear. The ‘how’ refers to choosing the mean in regard to ourselves, but not in
25 regard to the thing. What he said at the end, that it is not easy to determine to what extent and ‘up to what point’ (1109b20) a person deviating toward the more or toward the less is blameworthy, this follows on what is always being said by him, that it is impossible to determine exactly anything in matters of action, but rather in outline;

nor indeed anything else among perceptible things, whence too the heap puzzles (*sorites*) derive. For up to what point is a person rich? If someone should posit that it is someone who has as much as ten talents, they ask: 'but if someone should take away a drachma,¹²⁵ is he no longer rich? Or if two?' For it is not possible to determine exactly any such things, since they are perceptibles, in respect to¹²⁶ the rich man and the poor. In the case of the bald man too they ask whether he becomes bald by [the loss of] one hair, and what about by two, and what about by three? From this the arguments are called 'bald' as well as 'heap'. For in the case of a heap they used to ask the same thing: if a heap is made smaller by one grain [is it no longer a heap?], and then if by two and so on. And it is not possible to say when first it is no longer a heap because no perceptible things are grasped exactly, but rather broadly and in outline. It is thus too, then, in the case of actions and emotions. For it is not possible to say that a person who is angry to a certain extent is being angry at the mean or is excessive or deficient, because a deviation by a small amount to the greater or to the less escapes notice. This is why one needs practical wisdom, which recognizes the mean in emotions and in actions.

On Book 3 of the *Ethics* of Aristotle

58,1

1109b30-1111b3 'Given that virtue is about emotions' to 'to posit [these things] as involuntary'.

The purpose is to speak about what is voluntary and involuntary. First he says that consideration of these matters is necessary for 'those who inquire concerning virtue' (1109b33-4) and in general for one who is engaged in politics and law giving. For since virtue concerns emotions and actions, in which what is voluntary is praised if it turns out well, but what is involuntary obtains 'pardon, and sometimes even pity, it is necessary' (1109b32-3) for one who is inquiring about virtue to draw distinctions concerning what is voluntary and involuntary.

Now, it is agreed that the voluntary and involuntary exist in actions, but how might this be so in emotions? For the emotions seem to be involuntary. Or else [it is possible] somehow to dispose oneself in such a way, both in habits and in reasoning, as not voluntarily to be affected badly,¹²⁷ and in this way the emotions may sometimes be called voluntary. They might be involuntary, in a way, either simply or in accord with their own nature. But perhaps he did not say 'the voluntary and involuntary' about emotions, but rather about actions.

Further, things that are done on account of temper or in general on account of emotion are called voluntary, when a person does them knowingly. It is necessary for one who is engaged both in politics and in law giving to know about what is voluntary and involuntary, for no small part of lawgiving is that concerning 'honours and concerning

punishments' (1109b34-5); rather, in cities, the whole of lawgiving is about this. To know, then, whom one should punish, to whom one should grant pardon, and again whom one should reward with honours¹²⁸ would be above all characteristic of a good person¹²⁹ who knows sufficiently about what is voluntary and involuntary. Thus, this knowledge is necessary for the person engaged in politics and lawgiving.

- 59,1 [Aristotle] begins with the involuntary as more understandable. 'What is done through force or on account of ignorance is believed' (1110a1) to be involuntary. This does not seem to be a definition in the strict sense, but rather an exposition of the species of the involuntary. In general, those are not believed to be definitions that are given according to these divisions, for example that 'what is' is that which can
 5 either be affected or can affect [something else]. For in this way it is possible to define even homonymous things, for instance a 'key' is either that which opens doors or that [bone, i.e. the clavicle] which is around the neck. But it is necessary, nevertheless, to use such definitions too, sometimes, when it is not easy to grasp the account of what is common among the species, and this is so too in the case of what occurs by force and through ignorance. For what is involuntary is common to them and,
 10 it seems, is predicated of them synonymously, since what is voluntary too has a single account, as will become clear a little later. It is not possible, nevertheless, to assume a single account of the involuntary.

- Having said 'those things that are by force or through ignorance are involuntary' (1110a1), he first defines what is by force, affirming that that is by force 'whose origin is from outside, when it is of such a kind that the one who acts or is affected contributes nothing to it' (1110a2-3).
 15 Some think that the definition is sufficient, even if it is given only as follows: 'that is by force, whose origin is from outside'; for of the things that are up to us, the origins too are in us. For in fact if someone should grab me and lift me in the air when I had ordered it and willed it, the origin would be in me. Whenever the origin is from outside and someone grabs and carries me by force, such a thing is involuntary and by force. But the rest [of the definition] too seems to have been added not
 20 unreasonably. For there is a dispute, as he proceeds to say, concerning those who, 'through fear of greater evils' (1110a4), have done some shameful service for tyrants or, in general, for those in power, concerning which he inquires a little later. And these things seem rather to be voluntary. That is purely by force, when both the origin is from outside and the one who acts or is affected contributes nothing.

- It is thought that 'the one who acts' is not well added. For anyone to
 25 whom something happens by force, especially if he himself contributes nothing to it, would be said to be affected, but not to act, 'for example, if', as he says, 'a wind drives one somewhere, or human beings who have authority over one do so' (1110a3-4). For to be driven and beaten and such things are to be affected, not to do. Or is it possible¹³⁰ also to act by force? For example if someone, having been pushed himself, should

push another and should knock him down involuntarily. For he acted involuntarily and by force, having contributed nothing to this.

'By force' is said also in regard to inanimate things, for instance fire 30 is believed to be borne downward and earth upward by force. Is 'by force' said in this way and in the case of animate beings homonymous or synonymous? For it seems perhaps to be homonymous. For what is by force in the former is motion or rest contrary to their nature, but in animate beings not altogether contrary to nature. For an animal might 60,1 walk, being forced, although walking is not contrary to its nature. Or, given that these things are so, is every case of what is by force no less synonymous?²¹³¹ For the account that is provided also fits what is by force in inanimate things. That is by force, of which the origin is from outside, when what acts or is affected contributes nothing. That the 5 origin of motion is from outside is the case also for things that are moved in accord with nature, although they are not moved¹³² by force; for neither will something [heavy] be moved downward, unless it receives the origin of its motion from something else. But does not the rest of the definition make very clear what pertains also to those inanimate things that are moved by force? For a stone contributes nothing to its upward motion, as its nature contributes to its being borne downward. Concerning 10 these matters, then, let these points be determined.

Aristotle next raises a puzzle for what has been said above, namely whether 'all those things that are done because of fear of greater evils or on account of something noble' (1110a5-6) are involuntary. It seems that some of what is in the statement is correctly raised as a puzzle, but some in a silly way. For to raise the puzzle whether those things that 15 are done because of fear of greater evils are voluntary or involuntary is reasonable, but to investigate whether those things that are done because of something noble are voluntary or involuntary is ridiculous. For in fact things that are done because of virtue and something noble are praised and believed to be voluntary. Or is what is said rather of the following sort, namely 'whether all those things that are done because of fear of greater evils *rather than*¹³³ on account of something noble' are 20 voluntary. For if someone prefers not suffering something frightening to doing something noble, while it is up to him to endure what is painful for what is noble, one might dispute concerning this whether he has acted involuntarily or voluntarily; 'for example, if a tyrant orders one to do something shameful', threatening the death 'of one's parents and children; and if they might be saved if one did it, but would die if one did not do it' (1110a6-7), and one might endure it for what is noble. For it is disputed concerning such a case whether he acts voluntarily or 25 involuntarily, when he endures shameful things for the safety of his dearest ones, while neglecting what is noble. Socrates did not do this, but rather when the Thirty ordered him to lead one of the citizens, Leon by name, to his death (cf. Plato *Apology* 32C), then, in order that he might not share in their actions, he disregarded both his own safety and

30 that of his children and wife, and did not do the service that was ordered, because of what was noble and just. A puzzle is raised concerning such cases, then: whether one should call them involuntary when on account of such a fear a person gives in and endures [what is shameful].

- 61,1 The case seems to resemble jettisonings in storms. 'For no one would simply' (1110a9-10) jettison what is his from a ship; but sometimes one endures this for one's own safety and that of one's fellow seafarers. For in fact no one who is decent would voluntarily endure shameful and wicked actions, but sometimes people do endure them for their own
 5 safety and that of their dear ones. He says, then, that such actions are mixed out of the voluntary and involuntary. For insofar as the origin of the action is from outside, for example a tyrant or ruler and his threat, they are involuntary, but insofar as it is possible for people to suffer everything whatsoever in preference to doing something shameful, and yet they endure shameful things in order not to suffer frightening things, people believe them to be voluntary.
- 10 Nevertheless, he says that these actions more resemble 'voluntary ones' (1110a11): for such actions are chooseable and the end of such an action is judged according to the occasion on which it is done. For it is not possible to draw distinctions concerning any action in general, but rather why it was done and how it was done are judged at the time when it is done. One does it voluntarily at the time when it is done, and prefers one thing to another and contributes to its having been done in
 15 no small degree. 'For in fact the origin of moving' (1110a15) the parts of oneself, which are the soul's instruments, 'is in the very one' (1110a16) who acts, when he effects the actions. For he does not resemble one who has been driven somewhere by a wind or has been carried off by people who have bound him. But let us suppose that a tyrant has ordered a person to kill one of his fellow citizens and has threatened him with death if he does not kill him, and he kills him by applying his hand to
 20 the one who is being eliminated.¹³⁴ Those things of which the origin of doing and not doing them is in people themselves are believed to be voluntary; 'but perhaps they might simply' be said to be 'involuntary, because no one would choose' (1110a18-19) them in themselves.

Further it is clear that they are voluntary from the following: for sometimes 'people are praised' (1110a20) when they endure something painful rather than hand over their son to a tyrant for abuse, and even
 25 more so if they do it for the safety of their country. Since he said that even shameful things must be endured, one must understand that one must endure small things that are shameful in exchange for great things that are noble, for example if a tyrant should order a worthy man to put on a woman's cloak and appear before his fellow citizens, threatening, if he will not do this, to destroy his country and parents and children. For he will endure what has been commanded. 'If the reverse, however, they are blamed' (1110a22), that is, if they endure shameful

things for nothing noble. If praise and blame follow, it is clear that these 30
are voluntary things, for praise and blame are for voluntary things.

Sometimes those who have done some shameful thing gain pardon,
when they do what one ought not do because of the kinds of things that
exceed human nature, for example intense and insupportable tortures,
when someone burns and cuts and stretches them on the rack. It is not
appropriate, he says, that 'some things be done even when compelled' 35
(1110a26), but rather one must endure everything rather than do the 35
shameful things. For in small matters perhaps one might bear to 62,1
deviate from what are good things, but not in big matters; rather, one
will sooner bear being stretched on the rack and die in such circum-
stances before doing some utterly shameful thing.

Sometimes it is very hard to judge, when to do some bad thing and
not to do it seem evenly poised on both sides and equal, as though on a 5
balance. And it requires great practical intelligence to set out which one
should choose in place of which. It is not possible, in fact, to make
distinctions in general about such matters, as one can concerning other
matters of action; rather, one should judge adequately what follows
from the particular occasions and what is happening [at the moment].

'Still more difficult' than judging is 'staying with the things that have
been decided on' (1110a31). For sometimes people have chosen to en-
dure terrible things rather than to do shameful things, but when they
are in the ordeals they change their minds; and they have chosen to see 10
their son die rather than do something impious, but when they saw
their son being carried off they did not bear up but changed their
decision. This is why there is sometimes praise for those people who did
not submit to compulsion and blame for those who have given in to
compulsion.

One should say that things are by force 'simply' (110b1) and strictly
when 'the cause is in things outside' (1110b2), and the one who acts 15
contributes nothing. But the kind that we said are mixed are 'involun-
tary in themselves' (1110b3), because no decent person would choose
them, but they are done at the time when [they are done] instead of
these [other] things. Having spoken about those things that are invol-
untary in themselves, but voluntary at the time [when they are done],
he reasonably says that they are rather voluntary and not involuntary.
For being involuntary 'in themselves' is equal to 'in general'; but in
practicable things an account of things in general is empty, 'for actions 20
are among particular things' (1110b5-6), and in this way they were
voluntary. Thus, since they are voluntary in this respect, namely in the
ways in which actions above all have the power of being voluntary
rather than involuntary, they may more reasonably be called volun-
tary¹³⁵ than involuntary. Or does 'simply' not indicate 'in general', but
rather the fact that the actions in themselves, without the situation on
the occasion at that time, are involuntary, but when frightening things
press upon one, they are rather voluntary. For in fact actions in particu- 25

lar matters are voluntary, when the one who acts acts voluntarily at that time.

- Those people are ridiculous who say that ‘those things are by force’ (1110b9-10) which certain people do insofar as they are driven by pleasures. For they say that they fall under the definition of ‘by force’, for pleasing things are outside us and compel us. This argument makes
- 30 all wrongs occur by force, since practically all human beings commit wrongs because of pleasure. It is ridiculous ‘not to hold the person responsible for being easily snared’ (1110b14) by pleasing things, but rather the pleasing things themselves. It is up to him, then, both to be led and not be led by them. Both temperate and self-controlled people make this clear, since according to this argument, at all events, one would say that not even those who do noble deeds do them voluntar-
- 35 ily, for they are compelled by noble things. But if one holds the person responsible [in this case], it is reasonable that one hold the person responsible also for shameful things, and not the pleasing things themselves.
- 63,1 What ‘by force’ is has been discussed. He says that ‘through ignorance’ is in every respect ‘not voluntary’ (1110b18). There are two species of what is done through ignorance: one is homonymous with the higher genus, and is called involuntary. For when someone does something that ought not to be done through ignorance, and afterwards,
- 5 having learned, repents of it and feels pain, then what has been done seems truly involuntary. But when, having become aware, he neither regrets nor feels pain, and sometimes even is glad, one should not call it involuntary. For it seems to have occurred with the person being willing, even if he was utterly ignorant [at the time]. But since he did it when ignorant, one should also apply a different name to it – not ‘involuntary’; but we do not have available another name, so let it be called ‘not voluntary’.¹³⁶
- It seems, then, that the entire division is such as this: for one must
- 10 grasp it [i.e. the division], since it is difficult to observe, by way of the homonymies – of the genera in relation to the species – that are in it [i.e. in the involuntary]. Of these, the highest is the involuntary, which is in a way the same as the not voluntary. Under the involuntary or not voluntary, there is on the one hand what is by force, on the other hand what is through ignorance. Under what is through ignorance, there is on the one hand the involuntary,¹³⁷ on the other the not voluntary, each of which is homonymous with its genus, the one with the [generic] not
- 15 voluntary, the other with the [generic] involuntary. One could, then, call also the things that are under ignorance ‘not voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ in accord with the highest ‘not voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’, since when the species of what is through ignorance are compared with one another, in accord with the differentia that Aristotle stated, the one will be involuntary, the other not voluntary.
- ‘Different again’, he says, is ‘to act on account of ignorance’ (1110b24-

5), where ignorance is the origin and cause of the action. For although 20
 he is not said to have acted on account of ignorance, a person who has
 done something while drunk or angry sometimes acts in ignorance. For
 the origin of the action is in the one case drunkenness, in the other
 anger. The first, then, would be said to have acted on account of
 drunkenness, and the second on account of anger, but neither on
 account of ignorance. Nevertheless, he is in ignorance when he does
 what he does. If, then, someone does something on account of ignorance,
 he also does it in ignorance, but if he does it in ignorance he does not do 25
 it invariably on account of ignorance. Perhaps a person who has done
 something on account of drunkenness might reasonably be said not to
 have acted on account of ignorance, not only because he has, as the
 cause of his action, drunkenness, but also because he did not come to
 drunkenness in ignorance, and although it was open to him not to drink
 so much as to become drunk, he nevertheless did drink that much. He
 became drunk, accordingly, voluntarily, and so he did the things he did
 while drunk voluntarily and not on account of ignorance. The same
 things should be said also in the case of one who has acted on account 30
 of anger: for it was up to him to take care not to get carried away in
 advance by anger and so do terrible and unlawful things.

It is possible to take what he says next as following upon what was
 said before, and possible to take it also as something in its own right.
 For he says that a wicked man is ignorant of everything 'that one ought
 to do and from which one ought to abstain' (1110b28-9) and on account 64,1
 of such ignorance people become unjust and bad. For practically all
 human beings aim at the good. But sometimes they are not ignorant
 that unjust things are unjust, but they are mistaken and, believing
 that these things are beneficial to them, they choose to do them.
 Nevertheless, 'involuntary' is not said in this case, nor do we say that
 people do something involuntarily on account of being ignorant of 5
 what is advantageous and on account of ignorance 'in their choice'
 and 'in general' (1110b31-2). He says 'ignorance in choice' when
 someone makes a wicked choice on account of ignorance of what is
 advantageous. He calls this same kind also 'ignorance in general',
 because such ignorances is not about any one thing or any one action,
 but rather all advantageous things in general elude a person who is
 ignorant in this way.

Some errors, then, are not said to be involuntary on account of such 10
 ignorance. An indication is that those who have done involuntary things
 obtain pardon both from the laws and from those who judge, whereas
 ignorance that resides in character is hated. And plausibly so: for people
 are themselves responsible for having such ignorance, since they do
 take care to discern which are the things that are truly advantageous
 and [to understand] that vice and injustice are the most harmful of all 15
 things to the one who possesses them.

These things, as I said, can also be inferred from what was said

before. For a wicked person might be said to be ignorant of what he is doing. But nevertheless he does not act on account of an ignorance that resides in the actions, but if indeed at all, then on account of ignorance in general or in his choice, which is a choice of what is advantageous. But there can also be a kind of consideration in its own right against
 20 those who say that the errors are involuntary because each person who is ignorant is mistaken about what is advantageous to himself. For against those who declare their view¹³⁸ thus, it may be said that, while wicked people are ignorant of what is really advantageous to themselves, 'involuntary' is not in fact said [of something] on account of such ignorance, but rather on account of ignorance in respect to particular things and those which the action is about. This is the ignorance that obtains pity and pardon, as also do the things that are done on account
 25 of such ignorance.

Aristotle distinguishes too what the things are in which [an agent's] ignorance resides. They are either who he is <or what>¹³⁹ he is doing or 'about what or in what' or 'with what' he is doing it or 'to what end' and 'how' (1111a3-5). 'Who' indicates 'who it is who is acting', which one would not 'be ignorant of, unless one were mad' (1111a7). For no one who acts would be ignorant that he himself was acting, if he were not
 30 mad. 'What' is the thing that is done, which <people say> 'escapes' them, as 'Aeschylus said of the mysteries' (1111a10)¹⁴⁰ – for he mentioned them not as mysteries, but had mentioned mysteries inadvertently; and as the person 'who wished to show his catapult' (1111a10-11) to his friend, and, wishing to do this, released it and struck him, in doing one thing in fact did something else. He was ignorant, accordingly, of what he did. 'About what' and 'in what'¹⁴¹ seem to refer to one thing. That is
 35 why it goes thus: since about what and in what are one thing, a case in point is if someone should be ignorant of about whom he does something.¹⁴² For if someone, believing that his son is an enemy, kills him, he was ignorant of whom the action was about. Now, it is possible to say
 65,1 that he was ignorant of what place he did it in, for example in a temple. But Aristotle does not seem to refer to this (it will be evident a little later). 'With what' is when someone is ignorant of the instrument; for he is ignorant of what the thing with which he did it was like. For someone threw a spear at the person next to him thinking that it was blunted, but it escaped him that it was pointed; and someone threw
 5 something thinking that it was a pumice-stone, but in fact it was a rock. 'To what end' is if one should do something to one end, but something else should result, as when a person has given a drug to save someone, but was ignorant that it was fatal. And someone struck a person who was beside himself to bring him to his senses: he killed him inadvertently, not having struck him for this purpose. 'How' is if someone thought that he was striking gently, but he in fact struck vehemently, as in the case of those who are exercising.
 10 'Although concerning all these things', he says, 'there is ignorance'

(1111a15-16), in actions concerning particular things no one would be ignorant of all of them one after another, that is, it will never happen that he is ignorant of what he is doing and in what he is doing it and how and the rest, and further that it is he himself who does it, unless perchance he should be mad, but it is not strange that someone is ignorant of some one thing, and 'one who is ignorant of one of these things, is thought' to have acted 'involuntarily, and above all', he says, 'in the most decisive ones. The most decisive are thought to be in what the action resides and to what end' (1111a16-19) it is done. It is obvious that, in ignorance, 'to what end' is most decisive. For most decisive in ignorance is what someone would most say exists through ignorance, and this is to what end. For when someone is seen to have done something to a different end, for example something good or beneficial, in such <...>.¹⁴³ That is why those who speak in their own defence are accustomed above all to take refuge in this, thinking it best to establish their choice and to what end they did it, whether they wished to save someone or kill him. For practically all the other things that are through ignorance are referred to this. For in fact a person who is ignorant of what he has done refers it to this, for example that it escaped him as he spoke to what end he was speaking, whether to betray the mysteries or not, but rather as he was saying something else he inadvertently betrayed them. And one who is ignorant of the instrument refers it to this, namely for the sake of what he threw it, saying that he thought that the spear was blunted, but it was in fact pointed. And the one who thought that he was hitting gently, but in fact hit vehemently, would make his case on the basis of to what end, for example that it was to the end of exercise and while wrestling.

Most decisive, then, in things that are through ignorance is 'to what end', but further too, 'in what the action resides'. He takes 'in what the action resides' to be the same as 'about whom the action is'; and this is why we said that 'about what' and 'in what' were said equivalently. This is decisive because it too above all implies ignorance, for example that someone who thought a person was an enemy and not a friend killed him.

Having said these things about the involuntary, Aristotle proceeds to the voluntary. But it is not the case that just as there are two species of the involuntary – that a person has acted by force and on account of ignorance – [sc. there are two species of the voluntary], but rather, in order that someone have performed something voluntarily, this person must¹⁴⁴ have acted both without having been forced and not on account of ignorance. That is why there is one account of the voluntary, 'that of which the principle is in the one' who acts 'knowing the particulars' (1111a23-4); for in this definition is included both not acting by force and that one who has acted voluntarily did not do so on account of ignorance. Since things that have been done on account of temper or appetite have their origin in the person himself who acted and knew the

particulars, but they are thought to be involuntary, he says that those people do not suppose correctly who think that ‘things done on account of temper or appetite are involuntary; for [on this account] none of the other animals will act voluntarily, nor will children’ (1111a24-6). For they act according to appetite and temper, not according to reasoning. But in fact other animals and children do act voluntarily. Consequently,

- 10 things done on account of temper or appetite are not involuntary. That children and other animals act voluntarily, is obvious: for they are thought to do and suffer some things involuntarily, for example when they are bound and carried off involuntarily. But if they suffer and do some things involuntarily, namely those that are contrary to their own impulse, then they do voluntarily all those things that are in accord with the impulse and desire that is in them.

- Further, it would be absurd to call all the noble things we do on account of appetite or temper voluntary, for example if someone in a
 15 temper should kill a tyrant and liberate his country, or if someone should have an appetite for some noble pursuit and knowledge, but to call all the shameful things we do on account of appetite or temper involuntary: <‘it is absurd’>¹⁴⁵ to call ‘involuntary those things that one ought to desire. One ought both to get angry at some things and have an appetite for some things’ (1111a29-31). He says further that ‘invol-
 20 untary things are painful’ (1111a32): for everyone who does something involuntarily is distressed; but those things that are done ‘in accord with appetite are pleasing’ (1111a32-3). Consequently, pleasing things done in accord with appetite are not involuntary.

- One can also give the same account in the case of things that are done in accord with temper, for it seems that things that are done in accord with temper too are pleasing. For a person who accomplishes things in accord with temper for the most part feels pleasure. But
 25 since such a matter is controversial, Aristotle did not state it in the case of temper.

- Further, in what do things that are done wrongly on account of temper or appetite differ from those done wrongly in accord with reasoning? Or why do we not call involuntary things that are done wrongly in accord with reasoning, but we do call involuntary those things that are done wrongly in accord with appetite or temper? For it is obvious that all are to be avoided. But if those things that are done wrongly in accord with reasoning are voluntary, because reasoning is a part of the soul of the human being, it is similar also in the case of
 30 the others. For in fact the high-tempered and the appetitive are certain parts of the soul of a human being. Those things that are done wrongly by the non-rational part of the soul are also, then, faults of a human being, and it would thus be absurd to suppose them to be involuntary.

1111b4-1112a13 'The voluntary having been distinguished' to
'but rather if it is the same as some belief'.

Upon the account of the voluntary and involuntary follows that concerning choice. For choice is a kind of species of the voluntary. For virtue and vice are a kind of choice. Further, characters are judged more on the basis of choice than of action. For one might do noble things also by chance [or luck], and by taking care of them for some other purpose, for example someone who returns a deposit so that another one may be entrusted to him later, or through fear, so that he may not be exposed and pay the penalty. A person who has acted in accord with choice has given the greatest proof of character. 67,1 5

Choice is a voluntary thing, 'but it is not the same' as the voluntary, 'but the voluntary is wider' (1111b7-8) and more generic. 'For both children and other animals partake of the voluntary, but not of choice' (1111b8-9). For choice is something rational and with reason.

Further, 'things that are sudden are voluntary, but are not in accord with choice' (1111b9-10), for example things that are done of a sudden on account of temper. For of those beings that do something not in accord with choice but merely voluntarily, some do not do it in accord with choice because they are not so constituted by nature, as with non-rational animals; others are so constituted by nature, but they are not yet arrived at the right moment to have choice, as with children; and some are so constituted by nature and have [reached] the right moment, but because they do it of a sudden they may not act in accord with choice, as with those who do something of a sudden because of temper before deliberating and choosing. For they say that they did not act in accord with choice, but rather in accord with temper or some other reason. That the voluntary is indeed the genus of choice is obvious. For if something is a choice, it is also voluntary, but if it is voluntary, it is not invariably a choice. 10 15

After this, Aristotle inquires what choice is. Since some say that it is desire, and some belief, he shows that it is neither of these, differentiating desire into its species, namely appetite, temper, and wishing, and showing first that it is neither appetite nor temper. For temper and appetite are common both to non-rational animals and to children, but choice is not common to either. 20

He shows it further on the basis of the uncontrolled and the self-controlled person. 'For the uncontrolled person acts when he has an appetite, not when he chooses' (1111b13-14); hence appetite and choice are not the same thing. It is worth inquiring how he understands 'choice' in the uncontrolled and self-controlled person. For he will seem to be calling reasoning without desire choice, since the self-controlled person does something in accord with reasoning, but not in accord with appetite. And yet, choice is said to be a deliberative desire, as will become fully clear later. One must not fail to recognize, then, that the 25 30

self-controlled person acts in accord with choice, for in fact he does it by having reasoned out what is advantageous, with wishing, which itself too is desire, following upon his reasoning. The uncontrolled person acts contrary to this [i.e. choice], following his appetite. It is possible to find both a person who is in control of appetite and someone lacking control of it, the former acting in accord with the above-mentioned choice, the
 68,1 other contrary to the choice above-mentioned. Thus, in accord with the same account choice is something different not only from appetite but also from temper. But Aristotle was content to show in the case of the self-controlled and uncontrolled person in respect to appetite that appetite and choice are a different thing.

He says further that 'appetite is contrary to choice', for example in
 5 the self-controlled person, 'but appetite is not contrary to appetite' (1111b15-16). This is debatable: for appetite often appears to clash also with appetite, for instance when a person's appetite is to receive money from someone, but, conversely, because there is shame in taking, his appetite is for reputation. For here there is an evident clash among appetites, and he is pulled oppositely now by this one, now by the other.
 10 But perhaps things that sometimes stand in this way to one another are not contraries, but rather things that are always so, such as white and black and good and bad. For these are not sometimes contraries, and sometimes not, but always. In this sense, in fact, a good choice is always contrary to a wicked appetite, but the appetite for reputation and that for money are not always opposites. A sophist, surely, has them both, <but they are not>¹⁴⁶ contrary in this sense. The same thing will be
 15 found to be so also in the case of the other appetites. Thus, it is reasonably said that there is no appetite that is always the contrary of an appetite. Since, then, an appetite is not contrary to [another] appetite, but choice is contrary to appetite, choice and appetite are not the same thing.

Furthermore, 'appetite' is appetite 'concerning the pleasant and painful' (1111b16-17). Everything that is lacking, insofar as it is lacking, is painful; appetite is a lack; but choice is neither a choice
 20 concerning the pleasant – but rather concerning the good – nor concerning the painful.

Still less would one say that temper is a kind of choice. For least of all do things done in accord with temper seem to be done in accord with choice. Those, surely, who have acted in accord with temper above all say this in their defence, that it was not in accord with choice. For things in accord with choice are done with deliberation, but those done with temper are not done with deliberation.

25 It is obvious, then, that choice is neither appetite nor temper. That 'neither is it wishing' he shows next (1111b19). For wishing seems to be something close to choice, but it is not choice. It seems to be close because, first, it is in the rational portion of the soul, where the decisive part of choice is, and then because it is a part of choice. For when the

mind, having deliberated, consents and chooses, wishing, which is a desire, sallies forth along with it. And in fact we are usually accustomed to use 'to wish' and 'to choose' as though they signified the same thing. For in place of 'I choose to farm' <...>¹⁴⁷ and 'he has a good wish'. The use of the terms had eluded people, as it seems, because wishing and choice are close to one another. Because they are not the same thing: for no 'choice is for impossible things' (1111b20-1). For no one among mortals is said to choose to be a god, unless he were utterly senseless. For choice is a wishing for possible things, but wishing is for impossible things too. For we often say that 'I could wish to be a king', and 'I wished that I were immortal', but no one would say that he chose these. That is why no choice is for things that are not up to us: for we choose those things that are up to us: 'but wishing is also about things that can never be done' (1111b23-4).

Further, 'wishing is of the end' (1111b26), for we wish to be healthy; but 'choice is of things that are for the end' (1111b27): we choose to do this particular thing, so that we may be healthy.

After this Aristotle shows that neither is choice the same thing as belief. 'For belief is about all things, even eternal and impossible ones', not only about things that are up to us. For example, we have a belief about a diagonal, namely that it is incommensurable with the side [of a square]; this is a belief about an eternal thing. It is about an impossible thing, when someone has the belief that the universe is infinite. We have beliefs also about things that are up to us, for example that it is good to farm, or also that perhaps one will farm. But choice is about only things that are up to us, and neither about eternal nor about impossible things. For we do not say that anyone has a choice about the diagonal being incommensurable with the side or about the universe being infinite.

Furthermore, belief 'is differentiated by the false and the true' (1111b33); for of belief we say that one is true and another false. Now, no one, perhaps, says that choice is wholly the same thing as belief, but someone might perhaps suppose that it is the same thing as some belief, for example a belief concerning practicable things. But neither is it the same as this: for it is 'by choosing good and bad things that we are the kind we are' (1112a2) in character. For good people are said to be those who choose good things, and bad people those who choose bad things; but we are not the kind we are 'by believing' (1112a3). For many people have a belief, as was said, about both eternal and about impossible things, and they are not that kind. But neither are they the kind they are in character if they have a belief about practicable things: for example, a person who believes that justice is a noble thing is not yet good. For it is possible for him not to choose justice, but rather, after believing, if he both chooses and inclines toward justice and furthermore desires it, then he is just. Furthermore, an uncontrolled person believes correctly, but does not choose nobly.

35 In addition to this, 'we choose to accept or avoid' (1112a3): to accept things that seem good to us, and to flee those that seem bad to us. But no one 'believes' to accept or avoid, but rather we believe what each thing is, for example, what virtue is and what wealth is, or 'to whom it is advantageous or how' (1112a4), for instance that sweet food, and
70,1 being tended quietly and not in crowds, are beneficial to melancholic people, none of which are we said to choose but rather to believe.

Furthermore, 'choice is praised by virtue of being of what one ought [to choose]' (1112a5-6), for example the choice of good things, but belief is praised by virtue of being true. 'And we choose', he says, 'what we most certainly know to be good things, but we believe things that we do
5 not know [to be so]' (1112a7-8). Concerning this one might disagree: for not all people choose what they most certainly know to be good things, but some have been mistaken: surely bad people do not know that the things they choose are bad. Or is what is said rather that human beings choose those things that they think they most certainly know are good? For they believe things that they do not fully know. Surely we have beliefs about many things, though we agree that we do not know them
10 exactly and we say that we believe thus up to now, and if it appears otherwise we shall change our belief. Furthermore, the same people do not choose and believe best, but rather some have better beliefs, but choose worse because of vice; for example, someone has the belief that justice is a noble thing, but he chooses injustice, assuming that it is beneficial to himself and having a desire that is in harmony with such reasoning.

15 One need not be perturbed about whether belief invariably comes before every choice or follows it: for we are not investigating this, but 'whether it is the same thing' (1112a12-13) as belief, since belief does indeed come before choice, but it comes before it in this way, with reasoning first assenting to something as choiceworthy; after this desire for that same thing follows; and thus choice arises. It follows in this way, since <if>¹⁴⁸ one chooses anything at all,¹⁴⁹ one invariably has a
20 belief about it as about a good thing.

1112a13-1113a12 'What, then, or what kind of thing is it' to 'we desire in respect to wishing'.¹⁵⁰

Since choice is neither temper nor appetite nor wishing, nor again is it belief, one must inquire what it may be. We have its genus, in fact, for
25 'it appears to be something voluntary' (1112a14); and if choice seems to be something voluntary that 'has been deliberated in advance' (1112a15), one would not be off the mark in giving this account of choice: for non-rational animals act voluntarily although they have not deliberated but rather follow mere desire, temper, and appetite; and similarly children, too. Some developed men do many things of a sudden,
30 without having deliberated, and are said to have chosen none of these

things. One who has deliberated about something, and has assented to it as choiceworthy, with desire too following along, is said to choose it. That is why he says that what has been deliberated in advance is voluntary, making it clear that choice resides in deliberating in advance and that one must previously have deliberated and reasoning must occur, and then desire must follow. For 'previous' is previous to something, and it is obvious that deliberating in advance is prior to desire. At the same time he also implies that desire resides in what is done voluntarily, for the voluntary always goes along with desire. That is why he says: 'for choice is with reason and with intellect' (1112a15-16), and not a result of bare desire; but the voluntary sometimes arises by mere desire. 71,1 5

The term 'choice' [literally, 'pre-choice' or 'preferred choice': *pro-airesis*] also makes this clear. For it designates choosing one thing before others. For whenever someone deliberates over whether this or that is choiceworthy, or having made an inquiry concerning several things inclines to some one thing, and consents that it is choiceworthy, and furthermore has his desire sallying forth along with it, he is believed to choose that thing first before all the others about which he has deliberated. 10

After this he inquires into what things human beings deliberate about and what kinds of things are deliberable. For people do not deliberate about all things, nor is anything whatsoever something deliberable. First he assumes that what is deliberable is not that about which anyone at all might deliberate, for example someone who is mad, but rather that about which someone deliberates who is in accord with nature: for one who is mad might deliberate both about how he might make <some inconceivable things>¹⁵¹ and how he might ascend to the sky, but none of these things is something deliberable. One must, then, look into what deliberable things are. 15

Of things, in fact, some are eternal and always the same, for example the universe; for it is ungenerated.¹⁵² Eternal too is the diagonal incommensurable with the side of a square. No one deliberates about such things, nor about how the diagonal might become commensurable, but rather, in fact one does [think about it], one inquires whether it is incommensurable, but one does not in any way deliberate about it. There are other things that are not forever, but forever occur in the same way, for example the rising, setting, and turnings of the stars. For none of these things is forever, but they forever occur in the same way. Nor is there deliberation about such things. He says that these things occur in the same way by necessity or by nature or through some other cause, calling 'necessity' here not that which is forcible – for none of the things in the heavens occurs by force – but rather he has termed 'necessity' the providence of the one that moves them forever in the same way, because it always and invariably moves them and can never do otherwise. For that is called 'necessary' which cannot be otherwise. By such a necessity, surely, occur the motions of the stars and their 25

risings and settings and turnings, whether by nature or in accord with nature. For the things in the heavens move in accord with nature <or by nature>¹⁵³ or even by both. For the providence of the one that moves them is entirely in harmony with the nature of the things that are borne along.

There are some things that occur in accord with nature, but a nature that is more irregular,¹⁵⁴ for example droughts and floods. Neither do human beings deliberate about these things. There are other things that occur as they chance to, for example things 'by chance' (1112a27). It is obvious that neither are there deliberations about these things. For no one deliberates about 'the discovery of a treasure' (1112a27). But
 35 deliberations occur concerning human things, and not all of those. For
 72,1 the Lacedaemonians do not deliberate over how the Scythians may conduct their affairs properly, but rather all we human beings deliberate in the first place 'concerning things that are up to us' (1112a30-1); these, he says, are the ones that are left.

Necessity, nature, and chance are the causes of all things that are and come to be, and in addition to these also 'mind and all that occurs
 5 by way of a human being' (1112a33), that is appetite, temper, wishing,¹⁵⁵ and desire in general. For in fact these things, which are in a human being, become responsible for many things. Since, then, deliberation has been seen to be neither about things of which nature nor about those of which chance [is the cause], it remains for deliberation to be about those things for which the human mind and human desire are responsible. For we reflect about those things for which we can be responsible, which is why also of the arts, those that are 'exact and self-sufficient' (1112b1) [sc. are ones we do not deliberate about]¹⁵⁶ – those arts are called exact which draw a necessary conclusion through necessary [premises], and those self-sufficient whose theorems are determined and which do not require either deliberation concerning them or chance; pretty much the same arts are exact and self-sufficient, for example geometry and arithmetic, for of such arts the theorems are also determined. And no one deliberates concerning a triangle, whether
 15 it has its three angles equal to two right angles or how it will be. For those things about which we deliberate are up to us both to do and not to do. It is not up to us to make the angles of a triangle not equal to two right angles, but neither is chance required for this,¹⁵⁷ but rather the theorems are determined from eternity. But not even the art of writing deliberates about 'how something is to be written' (1112b2). Those arts
 20 are neither exact nor self-sufficient which do not possess necessity but rather 'for the most part' and depend on chance, for example the medical and money-making arts. For neither does a doctor possess a determined theorem so that he will invariably cure someone of this particular thing, but it is rather that such-and-such people are for the most part benefited by such-and-such a diet; nor is it that the money-maker invariably earns a profit, but it is rather for the most part. And they also depend

on chance. And among these same arts some are more exact and self-sufficient than others. For the helmsman's art has achieved less exactness than the art of exercising, and is more dependent upon chance. 25

He says that it is 'even more so concerning beliefs than the sciences' (1112b6-7). What he means is like this: he showed that deliberations occur concerning those things of which the arts are neither exact nor self-sufficient. He says that there is more deliberation concerning things about which we have only beliefs than those about which we have arts; for example, someone who has beliefs about medical matters deliberates more than one who possesses the art, because in the case of the latter person the theorems of his art are somehow more determined. And in general we deliberate about practicable things concerning which we have beliefs more than about those that fall under the arts. For we doubt more when we have beliefs than when we possess the [relevant] arts. 30 73,1

[The phrase] is also written as follows: 'even more concerning the arts than the sciences', as though the productive ones are called arts, but the theoretical ones sciences. It is obvious that the theoretical ones do not require deliberation, but rather the productive ones do. We deliberate, indeed, concerning things that are for the most part, in which it is unclear 'how they will turn out' (1112b9). About things that are known as to how they will turn out no one deliberates further, but rather about indeterminable things. That is why we summon advisors when there are important matters, since we obviously distrust ourselves as not being competent. 5

Furthermore, we deliberate 'not concerning ends, but those things that are for ends' (1112b12). For having posited ends for themselves, all people deliberate about how they may attain them; for example, a general, having posited victory [as an end] for himself, deliberates about how he will be victorious, and a doctor considers how he will bring about health, and in general a person who deliberates inquires about how he will attain the proposed end. Now, when there are seen to be several ways, people 'consider by which one they will most easily and best' (1112b17) attain their end; for example, a general who wishes to be victorious deliberates thus: it appears at first, indeed, that it is possible to be victorious by using infantry, cavalry and naval power; but after this he investigates with which one he will most easily and least dangerously win, and whichever such way he finds, that one he prefers. If there is a single way, whether it was judged preferable to all others, or even appeared so from the beginning, we inquire how the end will be [accomplished] through this way; for example, how there will be success in the war by way of the cavalrymen, 'and that through something' (1112b18), for example, in what way we will acquire a cavalry, because clearly one needs money for this. Where will the money come from? No doubt from payments coming from the citizens. When this is decided, from this point they begin the action: this [i.e. the decision concerning 20

payments] is last in discovery in regard to inquiry, but the first cause
 25 in the action. And the event resembles the analysis of a diagram that
 geometricians perform.

One who deliberates,¹⁵⁸ then, inquires and analyzes in the above-
 mentioned way. But inquiry and deliberation are not the same thing,
 but rather inquiry is broader. For we inquire too about mathematics,
 for example whether the diagonal is commensurate, and about eternal
 30 things, for example whether the sun is a sphere. But we deliberate
 about things that are up to us, and when we inquire about these, as was
 said, we analyze them and we make 'the last thing in the analysis the
 first in the process' (1112b23-4) of the action.

When deliberating, if people 'encounter something impossible they
 back off' (1112b24-5), but if they encounter something possible 'they
 attempt to do it' (1112b26-7). These points are related to their being
 very well known,¹⁵⁹ because we deliberate about things that are up to
 74,1 us: for if things seem impossible to us, we no longer either deliberate
 about them or attempt them. 'Those things that can be brought about
 by us are possible' (1112b27). He says that things that can be brought
 about by our friends too are included in what can be brought about by us.

That what is possible is brought about by us, is evident. 'For the
 origin is in us' (1112b28), that is, the origin of our acting. For he takes
 5 as 'origin' here 'the moving origin' [or cause]: the moving origin of the
 things that are up to us is in us.

We inquire, when we deliberate, 'sometimes about the instruments'
 (1112b29), and sometimes about the use of them; for example, some-
 times a doctor inquires how he may obtain medical instruments, and
 sometimes how he will use them. Similarly too in practical matters we
 sometimes inquire by what instrument it will be realized, for example
 10 a general inquires whether by means of cavalry or infantry power, or
 again how he may use his infantry power.

From what has been said it is evident that a human being is always
 the origin of his own actions, and all things are not determined by
 necessity nor are they fated. For if someone inquires and deliberates
 and chooses, it is obvious that it is up to him. If not, all deliberation and
 inquiry about practicable things are abolished.

Each human being, then, is the origin of and responsible for what he
 15 does. Since he deliberates about his own actions, and actions are for the
 sake of other things, for they are for the sake of the end and the good,
 it is obvious that neither 'is the end deliberable, but rather things that
 are for ends' (1112b33-4), in general.¹⁶⁰

Nor, indeed, do we deliberate about individual and perceptible
 things, 'for example if this thing is bread' (1113a1) or if it has been
 baked as it should be. For concerning those things about which we have
 a clear perception, we do not deliberate whether they are such-and-
 20 such, but rather we have perception as our origin [or starting point]. If
 we do deliberate about such things, we shall arrive at an infinite

regress. For if there are not some starting points that are trustworthy and clear, it is necessary that each thing be confirmed by another, and this goes on to infinity. This was mentioned also in the *Analytics* (*Posterior Analytics* 2.3, 90b25-7).

'The deliberable and the chooseable' (1113a2-3) are not simply the same thing, for the deliberable is more generic, but not vice versa. We deliberate about many things, surely, but do not choose all of them, but some one deliberable thing among them, being chooseable, is judged preferable on the basis of deliberation. That is why he says the chooseable 'is already defined' (1113a3); for until we deliberate about something, we are indefinite about it, but when we have chosen it, we determine that it is practicable and we cease from deliberation. 'For', he says, 'each person ceases inquiring how he will act, when he refers the origin to himself' (1113a5-6), that is, when he finds himself able to become responsible for it and that it is up to him to do it; and he not only refers it to himself but 'to the commanding part of himself' (1113a6), that is, his mind. For when someone thinks that what the mind has deliberated about and chosen is practicable, he ceases from inquiry, with desire too sallying forth along with his reasoning. An example of this, he says, is the ancient governments 'which Homer portrayed' (1113a8); for the kings were described by him as reporting to the people what they had chosen. Aristotle likens, as it seems, the kings to the reasoning and deliberative part of the soul, and the people to desire. When, accordingly, the mind, like a king who has deliberated and assented, communicates to desire, as to the people, and desire votes in favour and sallies forth along with it [i.e. the mind], something like this is choice.

Since, then, the chooseable is deliberable and desirable among the things that are up to us, 'choice too should be a deliberative desire for things that are up to us' (1113a10-11). He indicates how he takes this account of choice: for it is not in the sense of an exact definition. For neither deliberation nor desire is the genus of choice, but rather what results from both as a compound. That is why he says: 'for having judged as a result of having deliberated, we desire in accord with our wish' (1113a11-12).¹⁶¹ But the word 'deliberation' is also written here [instead of 'wish'], as though deliberation begins and desire follows, and as a result of this there arises choice. That 'an animal is an ensouled body' resembles such an account; for in fact in that case, body is not the genus of animal, but rather what is said is something like the following, that an animal is that which is constituted out of body and soul.

'Choice, then', has been discussed in 'outline' (1113a12-13). The definition is not exact, as has been shown, but resembles more a sketch. It has also been discussed 'about what kinds of things it is' (1113a13): that choices are about practicable things, and that they are 'of things that are for ends' (1113a13-14), but not of ends. It has been said that wishing is for the end. Since some people aim at the truly good, while

- others aim at the apparent good, wishing is thought by some people to be for what is simply good, while it is thought by others to be for 'the apparent good' (1113a16). It results that, for those who say that the good is to be wished for, what a base person wishes is not by nature to be wished for, 'while for those who say that the apparent good is to be wished, there is nothing that is by nature to be wished for. If this is not
- 25 satisfactory' (1113a20-3), namely that there is nothing that is by nature to be wished for, 'then should one say that' the good is 'to be wished for simply, but that to each particular person the apparent' (1113a23-4) good is so? Perhaps one could say that there is nothing that is by nature to be wished for, but rather there is good by nature, whereas what each particular person wishes is to be wished for, as Aristotle himself says. Just as what is healthful is, on the one hand, what suits a person who is in a state that is in accord with nature – for example, we say that
- 30 those foods and drinks are healthful which are proper to those bodies that are in a state in accord with nature – but, on the other hand, what suits sick people is not simply healthful; 'and similarly' some things are, on the one hand, simply 'bitter and sweet and hot and heavy things' (1113a28-9), namely those that appear such to people who are in a state in accord with nature, but on the other hand those that appear so to
- 76,1 people who are sick are not so simply; so too whatever a worthy person wishes is simply to be wished for, and this is the good, but to each particular person the apparent good is not what is simply to be wished for, when a base person wishes it.¹⁶² For in every matter 'the worthy person judges particular things correctly' (1113a29-30) and is the standard for the nature of each particular thing. 'For in accord with each
- 5 individual state, both of the soul and bodily, specific things appear both good and pleasing' (1113a31), but what is thought so by particular individuals differs. For the worthy person what is true appears clear, but to the base person it is what chances to be. For the many are deceived, as he says, 'by pleasure' (1113a34) and pain. For they pursue pleasure as being a good thing, 'but flee pain as being a bad thing' (1113b1-2).
- Since <...>¹⁶³ things that are 'for the end' (1113b4) are chooseable;
- 10 for all actions concerning them lead to happiness; hence they are voluntary. This is evident from the fact that 'virtue is up to us'; but if virtue is up to us, 'so too is vice; for in those things in which acting is up to us, so too is not acting up to us' (1113b6-8). For if not acting is not up to us but rather is utterly constrained, it is obvious that acting too is utterly constrained. For if acting is utterly constrained, neither will
- 15 <not>¹⁶⁴ acting be up to us. It is obvious, then, that in those things in which acting is up to us, not acting too is up to us. Thus, if acting, when it is noble,¹⁶⁵ is up to us, then not acting, when that is shameful, is also up to us. If 'doing noble and shameful things is up to us, and similarly not doing them, and this is what being good or bad is, then it would be
- 20 up to us' (1113b11-13) to be decent or bad people. Not only virtue, then, but also vice is up to us.

'To say', [Aristotle] says, 'that no one is voluntarily evil or involuntarily blessed' (1113b14-15) seems to be true in the one case, and false in the other. 'For no one is involuntarily blessed' (1113b16), but voluntarily evil, yes. For 'wickedness is a voluntary thing' (1113b16-17). [Aristotle] believes that happiness is activity in accord with virtue. Virtue and activities in accord with virtue are a voluntary thing. If someone thinks otherwise, he ought to dispute what is said here and ought not to agree that 'a human being is the origin of his own actions' (1113b18). It is believed that other animals are origins of coming to be, each in particular for the things that come to be from it, but in no way of actions. For none of them has a share in action. But just as a human being is the begetter of children and origin of the things that are begotten from him, so too is he of the actions that come from him. And those things are up to us whose origins are in us. 25 30

After this [Aristotle] makes use of confirmations especially involving popular beliefs. For in fact each person privately as well as lawgivers 'punish those who do wicked things' (1113b23-4). The argument, thus, is pretty much like this: if doing wrong were involuntary, lawgivers would not punish those who do bad things; but they do punish them; hence, it is not involuntary. Having said that lawgivers punish them, he added, 'those who do not do so by force or through ignorance for which they themselves are not responsible' (1113b24-5). For sometimes people become responsible for their own ignorance, for example if they have become drunk. 35 77,1

Furthermore, they punish some, but honour others, so that they may prevent people from doing wrong, but encourage them to do noble things. For no one either discourages people from doing involuntary things or encourages them to do involuntary things. For surely they do not encourage people not to grow hot when a fire is nearby or to be hungry when they are eating. If, then, they encourage and discourage, it is obvious that both virtue and vice are up to us. 5

'They also punish those who are ignorant about those things in the laws which they should know and which are not difficult; and similarly too in other cases' they punish for things that people are thought to be ignorant of 'through negligence' (1113b33-1114a2). He says these things, because there are certain lawful things in cities which all people should know, and pardon is not granted to anyone who is ignorant, for example, that one does not beat one's father, does not rob temples, and does not murder. For each of these things is forbidden by the lawgivers and no one should be ignorant of them. If someone should say that he did these things in ignorance of the fact that he was prevented [from doing so] by the lawgivers, he would not obtain pardon. But if someone should be ignorant concerning inheritance rights of kin who are heirs or about some such thing, he is pardoned. For knowledge of such things pertains to those who occupy themselves with the laws. Similarly in the case of other things too no one obtains pardon even if he is ignorant 10 15

through negligence. For example if in war someone casting at an enemy chances to hit a friend who is in the same place [as the enemy], and he is ignorant that it is he, he is pardoned. For he could not have expected this. But if he was acting idly and struck a friend who was standing next to him, not having examined the situation but rather not taking care to know, then they punish such a person, since it was possible for him to know who was standing next to him, but he did not take care to. Then too, someone who was exercising with a bow where he thought that no one would be walking and happened to hit someone contrary to his expectation would obtain pardon. But someone who idly shot where it was likely that many people would be walking and killed someone would least obtain pardon, since it was up to him to take care and guard against it. All these things are said because the origin of certain things is in us, and for these things there is no pardon, since people are not pardoned even for those things that are through ignorance, if they themselves were responsible for it.

But one might perhaps say concerning those people, such as we have been discussing, who err through ignorance, whether those who are ignorant of things in the laws because of idleness and transgress for this reason, or those who do wrong in general through negligence of those things which they could have known if they had not been negligent – of such people, then, perhaps someone could say that their nature was the cause of their negligence, for they were negligent and idle by nature. Aristotle denies that these things are from nature, but says rather that it was up to those very people ‘to have become such’ (1114a4). For by living laxly and idly they settled into such a habitual state as to concern themselves with none of the things about which it is right to have concern. For in fact it is not nature that one must hold responsible for people being unjust or dissolute, but each particular person himself. For people who are always doing evil become unjust, developing their state as a result of their activities, and those who are always spending time ‘in drinks and such things’ (1114a6) become dissolute. For in fact in athletic contests those who in each case wish to distinguish themselves continually practice the events of the contest, on the grounds that habitual states arise out of activities. To be ignorant of this, indeed, is the mark of an utterly ‘unperceptive person’ (1114a10).

It is also ‘non-rational’ to say ‘that one who does wrong does not wish to be unjust or that a dissolute person does not wish to be dissolute’ (1114a11-12). He does not mean this in the sense that someone who does some wrong thing is invariably unjust, or that one who does something dissolute is dissolute. For he would be saying something contrary to his own view. For it is possible to do one of these things both involuntarily and by being ignorant, but he says that someone who does evil voluntarily is doing wrong and that someone is acting dissolutely who does this voluntarily. It is truly non-rational, then, for someone who voluntarily does wrong to say that he does not wish to do wrong or

someone who is voluntarily acting dissolutely to say that he does not wish to act dissolutely. Since, then, not in ignorance but rather voluntarily and knowingly he did these things, as a result of which he will develop a habitual state of injustice and will be unjust, he would be unjust voluntarily. 15

Someone might say, if it is up to us to be unjust, then it is also up to us to cease from injustice, when we wish; but it is not up to us to cease; hence neither is becoming unjust. Aristotle does not concede this, but rather says that injustice is up to us. For people voluntarily practice the unjust acts as a result of which they become unjust. But they do not, indeed, cease being unjust whenever they wish. For in fact someone is voluntarily sick when he disobeys his doctors, but he is not released from his sickness whenever he wishes to be, once it has sufficiently overcome him. And a person can voluntarily hurl himself or a stone, but he will not whenever he wishes check himself or the stone as it is borne along. 20

'Not only are the vices of the soul voluntary but sometimes those of the body, too; for no one reproaches people who are ugly by nature, but rather those who are so through lack of exercise' (1114a21-4). And if someone involuntarily is damaged in sight, he is pitied, but if he suffers this 'as a result of besottedness' (1114a27), he is hated. If, then, those vices in the body that are up to us are reproached, it is much more appropriate that those in the soul be so, which are altogether up to us. 25 30

Some people disagree, saying that vice is not up to us: for all people aim at 'the good that appears to them' (1114a31-2), but each particular person does not have control over its appearing like this or like that. Rather, just as sight in one person is keen and such as to see exactly, but in another is weaker and worse in discriminating, so too some people are not able to see the things that are so by nature, since some have a kind of vision, so to say, in the soul that is able to see what is truly good, but others have vision that is given to overlooking this. If, then, such a power of the soul in us is involuntary and belongs to us by nature, it is obvious that those people who do not believe that what is really good is good, but see the bad as being good, are not at fault. It follows upon that that their actions are worthy of pardon, even if they are as base as can be. For human beings do all things in accord with the pursuit of the good that appears to them. 35 79,1 5

Furthermore, he adds the following, as being what is thought by those who say that we do not have control over the appearance: 'for if each person is responsible for his own habitual state' (1114b1-2) – he means his own vice or virtue – he will also be responsible for the appearance; for it is in accord with the appearance of the good that human beings do all things, as a result of which their habitual states come to be. But it is not, in fact, from the appearance, but rather in accord with his nature that each person sees his own end and good. In reporting, in what follows, the account of those people he acts as 10

advocate for it. For he says that it is then clear also that 'he to whom this pertains by nature is someone naturally good' (1114b8). And this would be the perfect good nature.

- To those who speak thus he first counters only this far, saying that
 15 even if it is so in the highest degree, 'virtue' is no more involuntary 'than vice' (1114b12-13). For the apparent end appears alike to both the good person and the bad, 'whether by nature or howsoever' (1114b14), and we do the rest with regard to this. Thus, if virtue is voluntary, vice is too: vice is involuntary – then so is virtue. Whether, then, the end does
 20 not appear to each person by nature, but those who say this speak falsely (for with respect to the end appearing this way or that a great share is also due to each person practising from the beginning what one ought or ought not); or whether the end does appear by nature, as they say, and yet they posit virtue as voluntary (since virtuous people voluntarily do all the other things that lead to the end and to what is really good) – with respect to either of these alternatives vice would be
 25 similarly voluntary.

- Having said these things, he now makes his own view clearer, having shown how the virtues are voluntary not only by the fact that we voluntarily acquire them through our daily practices, but also by the fact that, as a result of our practices, we become somehow discerning of this, too.¹⁶⁶ For he says, 'if, then', as is said, 'the virtues are voluntary
 30 (for in fact we ourselves are co-responsible somehow for our habitual states' and 'by being certain kinds of people we set up such-and-such an end'), for these reasons 'the vices too would be voluntary' (1114b21-4). For in fact we become co-responsible for our own evils and practices, and by becoming certain kinds of people we set up a base end¹⁶⁷ for ourselves. Aristotle did not say that all people are simply responsible for their habitual states but rather that they are co-responsible, perhaps attributing something also to nature, but a small amount and that able
 80,1 to achieve correction, and perhaps too something to chance, by having fallen in with wicked people from the beginning. But nevertheless in all these cases the greatest part is ours, in choosing to practise noble or shameful things.

- 'It has now been said concerning the virtues collectively' (1114b26),
 5 he says, that in genus they are means and habitual states. Since it is necessary, if they fall under two genera, that they are either the same or that one of the genera falls under the other, one must understand that the mean falls under the habitual state: of habitual states some are means, and others not. It has also been stated that the habitual states¹⁶⁸ are productive of those things by which they arise, and in themselves (1114b28): 'in themselves' is added either because it is possible for a courageous person to do temperate things, but not insofar as he is
 10 courageous but rather insofar as he is temperate (for he will do everything as having complete virtue, but in accord with each particular virtue he will do the things pertaining to it and the activities from which

his being courageous arose and in accord with the account of courage: for a courageous person will sometimes also incidentally do just things too, but not insofar as he is courageous but rather insofar as it happens for a courageous person to be just too; for some virtues mutually accompany each other) – or because it is possible also to do things that are not proper to one's original practices when reason so chooses, as a temperate person will act in accord with temperateness itself but, when reason chooses, may seduce the wife of a tyrant for the safety of his city. But he will do this incidentally, but he will do temperate things in themselves. 15

He says further that actions and habitual states are not voluntary in the same way. For with actions a person will do them and cease from them from beginning to end whenever he decides to, whereas we have control of the beginning of our habitual states, but no longer have control of their increase. For the increase, occurring little by little, escapes us and sometimes some people become evil further than they wished. For sometimes a person will go ahead in drunken and dissolute behaviours, as though it were in him not to acquire the habitual state, and he does not notice that he is little by little acquiring the habitual state, just as in the case of illnesses. For someone does things that are not beneficial, not knowing how far the illness will advance, and little by little it grows to the point one would not have wished. In this way, then, we are said to have control of our habitual states, by having control of the beginning. Not only vice but also virtue as a result of practices becomes irresistible upon increase, and one might not notice that one is greatly advancing. 20 25

After these things, he begins speaking about each of the virtues, composing his account starting from courage. Courage is said to be 'a mean concerning fears and feelings of confidence' (1115a6-7), not similar in respect to both emotions, but rather making more use of being confident, but as little as possible of fear. Also, a courageous person is more recognized by being fearless for the most part than by being afraid. In this way, then, it is said [to be a mean] concerning feelings of confidence and fears, by using both as one ought, and by a courageous man not occupying himself in a similar way with each of the emotions. 30 35 81,1

Since we are afraid of frightening things, it is worth knowing what frightening things are, so that it may be clear in respect to what kind of frightening thing a courageous person is praiseworthy when he is fearless. These will be clear when fear has been defined. People define fear as 'the expectation of an evil' (1115a9). Evils, then, are what we fear. Concerning what kinds of evils, then, and fear of what things is the courageous man fearless and the coward downcast instead? It is obvious that it is not about all kinds: for a courageous man is not fearless about ill repute or poverty or sickness or friendlessness. 'For one should fear some' (1115a12) of these things, and it is shameful not to fear ill repute. For a courageous person is not shameless but rather 5

respectful, and will guard against ill repute to the extent he can. One who is always disdainful of this is called shameless.

- 10 Perhaps someone may say that one should fear friendlessness but not poverty, or in general those things that are up to us, like vice; but nevertheless, we do not call those who are fearless about poverty courageous. For many people who are cowardly 'in matters of war' (1115a20) are fearless in respect to the spending of money and waste it confidently. But neither is one called a coward if one fears 'abuse of one's children or wife, or envy,'¹⁶⁹ nor if someone is confident when about to be whipped' (1115a22-4), as many slaves are, is he courageous. It is obvious, then, that a courageous person is fearless 'concerning the greatest' (1115a25) of evils. For this is why he seems most enduring <of terrible things; for death is the most frightening>¹⁷⁰ of evils, since it is the limit of being. For all people are afraid of not being.

- Is the courageous person, then, fearless concerning any death whatever, or not? For a person is not quite called courageous who is fearless in the worst [deaths] or in dangers at sea or in sickness, but rather one who is so 'in the noblest' (1115a30) deaths; such are those in war on behalf of one's country and one's dearest ones. For, for every virtue, what is noble is the end: thus, a brave person too chooses death on behalf of what is noble and is fearless in respect to this. 'One who is fearless concerning a noble death is strictly speaking courageous; and',
 20 he says, 'concerning those things that bring on death and are imminent' (1115a32-4). For a person who is fearless in respect to a death that is expected at a distance does not, perhaps, perform any great deed; for he is freed up in regard to his fear by time. But a person who is fearless in regard to a death that is imminent for the sake of what is noble possesses fearlessness in his habitual state.

- Primarily, then, a courageous person is fearless with regard to a noble death. It follows for him also to be fearless at sea and in sicknesses because of the preparation of his soul. For in fact a person who is fearless at sea is not called courageous for that: for the courageous person is not fearless for the same reason as seamen. For courageous people give up hope of safety, and sometimes even are displeased at such a death (for they would not wish to die in vain, but rather having performed some noble act), but they nevertheless bear it not ignobly.
 35 But seamen are not afraid because they are of high hopes on account of their experience.

- Aristotle then again says about people who are courageous at sea and bear the danger with due measure that they are accustomed to being manly [or showing courage] where there is 'prowess', that is a gallant action, or where 'dying is a noble thing' (1115b4-5). In wrecks at sea
 82,1 there is neither prowess nor is death noble, and yet, nevertheless, they bear it in due measure on account of the preparation of their soul, as we said.

He says that 'what is frightening is not the same for everyone'

(1115b7). For it is obvious that the same thing is not frightening for a courageous and a rash person, but rather each one fears in whichever way he happens to have the disposition. But perhaps it is possible to understand in another way the statement that different things are frightening to different people. For to one, ill repute is a frightening thing, and to another death, to another poverty, to another something else. 5

There is also something frightening, he said, 'beyond a human being' (1115b8), for example excessive earthquakes, descents of thunderbolts, and any other such things. Such a thing is frightening to everyone who has sense, and thus to a courageous person as well. Things that are humanly frightening differ, he says, 'in magnitude and greater and lesser' (1115b9-10). For some things are intensely frightening, and some less so; for example a great force of enemies, excellently equipped, can produce great fear, but one that is lesser in size and equipment would produce less fear. Similarly, it is sometimes possible to be intensely confident, when it is evident that we are stronger, and at other times less so. But nevertheless, the courageous person is 'dauntless', but 10
dauntless 'as a human being' (1115b11). For he will be afraid little by little and as the frightening things exceed those that are human in magnitude. But nevertheless he 'will endure' them 'for the sake of what is noble' (1115b12-13), and he will be confident as one should be and when one should be. 15

It is possible to fear frightening things both more and less. For in fact, among people who are neither courageous nor cowardly but middling, one fears the same things either more or less than another. It is also possible to fear things that are not frightening as though they were frightening, which is what the coward suffers. It is not that, just as virtue is distinguished by those numbers [sc. of ways] by which we always distinguish what things it should be productive of, and toward whom one ought [to direct it], and when one ought and to what extent one ought and how one ought and for the sake of what one ought, so too is vice. Rather, if someone deviates in any one of these things, what happens is already in accord with vice. That is why he says that, 'of errors' in respect to cowardice, one occurs because 'one ought not' [fear], 25
another because [one fears] 'not as one ought' (1115b15-16). It is possible for it to be transgressive of the 'when' or of any other such [categories].

'Similarly too concerning rash deeds' (1115b16-17): rash people are confrontational either when they ought not to be emboldened or toward those whom they ought not to be or in respect to some other of the above-mentioned distinctions. Someone who observes all of the above-mentioned distinctions is courageous, and above all that for the sake of which. For the end of every activity 'is the one in accord with its habitual state' (1115b21); for example, the end of the activity in house-building is the one in accord with the house-building state. So too, indeed, of actions in accord with courage, the end is the one in accord with courage; what is noble is the end of courage; hence too for actions in 30

accord with this virtue. Thus, a person who endures terrible things for the sake of what is noble is courageous. For each thing is defined by its end, that is, each action is believed to be noble or shameful because of its end. For if it is done for the sake of what is noble, the action is noble, but if it is done for the sake of what is shameful, it is shameful. For in fact courage is a noble thing, since its end is noble.

Those in accord with an excess of courage, as he said earlier (2.7, 1107a33), he takes to be several, [among them] one who exceeds in fearlessness, whom he calls nameless: for we are not accustomed to call certain people 'fearless', as we do 'rash'. 'One who was so' in all circumstances 'would be mad' (1115b26), if he did not even fear things that are beyond a human being. One who 'exceeds in being confident is rash; he seems also to be a boaster' (1115b28-9). He calls 'boasters' those who make pretence of having what they do not. Such too is the rash person: for he pretends to be courageous although he is not. 'In the things that he can, then, he imitates' (1115b31-2) the courageous person, but he is wrong: for he is emboldened before the terrible things occur, but when he comes to be in their midst, he does not endure them. 'That is why most of them are coward-rash' (1115b32). Homer made the barbarians an example of such people when he said, 'they came on with noise and shouting' (*Iliad* 3.2); for a clamour prior to the right moment is characteristic of those who are emboldened. Courageous people are quiet prior to the terrible events, but when they are in the midst of the terrible things, they show their confidence. An example of these are the Greeks, 'who came on in silence, breathing might' (Homer, *Iliad* 3.8).¹⁷¹

A person who exceeds in fearing and is deficient in being confident is a coward. Aristotle says that he is more manifest 'in exceeding in pains', that is in fear, for fear is a kind of pain. For not being confident and fearing are not said in the same way: for being confident is said of daring with respect to dangers, and further of being disdainful of enemies; but feeling pain indicates a person who is downcast in his soul and who is despairing and expects great evils.

'As has been stated, then', he says, 'courage is a mean concerning rash and frightening things, in the conditions that have been stated' (1116a10-11). For a person who, as was said, is rash and fearless about all evils is not courageous, but rather a person who is fearless with respect to death for the sake of what is noble. For on account of what is noble the courageous person endures terrible things, and because not enduring them is shameful. Some things provide an appearance of courageous people, but are still¹⁷² those of cowardly and weak people, 'for example to die while fleeing poverty or passionate love' (1116a12-13) or some other painful thing. For it is softness to flee laborious things. Softness is opposed to toughness, but nevertheless it is foreign to the courageous person.

Aristotle says that five other courages are also named homonymously with that which is properly speaking called courage; they are of

the type of homonymous things that are so called 'by similarity'. For they seem to be similar to courage, but one is more, another less.

First he sets out so-called political courage. For citizens endure dangers because of penalties from the laws and reproaches and because of the honours that are proffered to those who nobly risk danger. This one is most similar to courage on account of respect, which, if it is not a virtue, is nevertheless something similar to a virtue, for it is an emotive disposition. That it is praiseworthy will be stated in the accounts that concern it (4.15, 1128b10ff.). Things in accord with political virtue occur not only on account of respect, but also because of a desire for honour and 'avoidance of reproach' (1116a29); of these, honour is a noble thing, and reproach shameful. Someone who acts, then, in accord with political courage pretty much acts on account of what is noble, since he acts on account of honour – honour is a noble thing – or on account of avoidance of reproach, since reproach is shameful. But in fact a person who is really courageous will not act on account of honour or avoiding reproach, but rather even if he does not expect to be rewarded with honours he will act because of what is noble itself (what is noble is what reason too suggests), and not avoiding reproach but rather what is really shameful (it is shameful not to do things in accord with reason). But political courage most resembles this.¹⁷³

Performing¹⁷⁴ the deeds of courageous people 'when compelled by rulers' (1116a30), or those who are compelled by fear of death at the hands of rulers when they are going to risk danger, 'one might classify' (1116a29), as he says, under political courage, since these people too are serving the command of a ruler as though he were the law, but they are worse than those previously mentioned. For the former act on account of respect and desire for honour, but the latter on account of fear. It is by avoiding what is painful, accordingly, and not by aiming at what is honourable, that they run risks.

Another species of courage that has become homonymous with true courage is that¹⁷⁵ with respect to experience. For experience concerning each particular thing is thought to be courage. For at sea, surely, those who are experienced in the sea bear its dangers fearlessly, and those who are experienced in charioteering drive chariots fearlessly, and in athletic contests people compete fearlessly in whatever competition they happen to be experienced in. That is why 'Socrates thought' (1116b4), he says, that courage was knowledge. He says this, because Socrates believed that those who are experienced in terrible things were also knowledgeable about them. One must inquire whether the other companions of Socrates speak this way about courage, and the Socrates in Plato's *Laches* (cf. 195E, 196D).

'Different people are such in different things' (1116b5), he says, that is, experienced and for this reason enduring, and 'soldiers are in matters of war' (1116b6). He calls 'soldiers' those who permanently serve for pay. For these, on account of their experience, often stand firm in

battles and are thought to be courageous. But he explains what makes them stand firm: first, they know the 'vain things of war' (1116b7). For there are some things that seem frightening, but contain nothing frightening, and these he calls 'vain'. Then, on the basis of their experience they are able both to guard themselves and to strike, like good boxers, and they are experienced in using their arms. Further, they are
 35 best equipped in the arms themselves. They fight, then, like 'athletes
 85,1 against amateurs' (1116b13). 'For in fact in such contests', that is gymnastic ones, 'the most courageous are not the most battle-ready, but rather those who are strongest and the best in body' (1116b13-15). Or else Aristotle meant 'in such contests' to be about military matters, that is, in situations of war 'the most courageous are not the most battle-
 5 ready', and so forth. For the majority of people are soldiers when they are strong in body and at the peak of their youth; this, then, is why they stand firm. But none of them do so on account of what is noble. But soldiers are most put to the test when a great danger arises and they are inferior in numbers or equipment. 'For they flee first', he says, 'but the civic forces stand firm and die' (1116b17-18). By this he shows that
 10 political courage is far better than that on account of experience. But it too resembles courage: that is why soldiers stand firm in dangers like courageous people, and are neither afraid nor feel confident, again like courageous people, but not, however, on account of what is noble but rather on account of experience.

A third species of courage by homonymy is the high-tempered. For in
 15 fact those wild animals are called courageous which are high-tempered and are borne by temper against those who have wounded them. For 'courageous people are high-tempered' (1116b26-7), and temper above all propels them into dangers. Now, courageous people act on account of what is noble, and use their temper as a help. For temper causes them to be inspired in dangers. A courageous person, then, acts with temper, for temper is an effective thing. But a person who acts with temper,
 20 however, is not invariably courageous. One must understand the temper of the courageous person according to homonymy, not as a kind of frenzy but rather as temper sallying out along when reason orders it to. For we do not act the same way when we are dispirited and when temper rouses us. But wild animals are not strictly speaking courageous, because they attack either because of fear or because of the pain from the blow.

In general, those who run risks only on account of emotion are not
 25 courageous, since in this way 'adulterers too' (1117a1) would be courageous, for they do daring things on account of appetite. Neither those who endure dangerous things on account of appetite, then, nor those who do so on account of temper are truly courageous, but rather those who do so on account of what is noble. But courage on account of temper too resembles true courage, since the activity of what is really courage too is with temper and because courageous people are high-tempered.

Aristotle says that courage 'on account of temper seems to be most natural' (1117a4). For of all the homonymous courages perhaps political courage is the best, according to what has been said, but that on account of temper is natural, since temper is a natural thing and we human beings seem to aim by nature at taking revenge upon those who wrong us: and this is the function of temper. 30

He says that if such a disposition 'were to get in addition choice' (1117a4-5) and acting for the sake of what is noble, it would be courage. For a high-tempered person who got in addition noble choice on the basis of habit and reason and doing things in the midst of terrible situations for the sake of what is noble, would be truly courageous. 35

A fourth species of courage by homonymy is that of people with high hopes, who 'are confident', as he says, because they have 'been victorious' (1117a11) over many people and many times. These people too are similar to courageous people, since courageous people too are confident in terrible situations. People with high hopes too are confident, but not, however, on account of the same things, but rather people with high hopes are so 'because they think that they are stronger and cannot suffer anything' (1117a13-14). Aristotle says that they resemble people who get drunk: for in fact people who are drunk for the most part become high hopers, and people with high hopes become drunk, as it were, on their high hopes and for this reason are confident, since, if something were to happen to them contrary to their expectation, they would flee. 86,1 5

A courageous person endures 'things frightening to a human being' and above all 'those that appear so' (1117a16-17), because enduring them is noble and not enduring them is shameful. This is why he said 'frightening to a human being', since things that are beyond a human being a courageous person too fears, as was said previously. Having said that enduring things that are frightening to a human being is the mark of a courageous person, when he endures them on account of what is noble, he adds: 'that is why it is thought to be the mark of a more courageous person to be unperturbed in the midst of sudden fears' (1117a18-19), showing that a person who is really courageous, by virtue of having a habitual state of courage, is like this. The habitual state renders people ready to act in accord with it, as is also the case with other actions. For in fact a person who has an oratorical state orates readily, but even a person who did not yet have the habitual state sufficiently could speak after preparation. So too a person who has courage easily endures frightening things, even if they are sudden, and the things that he should both do and endure are quickly recognized. In what sense does he say that such people are more courageous? Is it on the grounds that there is slackening and intensification in courage, and because those who endure dangers after preparation too are courageous, but those who bear up under sudden dangers are more so? Or did he add 'is thought' for this reason? For perhaps a person who has the 10 15 20

habitual state is thought to be *more* courageous, but he alone is truly courageous [sc. and the other is not courageous at all].

In addition to all these Aristotle enumerates a fifth species of homonymous courage, that of people who are confident on account of ignorance, when they think that they are engaging with different
 25 enemies who are weaker than themselves and are confident for this reason. For they too resemble courageous people, because they are confident just as courageous people are, and 'they are not far from people with high hopes' (1117a23), as he says. For in fact these become high hopers on account of their ignorance, but they are worse than the ones with high hopes insofar as¹⁷⁶ they have no worth. For the latter are of high hopes because they have often been successful and advance with a certain resolution ('that is why they also stand firm for some time'
 30 (1117a24-5) in dangers), but if the former, who are deceived on account of ignorance, recognize that those against whom the battle is are different people and stronger than themselves, they quickly flee. This is what Aristotle says the Argives suffered: for they were advancing as though against the Sicyonians, of whom they were disdainful. But they were not Sicyonians but rather Lacedaemonians. When they fell upon them and recognized the Lacedaemonians, they quickly turned around and fled.

35 Although courage is about feelings of confidence and fears, he says
 87,1 that 'it is not similarly about both, but rather more about frightening things' (1117a29-30), not because fearing occurs more frequently than being confident, since in this respect, at least, courage is more about the feeling of confidence than about fear, which indeed we said previously (cf. 80,32), but rather because¹⁷⁷ [courage] is being fearless and unperturbed amidst frightening things. Both of these are marks of the
 5 courageous person – both the confidence and the fearlessness – but the courageous person is more typified by being fearless amidst terrible things. But he is not so because he is eager for terrible things, 'which is why courage' seems to be 'something painful' (1117a33-4). For it is enduring of terrible things and is justly praised. For it is harder 'to endure' painful things 'than to abstain from pleasant things' (1117a34-5). Thus, according to this account, it is more worthy of praise than temperateness is.

10 Now, the end of courage is what is noble and pleasant together. But what is pleasant in it seems 'to be obscured' (1117b2), that is, to become invisible, 'by the circumstances' (1117b1-2).¹⁷⁸ Aristotle calls the discomforts that courageous people endure amidst terrible things 'circumstances'. 'Death', he says, 'and wounds will be painful to the courageous person, and involuntary for him' (1117b7-8). He calls arduous things 'painful': for it is necessary for one who is human to suffer
 15 when fighting and being wounded, should it so happen. 'Involuntary', in turn, because he would not endure these things in themselves, nor the discomforts; 'but he endures them because it is noble or because not to'

endure them 'is shameful', and 'by how much the more', he says, 'he has virtue entire and is more happy' (1117b9-11), he will feel more pain over death – if it is in vain, obviously, and for the sake of nothing noble. 'But he is no less courageous' (1117b13), he says, in enduring death on account of what is noble, and even 'more', because instead of happiness in his life he chooses death on behalf of what is noble. 'To be active pleasantly does not, in fact, obtain in all the virtues' (1117b15-16): for activity in accord with liberality is pleasing, and that in accord with temperateness and similar virtues, but that in accord with courage is arduous. But it is pleasing to the extent that there is a reference to the end which is noble and pleasing.

'Nothing, perhaps, prevents such people [i.e. courageous people]', he says, 'from not being the best soldiers' (1117b17) and so forth, by which he shows that it is possible for soldiers – I mean mercenaries – to be useful, not because they are courageous, but because they are ready for death. For those who hire soldiers need such types more, but perhaps do not need mercenaries to be courageous,¹⁷⁹ unless they are seized by some great necessity and misfortune.

He says that it is not hard, on the basis of what has been said, to grasp what courage is: it would be, to take it in outline, a habitual state that renders people enduring of dangers and death for the sake of what is noble.

'After this, about temperateness' (1117b23). He says that temperateness and courage are virtues 'of the non-rational parts' (1117b24). For temperateness is a virtue of the appetitive part, and courage of the high-tempered part. He says that it is a mean concerning pleasures. When he defined it earlier (2.7, 1107b5) as a mean, he said that it was a mean concerning pleasures only, for it is less about pains. For a temperate person is said to be concerned with pains to the extent that he does not feel pain at the absence of pleasures, since the activity of temperateness is about pleasures.

'About what kinds' (1117b27) of pleasures it is a mean, he shows in a way by using the following kind of division. Of pleasures, some are bodily, some of the soul; and those of the soul are those in which the soul as such takes pleasure, whereas the bodily ones are those in which the soul takes pleasure by way of the body. For example, love of honour and love of learning.¹⁸⁰ For, he says, each of these – the lovers of honour and the lovers of learning – rejoice although the body is not affected at all, 'but rather the intellect' (1117b31). How does he mean that lovers of learning or lovers of honour rejoice when the intellect is affected? For rejoicing and pleasures, surely, are not in the intellect but in the emotive part of the soul. Did he, then, say 'intellect' in the more common way instead of 'soul', or is what is said something like this, that each of these people rejoices in the emotive part of the soul, but the body is not affected at all, as it is in the case of bodily pleasures, but rather the intellect? The intellect is aware that it is being affected by some such

thing when it attains what it wished, the intellect of the lover of learning that it has attained learning, that of the lover of honour, that it has attained honour. Upon this movement of the intellect, which he called 'an emotion', there follows pleasure in the part of the soul that is emotive.

Those who are concerned with the pleasures of the soul 'are called neither temperate nor dissolute' (1117b32), for neither do we call 'lovers of stories and story-telling' (1117b34) dissolute but rather chatters. Nor is temperateness or dissoluteness about pains of the soul. For we do not call those who feel pain at the loss of money or of a friend or rejoice at their acquisition either temperate or dissolute.

- 25 Temperateness appears then to be about bodily pleasures, but it is not about all bodily pleasures. So that it may become clear about which ones it is, one must distinguish the bodily pleasures. There are as many species of bodily pleasures as there are of senses. For, for as many as there are senses, there are that many bodily pleasures as well, some through sight, some through hearing, some through the other senses.
- 30 Neither temperateness nor dissoluteness is, indeed, about the pleasures of sight. For those who enjoy 'colours and shapes' (1118a4) and paintings are called neither moderate nor dissolute, although it is possible in these things 'to enjoy them as one ought and in excess and in deficiency' (1118a5-6). But neither is 'as one ought' [in this case] attributed to temperateness nor 'in excess' to dissoluteness nor 'in
- 35 deficiency' to the state that is adjacent to temperateness, which Aristotle sometimes terms 'insensibility'. Since, then, it is possible even in pleasures concerning sight to rejoice as one ought, there will seem to be
- 89,1 also some virtue. For 'as one ought' pertains to virtue and 'in excess' and 'deficiency' are vices. It is not easy to say what is the virtue and what the vices, then, that are about visible things. Is it, then, that they are not virtues but rather that such habitual states arise even in middling human beings and that those states that have measure are praiseworthy, whereas those that are contrary to measure are blameworthy? Or
- 5 that the measured states conform to practical intelligence, whereas those that are utterly at fault and without measure follow upon senselessness? Or do [the measured states] conform rather to temperateness? For temperateness in itself, he says, and will affirm as he proceeds, is about pleasures by way of touch. It goes along with the temperate person to be a viewer of visible things to the point that one should and of those things that one should and so too with the other distinctions, but with the dissolute person there goes along what is insatiable in all
- 10 these, and with the insensitive person being deficient in all.

Concerning these matters one must inquire: for one should say these [same] things also about things relating to touch and about those relating to smell. Aristotle himself, however, will maintain, in what follows, that there is neither temperateness nor dissoluteness concerning pleasures relating to hearing or those relating to smell: 'for we do

not call', he says, 'those who enjoy' the smells of incense or roses or apples 'dissolute' (1118a10-11), but rather those who enjoy intensely the smells of flavoured dishes and perfumes, because they get a 'recollection of their objects of appetite' (1118a13): they enjoy perfumes when recalling their mistresses, and aromatic dishes when they are thinking about the pleasure in eating. For it is possible for a dissolute person also to have enjoyment incidentally with the other above-mentioned senses. For upon seeing his mistress or a dish he rejoices as he thinks about the gratification, and upon hearing his mistress speak or conversations concerning dishes. This is not simply pleasure in seeing or in hearing, but it is so rather when someone takes pleasure and refers it to nothing other than to what is visible or audible, which a person who enjoys colours and shapes themselves experiences with respect to sight, and one who enjoys melodies themselves with respect to hearing. It is similar too in the case of smell: for smells are pleasing in themselves when someone takes pleasure in them and refers them to nothing other than the smell, for example those that are from flowers, but they are pleasing incidentally in reference to foods. That is why one may see other human beings, who are not called either temperate or dissolute, 'enjoying the smells of foods when they are hungry' (1118a14-15), but when they are not hungry no longer enjoying them, since the pleasure that comes from the foods does not follow of itself upon the smell, but rather incidentally.

He says that neither 'do other animals' have pleasure 'with respect to these senses' (I mean seeing, hearing, smell) 'except incidentally' (1118a16-18). For dogs do not enjoy 'the smells of hares' (1118a18) in the way that human beings do that of flowers, but rather through a recollection of eating. Nor does a lion enjoy 'the voice of an ox' (1118a20) the way a human being does a melody, but rather it enjoys the eating of the ox, and 'it has perceived by its voice that it is near; nor when it finds a stag' (1118a20-2) does it enjoy it the way a human being enjoys shapes or bodies, 'but rather because it has food' (1118a23). This is why he says that other animals have no pleasure through the above-mentioned senses, because they get no pleasures in the bare visibles or audibles or smellables, but rather the rest of the animals share in pleasures only through the recollection of the business of Aphrodite.¹⁸¹

'Temperateness and dissoluteness are about such pleasures, of which the rest of the animals partake too' (1118a23-5). These are the pleasures that are in touch and in taste. That is why 'they appear slavish and bestial' (1118a24), since they are common to non-rational creatures and slaves. 'They seem', he says, 'to make use of taste too, either a little or not at all' (1118a26-7). This he says either about dissolute people alone or also about temperate people, since temperate people enjoy smells in due measure, but dissolute people do so in excess – I mean the smells that come from foods and drinks. That is why it seems rather to be said about dissolute people. For [smell] is the discrimination of taste. Some

15 people have already formed such a habitual state so as to discern wines – the dry and the sweet – from their smells, and in general the difference among them, and they prepare dishes by smelling them. Thus through the same state it is possible for a dissolute person to enjoy these very smells excessively. But nevertheless he says that they do not enjoy them in themselves, ‘but rather the gratification’, which is entirely ‘through
 20 touch both in food and in drink and in the so-called business of Aphrodite’ (1118a30-2). Aristotle added ‘so-called’, showing a caution fitting for a philosopher. For he himself does not name it ‘the business of Aphrodite’, but rather he is using the name it is given.

Having said that perception, through which there is dissoluteness, is common to all animals (for it is through touch, which is common to all
 25 animals), he adds: ‘and it might seem to be justly reproachable, because it is not insofar as we are human beings that it pertains to us, but insofar as we are animals’ (1118b2-3). This, in fact, involves a certain puzzle. For dissoluteness and in general every vice seem to be specific to the human being, whereas no other animal is dissolute; for neither is any temperate, but rather those that we call dissolute we call that way metaphorically speaking, on account of their hypersexuality. Aristotle
 30 seems, then, to be saying this: dissoluteness is reproachable, because we enjoy the pleasures that are productive of it not insofar as we are human beings, but rather insofar as we are animals. For the pleasures that are productive of it are through touch, and these are common to animals. This is why he adds: ‘it is bestial to enjoy these things and like them very much’ (1118b3-4), obviously. And he adds, wishing to show unalloyedly what kinds of pleasures dissoluteness and temperateness
 35 are about: for neither are they about all pleasures through touch; for they are not about those pleasures that arise ‘in gymnasia through rubbing down and warming’ (1118b5-6), which in fact are the most liberal pleasures among those coming from touch and least common to
 91,1 other animals, ‘but rather about certain parts’ (1118b7-8).

Wishing next to make the differences among dissolute people clear, he first differentiates the appetites upon which the pleasures follow.
 5 For as many species as there are of appetite, so many are there too of pleasures. Thus, if the pleasures are clear, the species of dissoluteness too will be evident. For each dissoluteness concerns a different pleasure.

Of appetites, ‘some are common, and some are individual and acquired’ (1118b8-9). He calls the natural appetites ‘common’. These, as he proceeds to say, are for those things which, when we are lacking them, we desire replenishment, for example the appetite for dry or
 10 liquid nourishment. Along with these would also be the appetite for the bed, above all in those who are young. He contrives in addition¹⁸² to the natural appetites certain individual and added ones or even appetites wholly contrary to nature. He calls them ‘added’, because they are added on and have not been introduced by nature itself.

The division of the appetites, then, would be such as this. Some are

natural, and some are individual. Of the individual, some are sick
 appetites for things that are within what is natural, whereas others are
 utterly contrary to nature. What is strictly speaking natural is for a
 person who is lacking something simply to desire replenishment. In
 this, he says, people err 'toward one thing' (1118b16), when they desire
 to overfill themselves with something, not invariably because they have
 an appetite for expensive foods or drinks but sometimes for whatever
 there may be. Such people are few and most slavish, and they are called
 gluttons. Of the individual pleasures there are some, as we said, among
 the natural ones, since they are not simply [based on appetites] for
 more. These pleasures are mentioned because they are not excessive in
 the desire as such for satiety, but rather in being intense and vehement
 about it; these people, indeed, are called 'lovers of such-and-such', for
 example lovers of wine, lovers of women, and lovers of life. That is why
 he says that the desire for nourishment and for the bed is natural, but
 those for this particular food or bed [i.e. sexual partner] are no longer
 for every kind or [always] for the same things.

'This is why it appears to be our own' (1118b12-13). It is obvious that
 some simply desire replenishment and are not overpreoccupied with
 food, while others invariably crave expensive food and get excited about
 the expensiveness of dishes and wines. What is 'our own', indeed,¹⁸³ is
 either being sick in respect to these things or not. But he says that such
 desires have something natural, at all events. 'For to different people
 different things' (1118b14) are pleasing and to some, indeed, whatever
 there may be is more pleasing than expensive things. It is obvious that
 some people are pleasantly disposed by nature toward such particular
 flavours, for example toward sweet or dry wines. Now this, perhaps, is
 natural, but to get excited over something and be vehement about it is
 already 'our own'.

It is in respect to this that he said here that what is natural is 'toward
 one thing', since these errors too were said to be among natural things.
 Or else it is that, as we said before, natural appetite is for replenish-
 ment, but being overfilled is a fault in this appetite. Intensified <and
 sick appetites for a particular thing>,¹⁸⁴ concerning which they would
 already be individual, are natural, but they somehow transgress nature
 by producing a kind of individual form of appetites. That he means it in
 this way he will make more clear as he proceeds: for he says 'many
 people, in many ways, err greatly concerning the individual pleasures'
 (1118b21).

'For of those who are called lovers of such-and-such' (1118b22) to 'as
 the many do not enjoy' (1118b27). For in these words Aristotle outlines
 two kinds of individual pleasures, one characteristic of those who enjoy
 things one should not, which is utterly contrary to nature and is not
 even worthy to be named. (These are kinds of dissolute [pleasures].¹⁸⁵
 †For many kinds are classified under the one kind of appetites contrary
 to nature.†¹⁸⁶) The other is enjoying 'more than as the majority does as

one should' (1118b23-4).¹⁸⁷ The majority are the measure; for the majority tend pretty much to not being excessive in their pleasures, but they are not exact. Dissolute people, then, enjoy more or in a worse way than as the majority do, whereas temperate people enjoy in a better way than the majority. The phrase 'not as one should' or 'as one should'¹⁸⁸ is like this, that they act more as one should not than as one should. Just as,
 15 then, there are two highest kinds of desires, the one common, the other individual, and of the individual one kind is among things in accord with nature, so too among pleasures there can be the same number of kinds of dissoluteness, and these too exhibit a double kind. For either people aim at pleasures that are contrary to nature, or, among things in accord with nature, [enjoy] more than one should and not as one should, which¹⁸⁹ become sick pleasures. Under these last are several kinds: love of food, love of wine, and all such.

- 20 'That dissoluteness is an excess concerning pleasures' (1118b27-8) is obvious. Temperateness and dissoluteness are said to be 'about pains' (1118b28-9) not by virtue of enduring them, like courage, but rather, as has been said several times by now, a temperate person is so called because he does not feel pain at the absence of pleasures, whereas the dissolute person is so called because he does feel pain. For he feels pain, as Aristotle says, 'when he fails to obtain them, and while he is appetitive'
 25 'ive' (1119a3-4) he feels pain. For every appetite is accompanied by pain. For someone who has an intense appetite for pleasure feels pain intensely. To feel pain on account of pleasure seems like something amazing, but it is not amazing. For a person does not feel pain when he possesses pleasure, but rather when he is aiming at it and believes that he is lacking the most pleasing things.

- People who are deficient concerning pleasures 'do not occur often. For such insensibility is neither human' (1119a6-7) nor characteristic of any
 30 animal. 'For in fact other animals discriminate' (1119a7-8) what is pleasing and painful in their food. '<If for someone one thing does not differ>¹⁹⁰ from another' (1119a9) in regard to pleasure, he resembles something inanimate. The type is nameless because it does not occur, but Aristotle sometimes calls it insensitive.

- 'The temperate person is in the middle' (1119a11) concerning all these things. For he neither enjoys the things that the dissolute person does (for the latter takes pleasure in excesses of pleasure, but the former is disgusted by excesses), nor in general does he enjoy things
 35 that one ought not. For he does not welcome lack of measure in the natural pleasures, and he can neither bear to hear nor does he have an appetite for those that are contrary to nature. But with due measure he
 93,1 desires those that are necessary, and those that lead to health and well-being – with due measure and not so as to aim at any of them contrary to what is noble or beyond his resources. For in fact it is specific to the temperate person not to indulge in pleasures beyond his resources.

Cowardice and dissoluteness are, then, among voluntary things. For we choose pleasure voluntarily, and dissoluteness resides in not choosing <the pleasures one should or choosing>¹⁹¹ the pleasures one should not. For we are driven and pursued involuntarily for the sake of¹⁹² pleasure and pain. Cowardice too is such a thing. For pain diverts a person from things in accord with nature and somehow corrupts the nature of one who has it, whereas pleasure possesses nothing of the kind, as Aristotle says. Now, some people are carried away even by pleasures, but not so far as to be confounded in their natural condition, which is thought rather to be in accord with physical pain and hurt. 'That is why this is more reproachable' (1119a25) than what is less voluntary.

Furthermore, it is easy to become habituated to mastering pleasures. For those who are habituated are out of danger, and thus not habituating oneself to holding out against pleasures is rightly more reproachable¹⁹³ than not habituating oneself to enduring fears. Things in connection with cowardice have a certain other contrast in respect to those done through dissoluteness. For cowardice in itself is painless, for someone who has this habitual state is not aggrieved, but the particular things that happen in this state are painful and terrible. For cowards are beside themselves amidst terrible things and in their fear they are distressed and behave in terribly disgraceful ways. It is the reverse with <things in connection with pleasures>.¹⁹⁴ That is why they appear voluntary, for they occur to one who has an appetite for them and enjoys them. But the habitual state is painful: for those who have it are distressed in the case of dissoluteness, because it is extremely reproachable. This is why Aristotle says: 'for no one has an appetite to be dissolute' (1119a33).

'We apply the term "dissoluteness" also', as he says, 'to childish faults' (1119a33-4). For we call certain children dissolute, who are disobedient to their tutors and commit many childish faults. Aristotle says that it makes no difference to the present argument whether the name has been transferred from children to dissolute men or the reverse, but 'it is obvious that the latter' was named 'from the prior' (1119b2-3). One can say, in one way, that 'from this' means it has been transferred 'from the dissolute child to the man'. For 'the prior [i.e. former]' is the man. But one can say, in another way, that it means 'from the man to the child'. For the more complete is simply prior to the incomplete, and the man is more complete. But it makes no difference which was transferred from which, but rather they have a great similarity. 'For everything that desires shameful things and has much increase should be chastised' (1119b3-4), and appetite is such a thing. For it often desires shameful things, and if it is not prevented and chastised, it achieves great progress. A child is such a thing: 'for children too live in accord with appetite' (1119b5-6) and achieve much progress toward both: toward the good, if they are chastised, and toward the contrary, if

- they remain dissolute.¹⁹⁵ For in children there is a great ‘desire for what is pleasing’ (1119b6-7). In a child, then, the appetite of those who are governed by tutors or teachers should be obedient. For a tutor has his specific reason,¹⁹⁶ and in a man the appetitive part should be subordinated as though under a tutor who possesses reason. And in this way, then, dissoluteness in children resembles that in men. For in both the appetitive disobeys that which governs. People should be obedient and subordinated to what rules. If not, dissoluteness proceeds so far that sometimes, in men, their many and intense appetites ‘knock out reasoning’ (1119b10), that is, render it useless. But the appetites should be measured and not be opposed to reason. For this is what being chastised is: for a child ‘to live according to the instruction of his tutor’ (1119b13-14) and for a man according to the instruction of reason. The appetitive part of a temperate person is in harmony with reason and is not carried away by being tyrannized like that of the self-controlled person, but rather is so educated as to have an appetite for what it should and all the rest, in accord with the other distinctions.¹⁹⁷ For thus reason too bids.

95,1

On Book 4 of the *Ethics* of Aristotle

1119b22-1120b27 ‘We speak next about liberality’ to ‘and be excessive in gifts’.

- 5 This consideration is suitable to discovering the kinds of things concerning which each virtue is a mean. For the activity of each virtue concerns those things in connection with which it is praised. For example, temperateness is praised in connection with the use of bodily pleasures, for its activity is about these, and, accordingly, it is a mean concerning pleasures. It is similar too concerning the other virtues. And since liberality is praised in connection with the giving and receiving of commodities (*khřēmata*), it is obvious both that its activities are about commodities and that it is a mean concerning the giving and receiving of commodities. By ‘commodities’ in a general sense is meant all things, as when we say ‘he did a certain *khřēma*’ instead of ‘he did a certain thing’; and from this is said ‘do commodities’ (*khřēmatiszō*, i.e. ‘engage in business’). But ‘commodities’ is said especially of things whose value is measured in coin, for example houses, slaves, furniture, equipment, cattle, and all such things. It is possible to measure by coin how much each of these things is worth. In this meaning virtue is not a ‘commodity’ (*khřēma*) for it is not possible to say how much money (*khřēmata*) it is worth, for it exceeds all value. Similarly, neither is friendship an evaluable commodity, but rather it exceeds the value of money. Likewise too parents and country and, simply, all things that exceed the possession of money.
- 20

But the definition of what are thus called commodities seems not altogether adequately rendered. For coin itself and money are not

measured by coin. Thus, the complete definition is pretty much as follows: a commodity is either coin or that of which the worth is measured in coin. But coin itself, too, is especially called a commodity, for example when we say that so-and-so lent 'commodities'. Thus, 'commodity' (*khreîma*) is said in three senses, of which it is clear which one Aristotle has used: for it is the second of the above-mentioned ways. 96,1

Aristotle says that illiberality and profligacy concerning commodities are excesses and deficiencies. He said jointly about both that they are excesses and deficiencies not unreasonably, but did so rather because each of them is both. For profligacy is excessive in giving <but deficient in receiving, whereas illiberality is deficient in giving>¹⁹⁸ but is excessive in receiving. But in fact, although each of them is an excess and a deficiency, nevertheless Aristotle is sometimes in the habit of calling profligacy excess and illiberality deficiency, since liberality is typified more in respect to moderated giving, and in this the profligate person is excessive, while the illiberal person is deficient. As regards the primary activities of liberality, then, profligacy is the excess, illiberality is the deficiency. 10

To one who considers simply and purely the essence of each, and the nature of both illiberality and profligacy, illiberality appears to be a certain habitual state that is more eager 'than one should be about commodities' (1119b29-30), whereas profligacy is a state that is destructive of one's existing commodities. That is why one who has this habitual state is also called 'profligate' (*asôtos*), as being an 'unsalvageable' (*asôtos*) person, that is, one who is ruined thanks to himself.¹⁹⁹ For living is believed to be by way of commodities, and one who destroys these in a sense ruins himself as well. 15

Simply, then, as I said, each of the vices is typified in the above-mentioned way, but people for the most part are accustomed to call profligate not those who destroy their substance in any way at all, but rather those who are 'lacking in control and are spendthrifts for the purpose of dissoluteness' (1119b31-2), weaving together two vices, dissoluteness and profligacy. 'This is why they seem to be most base' (1119b32) who are said to be profligate in this way. For they have many vices simultaneously, lack of control, profligacy, and dissoluteness. 25

Next he says: of the things that have 'a use' (*khreia*), it is possible to use them both well and badly' (1120a4-5) (he is calling 'usefulness' (*khreîsis*) 'use' (*khreia*)); for the things that it is possible to use it is possible to use both well and badly. For example, it is possible to use money, and it is possible to use money well and badly, and likewise a slave, house, furniture, and all such things. 30

Perhaps one might pose a puzzle concerning virtue and vice. For we say that we employ both of these and yet we do not, surely, employ either virtue badly or vice well.²⁰⁰ But we say to those who speak this way, that neither of these is among things we use, but rather virtue and vice are something that uses other things. For we primarily say that a 35

97,1 human being uses *things*. There is a way in which we say that the soul too is what uses something, since it is by means of this above all that a human being uses things;²⁰¹ and further, virtue and vice use things, because the soul too, by means of these, uses those things of which there is a use, the former [i.e. virtue] well, the latter badly.

5 The argument, then, runs as follows: it is possible to use those things of which there is a use well and badly; wealth is one of these things of which there is a use; it is possible, consequently, to use wealth too well and badly.

‘A person who has virtue concerning each thing uses it’ (1120a5-6) well: for example, the person who has excellence concerning a lyre uses a lyre best, and this is the musician; the person who has excellence concerning horses uses a horse best, and this is the horseman; and the
10 person who has excellence concerning wealth uses wealth best, and ‘this is the liberal person’ (1120a7-8).

Aristotle did not say it in the way we have said it, that wealth is one of the things of which there is a use, but rather that ‘wealth is among the useful things’ (1120a5), as if he were saying that wealth is one of the things of which there is use and such as to be among the useful things.²⁰² For not everything of which there is a use is also useful. For
15 there is a use of poverty and sickness, but neither of these is a useful thing. But rather of the things we use those are called useful that a worthy person who is in accord with nature would primarily use, and that is why they also seem to be good things.

Having drawn the conclusion that the liberal person best uses wealth and commodities, Aristotle says what the use of commodities is. For use
20 and possession differ. Spending and giving are use, whereas receiving and guarding are possession. That is why liberality resides more in giving to whom one ought and when one ought and as much as one ought and according to the other distinctions than in ‘receiving <whence one ought and not receiving>²⁰³ whence one ought not’ (1120a10-11), since receiving resembles possession, whereas giving resembles use. The liberal person is so in the use of commodities. For ‘doing a good’
25 rather than ‘being done a good’ (1120a12) is the mark of virtue. Doing a good resides in giving, but being done a good resides in receiving. Consequently, giving is more proper to liberality.

Furthermore, it is a mark of virtue ‘to do noble things rather than not to do shameful things’ (1120a12-13). For to be praised is more proper to virtue than not to be blamed. For both are characteristic of a virtuous person, but the primary function is to do noble things. Thus, the
30 primary function of liberality is a giving away that occurs as it ought; for praise arises for this. Not receiving badly does not earn praise: rather, it is sufficient that one is not blamed. Further, virtue is in the more difficult and harder things: to give away what is one’s own is more
98,1 difficult than <not>²⁰⁴ receiving what is another’s. Thus, liberality is thought to be more about giving than about not receiving.

Furthermore, not receiving is common also to justice: just people, surely, are also praised when they do not receive gifts and prefer what is just to commodities, but to give commodities is specific to liberal people. Liberality, then, is about that in which what is specific to liberality resides. 5

One must not suppose that Aristotle is saying about this that liberality is not about not receiving whence one ought not and about receiving, if ever it should be necessary, whence one ought, but rather that the primary function of liberality and that in respect to which it is typified is giving. What he said at the end of all the above-mentioned points is true. For those who do not receive as one ought <not>²⁰⁵ are not praised, but rather they are not blamed. Also true is what is said next (1120a21), that liberal people are more loved by human beings. For just and prudent and wise people are sometimes envied, and some believe that temperate people are vulgar and pretentious, but liberal people are exceptionally loved. For human beings enjoy receiving, and liberal people enjoy giving. That is why people nevertheless love those who are given to spending too much, even though they are not liberal: it is because they have something similar to liberal people. 10 15

Since all 'actions in accord with virtue are noble and for the sake of what is noble, the liberal person too' (1120a23-4) will give for the sake of what is noble and this will be his aim, just as with other virtuous people, and he will give rightly: for he will give 'to whom one ought and as much and when and the rest' (1120a25), by which 'rightly' is defined; and in addition to all these things he will give 'pleasurably' or at all events 'painlessly' – for everything 'in accord with virtue is pleasing or painless' and 'least painful' (1120a26-7).²⁰⁶ Perhaps he added 'least painful' because of courage: for a certain disagreeableness and physical pain attend the activity of courageous people, but nevertheless the pain is overcome by the pleasure that derives from what is noble. 20 25

'One who gives to those one ought not or not for the sake of what is noble' (for it is possible to give to those one ought but not for the sake of what is noble) 'but rather for any other reason' (1120a27-9), for example on account of reputation and honour or so that one may receive more or on account of fear – none of these people, indeed, is termed liberal but rather either a popularity-seeker or ambitious or scoundrelly. Nor again, in general, is a person who gives indeed, but feels pain at it, as some people sometimes do who pay taxes to their countries or contribute privately, but are distressed in doing so. For such an action is not liberal. For a liberal person should take much more pleasure in giving than the one who receives [in receiving]. 30

What he says next is obvious, that it is characteristic of the liberal person that he will not receive 'whence one ought not: for receiving' contrary to what is proper 'is not the mark of a person who does not honour commodities; nor would he be given to asking for things, either: for to be done a service unscrupulously is not the mark of one who does 35

a good thing', (1120a31-4) he says. However, some say that it is characteristic of the same person both to do a good and to be done a good, and that to be done a good suits a good person. Aristotle says that both are the mark of a virtuous and liberal person, but that virtue is both spoken and thought of in relation to doing a good more than being done a good, and that is why virtue seems to be a divine thing and a kind of
 5 resemblance to god. For what is divine is thought of not in relation to being done a good but to doing a good. A liberal person, then, he says, will receive whence one ought, 'for example from his own possessions, not as a noble thing but rather as something necessary so that he may have the ability to give' (1120a34-b2) – that is, 'have the ability' to be active in accord with liberality.

What follows (1120b2-3) is in itself an observation on what pertains
 10 to a liberal person, just like most of what has been said, but it is of benefit also in regard to the impression associated with liberal people. For those who are neglectful of their own possessions give the impression of liberal people to those who do not consider the matter rightly, but it is not the mark of a liberal person to be neglectful of his own things, but rather the opposite. For how will he have enough for those to whom he should give if he does not take care of his own? That is why the art of household management too is a kind of virtue. For every
 15 virtuous person is concerned with that by the use of which he will be active in accord with the relevant virtue. A courageous person, surely, is concerned with strength, so that he may be able to be active in accord with the virtue. It is much the same for a courageous person to be neglectful of strength as for a liberal person to be neglectful of possession, since the activities of the afore-mentioned virtues occur by means of these. Sometimes a liberal person will leave even less for himself if
 20 reason so determines; for he does not altogether look to himself but rather to what is noble.

What is said next too is obvious, that liberality is 'in accord with one's resources' (1120b7), because it does not consist in giving lots of things. For something is noble when it comes from a habitual state: for example, what is in accord with courage is noble when it arises from courage. What is in accord with liberality too is noble, accordingly, when it arises from a habitual state. For it is characteristic of a habitual state to
 25 observe all the above-mentioned distinctions: when one ought and to whom one ought, for the sake of which, and how much. One who gives not according to his resources but is excessive or deficient transgresses the 'how much'. 'Nothing prevents one who gives less', he says, 'from being more liberal, if he gives from lesser possessions' (1120b9-11), than one who gives more from greater possessions, but not in line with his resources. Similarly, nothing too prevents one who has less, but gives
 30 more, from being profligate and not liberal in line with his resources, or the one who gives less from being more liberal. In what sense did he say 'the one who gives less is more liberal'? Is it that the one is less, the other

more liberal? But if indeed that other transgresses and does not give in line with his resources or observe just how much one ought to give away, he is not liberal. Is there, then, slackening and intensification in the incomplete virtues (let the argument be for the case of liberality)? For example, if someone is in all things exact in giving to whom one should and when one should and for the sake of what is noble and all the rest, but is deficient in quantity? But perhaps he did not mean 'more liberal' in this sense, but rather, as he is often in the habit of saying when he compares things, when one is [a certain way] and the other is not so at all: for example, that one who is deliberative is more prudent, and one who is not is less, the one being [simply] prudent and the other not.²⁰⁷

What is said next is not universal but is rather the case for the most part. For 'those who have not acquired but rather inherited' (1120b11-12) are only for the most part more liberal than those who have acquired [their wealth] by themselves, since often it is just the contrary. What follows this too does not necessarily happen, but rather for the most part, namely that a liberal person does not easily become rich (1120b14-15) (for the reasons he says), but by care and by not giving to whom one ought not he will have enough available for proper use.

Since one who spends beyond his resources is profligate, we do not call tyrants profligate: for no expense seems to exceed the extent of their resources. On the contrary, we are sometimes in the habit of disparaging tyrants and kings as base when they do not spend in accord with their resources.

1120b27-1122a17 'Liberality, then, being a mean' to 'let this much be said'.

Just as the arts too reveal themselves in great works and in small – for example, Polyclitus made his art clear by producing both great and small works – so too a virtuous person makes clear what is noble both in great things and in small. And 'a liberal person, indeed, will both give and spend on the things one ought and as much as one ought, and in great and small things alike, and this pleasurably' (1120b28-30) – for to be active pleasurably is common to the virtues – 'and he will receive whence one should' (1120b30-1). And in fact Aristotle says that decent receiving accompanies decent giving. For giving seems, simply, to be contrary to receiving: for giving is, as it were, a loss, whereas receiving is acquisition. But in fact decent giving is not a loss but rather a use of one's things and a noble use; similarly, receiving is not simply acquisition but one that occurs for proper use. Thus, they are not contrary to each other but rather accompanying. For if a person is such as to give something in a noble way, he is also such as to receive in a noble way, and vice versa. The contraries do not occur in the same person. Base receiving is contrary to decent giving, and of these the latter occurs in a decent person, while the former occurs in a wicked one.

What he says next is necessary. For if a person takes pleasure in spending in a noble way, but is compelled to spend in a bad way or upon those people whom one ought not, either by tyrants or by the city, he will feel pain, but with due measure:²⁰⁸ what pains him will be not the cost or the expense but rather the fact that it occurs improperly. Since
 100,1 some people believe that a virtuous person feels pain at nothing at all, Aristotle adds a remark and says that 'it is characteristic of virtue' – that is, of someone who has virtue – 'to feel pleasure and pain in the things that one ought and in the way one ought' (1121a3-4). For the emotive part of the soul has not been stripped away from him, but rather made orderly. It is necessary, then, that he have some moderate
 5 pain for activities that are not appropriate, since he is a human being and a lover of what is noble. But he makes it clear that he feels pain not at the cost, but at the activity that occurs improperly, when he says that he is more aggrieved if 'he has not spent what it is proper to' (1121a6).

He says that it was previously mentioned that 'profligacy and illiberality are excesses and deficiencies' (1121a10-11). For in each of them,
 10 as has been said, there is both excess and lack. Since it pertains to each of them to be in two forms, 'in taking and in giving' (1121a11-12), and spending is, properly speaking, called giving, the profligate person is thought to be a spendthrift (let spending, he says, be giving in a general sense).

Having said that illiberality is excessive in receiving, he added, 'but in small things' (1121a15); obviously²⁰⁹ the illiberal person is not said to exceed in virtue of receiving great things but rather, on the contrary, in
 15 receiving small things often and from everywhere and from wherever he can, not hesitating to receive whatever he can and in whatever way he can.

Since he assumed that profligacy is excessive in giving but deficient in receiving, he believes that it is such in accord with its definition. 'But they are not at all coupled, for it is not easy for one who receives from nowhere to give to everyone' (1121a16-17), because private people
 20 completely exhaust their resources – 'and they too are believed', he says, 'to be profligate' (1121a18-19). He added this because kings are believed to be profligate and they can give although they do not receive. A person who is such as to be really profligate in giving to all but not receiving 'is in no small degree better' (1121a19) than the illiberal person. For he is curable 'both by age', since for the most part young people are profligate in this way, 'and by lack' (1121a20-1) – for it too is itself adept at
 25 compelling one to be temperate, and one may advance to the mean by having the characteristics of a liberal person [i.e. by in fact not giving too much]. 'For in fact he gives and does not receive' (1121a22-3), but erroneously. If, then, he should change through habit or in any other way, he would arrive at liberality. But one who is really profligate is far better than the illiberal person.

Most people, however, do not have both the above-mentioned charac-

teristics – I mean giving and not receiving – but rather they blend and mix together profligacy and illiberality into the same thing: for they continually receive whence they ought not so that they may have the wherewithal to spend openhandedly, but at the same time they do not have a thought for what is noble and so do not hesitate to supply themselves in shameful ways. That is why not even their givings are liberal: for they neither give for the sake of what is noble, as is the aim for all virtuous people, nor do they do good to those whom one ought but rather to flatterers or to those who provide some other pleasure. That is why most of them are dissolute, since they divert their extravagance toward pleasures. 30 102,1

But profligacy that is really such is curable, as has been said, whereas ‘illiberality is incurable’ (1121b12-13). He called it ‘incurable’ instead of ‘hard to cure’, since for the most part ‘old age and every kind of <disability>’²¹⁰ (1121b13-14) seem to make people illiberal. For those who are too weak in their bodies and disabled in many respects become illiberal because they believe that they lack many things. Furthermore, because illiberality is more native to human beings, it is harder to cure. For it has been said (2.8, 1109a15) that those things to which we human beings incline and in respect to which we are susceptible are hard to cure. And most people incline more toward love of commodities than toward <giving things away>.²¹¹ 5 10

Aristotle says that illiberality is of many kinds. For practically every vice is of many kinds, as he said earlier (2.5, 1106b29), and illiberality no less than any other. ‘For since it consists in two things’ (1121b17-18), an excess of receiving and a deficiency of giving, ‘it does not occur entire in all people’ (1121b19), but some are illiberal in receiving and are excessive in this, while some are only deficient in giving, but do not think it right to receive. There are many names for these people: ‘miserly’, ‘stingy’, ‘skinflints’. Some do not receive because of decency – or apparent decency:²¹² they say that they are protecting their own possessions ‘so that they may not ever be compelled to do something shameful’ (1121b25-6). Others refrain from other people’s things through fear, believing that it is not very easy, when they receive other people’s things, not to give something away. 15

Aristotle next makes it clear also who those people are who are excessive in receiving. They are those who think it right to receive from everywhere and believe that no profit is shameful, for example brothel-keepers and tax farmers and those who lend in small amounts and at high interest. For these are in every way shameless profiteers. For they submit to anything whatsoever for the sake of a small profit, since those who make great profits whence one ought not ‘we do not call illiberal’ but rather wicked and ‘impious and unjust’ (1121b3-7), for example tyrants who sack cities and despoil temples. He alerts us that the robber, too, and the gambler are illiberal, although they seem to some to be lavish: for the robber risks the greatest dangers for the sake of 25

little profit, and gamblers ‘make a profit from their friends’ (1122a10-11), together with whom they spend the day and live, and they take pleasure when they send them off naked.

- 30 It is said that ‘illiberality is reasonably’ opposed to ‘liberality’ (1122a13-14): for in fact it is a greater ‘evil than profligacy’ (1112a14-15), and human beings err more in its direction.

- 103,1 **1122a18-1123a33** ‘[To speak] also about munificence would seem something that follows’ to ‘nor very indecorous’.

- That speaking about munificence follows upon speaking about liberality, whether as a species of a genus or as a part of a whole, is obvious. But one must consider whether they are the same thing or not when we
 5 have stated in what it differs from liberality. For liberality is about giving and receiving, but munificence is about giving. For let expense and munificence be called, in common, giving, as Aristotle thought right; further, liberality is not only about great but also about small givings, whereas munificence, as the name itself indicates [*megalo-*
 10 *prepeia*, literally ‘greatly conspicuous’], is expense that is conspicuous in magnitude; thus, it is about expenditures that have magnitude. Given that it is such, is it a species or a part of liberality? For if it is a species, since no genus has one species but rather several, how shall we divide liberality? Or shall we say that one species of it is about giving, and another about receiving, and that of that which is about giving, one species concerns great expenditures, the other small ones – and that of
 15 these, the large and great expenditure is called munificence, whereas the others are nameless?

- But it would seem to be absurd to differentiate liberality into two species, the one concerning giving and the other receiving. For liberality is not thought to be in respect to this – that is, giving alone. For if someone is at fault in respect to <receiving, even if he is correct in respect to> giving,²¹³ he is no longer liberal; but neither is a person who receives rightly liberal, if he does not also give nobly. At the same time,
 20 if the definition of liberality is that it ensures correctness in giving and receiving, it would not fit either of the species [separately].

- Munificence rather resembles, then, a part of liberality. For in fact in this sense it is possible to say that if there is some munificence, there is liberality, but if there is some liberality, there is not invariably munificence, just as if someone should differentiate the medical art into
 25 three parts – medicinal, dietary, and surgical – one would say that if something is medicinal, it is invariably medical, but if something is medical, it is not invariably medicinal. If someone can call these too the species of the medical art, nothing prevents munificence too from being a species of liberality.

The munificent person is reasonably said to consider the expenditure that is suitable in magnitude. ‘For magnitude is in relation to some-

thing' (1122a24) – for it is the magnitude of something. If, then, there is a different magnitude for different works, he will consider the one that is suitable to each. 'For the same expenditure is not' (1122a24) appropriate for one who outfits a ship and an ambassador. The munificent person, then, will inquire into what is suitable 'in respect to himself and in what and about what' (1122a25-6). Aristotle said 'in what' and 'about what' equivalently: 'in what' thing and 'about what' thing the expenditure is. For one expenditure is proper when someone is establishing a munificent temple, another when one is surrounding one's own city with walls, another when one is outfitting a chorus, another when one is in charge of athletic training. In accord with each of these the munificent person will spend suitably, aiming at the magnitude that is proper to each.

'A person who in small things and in moderate things spends in accord with their worth' (1122a26) and so forth: by 'small' Aristotle has clearly shown the difference between the munificent person and the liberal person. For liberality is about small and moderate expenditures, since the liberal person is no less such in small expenses as well. For his essence is not in spending great amounts, as it is for the munificent person, but rather in doing so nobly. One must know that just as niggardliness differs from illiberality, and tastelessness and vulgarity differ from profligacy, so too munificence will differ from liberality. Those who are excessive in spending on what one ought not are also called vulgar, and not only those who work at forges, that is furnaces.²¹⁴ And it is obvious from what he says that liberal activities can also occur among those who are not wealthy, whereas munificent activities require wealth.

'Of such a habitual state' – I mean munificence – 'the deficiency is called niggardliness, and the excess' (1122a29-31) seems to be nameless, but he calls it vulgarity and tastelessness. For those who work at manual arts are also called 'vulgar', but those too are so called who take pride in themselves²¹⁵ as being wealthy or great or noble. The term came from those who work before a fire: for they used to call furnaces 'forges' (*baunoi*) and from there they named all manual arts 'vulgar' (*banausoi*). It seems to me that they then transferred the term from craftsmen who are conceited and take pride beyond their desert to those who pretend to too much. That is why Aristotle calls the vice that is associated with munificence 'vulgarity' (*banausia*), since it is a kind of pretence to a costly magnitude in expenditures. For such a person shows off in things one ought not and in a manner one ought not. But he says that he will speak later about this (cf. 4.7, 1123a19).

He says that the munificent person resembles one who is knowledgeable, whether because he is contemplative about the expenditure that is suitable for each magnitude and deed (to contemplate is the mark of what is properly called knowledge: for they used properly to name the contemplative sciences 'knowledges'), or else he calls the craftsman

'knowledgeable'. For it pertains to every craftsman to contemplate what is suitable for each product. For example, it pertains to a shoemaker to know the shoe that fits the foot, and to a painter to know how one should
 5 paint a hero or a private person or someone who feels pleasure or feels pain. In the same way in fact a munificent person too will contemplate the expenditure that is suitable to each work and will spend munificently.

'For as we said in the beginning' (cf. 2.1, 1103b23), he says, a habitual state is defined by its activities and by the things of which it is' (1122a35-b2).²¹⁶ He says this because he also said earlier that habitual states too are discovered from their activities. For of whatever sort the activities are, of this sort too is the habitual state from which the
 10 activities come and the things of which the state is either contemplative or productive or enactive. For example, <of whatever sort> the activities of the house-building art are, such are the <habitual states> involved in house-building.²¹⁷ It is obvious, then, that the house-building art is activating of such activities. What underlies the house-building art is wood and stones, using which as its matter it produces its activity; and it is the same way in the case of the virtues. For a little earlier (cf. 4.1,
 15 1119b22) liberality was said to be about commodities, since its activities are about commodities and thus what underlies it, obviously, is commodities. Since, then, the activities of a munificent person are expenses that are both great and suitable, both the habitual state is clear (for it is from the habitual state that such activities come) and also that great works and great expenditures are what underlie it.

Either this is what was said before [i.e. 'in the beginning'], or else it
 20 was that a habitual state, that is a character-based one, is defined by the very²¹⁸ activities that go along with it and of which it is always activating. For the mean was not that which is said of things,²¹⁹ but rather that in relation to us. Of the munificent person too, then, the expenses are great, since they are suitable to every great thing, and they do not have some one great thing [as their object] but rather whatever the immediate need demands:²²⁰ the works too are great in such a way, indeed, each taken in relation to itself. For thus the
 25 expenditure too will be great and 'suitable to the work', if 'the work is worthy of the expense' (1122b4-5) and the expense is worthy of the work or is even something in excess. For perhaps in this a munificent person will go rather further and be in excess in his expenses, so that the work may be great.

Since the following pertains to the rest of the virtues, it does so to munificence as well: one thing is the aim – to spend for the sake of what
 30 is noble and to do great works – and another thing is to do it pleasurably. For activities in accord with virtues are pleasing to virtuous people. And further, he will spend lavishly, and not calculate too exactly: 'for exact calculation is niggardly' (1122b8).

106,1 'From an equal expense' (1122b13-14), he says, a munificent person

will make a work great; for example, if it should be necessary for him to set up something for his country at a hundred talents he will not make a small but richly gilded thing or made of some expensive stones (for²²¹ it is possible to make something intricately with carnelians or emeralds or some other such stones and produce some trivial work), but 5 he will rather wish to produce some work that has magnitude, as Pericles did the Olympieion²²² or some such thing. For there is not the same virtue for a possession and a work. For one should have a possession that is worth a great deal and, though it is much, able to be kept in a little [space], for example gold, pearls, and precious stones. But with a work, the one that is great and noble is most valuable. For everyone who sees such a work must marvel at it, and a munificent 10 thing should be marvellous. The virtue of a work is munificence in magnitude, that is if it is great and well-established.

'Of expenditures' (1122b19), he says, honourable ones are <such as we say>,²²³ that is, munificent – when they occur nobly, obviously. Honourable are expenditures concerning the gods and 'concerning everything divine' (1122b21), for example if one must propitiate divinities, and 'all those things relating to the community' (1122b21) about which one ought to be ambitious in a noble way. 15

'In all things, as was said' (1122b23) earlier too (4.4, 1122a25), the munificent person considers two things: who he himself is who is spending and what his resources are, and what the work is. Aristotle denies that a poor person is munificent, not in respect to his habitual state but rather in respect to his activity. For nothing prevents a poor person from having the habitual state, but he cannot have the activity because he has no possessions. And it is clear that he is speaking about the activity, because a poor person who tries to spend will be foolish, for 20 he will spend beyond his worth and what is proper. For everything that is in accord with virtue is done correctly. It is fitting indeed for those who have talents [i.e. large sums of money]²²⁴ in advance to spend them, for it is right that they be worthy also of those things which their ancestors accomplished munificently or those people whom they 'have a share in' (1122b31). They 'have a share in' their kin or those of their household; thus, it befits the munificent person who has kin or members of his household not to be outstripped by them, if he has wealth and resources. 25

Above all, then, the munificent person will be active 'in such expenditures' (1122b34), I mean in those relating to the community: he will spend munificently in all individual matters 'which occur once, for example marriage and such things' (1122b35-1123a1), and concerning that for which the whole city is eager he will go to excess: for example, if the whole city is eager for arms or for horses, he will furnish these 30 things munificently, and if those in office are eager for some such thing, either because it is liberal or because it is useful to the city, he will provide²²⁵ for the munificent use of it.

'Concerning the reception of foreigners too, and gifts and return gifts'

(1123a2-4), he says, the munificent person comports himself nobly. Aristotle will seem, in mentioning return gifts, to be agreeing that a munificent person will receive gifts. But there is nothing surprising in this: for in general munificence is about great expense and in great works. A person who is good would surely not hesitate to receive a gift sometimes, when he is going to give a greater gift in return.

Since the munificent person is not 'given to spending on himself, but rather on the community' (1123a4-5), as has been said, and dedications <are like gifts>²²⁶ ('gifts have something similar to dedications' (1123a5)), he will also be keen in respect to gifts.²²⁷ For really a gift that is nobly given for the sake of Zeus Patron of Friends or Zeus Patron of Guests is inferior to no dedication.

Aristotle says that a munificent person 'spends more for those works that are longlasting' (1123a8), for example temples of the gods and the restoration of walls and things that are durable, rather than for outfitting of choruses and athletic training and those things that are only expenditures, but seem to have no enduring product. And in each of the works he considers what is fitting and will not make a like expense for a temple as for a tomb. 'In the case of expenditures, a great one in a great work is the most munificent, and here an expenditure in these things [is munificent]' (1123a10-13), that is, in each thing what is proper and meet [is munificent].

And further, 'what is great in a work differs from what is great in expense' (1123a13-14); for nothing prevents a work itself from being great, although the expense is small, for example 'the most beautiful ball or vase possesses munificence in a child's gift' (1123a14-15). It is possible to take this in two ways: either that when a child gives a present to another child he is munificent as [would be the case] in a child, although strictly speaking munificence does not exist in a child, nor does any other virtue at all, but this whole thing is a matter of childish virtue; either we will understand it, then, in this way, or else that when a munificent person gives as a present to a child a most beautiful ball or vase, the gift is munificent and juvenile [as is suitable] for a child, but the value is small and illiberal, if one considers the value in itself. The whole of this is an example of the fact that there is something great in each work in accord with its kind, since even in childish gifts there is a certain munificence.

Aristotle said 'great [expenditure] in great works', for example if in some honourable work there is in addition magnitude. Most honourable are, first, works for the gods; next, those for the community. The next part of the sentence is 'in the case²²⁸ of expenditures each' (1123a10-11) is greatest in its own kind and so forth. 'For this reason it is characteristic of a munificent person' if, in whatever kind of work he does, he should be excessive 'in a munificent way' (1123a16-17), when both the expenditure is worthy of the work and the work of the expenditure.

What he says concerning the vulgar and the niggardly person is

clear. It is clear, then, that they are vices, and he himself says so, but also that they do not bring 'reproaches, in fact' (1123a32), because they are not harmful to one's neighbours²²⁹ as injustice is damaging and dissoluteness and virtually all the other vices.

1123a34-1125a34 'grandeur' up to '<...>'.²³⁰

108,1

For understanding what grandeur²³¹ is, it makes no difference, as he says, whether one considers the habitual state or 'a person who is in accord with the habitual state' (1123b1) – he calls 'in accord with the habitual state' the grand person. But for understanding it more easily, perhaps a consideration of the grand person is useful. That is why he makes the inquiry about him. For when he is clearly seen, the transition 5 to grandeur will be easy.

'The grand person', he says, 'is believed to be one who thinks himself worthy of great things, <and is worthy of them>²³²' (1123b1-2). For one who thinks himself worthy of great things, but is not worthy of them, is foolish. No one who is in accord with virtue is foolish. Thus, <a grand person is in fact worthy of great things.

The grand person, then,>²³³ is not one who is worthy of small things and thinks himself worthy of small things, who Aristotle says is temperate. Different is one who thinks himself worthy of great things but 10 is unworthy of them, whom Aristotle terms 'conceited' and classifies under excess. He classifies as a third kind one who thinks himself worthy of greater things than he is worthy of, who, Aristotle says, is not invariably conceited. As a fourth he classifies one who thinks himself worthy of lesser things, 'whether he is worthy of great things or of moderate things or even of small things, but thinks himself worthy of still less' (1123b10-11). Concerning all these one might reasonably 15 inquire beginning from the grand person himself.

In fact, there is a notion in the term itself of the grand [or great-souled] man as one who has a certain magnitude of soul, and by virtue of this is neither puffed up by good fortune nor cast down by bad fortune, but rather one who bears his fortunes suitably. For those people are above all called grand whose soul resembles strong and healthy bodies, which are not altered either by stifling heat or wintry cold or winds, but 20 remain unshaken and unaltered. In the same way the grand person too is not shaken or changed by any fortune, since he knows that none among human things is worthy of serious effort but that virtue is the greatest good and vice the greatest evil, and that the other goods and evils are not such that it is worth being downcast over the evils or elated over the goods. The grand person seems above all to be such a one. We 25 are accustomed, in fact, to saying in the case of those who are not downcast in misfortune that they have borne it with grandeur, and in the case of those who are not elated or puffed up by good fortune that they are characterized by grandeur.

Aristotle calls 'grand' a person who thinks himself worthy of great things, and is worthy of them. What these great things are, of which he
 30 thinks himself worthy, Aristotle makes clear as he proceeds. For he says that honours are the greatest 'of the external goods' (1123b20-1) at which the grand person aims. This in itself will seem to be absurd. For if honour on the part of others is the aim, the grand person thereby
 109,1 seems not to depend on himself but rather upon others, and if it should so happen, to change often from faring well to faring ill, if he is honoured at one time and at another not but on the contrary dishonoured – yet it is not at all appropriate to a virtuous person to be dependent upon others. But perhaps Aristotle does not mean this: for on the contrary he
 5 says that the grand person is disdainful of honour that comes from the many, since he believes that none among human goods is worthy of much honour. What then is his aim? Not, by Zeus, to be honoured, for in this way he would be dependent upon others, but rather to show himself worthy of being honoured by worthy people and to be conscious of himself as being the best and worthy of honour and zeal on the part of good people. When he obtains this, he will be glad, and if he does not
 10 obtain it, he will believe it sufficient that he himself is conscious of what kind of person he is. For he is such a person as the poet made Achilles, when he said: 'I think that I am honoured by the dispensation of Zeus' (Homer *Iliad* 9.608). For the gods are best of all, and the grand person believes that honour from them belongs to him because he is good and complete in respect to virtue. For Aristotle says that he has pretty well all the virtues, but is characterized by the magnitude of his soul: for
 15 grandeur is a kind of adornment of all the virtues. For (he says) each virtue is typified by what underlies it, for example temperateness by being about pleasures and pains, courage by being about fears and feelings of confidence, others by some other thing. Grandeur blossoms on them, as a kind of habitual state that supervenes upon the possession of all the virtues. From this comes the grand person's magnitude
 20 of soul. Upon such magnitude, Aristotle says, follows what was mentioned by us, namely bearing misfortunes suitably; and many other things accompany it, about which he himself will speak clearly.

Such then, to speak in outline, is the grand person: one must now consider the others. The first, in fact, was the one who is worthy of small things and thinks himself worthy of small things, whom he called 'temperate'. But if he is worthy of small things, how would he be
 25 temperate? For a temperate person is virtuous, and a virtuous person is worthy of great things, since he calls 'temperate' a person who acts correctly concerning pleasures, and this one is such a person.

Aristotle seems, then, to take 'temperateness' here in a more general sense, instead of practical wisdom, as we are often accustomed to doing, and this not as the virtue but rather as the natural intelligence that some people have, so as to see what things they are worthy of and to what extent. Such a person would not be a naturally unfit human being,

since he is a person who, being aware that he has not yet known or done anything great, does not believe that he is worthy yet of great honours. But nothing prevents him, when he has been educated, from becoming grand. 30

On the other hand, a person who thinks himself worthy of great things although he is unworthy of them is wicked and conceited, claiming honours that are not appropriate although he is altogether unworthy of them. He thinks himself worthy not of things that are great absolutely, for he does not know any other than those which are believed to be great, I mean civic honours. For a great honour is one that is so in truth (this is praise from those who are worthy and best), but the other is what is believed to be great, which the many confer: crowns and statues and such things. The conceited person thinks himself worthy of obtaining these, although he is not even worthy²³⁴ of them. 35 110,1

'Not everyone who [thinks himself worthy] of more than he is worth is conceited' (1123b9). For some people who are naturally good and gracious are beneficial for their countries when there is occasion, contributing to and helping the community and setting up dedications. These people are worthy of honour from their cities. Sometimes they think, because of this, that they are absolutely virtuous and perfect, not through conceit but rather through ignorance, and nothing prevents these people, when they have been educated, from becoming perfectly good. 5

Concerning the person who is diffident, one can indeed raise a puzzle. For he says that someone is diffident whether he is worthy of great things or 'of small things, but thinks himself worthy of still less' (1123b11). For if he is generally worthy of great things, how could he be wicked? Or could he be worthy of great things in the following sense, for example if he has distinguished ancestors but directs himself to small pursuits and practises a vulgar craft, even though it is possible for him take part in political activities, and if he is not naturally unfit for learning or knowing something, but he has kept away from these things and pursues just anything at all. For this person really thinks that he is worthy of less than he is. 15

The person who is worthy of little things and thinks that he is worthy of still lesser things is altogether diffident, although Aristotle says that the one who is most thought diffident is the person who is worthy of great things but thinks himself worthy of small things; perhaps he is looking to such things as we have mentioned.

Let these things, then, be said about these types, from which it has been understood, to speak summarily, that the grand person is one who thinks himself worthy of great things and is worthy of them, the person classified according to excess as conceited is one who thinks himself worthy of great things although he is unworthy of them, and the person classified according to deficiency is one who thinks himself worthy of less than he is worthy of.²³⁵ It is not necessary to go over all the things 20

that follow, since they are both obvious in themselves and as a result of what has been said, but if any points in the text give rise to objection, they must be considered.

- 25 He says that the grand person is extreme in magnitude, for he is great by virtue of having the most extreme magnitude of soul, 'but he is a mean by virtue of having that which he ought' (1123b14). For he is neither excessive nor deficient in thinking himself worthy of the things he is worthy of. Of those in the adjacent vices, some are excessive, and some are deficient: conceited people are excessive, those who are diffident are deficient.

- 30 Since he thinks himself worthy of the greatest things, and the greatest, in the superlative sense, is unique, the grand person would be concerned with a unique thing. What this is, accordingly, must be grasped on the basis of worth. For worth 'is said in respect to external goods' (1123b17), for we speak of the worth of wealth or reputation or honour or some other thing. Of external goods the grand person thinks himself worthy of the greatest. Greatest is that which 'we grant to the gods' (1123b18), that is, honour. Because of this Aristotle presents the grand person as being concerned with honours and dishonours. For he aims at those honours that one ought and believes himself worthy of them, and he disdains those one ought not aim at, and likewise, indeed, for dishonours: he believes that those coming from good people are foreign to himself, and those coming from the many he disdains. The
111,1
5 argument is pretty much as follows: if he thinks himself worthy of the greatest things and is worthy of them, and the greatest thing is unique, and 'worth' is being spoken of in regard to what is external, then the greatest of external goods would be that of which he thinks himself worthy. If honour is the greatest, he thinks himself worthy of this. This is both evident on the basis of the argument, and even without argument grand people are seen to be concerned about honour.

- 'The diffident person', he says, 'is deficient both in respect to himself and in respect to the worth of the grand person' (1123b24-5). For he does
10 not think himself worthy of the things of which he himself is worthy, and he is far from aiming at the things the grand person does. 'The conceited person is excessive in respect to himself' (1123b25-6): for he thinks himself worthy of things he is not worthy of; 'but he does not, indeed, exceed the grand person' (1123b26), for he is not able even to conceive of the things that the grand person thinks himself worthy of.

- After this Aristotle demonstrates that the grand person is best. For
15 if he is worthy of the greatest things, he would be the best. 'And what is great in each virtue', he says, 'is believed to be characteristic of a grand person' (1123b29-30). As we said (cf. 109,15), each virtue is typified by what underlies it, and in grandeur magnitude must be added to each virtue. For a certain magnitude comes to be present to the soul with this habitual state, and it comes to be present when all the virtues are perfected.

Proceeding, he says that grandeur is a kind of adornment of the virtues, for it makes them greater. Greater how? It is because a certain magnitude comes to be present to the soul of virtuous people, and the worthy person thinks grandly [i.e. takes pride] in respect to each virtue, since he contemplates the health and the beauty of his soul. Because of this it is difficult to be in truth grand, for one must have complete <virtue>²³⁶ and nobility; but this is difficult.

The grand person, then, is concerned most of all about honours and dishonours, and he will feel pleasure when he is honoured by worthy people in accord with his worth, 'since he obtains what is proper or indeed less; for no honour can be worthy of complete virtue' (1124a7-8). By 'complete virtue' he means virtue as a whole, which it is necessary that the grand person have. 'Nonetheless, he will accept it' (1124a8-9) when they do not have a greater honour to bestow. 'Honour from ordinary people' (1124a10) he will make little of,²³⁷ and also that for small things. For if some small things are done by him, he will not think that he should be honoured for these. Likewise he will make little of dishonour, too, that comes from the many, for if it should arise concerning him, he knows that it will not be justly, and he is disdainful of everything that occurs unjustly.

Above all, then, as has been said, the grand person is concerned about honours, and thinks himself worthy of the greatest. It follows upon this that he neither becomes overjoyed when he is fortunate nor overly pained when he is unfortunate. For a person who is habituated to thinking himself worthy of the greatest things is superior to other goods and evils, such as wealth and poverty, reputation and ill repute, in a word the goods and evils that concern the body and are external. For he believes that the greatest goods are those that concern the soul, and since these belong to him he is neither elated nor cast down by any <of those others>.²³⁸ For not even in respect to honour is he so disposed as to be overly elated by it, but rather he disdains utterly that which comes from the many, while that which comes from worthy people he accepts if it should so happen, but if it does, it does not on this account go unnoticed that he does not approve.²³⁹

'Some people believe that strokes of good fortune contribute to grandeur' (1124a20-1). For a person who thinks himself worthy of the greatest honours is grand, and those who are well-born and rich or powerful <or>²⁴⁰ have some other good fortune think that they are worthy of being honoured and are honoured as being at the peak of good things. But these people are not in fact grand either by virtue of aiming at honours or of obtaining them. For a good person can in truth become grand, and the same person can also become honoured; and if both virtue and external good fortune are his, he will perhaps seem more honoured to the many, but in truth he is more so²⁴¹ if, precisely because of his good fortune, he can be active unimpededly in accord with virtue in important things. For honours attend on noble activities. Without

- 20 virtue, strokes of good fortune mostly produce arrogant and contemptuous people, for they imitate the way they think grand people are in those things in which they can: and they can do so in disdaining the many, but not in acting in accord with virtue. For a grand person disdains the many not in order to insult them but in order not to marvel at the honours that come from them. And he disdains them justly, for he
 25 believes truly that he is superior to the rest, whereas the others believe falsely and randomly concerning both themselves and others.

Since the grand person is not ignorant of his own magnitude and he knows what other human things are like, he is reasonably neither often in danger nor danger-loving, since he believes that he should not squander himself at random and he does not think it worth risking
 30 danger for things that are worth nothing. In matters in which he judges that it is worth risking danger,²⁴² he is great at risking danger. For he does believe that life is a great thing, but rather he prefers to it dying nobly and for noble works.

- ‘And he is such’, he says, ‘as to do good but to be ashamed of having
 113,1 services done for him’ (1124b9-10). Some people criticize this as not well said. For they say that it is proper to a good person not only to do good but also to have good done to him; and what they claim is true, but they do not perceive the magnitude of the grand person. For many things must happen²⁴³ if he is to put up with being done a service whether in
 5 money or in power or in any of the things of this sort. This, then, is what he means when he says that the grand person would be ashamed to receive either money or any other such benefaction. For the magnitude of the grand person resides in superiority, and one who is done a service is thought to have been ranked in the position of one who is outdone. That is why Aristotle says that he is disposed to do more services in return, so that the one who first began [doing a service] may be owing once again.

- People have strongly blamed, indeed, what he adds next. For he says
 10 that the grand person recalls the good things that he himself has done, but does not recall those that have been done to him. The contrary seems to suit a good person, namely not to recall the former at all but rather those good things that have been done for him: for this is the mark of a character that is grateful. But Aristotle does not mean this – that he forgets the good things that were done for him. For the grand person will least of all people do this, since he attempts, as he said,²⁴⁴ to be a benefactor [i.e. giver] of more things in return, but rather he is not
 15 disposed to mention them in conversation nor is he always gladly recalling to others the good things that were done him, nor would he gladly hear of them from others.

It is also characteristic of the grand person not easily to beg of anyone that he be helped whether in money or any other thing, but rather only reluctantly and under great necessity, but rather to provide eagerly to those who beg him, unless they are wicked. For he said ‘do a service’ (1124b18) instead of ‘provide’.

When he says that the grand person should 'be great in regard to those in authority and good fortune' (1124b18-19), he does not think it right that a grand person who lives in a city ruled by a king and is one of the subjects should revolt against the one who rules and is king – for such a thing is the mark of a senseless person – but rather that even in respect to <rulers>²⁴⁵ he is not altogether undignified or ignoble, and especially if the grand person does not happen to be one of those who live in the city ruled by a king. Above all he will be great <in respect to those who on account of>²⁴⁶ wealth or some other power are in authority, since he believes that he has much greater virtue than they do. He will be moderate 'in regard to average people' (1124b19-20), for this is decent, as he himself says.²⁴⁷ 'Priding oneself'²⁴⁸ (1124b21) in respect to those in authority does not mean this – for he will be vulgar if he says proud things about himself – but rather that he will not detract from his own dignity when he meets people in <authority>.²⁴⁹

'And they will not', he says, 'enter upon honours or where others are foremost' (1124b23-4). For people have an impression of one who seeks after all things as the grand person,²⁵⁰ for example if one should wish to be foremost among orators and those famous in music or in any contest. But in fact these things are adolescent and characteristic of superficial men, whereas a grand person, when he sees people who are foremost, will not compete or dispute against them for first prize in these areas. For the magnitude of his own virtue, which is truly held in honour, is sufficient for him.

When Aristotle says that he [i.e. the grand person] is 'idle and a hesitator' (1124b24), he is using the term 'idle' instead of saying that he is not easily moved to any ordinary actions, but rather only 'where there is either great honour or passion' (1124b24-5).²⁵¹ For the grand person is passionate for those²⁵² that are naturally good and truly noble, and he aims at such deeds upon which there follows great honour on the part of worthy people, not so much on account of the honour as on account of what is noble in the actions.

Aristotle says that he is truthful 'in whatever is not by way of irony' (1124b30). From these words it is clear that Aristotle does not believe that all irony is base, for otherwise he would not attribute irony to the grand person, who is outstandingly good. Avoiding what is invidious, he will not talk about all his qualities – at least to the many, since to those who are worthy and similar to himself he will talk about them, given that they are truth-loving.

It is obvious that the statement that the grand person 'cannot live' for others, 'except for friends' (1124b31-1125a1), is true. For he will not, at all events, submit himself to the choice of another, nor will he adapt his own life to what another believes, unless indeed that person is a friend. To a good person, a good person is really a friend; thus in this way too he will live, in a certain manner, for himself.

He will not be 'prone to marvel' (1125a2), as the many are prone to

marvel either at great dedications or at the strength²⁵³ of bodies or at a musical competition. For nothing appears great to someone who possesses virtue.

Nor is he a 'talker about persons' (1125a5). For a person who discusses people is a talker about persons, as some people examine minutely the lives of others – what is good or bad in so-and-so. These things go unnoticed by the grand and truly philosophical person, as Plato puts it in the *Theaetetus* (173D), much more than the number of pints in the sea. But neither does he talk about himself. What, then, are the associations and talk of the grand person, since talk about people is not for him? Perhaps one would not go wrong in saying about him that in general he is a talker about the divine, and one who makes people knowledgeable – even the masses – about these things and about nature?²⁵⁴ But if he does talk about human matters as well, it is about some other virtue and the activities in accord with it. Nor is he 'given to praising' indiscriminately, but neither is he ever 'given to bad-mouthing' even of his enemies, except on account of insult (1125a25-7). One must not understand this in the sense that he will badmouth his enemies by insulting them, but rather that in general the grand person is the kind who will not say base things even about his enemies, unless they should insult him beyond what is proper.

115,1 'And he is least given to complaining about necessary or small things' (1125a9-10). 'Necessary' are things that refer to our necessary wants. He will not lament, indeed, if he is deprived of these, but rather will bear it with due measure, and as a result he will not readily beg to obtain them. For to lament over these things or beg for them readily is the mark of one who is eager for them and who believes that the possession of them is a great good. But the grand person will acquire the necessary things for himself, but not with great eagerness, but will choose rather to die than to be in want of them shamefully.²⁵⁵ He will keep rather²⁵⁶ many of his possessions unsown²⁵⁷ and barren on account of his liberality, leaving them vacant, for example, for porticoes <or>²⁵⁸ groves and precincts of gods. For he is self-sufficient and in need of little; hence, he does not need yields from many sources.

Aristotle says that even the movement of the grand person is slow and not hurried, and that his voice is deep. He surely does not think that grand people ought to be invariably deep-voiced, but rather that they should speak calmly and not shout loudly, since he says that their speech is steady, that is, they will not talk hurriedly. For all these things are specific to a grand person, and he is stable²⁵⁹ by virtue of not being hurried whether in movement or in voice or in speech, unless perchance he is pressing ahead.²⁶⁰ For one must suppose this in addition, since if he intends to save a friend or city or someone else among those who matter to him, he will both run and shout loudly. But apart from such necessity that person is not hurried 'or tense who thinks that nothing is great' (1125a15) – except for a few things. These are all those

things that have magnitude, whether among matters of action or matters that consist in contemplation and knowledge. 20

The grand person is such, then, 'but the one who is deficient is diffident' (1125a17), being worthy of good things but not thinking himself worthy of them. We have said concerning him how it is possible to be thus (cf. 111,8-11). He seems to have a great failing: for since he does not think himself worthy of honours, neither does he concern himself with the deeds on which honours depend. Not only does he stand apart from noble practices 'but also from external goods' (1125a26-7), as Aristotle says. For least of all do such people concern themselves with strength or competition. They are neglectful not only of their reputation among worthy people but also of that among the many, since they believe that they would be worthy of nothing great; and because of their humility they do not think themselves worthy of wealth nor are they able to do the things characteristic of wealthy people, but rather those characteristic of poor people. 25

Conceited people are also ignorant of themselves, like those who are diffident. But they are more unseemly than diffident people. For the latter conceal their vice, for wishing to escape notice is specific to diffidence. Conceited people bring their senselessness out in the open, striving for honours in which they have no share. For in fact they wish to appear capable of speaking and acting, although they are neither of these things. And they speak proudly about themselves and if they are not wealthy they pretend to be or if they are wealthy they show off their wealth in a vulgar way. 30 116,1

He says that diffidence is more the opposite of grandeur than is conceit. For in fact he said earlier (2.8, 1109a16-17) that those vices are more opposed to which people are more susceptible; they are more susceptible to diffidence than to conceit, and diffidence is worse than conceit. For diffident people always²⁶¹ stand aloof from noble practices, but conceited people imitate the grand, though they slip up, and they are not utterly unfit by nature but may become grand if they are educated. 5

1125a34-b25 'Grandeur, then' to 'because the middle has not been named'. 10

He says that there is a certain nameless virtue that concerns honour, and that it bears the same proportion [to grandeur] as liberality does to munificence. For just as liberality is contemplative of the noble even concerning small gifts, whereas munificence only concerns great expenditures, so too, whereas grandeur concerns great honours, there is a virtue concerning moderate and small honours that disposes us as we ought to be. He thinks it is obvious that there is such a virtue on the basis of the vice in respect to excess and that in respect to deficiency. For it is possible to desire honour more than one ought and in things 15

one ought not and when one ought not and in accord with all the other distinctions. We are accustomed to calling such a person honour-loving [i.e. ambitious], since he desires honours in excess. We also blame the person who is deficient: this is one who prefers to be honoured in nothing and for this reason refrains even from noble actions. Since, then, there is a vice in respect to excess and one in respect to deficiency, there should also be some mean, characteristic of a person who desires honour when one ought and as one ought and from whom one ought and in the things one ought and in accord with the other distinctions. 'Since the mean is nameless' (1125b7), and so too the middle person, we usually name him by the terms for the extremes, sometimes naming him honour-loving, sometimes unloving of honour [i.e. unambitious], when he does not desire honours that are not appropriate.²⁶²

It is obvious that "such-and-such-loving" is said in several senses, and we do not always apply "honour-loving"²⁶³ to the same thing' (1125b14-15). For in fact 'such-and-such loving' is sometimes said in praise, and sometimes in blame – for example, someone is said to be 'horse-loving' who enjoys horsemanship and horses to the point that one ought, and this person is either praiseworthy or <not>²⁶⁴ blameworthy, but a person who is sick of mind and wastes his life on this is blameable; and similarly a dog-loving person. And the spectacle-loving person, who enjoys spectacles up to a point and certain ones and at certain times, is perhaps praiseworthy, but one who enjoys all of them²⁶⁵ and always and spends his life on this, by seeking every spectacle and never missing any, is blameworthy. One would say the same things too in the case of the listening-lover: there are people who waste their lives, as Plato says (*Republic* 5, 475D), going round everywhere and listening to comic or tragic actors and everyone who chatters or talks about anything whatever; these are blameable. But those who gladly listen as one ought and when one ought and up to the degree one ought are praiseworthy. But some people are not so called in several senses, nor [when they are so called] do they signify two kinds – those such-and-such-lovers who are so in a good way and those in a way that is not good; rather, some are only those who are so in a good way, others those who are so in a bad way. For wisdom-lovers [i.e. philosophers] and goodness-lovers are all praiseworthy, whereas wine-lovers and food-lovers and such people are all blameable. In fact, the name 'honour-lover' resembles those that indicate two things – in a good way and in a way that is not good²⁶⁶ – as are too the names 'listening-lover' and 'spectacle-lover'.

Since, then, he says, 'honour-lover' is said in several senses, 'we do not always apply it to the same thing, but rather in praising we apply it to what is more than what the many do' (1125b14-16). For the notion held by the many is a kind of standard in respect to what is noble: for all people aim by nature at honour, as being a noble thing, but they do not in fact get it exactly right: the many too more or less aim at honour but are unable to get it exactly. A person who aims at the things that

concern honours more than the many do, and gets it exactly right, is praiseworthy, but one who does so more than one ought is blameworthy.

This habitual state, he says, 'appears as dislike of honour in comparison with love of honour, but as love of honour in comparison with dislike of honour, and in a sense as both in comparison to both' (1125b21-3) – obviously, just as in the case of the other virtues the middle state appears as different in comparison to each [extreme state], so too love of honour [i.e. the middle state] appears as dislike of honour in comparison to love of honour, but in comparison to dislike of honour it appears as love of honour, 'and in a sense as both in comparison to both'. This [last phrase] in no way differs from what was said previously, but is as it were an explanation. For it is not absolutely both but both 'in a sense', that is in appearance. But it is also possible to say that it appears to be both when it is examined in comparison with both at the same time, that is, with love of honour and dislike of honour. 20 25

What has been said, then, about this nameless mean, and also about its adjacent vices, is obvious. One might raise a puzzle about it, namely whether it is a virtue. For if every virtue posits what is noble as its aim, and this one posits honour, then the person [characterized by it] is not virtuous. For he will seem to do noble things for the sake of compensation, not choosing them for themselves. Now, perhaps a person who effects noble things on account of honour is better than one who does them on account of money, but neither is he virtuous unless he does them for the sake of what is noble. One must say about him what we said also about the grand person, that what is noble is his aim and end also, but he fashions himself to be such a person as to obtain honour even from the many. The grand person, insofar as he is grand, aims only at honour from worthy people, whereas the honour-loving person does noble things for their own sake, but would wish not to go unnoticed even by the many. And nothing prevents both persons²⁶⁷ from existing in the same individual: insofar as he looks only to worthy people, he is called grand, and insofar as he looks to the many, honour-loving. For he would wish honours from them too to accrue to him for his noble actions, and justly so: these are the small honours – the ones that come from the many, but the ones that come from worthy people are great. 118,1 5

He says that the extremes appear to be opposed to one another 'because the middle has not been named' (1125b24-5). For other vices are opposed to one another and also to the mean, and appear to be opposed to it. Here, the person who is honour-loving to the point of vice, and similarly too the person unloving of honour, are opposed [only] to one another because the middle has not been named. Since he did not say which of the vices is opposed to the middle state, it may be suggested that it is rather dislike of honour. For in fact it is worse, for it prepares one to do none of the things that are proper, and many people are often carried away in the direction of this error.²⁶⁸ 15

1125b26-1126b10 'Mildness is' to 'and let the discussion of habitual states concerning anger be done with'.

The character-based virtues <are middles>,²⁶⁹ as was said in the first arguments (1109a20-4), because they are middles between excess and deficiency, which are vices, and because one chooses the middle in emotions and actions.²⁷⁰ One should note that they are not [all] concerned with two emotions, unless one takes the most general emotions, pleasure and pain. For all the character-based virtues choose the mean between these. Concerning the specific emotions, some virtues concern two, and some one, and some concern no emotion. For example, courage concerns fears and feelings of confidence, and produces people who are the emotional means between these and in accord with reason; and likewise too concerning actions. Liberality, again, is about actions, and is not about emotions or else only about these common ones, pleasure and pain. For the liberal person rejoices as one ought in his activities, and he feels pain if he is forced to do something contrary to reason.

Mildness is about one specific emotion; for it chooses the mean concerning anger and prepares the one who possesses it to be angry at the things one ought and when one ought and as one ought and according to the other distinctions, and not angry at things one ought not to be angry about. <Saying> that even the extremes are practically <nameless>,²⁷¹ Aristotle names the middle person 'mild' and the mean 'mildness', for the reason we mentioned earlier (cf. 53,1-14). For the terms 'mildness' and 'mild' existed among philosophers even before Aristotle, but they applied the term to a person who is calm and altogether angerless, and they never at all used to call a person who felt anger when one should and did not feel it when one should not 'mild'. But Plato (*Republic* 375C) thought a person should be [both] mild and high-tempered, on the grounds that neither the mild person nor the high-spirited one was sufficiently virtuous. Aristotle, however, names the person who is at the mean in anger 'mild', although he says that mildness inclines more toward the deficiency. For a mild person feels anger, but very little and infrequently.

He says that the extremes too are pretty much nameless, because mildness was used as a name more than irascibility was for people who do not experience anger in the way one should.²⁷² But in fact it [i.e. irascibility] implies a natural disposition rather than²⁷³ a habitual state, which is already a vice.²⁷⁴ The deficiency is quite nameless. He himself, after all, still inquires whether it should be called 'angerlessness' or something else.

He suggests that mildness is praiseworthy. 'For the emotion' which mildness in fact concerns is anger, 'and there are many things that induce' (1125b30-1) anger; for human beings are moved to tempers as a result of many things.

'Not to be driven by this emotion' (1125b34-5) nor to be easily

susceptible to temper in some other way is praiseworthy. What he means is that the high-tempered part of the soul must be educated so as to do nothing contrary to reason, but rather to sally forth along with reason, being in harmony with it. 20

Because he is 'unperturbed' (1125b34), the mild person seems to err more toward the deficiency, to those who do not consider matter correctly, by whom indeed he is thought to err. For he does not in fact err at all, but because he is 'forgiving' (1126a3) of many things and not 'vengeful' (1126a2), unless reason should dictate, he is accused of angerlessness at the wrong occasion.

He has made it clear too that the deficiency is slavish. 25

The excess is not of a single form. For every vice is of many kinds and characterized by what is limitless, as he said earlier (2.5, 1106b28-30), and excess in respect to temper is no less so than any other. The kinds are so difficult as to be impossible for all of them to belong to the same person. 'For evil', as he says, 'destroys itself as well' (1126a12) because it contains contrariety, 'and if it is complete, it becomes unendurable'. It is obvious to those who consider each of the kinds of anger characterized by excess that it is not possible for all to be present in the same person, and if they are present by hypothesis, then the vice will be unendurable. 30

Now, the vice is called 'irascibility' for want of another name. Those people are especially deemed irascible who get angry 'quickly and at those whom one ought not and for things one ought not and more than one ought' (1126a13-15), and because they stop quickly they have this moderate quality. What happens with these people is that they do not hide their anger, but rather retaliate quickly, that is, they take revenge. For they do not invariably wait for a great revenge, but rather it suffices them just to strike a blow and revile the other. Therefore they do not escape notice when they are angry, 'because of the sharpness' (1126a17) of their temper, but nevertheless they quickly stop again. 120,1

'Choleric people' (1126a18) are either the same as the irascible or possess a still more intense irascibility. 5

Another kind is that of people called 'bitter'. For they are angry for a long time, and do not quickly stop, and they hide their anger, and that is why they are called 'bitter'. They stop with difficulty even when they have at long last retaliated. Then revenge puts a stop to their anger, since it furnishes pleasure in place of their earlier pain. They are extremely burdensome to themselves, as he says, and to their friends. For they retain the weight of their temper for a long time, and because they hide it they are neither persuaded by others to make an end of their anger nor do they assuage it themselves, but rather they are forever quietly irritated, until they have punished them [i.e. those who roused their anger]. It is obvious that these people are the contrary of those who are specifically called 'irascible' and 'choleric'; thus, it is not easy for both to occur simultaneously in the same person, as he said (1126a11). 15

Harsh people resemble bitter people in most respects, for they too preserve their anger for a long time and take revenge harshly and are not easily reconciled, but they differ in that they make their anger more evident.

20 He says that the excess is more opposed to mildness [sc. than the deficiency is]. For in fact human beings are more carried away in the direction of anger and aim at taking revenge on those who seem to wrong them. Moreover, the excess is worse than the deficiency, for irascibility is more deleterious than angerlessness.

‘Harsh people are worse also in regard to living together’ (1126a31). He has called ‘harsh’ either all those in common who experience anger as one ought not, or else those who are specifically called harsh, with
25 whom living together really is a most unpleasant thing.

He said in the first book as well (1.1, 1094b19-27) that it is possible to speak about matters of action in outline, but that it is not possible to draw distinctions generally about any of them in the way one can in the case of mathematics. He suggests this here too, indeed, and says that it is evident also from what is said here that it is not easy to determine at whom one should be angry and for what things and for how long a time
30 and so on for the rest. That is why those who deviate a little, whether toward the deficiency or toward the excess, go unnoticed, but when they experience anger or angerlessness way beyond what is proper, then they are found out. Since, then, activities are in particulars and in perceptible things, about which it is not possible to speak generally, <there is need of>²⁷⁵ the habitual state that always treats what occurs
121,1 in the appropriate way, and for this reason mildness is praised, since it treats anger in accord with what is appropriate.

1126b11-1127a12 ‘In socializings’ to ‘the mean is nameless’.

Since mankind is social and communal by nature, it is necessary²⁷⁶ that
5 human beings share both in talk and in actions together with one another. In this communication and socializing in regard to human beings there is a certain virtue, which Aristotle says is nameless. Perhaps it could be called a sociable virtue or by some such name, and the person who has it will socialize with those who encounter him and who share in conversation, especially by aiming²⁷⁷ at being pleasing in
10 socializing with them. However, if in fact being accompanied by pleasure²⁷⁸ is unseemly and harmful to him or to those who hear him, he will try rather to cause them pain. For this person too will say everything for the sake of what is noble. Thus, if causing pain is noble, he will cause pain, and above all when, by paining them briefly, he is likely to benefit them for a longer time. For he is beneficial and helpful with²⁷⁹ those who encounter him, with what is pleasing if he can, but if not, with what is painful.

15 Such a virtue resembles friendliness. For earlier (2.4, 1108a26-30),

in his sketch, he called it 'friendliness' more generally, but here he makes the distinction that it is not friendliness but rather resembles friendliness. For in fact a friend tries to be pleasing to his friend, but if being accompanied by pleasure is harmful or unseemly, but causing pain is seemly and beneficial to his friend, he tries rather to do this. This habitual state is something like this [i.e. friendliness] and nameless, but without the cherishing. For this activity does not occur only toward one's friends but rather toward all those who encounter one, and is without the emotion involved in loving and hating. For he employs the same state toward 'people unknown and known, and toward familiar and unfamiliar' (1126b25-6), although he grants to each what is fitting. For socializing as one ought and for the sake of what is noble is common to all, but²⁸⁰ what is fitting is specific to each sort. For he will not socialize in the same way with familiar and unfamiliar people nor, likewise, with those who are older and those who are younger than he, nor with those who are governing and private people, but rather he will use the appropriate kind of socializing toward each group, having what is noble as the end but aiming, as we have said, at two things, namely what is seemly and what is beneficial to himself and to those who share in his society.

The person in the mean, then, being of such a sort, is nameless, unless one calls him sociable and his virtue the sociable virtue.

The person at the excess extreme is one who pleases everyone and wishes to gratify all people, whether through the benefit of pleasures that he intends to procure for them and that are seemly for himself and for them, or through their contraries [i.e. unseemly pleasures].²⁸¹ If he does this for the sake of nothing else, but rejoicing just in this very thing, namely gratifying others, he is called ingratiating, but if it is in order that he may profit from it, he is called a flatterer.

The person at the deficiency extreme is one who resists everyone and wishes to converse with no one for pleasure, like those whom the comic poets represent and term 'curmudgeonly'.²⁸²

Here too because the person at the mean is nameless, the extremes seem only to be opposed to each other, but they are opposed both to each other and to the mean.

One might define the above-mentioned virtue as being a mean concerning pleasures and pains and actions: for talk too is a kind of action. That which concerns socializings is such a kind of pleasure and pain. That a person enjoys being active in respect to virtue and is aggrieved when hindered is common to all the virtues.

Curmudgeonliness seems more opposed to the middle habitual state because it is more savage and bestial.

1127a13-1128b8 'The [mean] of boastfulness too is pretty much about these things' to 'in socializing in the rest of their lives'.²⁸³

He says there is not only the virtue set forth and its adjacent vices but
 15 also another kind of mean habitual state and two vices, and this
 habitual state too is nameless. It might be called 'truthful', or as he calls
 it, 'truth'. The person who possesses it values truth above all, and hates
 what is false in every way. He calls this person 'forthright' [literally,
 'everything-is-itself'] because, in accord with the name, he says and
 shows every thing that is his in his life as itself, whatever it is, and does
 20 not pretend that these things are either greater or less than they are.
 Truth in words is said to be truth in the strictest sense, but there is
 truth also, in fact, in actions. For a person who does not pretend in his
 actions to what is not his is believed to be truthful, for example if
 someone who is not wealthy does not pretend to be wealthy, or if
 someone who is not strong does not pretend to be, but rather exhibits
 25 in a clear way both what his life and his words are like. Someone who
 pretends to more both in his life and in his words is a boaster; one who
 pretends to less and diminishes what is his is ironical; and the one at
 the mean is a forthright person, being truthful. This is why I have
 transposed the text, so that when we read it as it is written we may
 thus, after 'a forthright person', add: '<being> truthful'.²⁸⁴

'It is possible to do each of these things', he says, 'both for the sake of
 30 something and for the sake of nothing' (1127a26-7). What he means is
 123,1 something like this: being truthful in words and in the actions in one's
 life, and similarly too speaking falsely, is something it is possible just
 to do from a habitual state, but it is also possible to do this for the sake
 of something. For example, a truthful person has a habitual state in
 accord with which he says all things truthfully and never speaks falsely,
 but there are times when he does violence to the habitual state within
 him for the sake of something necessary, and makes use of falsehood in
 5 the role of a medicine in behalf of things that are great and advanta-
 geous to himself or his friends or his country. Similarly those who have
 the contrary states too are on the whole liars, some tending to overstate,
 some to understate. But there are times when they may use what is true
 for the sake of profit or reputation or some other reason. Each group,
 however, is judged as to what kind of people they are from their habitual
 states, and not from the things that they do sometimes and for the sake
 10 of something. Aristotle explains this as follows: 'Each person says
 things and acts and lives in accord with the kind of person he is'
 (1127a27-8). Each person is like the habitual state that is in him, and
 he lives in accord with this, 'unless for the sake of something' (1127a28)
 he deviates from his habitual state.

What is false in itself is blameworthy, and what is true is praiseworthy; that is why a truthful person, who is disposed to choose²⁸⁵ what is praiseworthy in itself, is himself too praiseworthy, whereas those who

are disposed to choose what is blameworthy in itself, I mean what is false, are blameworthy. Both of these are blameworthy, but 'the boaster is more so' (1127a31-2). 15

He then resumes and speaks about each type, beginning with the truthful person. For there is another person who is truthful in agreements²⁸⁶ and in contracts and does not deviate from this at all. This person is active in accord with justice and with <what>²⁸⁷ the parts of justice are, whereas the other – the one who is truthful in living together and in words and in life – is active in accord with the afore-mentioned habitual state. This person too would be truthful in his agreements, for it is obvious that a person who is truthful in matters where it makes no difference will use truth the more in matters where it makes a difference. 20

He says that he inclines rather toward understating: for he will not say very grandiose things about himself, even if they are true, because it is offensive.

The person who pretends to other and greater things than are his includes two kinds. For one pretends to what is more for no sake at all, and is base because he enjoys what is 'false, but he is empty' and silly 'rather than bad' (1127b11). But the one who uses boastfulness for the sake of something is more wicked. And of this latter kind itself there are again two types. For one person boasts for the sake of reputation and honour, whereas another does so for the sake of money, and the latter is worse than the one who boasts on account of honour. For the boaster who boasts on account of honour is less blameworthy than the one who does so on account of money. For a person who boasts for the sake of honour pretends to the kinds of things for which human beings are deemed happy or praised. Now, people are deemed happy for wealth or²⁸⁸ for strength or a thing of that sort, but are praised for wisdom or ability in speeches or something that is up to them. Those who boast on account of reputation are pretenders to all these things, whereas those who boast on account of gain pretend to those kinds of things from which it is possible for their neighbours to profit, and for this reason they [i.e. the neighbours] are ready to give away money to those who are able to provide it [i.e. things that the neighbours can profit from]. It is easy too, although these things are not so, for them to escape notice because the many are not knowledgeable about these matters. Such are prophecy, medicine, and wisdom. For those who are in love with reputation and those in love with money and those in love with both – for example, the sophists – drag wisdom in both directions [i.e. to the increase of reputation and of wealth]. 25 30 124,1 5

He says that the boaster is so not in ability 'but in choice' (1127b14). For a good person and a wise person have the ability to boast, but they do not choose to. One who is able to and at the same time chooses to is a boaster. Aristotle said too in the *Topics* (4.5, 126a30-b3) and in other discussions that abilities are not blameworthy but choices are. 10

Ironical people, because they slant their qualities toward what is 15

- less, seem more gracious. For they do not speak falsely for the sake of profit or reputation 'but because they avoid what is grandiose' (1127b24). That is why they deny qualities that are highly esteemed. And perhaps those who are ironic for this reason and in such a way are not blameable, like Socrates. But those who deny both their minor qualities and those that are very evident and pretend that they do not
- 20 have them are blameworthy and, as he says, called 'fake modest' (*baukopanourgos*)' (1127b27). For this kind of thing is fakery (*panourgia*) rather than charm, for example if someone who is wealthy should say that he does not have enough even for necessities or someone who is very strong should say that he is the weakest of all. For this kind of thing too, as Aristotle says, is sometimes boasting: for he denies qualities that are evident, virtually demonstrating thereby that he has them.
- 25 He says that the Lacedaemonians boast by way of the extreme inexpensiveness of their clothing, for in fact taking inexpensiveness beyond what is proper is boastful. But those who are ironic concerning things that are not very evident, so that they may avoid what is offensive, 'appear gracious' (1127b31).

The boaster is more opposite than the ironical person to the one who is truthful, because he is worse and more offensive.

- This is not a mean, moreover, concerning some specific emotions but
- 30 rather concerning pleasure and pain, which are common to the virtues. For a person who has the habitual state enjoys it, and when hindered he is vexed.

- 'Since there is also relaxation' (1127b33) in socializing: the two virtues discussed above, the one that is similar to friendliness, which
- 125,1 we have termed 'sociable', and the truthful one, are about all socializing²⁸⁹ in life and talk, but the one about to be discussed is about a certain²⁹⁰ part of life. For since a human being needs some relaxation and slackening, 'there too there is socializing' and 'a kind of harmonious' playfulness (1127b34-1128a1). It is called 'wittiness', and the person who possesses it is called 'witty' (*eutrapelos*), like someone, he says, who
- 5 is nimble (*eutropos*). He calls him 'nimble' because the movements and turns (*tropai*) of his character are graceful. 'For just as bodies are judged by their movements, so too are characters' (1128a11-12). That bodies are judged by their movements is obvious. For so long as one is still, it is not obvious if some part of his body is maimed or if it is ungraceful, but when one moves one's body is best put to the test. So too in respect
- 10 to the playfulness of one's character,²⁹¹ some people are graceful and harmonious. Those who are graceful are called witty when they joke in a way that aims at not giving pain either to anyone else or to that person in respect to whom they make the joke, but on the contrary at leading them to pleasure. This person will both say and hear what one ought²⁹² and will willingly mishear those who make use of what is funny in an
- 15 uneducated or shameful way. Nor will he say such things among all people, but rather among those to whom it is appropriate. He has the

other distinctions relevant to the virtues as well: for he indulges in playfulness when one ought and in the things one ought and as one ought.

One who is excessive is called a buffoon, as one who is superficial and invariably aims at what is funny rather than 'saying things that are seemly and not causing pain to the person who is being joked with' (1128a6-7). For the sake of arousing laughter he spares no one, neither friend nor enemy, and sometimes not even the gods, like the writers of the old comedies. For out of buffoonery they did not even keep their hands off the gods.

There is also a deficiency here. For there are some people who do not think it right to indulge in playfulness at all and would not themselves say anything that is funny²⁹³ nor hear others with pleasure. Such a vice may perhaps be called boorishness and rigidity. These people never seem to be witty but rather to be the contrary of witty people, but buffoons sometimes seem to be witty because the many enjoy what is funny.

The middle state is called wittiness, but it might perhaps also be called cleverness. For it is characteristic of a clever person 'to say and hear the kinds of things' (1128a18) that are suitable for a free person. For 'the playfulness of a free person differs from that of one who is slavish' (1128a20-1), and that of an educated person from that of one who is uneducated. He sets as an example of each the old comedies and the new. For to those who wrote the old comedies using foul language seemed funny, whereas to those who wrote new comedies it was joking by innuendo, that is by hinting. But using foul language openly or just suggesting it matters not at all²⁹⁴ 'in respect to seemliness' (1128a25).

After this Aristotle inquires whether one should define the person who jokes well in terms of saying what is suitable for a free and educated person or by 'not paining the one who hears or indeed', on the contrary, 'by pleasing him' (1128a25-7). For perhaps one who jokes well should aim at both, but nevertheless one ought rather to define him in accord with one of these. And he says that taking the definition²⁹⁵ in respect to the people joked about is indefinite. For different things are perhaps pleasing and hateful to different people, and nothing prevents a person from joking well but being displeasing to one who hears him by virtue of his boorishness. The definition of one who jokes resides more, then, in how a free person should joke and toward whom. In this, then, a joke appears to be a certain mean <...>.

[Here the text breaks off, and resumes again in the midst of the commentary on Book 7.]

On Book 7 of the *Ethics* of Aristotle

127,3 <...> and the [lack of control] of the appetites. And he shows that the lack of control of the appetites is more shameful, which is why it would seem too that this one is reasonably called simply lack of control, 5 whereas lack of control of one's temper takes a qualifier. For he says that temper in a way 'hears reason, but mishears it, like hasty servants' (1149a26) who because of their haste mishear their masters, and like dogs which bark whenever someone knocks. For so too temper, which is by nature hasty and very hot, so to speak, because it is the hottest part of the body, by hearing²⁹⁶ reason – which is saying something else – as 10 though it were a command, rushes off as soon as it has heard. 'For an idea or impression' (1149a32) arises that there is an insult or that there has been a slight on the part of so-and-so. Although reason has in no way said nor has there occurred an impression that it must take revenge, one's temper leaps to it, as though it had been ordered to take revenge. It does not reason syllogistically (for reasoning syllogistically pertains to rational things), but it experiences something similar to one 15 who has reasoned syllogistically that he must fight this man. For reason, as has been said, only says: so-and-so insulted me; but one's temper, as though the universal premise had been posited that one must fight with those who have insulted one, and also the conclusion, 'therefore I must fight with this man', immediately grows angry and rushes off.

Such, then, is temper. 'But appetite, if reason or perception merely says "it is pleasant", rushes off' (1149a34-5) to enjoy it. In saying this, 20 Aristotle will seem to make appetite no worse than temper, for appetite too will seem at times to follow reason, although it mishears it. For reason says, 'it is pleasant', and appetite, as though reason were commanding it to follow, goes along with it. But it is not like this,²⁹⁷ but rather one's temper is really moved by reason when it is bidden, 128,1 whereas appetite errs in most things, even though it is clear that reason forbids it. That is why he says that temper follows reason, but appetite does not. Hence lack of control on account of appetite is more shameful than that on account of one's temper: for a person who is lacking in control of temper in a certain sense is overcome by reason, but 'one who is lacking in control of appetite is overcome' (1149b2-3) not by reason 5 but by appetite.

It is a puzzle how a person will be lacking control of his temper if he is somehow following reason. For one who is lacking control in any respect should be disobeying reason while giving in to emotion. But there is a certain reason in one who is lacking control of his temper that says that one must not be angry about all things nor those about which one ought not to be. This reason is in him, but it is not active at the time 10 on account of his emotion. For temper most of all produces something like madness in a person, since while it hears other reasons it mishears

the one that says 'so-and-so insulted me', although it is not contrary to the other reasoning:²⁹⁸ for it does not bid it to take revenge. But temper rushes off, as though reason were bidding this.

Still arguing on the same matter, Aristotle says that forgiveness follows more upon natural desires than upon those that are not natural, and just to the extent that they are natural and common. Temper and irascibility are more natural than excessive appetites and non-necessary ones. Nor did he bring in irascibility unreasonably, since it is a kind of excess of temper, but he did so rather to show that this is more natural than an excess of non-necessary appetites. He furthers the point that even such a temper is a more natural thing than such appetite from the fact that similarities of temper are established with our seeds [i.e. are inherited]: for in general, high-tempered people descend from high-tempered, but appetitive people do not always descend from appetitive, and some are born similar in temper just as they are in appearance. He adduces as an example the man who was criticized by his father upon beating him and said, pointing to his father: 'This man, although he is now accusing me, beat his father too', and pointing in turn to his son said, 'When he becomes a man, he will beat me'. He mentions too that when someone who was being dragged by his son reached the door, he told his son to stop: 'For I too', he said, 'dragged my father up to this point'.

He says further that 'those who are more scheming are more unjust' (1149b13-14). For a person who acts on account of temper is not scheming (for temper is a straightforward thing), but appetite is scheming. He makes use of generally accepted ideas as confirmation, citing things that are said by the poets about appetite. If, then, lack of control in the case of appetite is more unjust than that in the case of temper, it would also be more shameful, and therefore too it is 'lack of control simply and a vice, somehow' (1149b19-20). He did not call it a vice 'simply' but rather 'somehow', because it does not pertain to the whole soul, but to a certain part, as has been said often. Furthermore, no one insults another while feeling pain, but someone who acts in anger [feels pain],²⁹⁹ whereas everyone who insults another does so with pleasure. Aristotle added this by way of reinforcing the earlier premise. For everyone who insults another acts with pleasure, but never with pain. At the same time it bears upon that fact that <lack of control on account of> appetite is worse than lack of control <on account of temper>.³⁰⁰ For if someone who lacks control on account of temper feels pain for lacking control and therefore does not insult another, but one who lacks control on account of appetite takes pleasure in doing it on account of appetite and seems to be insulting someone for this reason, he [i.e. the latter] would be a worse person and deserving of greater anger. 'If, then, those acts at which it is most just to be angry are the most unjust' (1149b21-2), then lack of control on account of appetite would be more unjust than that on account of temper.

1149b23-1150b19 From 'That [lack of control due to appetite,] then, is more shameful' to 'one who likes games'.

That lack of control with respect to appetite is more shameful than that with respect to temper has been said, and also that self-control and lack of control concern bodily appetites and pleasures. But one must now grasp the differences among these same bodily appetites and pleasures. For, as has been said, some are human appetites and pleasures and are natural in kind: these are the necessary ones and are for things that are necessary to life. He says that they are natural too if they are natural in magnitude, for those that exceed what is appropriate also exceed the limits of nature. Some of the appetites and pleasures involve bestial dispositions, while some are due to disabilities and diseases, which those enjoy who are, as was said earlier, disabled in regard to their soul or their body and those who are in a sickly state. Of these, it is only with the first of those mentioned that temperateness and lack of control are concerned, for they are concerned with human [appetites and pleasures], and both of these involve choice. Therefore we do not call beasts either temperate or dissolute, since they do not have choice or rationality, though we sometimes call certain whole species of animals temperate and dissolute by way of metaphor, when we note the difference they bear in respect to other species. For example, we call some dissolute because they are randy, some because of their wantonness and the fact that they are gluttonous. But strictly speaking no beast is dissolute (for they do not have rationality), but rather, he says, they 'deviate from nature' (1149b35), that is, they seem like those human beings who deviate from their nature and are mad.

'Bestiality is less than vice' (1150a1) in regard to being blameworthy: for bestiality resembles madness, and therefore it is not blamed since it is not voluntary, but vice is blamed as being voluntary. Further,³⁰¹ bestiality is a lesser evil than vice by virtue of being less malicious. For just as a beast is not malicious in the way a human being is, so too bestiality is not malicious in the way that vice is. 'But it is more frightening' (1150a1-2), and a beast is more frightening than a bad human being, although less malicious. That is why he says that 'its best part has not been corrupted as it is in a human being' (1150a2-3), but what has been corrupted there [i.e. in a human being] it [i.e. a beast] does not have.³⁰² For in a bad human being the rationality that is in him has been corrupted, but it does not exist at all in a beast or in bestiality. One who has rationality can be wicked and malicious, but one who does not have it cannot. To compare a beast or bestiality, then, to a human being who has a vice is similar to comparing an inanimate thing to one that is animate in respect to which is more vicious or malicious; for the baseness of the one that does not have the animating principle would be less harmful. Just as what is animate is to inanimate things, so too is the rational to a non-rational animal. For the powerful principle in

reason is mind, and when such a principle has been corrupted, then, it is the cause of great evils.

Aristotle says further that to compare these things is very much as if one were to compare injustice and an unjust person. He establishes the parallel insofar as one who compares injustice with an unjust person is comparing incomparables; for one must compare habitual states with one another, for example injustice with dissoluteness, and kinds of people <with kinds>, for example an unjust person with a dissolute one. So too someone who compares a beast and a bestial character that has vice is comparing things that are not comparable. For one of these has vice, but the other does not. It is as though <each is worse in a way; for we see that even if a beast seems more malicious>,³⁰³ a wicked human being is a worse thing, 'for a bad person can do ten thousand times more bad things than a beast can' (1150a7-8). 15 20

In what follows Aristotle wishes to determine in what way a self-controlled person differs from one who is tough, and one lacking in control from one who is soft. Along the way he makes clear also the difference between the habitual state of the majority of people and that of people who are self-controlled or lacking in control: 'For', he says, 'concerning the pleasures and pains and appetites and aversions associated with touch and taste, it is possible to be so disposed as to be overcome even by those that the majority <are superior to, and to master even those than which the majority are>³⁰⁴ weaker. The one, then, who masters pleasures more than the majority do is self-controlled, whereas the one who is overcome even by those that the majority master is lacking in control. Thus with regard to pleasures the majority are at the border, as it were, between those who are lacking in control and those who are self-controlled, surpassed <by those who are self-controlled>³⁰⁵ but better than those who are lacking in control, and similarly concerning pains: for a tough person endures discomforts and hurts that the majority do not endure, but one lacking in self-control does not even bear up under those pains that the majority endure. Thus again concerning discomforts the habitual states of the majority are on the border between that of the tough and that of the soft. 25 30 131,1

At the same time the difference becomes clear between the self-controlled person and one who is tough, and between one lacking in control and one who is soft: for a self-controlled person and one lacking in control are so in regard to bodily pleasures, whereas the tough and the soft are so in regard to bodily discomforts and pains. For a soft person is such as not to be able to bear up under ordinary thirst or hunger or any other hurt at all, although reason bids him to endure. No doubt <one lacking in control pursues>³⁰⁶ pleasures, and the soft person too pursues pleasures while fleeing discomforts, but incidentally. However, the essence, in fact, for each is – for the one lacking in control, the pursuit of pleasures, and for the soft person, the avoidance of pains. Similarly too, mastering pleasures is characteristic of one who is self- 5 10

controlled, while it characteristic of the tough person not to be overcome by discomforts.

In what has been said, then, Aristotle has separated out the self-controlled person and one lacking in control from the tough and the soft. After this, he wishes to differentiate all of them from one another, the temperate person, the dissolute, the one with self-control and the one
 15 lacking control, and in addition the tough and the soft. The differences among them in respect to one another have been made clear too in the preceding; nevertheless, however, he tries to draw distinctions still more clearly and recognizably in respect to them.

‘Given that some pleasures’, he says, ‘are necessary, and some not’ (1150a16-17), those that are natural and ensue from things that are necessary for us in order to live are necessary, whereas those that are not such are not necessary, among which some come from things that are choiceworthy for themselves, for example honour and victory, and
 20 others from things that are contrary to nature and shameful. The necessary pleasures too are necessary up to a certain point: <their excesses are not necessary>,³⁰⁷ and likewise too their deficiencies. It is the same way too with respect to appetites and pains: for of these too some are necessary and some not. One who pursues excesses in pleasures, then, or does so in an excessive way is dissolute, for even if he
 25 pursues a pleasure that is not excessive, but he does so vehemently and in an excessive way, he is dissolute. For it is the mark of a temperate person to pursue ‘nothing in excess’ among the pleasures nor to pursue them vehemently. It is the mark of the dissolute person to do this on the basis of choice as well, contrary to <nature. For it is right> that he pursue pleasures, <but not>³⁰⁸ dissolute ones. Furthermore, it is not sufficient that he pursue on the basis of choice those pleasures that are not appropriate, but he must also choose them for themselves. For if he
 30 chooses and pursues it, for example if he commits adultery, and does not, however, do it for the sake of enjoying sex but so that he may obtain money, he is not dissolute but rather illiberal. The one who has all the above-mentioned features, then, is dissolute.

It is necessary that such a person not be disposed to regret, because he acts in accord with choice, and thus he is incurable. ‘For one who is not disposed to regret is incurable’ (1150a22), and in this respect he is worse than one lacking in control. For the person lacking in control is
 132,1 disposed to regret, and is therefore curable. One who is deficient in respect to the pleasures and does not make use of even the necessary ones is the opposite of the dissolute person: Aristotle called this one insensitive in the discussion at the beginning (cf. 2.2, 1104a24ff.). The temperate person is the mean of the two.

Having said this Aristotle returns again to the dissolute person. For,
 5 he says, ‘Similarly too for one who avoids bodily pains not by virtue of giving in to them but because of choice’ (1150a23-5). For in fact it is the mark of the dissolute person to avoid bodily pains, for example those

deriving from hunger or thirst or some other such, not by virtue of giving into them when reason bids the contrary, but rather because of choice. For a person who is overcome by bodily pains when reason bids that he endure them is soft, whereas one who is overcome by pains and at the same time has his reason corrupted and bidding him not to bear up at all under bodily pains is dissolute. This is why the dissolute person is so called in respect to pleasures and pains <alike>³⁰⁹ because he chooses shameful pleasures and pains not just because of appetite, and he avoids noble discomforts and hurts by choice; and he seems, in that he pursues shameful pleasures by choosing them, to be separated from the person lacking in control, and in that he avoids noble pains by choice, to be separated from the soft person. For the latter too avoids such pains, but not by choice. 10 15

Now, the dissolute person does everything, as has been said, in accord with choice. Of those who do things contrary to choice, the one lacking in control is 'led by pleasure', and the soft person 'on account of avoiding pain that comes from appetite. Thus', he says, 'they differ from one another' (1150a25-7). Aristotle said this either about the dissolute and the soft person or else, rather, about the person lacking in control and the dissolute person. For in fact he speaks next about this, for he says that a person would seem worse to everyone 'if he did something shameful when he was not moved by appetite or only slightly so, rather than if he were intensely so moved' (1150a28-9), just as, in fact, the dissolute person sometimes errs even apart from appetite or else with little appetite, whereas one lacking in control is conquered by a great emotion. 20 25

He says that the self-controlled person is opposed to one lacking in control, and the soft person to the tough one. After this, by way of making the difference between self-control and toughness still more understandable, he says that being tough resides in bearing up in respect to hurts, whereas being self-controlled resides in mastering pleasures. 'Bearing up is something other than mastering' (1150a35): for the former resembles not being defeated, but mastering resembles conquering. 'Therefore too self-control is more choiceworthy than toughness' (1150a36-b1), to the extent that to conquer is more choiceworthy than not being defeated. 30

Again, he says that the soft person gives in even to things with respect to which the majority of people resist, since he is soft and dainty. For daintiness is a kind of softness, as when someone drags his cloak for the sake of not taking the trouble to lift it, and does not think that he is wretched to be imitating those who really are in a wretched state because of disease. 133,1

He says that the case is similar concerning self-control and lack of control as that concerning toughness and softness. He himself makes clear how it is similar in the case of lack of control particularly, and softness. For it is not remarkable 'if someone is overcome by excessive 5

hurts or pains' (1150b6-7) but rather is deserving of pardon, for example if someone, like Philoctetes in Theodectes' [tragedy],³¹⁰ having been pricked by the serpent bears it up to a certain point since he wishes to conceal it from Neoptolemus and his men, but afterwards, when he cannot endure the magnitude of the hurt, becomes open about it.

10 Sophocles and Aeschylus presented him in the same manner. Carcinus too seems to have presented Cercyon (fr. 1b Snell) as overcome by great hurts.³¹¹ These men, then, are not soft, but rather [a person is so] if he cannot bear up under those pains that the majority can, but is overcome by them. It is the same too in the case of pleasure. For, as Theophrastus

15 says, someone is not deserving of reproach if, having tasted ambrosia, he has an appetite for it, but rather if someone is intensely overcome by pleasures such as most people [experience].³¹² Aristotle seems to introduce what befell Xenophantus³¹³ as an example of people who are very much overcome by pleasure and yet deserving of pardon. For having restrained his laughter for a long while he finally guffawed, which happens to other people, too.

In general, then, <if one is overcome by pains that>³¹⁴ the majority are able to endure, <or>³¹⁵ is overcome by pleasures of which the

20 majority are masters, he is at fault, unless it is on account of the nature of the kin group or <that>³¹⁶ of the region, as softness exists among the kings of the Scythians because the whole kin group is brought up this way and daintiness and the inability to bear any bodily pain are believed to be royal traits. No one, accordingly, would say that they do this on account of softness, but rather because this is granted as proper to their kings. He takes as an example of specific nature how the female

25 is in relation to the male: for it is common to both to be human beings but specific in some sense to the female not to endure all the discomforts that the male does. One would not call this softness but rather specific and innate to the female.

A playful person is one who plays with respect to everything. Some people believe that this sort is dissolute, but Aristotle denies this and

134,1 says rather that he is soft. Because he cannot bear seriousness, since it is laborious, he constantly plays, and play is relaxation. One should know that the playful person is one of those who are excessive in respect to this [i.e. relaxation]; if he is excessive in relaxation, then he may be called soft rather than dissolute, since too much relaxation is softness.

5 **1150b19-1152a36** 'One kind of lack of control is impetuosity' to 'to one another has been said'.

He says that there are two kinds of lack of control, one being impetuosity and the other weakness. Those who deliberate, but nevertheless do not persist in what they deliberated about because of emotion, are lacking in control in the weak kind of lack of control. For just as weak

10 bodies are easily seized by afflictions (*pathê*) and overcome, so too weak

souls easily give in to the emotions (*pathê*). Furthermore, all those who are by nature strong but are overcome by those who are inferior seem to <suffer this> on account of weakness. <Likewise,> when rationality, by nature <strong, having been seized> by appetite is overcome by it, it appears weak.³¹⁷

Those who are led by emotion because they did not deliberate at all have the impetuous kind of lack of control. For some, like people who have been tickled earlier and are not [subject to being] tickled afterwards, by deliberating beforehand and rousing their rationality are not overcome by emotion. Those who are impetuous in their lack of control because they did not deliberate beforehand at all are led by emotion. 15

For the most part, those who are impulsive and high strung are lacking in control in the impetuous sort of lack of control. For because they follow the impression of what is pleasant they do not wait for reason, but as soon as they have imagined that it is pleasant, they pursue it. The impulsive follow the impression of what is pleasant immediately because of the impulsiveness of their nature, whereas the high-strung do so because of its intensity. In what sense, then, do the impetuous have their reason contrary to appetite, if they do not even deliberate beforehand? It is so if in such people too there is reason that forbids³¹⁸ them to give in to shameful appetites, but because of the intensity or speed [of their natures], whenever emotion comes upon them, they are, as it were, blinded by a kind of mist, and then they do not see the reason that is in them nor wait for deliberation or inquiry. 20 25

Once again comparing the person lacking in control with the dissolute person, he says that the dissolute person is not disposed to regret (for in fact he acts after having chosen and for this reason abides in his choice once he has acted), but everyone lacking in control is disposed to regret, whether he has the impetuous or the weak kind of lack of control. Regret is on account of acting contrary to choice; that is why he says that it is <not>³¹⁹ like the puzzle we posed: for in posing the puzzle, he argued saying that one lacking in control was worse than the dissolute person, if indeed the former, even though reason opposes, nevertheless disobeys it, whereas with the dissolute person reason does not hinder it. Now he shows that the dissolute person is far worse because the one lacking in control is in fact curable, whereas the dissolute person is incurable. For wickedness resembles those diseases that are chronic such as dropsy and consumption and chronic fever. Doctors too agree concerning the body that the chronic diseases are more severe and harder to cure because they do not yield or offer occasion for help. Such a thing is wickedness, if indeed³²⁰ base choice inheres like a disease that is either hard to cure or incurable. But lack of control is similar to the intermittent diseases, such as epilepsy or any other that offers occasion for help. For in fact prior to the appetite the person is fine, and thus it is not impossible, if reason continually 5 10

encourages him and leads him to a change of heart in respect to his faults, for the person lacking in control to change.

15 And in general dissoluteness and lack of control are different in kind: 'for vice escapes one's notice, but lack of control does not escape one's notice' (1150b36). Vice is a wicked thing, not because one wrongs [sc. another], he said (in fact one often knows this),³²¹ but because a person does things that are harmful to himself, for he thinks³²² they are beneficial [sc. although they are not]. If it is lack of control, however, in this latter respect it does not escape one's notice: rather, a person knows that he is doing things harmful to himself, but he is overcome by his appetite.

20 Of those who are lacking in control themselves, 'those who easily get carried away' (1151a1) (these are those whom he earlier called impetuous)³²³ 'are better' than those who have reason but do not stay with it (by these he means people who have deliberated and inquired beforehand, but do not stay with what seemed right to them). He calls the latter worse, since they are overcome by a smaller emotion. An indication that the emotion of those who lack control in the impetuous type of
25 lack of control is greater is the fact that they do not even offer <a beginning>³²⁴ of having deliberated. At the same time, because they are impetuous or³²⁵ high-strung they have more intense emotions. To be overcome by a great emotion seems more deserving of pardon.

Further, those who have the weak kind of lack of control do not proceed to their errors without deliberating beforehand; therefore they are worse than the others. For those are more deserving of pardon who
30 have not foreseen either the harm or the shame of the deed to be done and for this reason err than³²⁶ those who have foreseen it and, even though they deliberated, err nonetheless. For he says that the person lacking in control is similar to those who get drunk even on a little wine and less than the majority do. Is³²⁷ this said about those who have the
136,1 impetuous kind of lack of control, because they grow drunk on a little wine, or about³²⁸ those who have deliberated beforehand and therefore are seized by a small emotion and less than those who are easily carried away,³²⁹ or is it said in general about all those lacking in control? For they all resemble those who quickly get drunk and on less wine than
5 the majority. For they are overcome by pleasant things by which the majority are not seized.

Now, lack of control is not simply a vice, but perhaps it is one in some manner, because the entire soul of the person lacking in control is not corrupted, but in some manner it has reason. That is why Aristotle says that vice does everything in accord with choice, whereas lack of control does so contrary to choice. Nevertheless, it is also a similar thing in
10 respect to actions, for the person lacking in control does the same things as one who is dissolute.

Since, then, the uncontrolled person is such as to pursue bodily pleasures that are excessive and wrong, but contrary to his reason and

without having been persuaded, whereas the dissolute person has been persuaded that one should pursue them, it is clear that the uncontrolled person is open to persuasion, but not in such a way that his reason changes (for he would be called base if not even his reason were right), but so as to be persuaded no longer to follow his appetite. But the dissolute person is unpersuadable. For virtue preserves the principle, whereas wickedness corrupts the principle.³³⁰ The end and that on account of which [we act] is the principle in matters of action, in accord with which [i.e. the end] we attempt to effect those activities that lead to it. If, then, we assume a fine goal, it is necessary that the activities also be fine, and if a base goal, that the activities must be base. Ethical virtue, then, assumes that the end and³³¹ happiness of those who are acting are noble activities in accord with virtue, whereas vice corrupts this principle and does not permit one to consider the active doing of noble things [to be] happiness: this is why he says that it is corrupting of the principle. 15 20

Just as there are certain principles in mathematics, for example in geometry and arithmetic, and if one has not accepted them one will not advance farther in those disciplines, so too in practical things one who has not accepted the end but corrupts the principle of what is to be done will not concede the rest. In this way, you might call a person who has corrupted the mathematical principles unpersuadable in respect to accepting the discipline. Indeed, neither in mathematical reasonings does one teach the principles, that is, demonstrate them, but mathematicians believe in them undemonstrated, nor in practical matters do we demonstrate the principle, but as Aristotle also said earlier (6.13, 1144b2), sometimes it is a natural principle that is posited as ethical virtue, and there are times when it is one deriving from habit: for these are the causes of right thinking concerning the principle for the sake of which [i.e. the final principle]. For this name for the soul [i.e. virtuous] is engendered either by a good³³² nature or by noble habits, so that one who is going to live happily sees the end and strives in this way. 25 30 137,1

Then, resuming [the argument] again, what does he say? 'Such a person, then, is temperate' (1151a19-20). It is clear that he means a person who has both right reason and emotion concerning the bodily pleasures. 'And the opposite person is dissolute' (1151a20). One who is easily carried away contrary to right reason is lacking in control; for even if those who are uncontrolled in respect to the impetuous lack of control are most properly called easily carried away, there is nevertheless a way in which all those who are uncontrolled might be said to be easily carried away by virtue of being carried away by emotion, and therefore in some manner not to see the reason that is in them. Emotion masters the uncontrolled person to the degree that he does not act in accord with right reason, but not indeed so as to have been persuaded to pursue non-noble pleasures. For his reason is not corrupted by appetite, but, though it remains,³³³ it is overpowered. He is better than 10

the dissolute person, because 'the best in him is preserved' (1151a25), namely, the principle. He calls rationality the principle.

Contrary to the uncontrolled in a different way³³⁴ is the self-controlled person, who, Aristotle says, is persistent in his reason because of emotion,³³⁵ since he goes on to say (cf. 1151b4-12) that the obdurate person is persistent in his belief, not because of emotion but because of reason. To state it more clearly, the self-controlled person is said to be persistent in his belief because emotion does not master him, whereas the obdurate person too is said to be persistent in his belief because his reason, which opposes him, is not overcome. It is evident that lack of control is a base state, while self-control is a worthy one.

He next inquires whether one who persists in any reasoning whatsoever is self-controlled or rather one who persists in the truth, and whether it is one who persists in any choice whatsoever or one who persists in the right choice. Either he has taken 'choice' redundantly to be the same thing as reason, or he is calling wishing 'choice', or by Zeus he is calling 'choice' generally whatever comes from reason and wishing, since choice comes from desire and reason. Wishing, in fact, is desire, and the self-controlled person persists both in his reason and his wishing by prevailing over some other desire, namely the appetitive.

There is the same puzzle concerning the uncontrolled person as well, that is, whether someone who does not persist in any choice whatsoever or one who does not persist in any reason whatsoever is uncontrolled, or whether it is one who does not persist in false reason and a choice that is not right.³³⁶ He says that one who persists in any reasoning whatsoever and any choice whatsoever is self-controlled incidentally, but one who persists in right reasoning is so as such. And the same holds concerning one who is lacking in control: for one who does not persist in false reason and in a wicked choice is uncontrolled incidentally, since he thinks his reasoning is true and his choice is fine, although, contrary to the reason that is in him, he pursues his appetite's <demands>,³³⁷ even if they should happen to be noble. But one who transgresses true reasoning and pursues a wicked appetite is uncontrolled as such.

That those who have been so called are rightly called self-controlled and uncontrolled incidentally he furthers by saying, 'For if one chooses this on account of this' (1151a35-b1). The first 'this' he mentions is incidental.³³⁸ It may become more understandable as follows: if someone chooses wine and values it highly, that is, <he believes it is good, then>³³⁹ he values highly what he chooses as such. This is how a person seems, then, who persists in false reasoning and in a base choice, thinking that his reasoning is true and that his choice is fine, and that he honours what is true and what is noble as such; but he is persistent incidentally. One who does not persist in false reasoning, although he thinks that it is true, and pursues a fine appetite as though it were base, would be lacking in control incidentally. The one who persists in true

reasoning and conquers his appetite is self-controlled simply and as such, and the opposite person is [similarly] lacking in control.

Some people think that those who are obdurate are self-controlled, because they are persistent in their belief and hard to persuade. Aristotle says that such a person has something similar in appearance to the self-controlled person, just as the rash person has to the courageous and the conceited person has to the liberal, but they differ in many respects. It is in a special sense that he says here that the conceited person resembles the liberal, since he says elsewhere (2.8, 1108b22) that the profligate person resembles him [i.e. the liberal] in appearance.³⁴⁰ But he shows how the self-controlled person and the obdurate person differ. For the self-controlled person 'does not change because of emotion and appetite', that is he does not change his reasoning because he is overcome by appetite, 'since he is easily persuaded' (1151b8-10), if some right reasoning should come along, to depart and change from the belief he previously held about anything whatever. For in general he values true reasoning highest of all, and he does not invariably persist in preferring not to enjoy a pleasure, but if it should be the right moment and if reason so chooses, he will accept the pleasure. But the obdurate person is persistent in his belief 'not by reason', he says (1151b10-11), that is not overcome by a different and better reason, should it come along, since obdurate people are sometimes led by their appetites and pleasures and hold reason to be of no account at all.

Overall, the³⁴¹ opinionated too are obdurate, because of pleasure and pain: for they delight in protecting their own belief and so to speak conquering contrary arguments by not being persuaded to change, and they are pained whenever they are persuaded to change; thus, they resemble the person lacking in control on account of pleasure more than the self-controlled person. For they sometimes err through pleasure and are not persuaded to change for the better. It would have followed [for Aristotle] to say, 'and the boorish and the ignorant are not persuaded to change on account of lack of education and stiffness of character', but he skips this in his discussion.

He observes next that some have the appearance of an uncontrolled person,³⁴² although they are not uncontrolled nor blameworthy but rather the opposite and even praiseworthy, for example those who do not persist in what they believe on account of pleasure – but a noble and praiseworthy pleasure, like Neoptolemos in the *Philoctetes* of Sophocles. For he has been persuaded by Odysseus to tell lies to Philoctetes, but he does not persist in it since he takes delight and pleasure in not lying. Thus, not everyone who does not persist in what he believes on account of pleasure is lacking in control, but rather those who do so because of shameful pleasure.

Aristotle wishes that self-control too be a mean, just like the virtues. For if it is not a virtue, it is at all events a praiseworthy habitual state, and the dispositions that are adjacent to it in respect to excess and lack

15 are, if not altogether vices, nevertheless blameworthy. Just as, then, adjacent to temperateness, which is a mean concerning bodily pleasures in which both the reason that is in the temperate person and his desire are right, there is the dissolute person on the one hand, who goes to excess in pleasures with the result that both the reason that is in him and his desire have been corrupted, and the insensitive person on the other hand, who falls short and does not even enjoy natural pleasures
 20 (both reason and desire are base in him); so too, adjacent to the self-controlled person who is not overcome by appetites contrary to reason because he persists in reason is the uncontrolled person on the one hand, who is overcome by his appetites and by shameful pleasures, and who transgresses reason which forbids him to enjoy them – this one, then, is classified according to excess. The other would be someone who is such as to enjoy bodily things less than one should and who does not
 25 persist in the reasoning that bids him enjoy pleasures.

Is it that he has the appetite but nevertheless does not give in to his appetites, or that he did not even have the appetite?³⁴³ Aristotle indicates that he does not have appetites, when he says that he takes less delight than one ought in bodily pleasures. One might consider whether it is possible that a person who both has appetites and whose reason now bids him to enjoy these particular pleasures, nevertheless has some
 30 reason that opposes this in general on the grounds that one should not enjoy pleasures, or, if not reason, so that there not be contrary reasonings in him at the same time, then at least a wish or some non-rational
 140,1 impulse because of boorishness of character. This type of person seems to have been classified according to deficiency, but it has no name because it does not readily occur. For it is gratifying [even] to find some people who enjoy [only] as many pleasures as reason commands³⁴⁴ or, when even reason does not give in,³⁴⁵ who nevertheless avoid pleasure.
 5 Because such people do not occur, self-control alone is believed to be opposed to lack of control, just as temperateness alone is believed to be opposed to dissoluteness, since so-called insensitivity is found rarely or in no one at all.

When he says that the one person lacking in control does not persist in his reasoning because of the more, and the other because of the less, he means this, namely that the one uncontrolled person does not persist
 10 because he yields to pleasures more than he ought, the other because less than he ought, that is, because he does not accept even those pleasures that one ought to.

He [next] teaches why we often call the temperate person self-controlled and the dissolute person lacking in control. Many things, he says, are called as they are because of similarity. The self-controlled person seems similar to the temperate person (for both of them 'are such as to do nothing contrary to reason on account of bodily pleasures'
 15 (1151b35)), but they differ, as has been said many times, by virtue of the fact that the temperate person does not have base pleasures,³⁴⁶

whereas the self-controlled person does, and the temperate person is such as neither to take pleasure or delight in pleasures other than those which reason orders, whereas the self-controlled person, because his appetitive part is sick, is such as to take pleasure on the contrary³⁴⁷ in base pleasures, but he is not led by them, since his reasoning conquers them. It is clear too that the dissolute person is called uncontrolled by similarity: for both pursue bodily pleasures, but there is a difference 20 because the dissolute person is also persuaded that one should pursue them, whereas the other is not persuaded.

He says that it is not possible to be simultaneously prudent and uncontrolled. For it has been shown in the previous arguments (6.13, 1145a1-6) that the truly prudent person is worthy in character and has all the ethical virtues, hence too temperateness, and it is impossible for 25 the same person to be temperate and uncontrolled. Further, the prudent person, properly and in truth so called, is not the one who merely knows what is just, but rather the one who is a doer of what one ought, just as the one who merely knows [what is just] is not just. But the uncontrolled person is not a doer of just things, and hence is not prudent.

It is possible for the clever person to be lacking in control: this is why the temperate person³⁴⁸ too seems to be lacking in control. For some people suppose that a clever person is prudent, for they have a certain 30 similarity in respect to reason: for both are comprehending of what leads to the end that has been proposed. He has mentioned earlier (6.13, 1144a28) the difference that they have.

Furthermore, he [i.e. the uncontrolled person] will transgress and be out of control, not like³⁴⁹ one who knows the rules for action but rather like³⁵⁰ one who is suffering an emotion that is somewhat similar to a person who is drunk; for the uncontrolled person is as it were carried away and is dizzy by emotion, nor does he accurately perceive the 141,1 reason that is in him, but the uncontrolled person voluntarily acts although he knows in a certain way that he is doing what ought not to be done.³⁵¹ For he has reason that forbids it, but it is disturbed by emotion. He is not utterly evil but rather half-wicked: for that person is wholly bad, whose whole soul has been corrupted. And what is non- 5 rational is base, but 'the choice' of the uncontrolled person 'is decent' (1152a17). Once again, he has either called reason 'choice' or deliberation³⁵² together with reason.

He says that the uncontrolled person is not unjust because he is not a plotter: for a plotter, who plans, obviously, bad things, lies in wait and does evil, but of those who are uncontrolled, one kind deliberates³⁵³ and, not persisting <in his reasoning, is overcome by emotion, whereas the impetuous kind, not having deliberated at all, is overcome by pleasures which he does not>³⁵⁴ wish to enjoy; thus neither is a plotter. 10

Obvious too is what he has added after this, that lack of control and self-control concern an excess over the habitual state of the majority. For the self-controlled person exceeds them in persisting more in his

reasoning and in not enjoying the pleasures that they enjoy, whereas the uncontrolled person exceeds them in being worse than they are and
 15 being unable to abstain even from pleasures from which they shrink, although the reason that is in him bids this. He says that the lack of control of high-strung people and in general what is called the more impulsive kind is more easily curable than that of those who deliberate but do not persist (for it is clear that as soon as impulsive people were habituated to deliberating, that would quickly change); and further, that those who are uncontrolled because of habit are more easily
 20 curable than those who are so by nature: for nature is hard to budge. For habit too is hard to alter, because it produces something similar to nature.

Aristotle says that speculation 'about pleasure and pain' is proper to the political philosopher, for he is the architect of the goal. Why does he call him 'architect of the goal'? It is because everyone is called the architect of what he is a guide to the production of,³⁵⁵ and the political
 25 person guides [people] as to how happiness may come into being. Furthermore, practical intelligence is called architectonic (cf. 6.7, 1141b22-3), because it endows the ethical virtues with reason. Political intelligence is about the city and the happiness of the city. It is reasonable, then, both that [practical intelligence] itself be called the architect of the goal, and also the one who possesses it, that is, the political person. Since, then, when we have the goal in view we call this good and
 30 that bad simply – good, that which leads to the goal and to happiness, bad, that which is an impediment to the latter – it is clear that speculation concerning pleasure or pain, whether it leads to happiness or on the contrary impedes it, pertains to the one who is the architect of the goal. Furthermore, since ethical virtue is about pleasures and pains, as has been shown, and political [science] is about the concern for
 5 ethical virtue, it is necessary for the political [philosopher] to inquire about them. Moreover, 'most people say that happiness is accompanied by pleasure' (1152b5-6) and that the person who is happy is dubbed blissful (*makarios*), as if you were to say that he is 'enjoying greatly (*mala khaironta*)'.³⁵⁶ For this reason too, then, speculation about pleasure and pain is proper to the political [philosopher].

Now, there are some who believe that no pleasure is a good, and they say that Antisthenes (cf. fr. 120 Giannantoni) was of this opinion. These
 10 people say, indeed, that pleasure is not a good either in itself or incidentally. For of good things, some are so in themselves, such as virtues and activities in accord with them, while others are so incidentally, such as medical incisions and cauterizations,³⁵⁷ and hard exertions: for we choose none of these for itself, but rather on account of something else and incidentally. But pleasure is a good in neither
 15 respect: it is so neither in itself nor incidentally, 'for a good and pleasure are not the same thing' (1152b9-10).³⁵⁸

If the reading is thus, the interpretation is easy. For they deny that

pleasure is a good either in itself or incidentally, since it is not possible <for pleasure to be> the same as any [particular] good.³⁵⁹ If it is written with the article, 'for pleasure is not the same thing as *the* good',³⁶⁰ then this latter [clause] seems to have been adduced illogically. For whether the good is taken as the genus of good things or as happiness [i.e. the highest good], how is it demonstrated that pleasure is neither one of the things good in themselves nor one of those that are so incidentally? For he adduces this as if it were a reason, but that³⁶¹ [pleasure] is neither the same as the genus³⁶² of good things nor as happiness is not a reason why pleasure is not *a* good. For in fact there are other goods, which, however, are not the same as the universal good or happiness. But rather, since Aristotle believed that 'the good' was said homonymously,³⁶³ it seems he was saying that pleasure is not the same as any of the things designated by 'the good'. And indeed this is what he meant, since as he proceeds he will show that pleasure is not a good from the fact that it is not the same in genus as happiness. The argument will become clear shortly.

Now then, some believe that no pleasure is a good, others that one is good but many are base, and still others that though all pleasures are a good, nevertheless pleasure is not the best, that is, it is not happiness, while those who say that happiness is pleasure are opposed to these latter.

[As to the first,] then, 'In general [pleasure] is not a good at all' (1152b12), that is, no pleasure is a good in general,³⁶⁴ 'because every pleasure is a perceptible process toward a natural state' (1152b13). Now, it is called a process toward a natural state because it seems to be a replenishment of a lack and to lead to the good in accord with nature. For hunger is a lack in one's natural [or physical] condition: the pleasure in eating is the replenishment of the lack and the drive to what is in accord with nature, and the pleasure in drinking is a replenishment and process leading to what is in accord with nature. Hence 'process toward a natural state'. 'Perceptible', because there are also other processes within us, such as the generation of blood and the digestion of food, which are not pleasures because they escape our notice. But if the process and replenishment are perceptible, then there occurs pleasure.

The argument is as follows: no process is akin (*sungenês*) to its goal; pleasure is a process; therefore, it is not of the same kind (*homogenês*) as its goal; the goal, namely happiness, is a good; therefore pleasure is not a good, since it is not under the same genus [or kind: *genos*]. It is because of this argument that we said that it is permissible for 'the good' to be written with the article. That no process is of the same kind as its goal they try to show by induction. For house-building is a process, a house is the goal, and they are not of the same kind: for a house is a substance, but house-building is [in the categories] of action and relation. Further, shipbuilding is a process, a ship is the goal, and they are

not of the same kind. And one might take it this way in the case of many things.

15 Furthermore, this argument is fallacious: for in fact it assumes that the good is a genus, although it is not, but rather it is predicated homonymously [i.e. of different kinds of things]; and [on this assumption] it is a fallacy that no process is of the same kind as its goal. For if one grants that the good is a genus, then, since virtue and each of the activities according to virtue are producers of their goal, these things should be called a process; but each of the virtues is a good.³⁶⁵ But there will discussion by Aristotle himself in regard to the argument.

20 Further, in regard to pleasure not being a good they turn round³⁶⁶ the argument that the temperate person avoids pleasures and the prudent person pursues what is painless rather than pleasure. For the prudent person is tranquil also in [bodily] condition, and pleasure is a perturbing thing. Therefore he pursues painlessness, which is a kind of tranquillity, and not pleasure. Furthermore, [they adduce the argument] that what is obstructive of the good is not a good; but pleasure is such a thing;
25 therefore it is not a good. That pleasure is obstructive of thinking prudently they believe to be obvious: for no one can either take counsel or discover anything while he is amidst pleasures and feeling pleasure. Aristotle evidences also the fact that the greater the pleasures one is engaged in, [the more] he is unable to think; at all events, when a person is engaged in the pleasure of sex, it is not easy for him to think about or consider something. Further, for every good there is an art [or skill], but there is no art of pleasure: therefore it is not a good. Further all the
30 things pursued by the most senseless creatures are not goods; but pleasures are pursued by children and animals; therefore they are not goods. By means of these arguments they try to show that no pleasure is a good.

Those who say that not all pleasures are worthy show it from the fact that many are shameful, for example those of dissolute people and of
144,1 effeminate, and from the fact that many are harmful. For because of their excesses, their bodies are sick and they are harmed in respect to their property and – most important of all – their souls. For since they have no concern for any of the noble things on account of their eagerness for pleasures, they go on being extremely senseless and thoughtless.

5 That pleasure is not the best thing, and that it is not the goal, he again shows from [the nature of] the goal: for there is no goal [realized] during a process but rather after a process.

After this, Aristotle raises objections to the above-mentioned arguments. For that the fact that pleasure is not a good or the best thing does not follow from what has been said, is clear from the following. For 'the good' is said in two ways: on the one hand, simply, on the other, for
10 someone. What is good for everyone is good simply, for example virtues and activities in accord with them; but incisions and cauteries are good for someone, for these are not simply goods, but for someone, that is, a

person who needs medical treatment. Even sickness, although it is a bad thing simply, might be called a good for someone, for instance for a wicked person, for to be sick and suffer would benefit him, since he would be less able to do evil.

Since, then, 'the good' is twofold, 'both natural states (*phusis*) and habitual states (*hexis*) will follow suit' (1152b27-8); thus, some will be good simply, and others good for someone. For some natural dispositions and habitual states are good simply, for example virtues, while others are so for some people, for example the natural conditions and habitual bodily states of health, vitality, and keen senses. For these are goods for someone, namely a worthy person, and on this account they are also called goods simply. A sickly habitual state is also a good for someone, I mean for a wicked person.

Upon the fact that some habitual states are a good simply, while others are so for someone, it follows that the changes and processes that arise in connection with them are also, some good simply, and others for someone. Even those that seem bad simply will not be bad for some person, but rather will be choiceworthy for this person; for example sickly changes, though they are bad simply, are always beneficial to someone who is incorrigible in respect to wickedness, since they become his medical treatments for his activities in respect to wickedness. Other [changes and processes] are not choiceworthy even for this person, but are so sometimes: for example, incisions and medical treatments are so for a person who is sick at the time when he is sick, but they are not simply choiceworthy. And some are choiceworthy always, others never,³⁶⁷ so that they are not even pleasures, he says, 'but rather only appear to be', for example, 'all those accompanied by pain' (1152b31-2), like³⁶⁸ those of people who are ill. For they have true pleasures who are disposed in accord with nature. But if the pleasures of those who are sick are contrary to nature, much more so are those of dissolute people, for they are the more disposed contrary to nature. These latter things are said against those who claim that pleasure is not a good because a process is a change. For the changes and processes of good habitual states are good, while those of bad ones are bad. Thus, even if one grants that pleasure is a change or process, not every one is bad but rather that which arises from <a bad>³⁶⁹ habitual state is bad, while that which arises from a seemly one is seemly.

After this he shows that pleasure is neither a process nor a change. 'Since on the one hand activity and on the other a habitual state are parts of the good' (1152b33) – virtue is a good as a habitual state, while activity in accord with virtue is so as an activity, and perception is a good as a habitual state (I mean perception as a capacity),³⁷⁰ while perception in accord with activity is a good as an activity³⁷¹ – pleasure is a good not as a habitual state but rather as an activity of a natural state. The replenishments and restorations which are pleasing³⁷² to one's nature are so incidentally, since primarily we feel pleasure be-

cause our nature is active while we are being nourished (by 'nature' I mean 'the soul'). For then the nutritive soul is active, and that is why we feel pleasure, although it happens that at the same time there occurs a replenishment. But the pleasure is the activity of the remaining natural state (*phusis*) and habitual state (*hexis*) within us.³⁷³ For even if we are in need in respect to the body, we still have our nature [i.e. soul] remaining and able to be active in it [i.e. the body],³⁷⁴ <so that>³⁷⁵ it [our nature or soul] is active even as food and drink are there for it as well. The pleasure is by way of activity, but the replenishment of what is in need in the body is incidental, as he says.

The greatest evidence of the fact that pleasure is not a process is the one he mentions: for there are many pleasures 'without pain and appetite' (1152b36), with no need inhering in them, for example the contemplative pleasures. These occur when the soul itself is active by itself, but there are also those of the body, for example those of seeing, smelling, and hearing, and none of these pleasures happens to people who have previously felt pain. But if indeed pleasure were replenishment and pleasure were process and process toward what is in accord with our natural state, then all pleasures would have to be replenishments. But now it is evident that pleasure by way of contemplation is the activity of the contemplative soul, while that by way of seeing or smelling is an activity of the perceptive soul. It is reasonable too to call the pleasure that occurs when the body is being nourished and replenished the activity of the nutritive nature, because it [i.e. the pleasure] is inseparable from activity; for the activity of virtue too is an inseparable pleasure.³⁷⁶ But there will be a clearer discussion of this in what follows.

Further, one may adduce as a sign that pleasure is the activity of a natural state the fact that it [i.e. one's nature or soul] does not enjoy the same pleasing thing 'when one's nature is being replenished and when it has been restored' (1153a2-3). Aristotle here means by 'the replenishment of a natural state' not simply that which occurs through nourishment but also that which occurs in people who are ill; this truly indicates a replenishment of a natural state because they have altogether degenerated from their natural disposition. He says he terms the nature of healthy people 'restored'. Now, those who are ill do not enjoy things that are pleasing simply: the things that are pleasing to those who are disposed in accord with nature are pleasing simply, just as things that seem white to people who are disposed in accord with nature in regard to sight, are white. Now, those who are ill enjoy bitter and sour things, and none of these is pleasing either by nature or simply, while those who are healthy and in the condition of nature enjoy things that are pleasing simply. Of what then is this a sign, if not of the fact that pleasure is an activity of a natural state? For by however much the greater or more we are in accord with nature and our natural state is active unimpededly, so much the more do we like truly pleasing things.

When we are disposed contrary to nature and are in need of much replenishment, and our natural state is active in a bad and impeded way, we do not enjoy things that are simply pleasing. Thus, the pleasures that come from them are not pleasures simply or strictly. For as pleasing things are to one another, so too the pleasures that come from them. Things that are pleasing to those who are ill, such as <... while one who is healthy> and in accord with nature has contrary things that are pleasing.³⁷⁷ Thus, the pleasures too of those who are ill would be contrary to those of healthy people, and therefore are not even pleasures, but rather seem so to those who are disposed contrary to nature, just as [in the case of] pleasing things. 5 10

1153a7-35 'Further, it is not necessary' to 'since there are pleasures of the temperate person too'.

Those who claim that pleasure is not the goal nor the same thing as happiness chiefly use the argument that it is a process. Referring to these, Aristotle says that it is not necessary to suppose that something else is better than pleasure. It is agreed that a thing for whose sake something else exists is better than a thing that is for something else's sake, and therefore that the goal for whose sake a process exists is better than any process. But the process is not pleasure, as has been said: not only are pleasures not activities, but 'not all of them accompany a process' (1153a9-10). For those that involve replenishment, though they are not processes, nevertheless accompany a process: such are the pleasures that arise from nourishment and from being warmed when the body needs warmth, and from being cooled when the body needs cold. But neither the pleasures that arise from seeing nor those that arise from hearing are accompanied by replenishment, for no pre-existing need and pain occur. Above all, the pleasures that arise from contemplation are far from coming about accompanied by replenishment or any process. Since, then, pleasures are not processes, but rather activities of a habitual state in accord with nature, nothing prevents them on this account from being the best thing and the same as happiness. For since, while he denies that, if pleasure is a process, then it is permissible that it be a goal, he [nevertheless affirms that] it is evident that it is not a process, what prevents pleasure from being a goal? But one must refute the arguments that they use who claim that it is not a good or a goal. It might well somehow also be a goal, because it always occurs together with the goal and happiness, since all happiness is accompanied by pleasure.³⁷⁸ 15 20 25 30

Pleasures, then, ensue not when things are in process but rather when they are in use; for when natural habitual states are active and make use of things, then pleasures ensue. When the nutritive soul makes use of food and drink the pleasures from nourishment arise, when the visual capacity makes use of visible things and is active in 147,1

regard to them the pleasure from visible things arises, and when another natural state or habitual state makes use of some other thing, some other pleasure arises along with that. But even if one granted
 5 that, besides pleasures, something else was in process, this is nevertheless not so in the case of all pleasures, but rather only in the case of those that are primary and are said to arise with the fulfilment of a natural state: these are the ones that arise through replenishment. For we do not take nourishment for this reason, that is, to be nourished, nor do we choose the pleasure that comes from it for itself, but so that we may bring the body to its natural condition. This condition, then, is the goal,
 10 and it is a different thing from replenishment and the pleasure that arises with these things [i.e. eating and drinking]. Since, then, not all <pleasures are>³⁷⁹ restorations leading to what is in accord with nature (the pleasures that come with contemplation, indeed, have no such thing nor do they arise for the sake of something else, but they are themselves the goal), it is clear that nothing should prevent some pleasure from being a goal. Therefore, 'it is not right' to call pleasure a 'perceptible process, but rather', he says, 'one should call it the activity
 15 of a habitual state in accord with nature' (1153a13-14); for this is common to all the pleasures. And one ought to say that it is 'unimpeded instead of perceptible' (1153a15). For those who explain it [i.e. pleasure] as a process likewise used to call it a perceptible process toward a natural state, but Aristotle himself said it was the unimpeded activity of a habitual state in accord with nature.

If, then, in saying 'unimpeded', 'perceptible' were also implied, then
 20 the definition of pleasure would be sufficient. But if it is not implied, one must certainly add 'perceptible'. For if it is the activity of a natural state and unimpeded, but it is not perceptible, it will not be pleasure. For example, the digestion of food is the activity of a natural state, but it is not indeed perceptible, and therefore it is not a pleasure.

Pleasure, he says, 'is thought to be a process because it is strictly speaking a good' (1153a15-16).³⁸⁰ He says this because he holds that
 25 what is strictly called 'good' is activity. For in fact he posits that happiness is an activity. Since, then, pleasure too is a kind of activity, it would strictly speaking be a good. He says this, then, by way of criticizing those who say that pleasure is a process and that for this reason it is not something worthy. It is as though he had said that they deem it a process on the very basis on which they ought least to deem it a process [i.e. that it is a good]. For it is an activity and it is strictly speaking a good for this reason. But they said that it is a process for this
 30 reason, misled by their believing that activity and process are the same thing; 'but it is different' (1153a17). Not all people know that activity is in fact a good, but, because they collapse activity and process into the same thing, they believe that pleasure is a process. Now, perhaps some activities are causes of process, but not even they are in fact processes. For house-building activity is the cause of a process [i.e. the house

coming into being], but it is not itself a process. Some activities are even simply a goal, since happiness itself is a kind of activity in accord with virtue. 35

Responding to those who affirm that the pleasures are bad, since 148,1
some of the things that are pleasing are injurious, Aristotle says that nothing prevents one from affirming this about healthful things as well. For some of the things that are healthful are bad for business. For if someone is continually exercising and concerned for his body, he might well be less concerned for business; but these things [i.e. exercise] are not bad for this reason, namely that they are sometimes and for some 5
individual antithetical to business. Rather, if indeed they are bad, they are bad in this respect, namely for being a impediment in regard to business sometimes and for some individual. 'For even contemplation is sometimes damaging to health' (1153a20), whenever someone neglects his own health because he spends too much time on contemplation. But is contemplating, then, bad on this account, or is it not rather bad for the health by virtue of engaging too much in it and for that individual who does so, and not simply bad? One should, then, 10
say this same thing, that some pleasing things are injurious sometimes and for some individuals among those who engage in them more than one ought and not on the occasion on which they are appropriate. But neither pleasing things nor pleasures are for this reason bad simply.

It used to be said that pleasure was a bad thing for this reason, too, namely because it impeded understanding and thinking: for no one can understand or reflect when he is in [a state of] pleasure. The pleasure of sex makes this most clear. To this too, then, Aristotle objects: for it is 15
not its specific pleasure, he says, that impedes 'either understanding or any habitual state whatever' (1153a21), but rather a foreign one, since their specific pleasures rather increase [understanding and the rest]. For example, if someone takes pleasure in reflecting on noble or good things, he acquires from the pleasure a fervour for reflecting; a pleasure in contemplating increases the power of contemplating, and that which comes from learning produces progress in learning and sets a goal for 20
knowledge. In general, every job and every activity, if it is accompanied by pleasure, succeeds and is accomplished better.

He reports further [the argument] that there is an art [or skill] for every good, but there is no art of pleasure; therefore, pleasure is not a good. And he solves this argument too. 'It happens logically', he says, that no pleasure is the product of an art,³⁸¹ 'for neither is there an art 25
of any other activity, but only of a capacity' (1153a24-5). For example, the medical art is productive of health, since health is a capacity and a habitual state, but it is not indeed productive of healthy activities; rather, health is the product of the medical art, but healthy activities are activated from the habitual state. So too for vitality: for this itself is the product of the gymnastic art, but gymnastic activities are not the product of gymnastic art but rather of the person who has vitality. 30

One might perhaps object to Aristotle by pointing to activities that come from arts, for they are all activated by arts: medical activities by the medical art, architectural activities by the architectural art. But one must note that his argument is about the goods that arise out of art. Of goods, some concern the body, some the soul, and some are external. Now, the activities connected with the arts are not strictly goods [sc. arising from that art]; rather, those arts that are called productive of some goods³⁸² – the medical art of health, the gymnastic art of vitality – are productive of a capacity, but not of activities. The activities connected with wisdom [or expertise] are indeed good, since they are activities connected also with the virtues and not without knowledge. But the argument is not about such goods, but rather about those that arise by some art; for they used specifically to call these arts. Since, then, pleasure is an activity, logically there exists no art of it.

He next shows for good measure how there are some arts of pleasures, for instance the art of perfumery and the culinary art, that have it as their goal to produce pleasures. But he is objecting to the argument that says that no pleasure has an art.

Some other such arguments too were alleged against pleasure. For they said that what a temperate person avoids is not a good; but a temperate person avoids pleasure; therefore, it is not a good. Moreover, since a prudent person does not pursue pleasure but rather painlessness, pleasure is not a good, but rather painlessness is. Further, what the most senseless creatures pursue is not among worthy things; but the most senseless creatures – animals and children – pursue pleasure; thus, pleasure is not among worthy things. For all these arguments, [he says that] there is a single solution in accord with nature: ‘since it has been explained in what sense’ all pleasures are ‘good simply and in what sense they are not good’ (1153a29-30) (they are good simply, since they are activities of a habitual state in accord with nature, but not all are good, since activities too of those who are disposed contrary to nature are thought to be pleasures: he believed the solution to be clear on the basis of this division), animals and children pursue the latter such pleasures.³⁸³ But it is worth noting which kind: for they do not altogether pursue those that are contrary to nature, such as ill people do, but rather those of this type. For in fact animals and children pursue pleasures that are according to replenishment; for their pleasures are of this type, and people who are ill and those who are disposed contrary to nature also pursue these pleasures. For they are all replenishments.

One must splice the text as follows: ‘animals and children pursue such pleasures as are accompanied by appetite and pain’, and it is obvious that ‘a prudent person pursues painlessness in respect to these pleasures’ (1153a30-2, modified).³⁸⁴ For he does not wish to enjoy bodily pleasures in just any way, but rather it suffices him not to be pained by their contraries [i.e. bodily pains]. A prudent person, then, does not simply avoid bodily pleasures, but rather their excesses,³⁸⁵ ‘in respect to

which the dissolute person [is such as he is]' (1153a33-4).³⁸⁶ Therefore a temperate person also avoids such excesses, since, in fact, a temperate person too has pleasures. For a temperate person also enjoys bodily pleasures up to a certain point and of a certain kind.

1153b1-1154b31 'But that pain, indeed' to 'for it is neither simple nor seemly'.³⁸⁷ 150,1

They say that Speusippus showed in this way that pleasure is a good: the contrary of good is evil; pain, which is an evil, is the contrary of pleasure; therefore pleasure is a good. Aristotle, however, did not pose the argument thus, but rather he corrected it by saying: the contrary of what is to be avoided, insofar as it is to be avoided, is good; pleasure is the contrary of pain, which is something to be avoided, and it is not an evil (for no one would say that pleasure is an evil); therefore, it is a good. This argument has force against those who deny that pleasure is an evil but say that it is neither a good nor an evil.

Such, then, is the entire intention of the argument; what concerns the wording is as follows. He first posits pain as a bad thing with a reservation: for that which is simply pain is an evil, namely, that of wicked people, for example the pain of an unjust person which he feels when he cannot do a wrong, and that of a dissolute person when he is distressed by being prevented from enjoying his dissoluteness. But there is a pain that is not simply an evil, which a decent person feels because it does not come from a wicked habitual state; but this too is nevertheless an evil, because it is impeding of noble activities. For when he is feeling pain a good person is greatly impeded in respect to noble activities. Having posited for these reasons that pain is a bad thing, he next discusses the argument mentioned earlier in respect to pleasure being a good thing.

Then he adds: 'For in the way that Speusippus solved it, the solution does not follow' (1153b4-5). Either he is calling a demonstration a 'solution' or he [i.e. Speusippus] really solved the argument of those who say that pleasure is not a good thing. But he did not sufficiently solve it by saying: 'the contrary of bad is good; for the contrary of pain, which is a bad thing, is pleasure; therefore it is a good thing'. For it is not only a good thing that is the contrary of a bad but also another bad thing; for example not only courage, which is a good thing, is the contrary of rashness but also a bad thing, cowardice. That is why <Aristotle says that, in taking pleasure and pain> as contraries <he is lacking>³⁸⁸ what has solved it, having rightly posited not only a good thing as the contrary of the bad but also a bad thing.

Aristotle then assumes in addition that pleasure is not a bad thing, on the basis of which he reasonably syllogizes that pleasure is a good thing. He said this in the case of all pleasures; 'for he [i.e. Speusippus] would not have said that pleasure is something <essentially evil>³⁸⁹

(1153b6-7). One must adjoin to the argument <its premise>,³⁹⁰ in which it is assumed: 'pleasure is not a bad thing'. For subsequent to this one
 30 can say that pleasure is not a bad thing.³⁹¹

The argument after this seems to be addressed to those who say that pleasure is not the end or the best thing because some pleasures are base, for example those of dissolute people.³⁹² For to the extent that, in the case of this argument, there is some pleasure <that is noble>, he [i.e. the proponent of the preceding claim] believes that <pleasure itself
 151,1 must be>³⁹³ the best thing and the same as happiness. But they³⁹⁴ object to those who demonstrate it in this way: for even though there are base pleasures, what prevents some pleasure from being the best among human goods? – just as a certain kind of knowledge is best of those that exist, for example wisdom, even though there are many base arts, such
 5 as the artisanal ones (one must not construe 'base' in the sense of bad, but rather as cheap and not worthy of any serious effort).

What he adduces next may perhaps seem to someone to be true, affirming that pleasure is the greatest and the best thing. For he says that 'perhaps it is also necessary' (1153b9) that it – pleasure, obviously – be the most choiceworthy thing; but that something is most choiceworthy is at the goal of the argument and supports the argument that
 10 says that pleasure is the most choiceworthy thing of all. For if, 'for each habitual state, there are some unimpeded activities' (1153b9-10), for example those of the best states, when they occur in important and choiceworthy things with nothing impeding them, and if happiness is the unimpeded activity of all the habitual states, that is, of the virtues, or of one of them, for example wisdom (pleasure is the same thing as this: for it has been granted that it is the unimpeded activity of a
 15 habitual state in accord with nature), then it is clear that some pleasure would be the best and most complete of good things, even if it so happens that there exist base pleasures. This is the rest of the sentence, as he says: 'perhaps it is necessary' that pleasure be most choiceworthy, 'if in fact for each habitual state' and the rest. By this, then, he seems to be affirming that the good and pleasure are the same thing. However, it is not like this. Rather, against those who say that pleasure is a process
 20 or that some pleasures are base, for whom it also ensues, for this reason, that pleasure is not the good, he argues on the basis of popular opinion that it is possible to call it the best thing. For in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (10.4, 1174b31-3), at all events, where a definition has been given and Aristotle has spoken clearly concerning pleasure, he says that pleasure is not the same as happiness but rather follows upon it, 'as beauty does upon those in their prime' (1174b33).

A sign that this is not Aristotle's view but rather that of Eudemos is
 25 that he says in the <tenth>³⁹⁵ book concerning pleasure that it has not yet been discussed. But whether this is Eudemos' or Aristotle's view, it is said on the basis of popular opinion. This is why the best thing is said

to be pleasure: because it comes with the best thing and is inseparable from it.

What comes next also agrees with this: for in this he says that everyone believes that the happy life is pleasant and interweaves pleasure in itself. 'For no activity that is impeded is complete, but happiness' (1153b16) is a complete activity. For by this he seems to make it clear that happiness is interwoven in pleasure and is inseparable from it, and for this reason happiness is unimpeded, namely because it is accompanied by pleasure. And if one takes the converse it is true to say: since it is unimpeded, for this reason happiness is accompanied by pleasure. Perhaps for this reason too pleasure is an activity, namely that it is a kind of thing that follows upon happiness. He says that therefore the happy person needs in addition external goods and those in the body, so that he may not be impeded at all in respect to important activities. 30 152,1

And here he rightly faults those who say that a good person is happy, even if he is stretched on the wheel. 'Because the happy person needs luck in addition' (1153b17-18), some people believe that good luck is the same as happiness, although it is not the same but rather has the logical status of *sine qua non*. For it is not possible to be happy without good luck. He says that when good luck is excessive it even becomes an impediment to happiness and perhaps is no longer even good luck. For the limit of good luck is to coexist with happiness and with activities in accord with virtue. It is obvious that what he says is true: for occurrences of good luck, when they are excessive, often corrupt reasoning by stuffing it with arrogance and boastfulness. And even if one is not corrupted, but his acquisition of money is excessive, it is necessary that it occasion him an absence of leisure and draw him away from the study and contemplation of the noblest things; but this is not good luck. 10

That he is arguing in objection to those reasonings that condemn pleasure is clear also from what follows. For what some say in demonstration of the fact that pleasure is base, namely that animals and children pursue it, he says is rather an argument in favour of pleasure: for the fact that it is pursued by all is posited as a sign that pleasure is the best thing. Here, he brings in a bit of poetry: 'No saying is wholly lost [which many bruit about] ...' (Hesiod *Works and Days* 763); for it cannot, it seems, be pursued in vain by everyone, but rather it is reasonably pursued, since it is integral to happiness. 15 20

What is said after this may become familiar <...>³⁹⁶ they propound small ones. The person who is disposed in accord with nature is the standard and measure of every act, for example healthful foods and drinks are those that suit the person who is disposed in accord with nature, and those things that are good for the worthy person are really goods, even if they chance not to be goods for a base person. And pleasure too, consequently, for one who is disposed in accord with nature is really, and not just apparent, pleasure, and what is pleasant 25

to this person is really pleasant (cf. 3.6, 1113a33). What is pleasant, on the other hand, to one who is sick and contrary to nature is not simply pleasant but pleasant to this person and at the time when he is sick. Since, then, the natures of animals differ, so too the one that is best
 30 disposed would differ in respect to each nature. For among other animals too there is that which is sickly disposed, and that which is according to³⁹⁷ nature. The criterion of true pleasure in the case of each animal is that which suits the one that is disposed according to nature. Since, then, it is not one and the same nature or habitual state that is
 153,1 best, but as sick ones differ, so too do the best, therefore their pleasures are different and they do not all pursue the same one. And yet all pursue pleasure.

Having said this he says, as though changing his mind: 'But perhaps they do pursue not that which they think or would say they do, but rather the same pleasure' (1153b31-2). This is said about human beings;
 5 for 'would say' and 'believe' are proper to human beings. If indeed it is said about all animals, then he is calling³⁹⁸ a [mental] impression [such as an animal can have] rather too generally the thought and utterance of the mind. For all things seem to pursue the unimpeded activity of their nature and all seem to meet resistance. There is something divine in animals and above all in rational ones, if someone³⁹⁹ aims at his proper and unimpeded activity and therefore at pleasure.
 10 The best and most complete of pleasures, then, is the self-subsistent pleasure of the soul, when it enjoys contemplating the most noble and most divine of things. Nevertheless, only the bodily pleasures have assumed the name of pleasure; for only they seem to be and are called pleasures. The reason is that people encounter them most often, when they are fed each day, grow warm or cold, sometimes too when they
 15 enjoy the most intense pleasure, that of sex, and furthermore because all human beings participate in these, but few in the contemplative pleasures. Since, then, only these are familiar to all, the great majority of human beings believe that only these are pleasures.

The next argument is addressed again to those who believe that pleasure is neither a good nor a bad thing. For if pleasure and such
 20 activity are not a good thing, it is not necessary for a happy person to live pleasantly, but it is possible to be happy even though one is living painfully. For pleasure is neither a bad nor a good thing, and pain is neither of these things: for since it is neither <of these, a person does not>⁴⁰⁰ flee pain as something hostile, and a happy person approaches it just as he does pleasure, although not in the same way. The argument, to put it in a few words, is as follows: if pleasure is not a good
 25 thing, it is not necessary for a happy person to live pleasantly any more than painfully; but he should live pleasantly rather than painfully; therefore pleasure is a good thing.

Furthermore, if the life of a worthy person is not pleasant, neither are his activities pleasant; but in fact his activities are pleasant, and so

too, consequently, his life. One should take it that the activities are pleasant when they are in important things.

There was a certain view of people who said that bodily pleasures are 30
not a good thing but rather neither good nor bad, and that there were
some pleasures that were intensely choiceworthy, such as the noble
ones. These are the pleasures that occur when the soul is active in the
contemplation and practice of the most noble things. He speaks in
objection to these people, that is, the ones who say that some 'pleasures
are intensely choiceworthy, such as the noble ones, but not the bodily
ones and those in which the dissolute person is interested' (1154a9-10). 154,1
They suppose, it seems, that these pleasures are not noble because they
admit also of dissoluteness. The people who say this must look into 'why
the contrary pains are wicked; for a good thing is contrary to a bad'
(1154a10-11). It appears that he is using against them the argument
that he mentioned earlier as well: for since the contrary of pain, which 5
is a bad thing, is pleasure and not a bad thing, it is necessary to agree
that it is a good thing. Or might they say that they are good in this way,
since what is not bad also seems good? In saying this he introduces what
he himself believes, namely that bodily pleasures are good up to a
certain point, when they have measure and limit, but when they exceed
what is right, they are base.

For of all those habitual states of which there does not exist an excess 10
of the better, neither is there an excess of the pleasure deriving from
them. An excess that is destructive of the better is an excess of the
better, such as are the excesses that are adjacent to the virtues [i.e. the
adjacent vices]. To those habitual states, then, to which this does not
pertain⁴⁰¹ – that there are some excesses adjacent to them – neither is
there an excess of the pleasure deriving from them: for example, there 15
is no excess of the contemplative state, nor of wisdom generally. For this
is not said about actions, but rather about contemplation and knowl-
edge. The pleasure deriving from contemplating, then, does not have
any excess, but rather to whatever degree it occurs it does not cease
from being noble and good. But of all those habitual states and changes
of which there is an excess, there is also an excess of pleasure: for
example, with temperateness there is connected a certain excess,
namely dissoluteness, and the pleasure, therefore, that is excessive
concerning bodily things that are pleasant is base and blameworthy. 20

In general, Aristotle says, there is an excess of all bodily goods: for in
fact a disproportion of cold or hot or other things from which the body
is compounded is a kind of excess of health, when it has an excess; and
the base person⁴⁰² is called base by virtue of pursuing the excess, but
not by virtue of running after the necessary pleasures, since all people 25
enjoy in some way delicacies and wines and sex, but the dissolute person
does so 'not as one ought. He is oppositely disposed in the case of pain:
for he does not avoid an excess' (1154a18-19), but rather every pain
generally, and does not bear to exert himself in the least thing, even if

he will produce something good. For pain, he says (1154a20), is not the contrary of an excess of pleasure, but rather the contrary excess is, and
 30 that which the person who pursues pleasure in excess flees.⁴⁰³ But he flees every pain. He said this by way of demonstrating that there are some bodily pleasures that are choiceworthy, and up to what point they
 155,1 are. The excesses in this pleasure are mistaken, whereas those that arise from the noblest activities are truly most choiceworthy, when the soul is active concerning the noblest and best things.

Since bodily pleasures seem to be most choiceworthy to the majority, he says that the cause of this falsehood must be discussed. The reason
 5 for error, when it becomes clear, contributes to the confirmation of the truth. The first cause of the fact that the bodily pleasures seem more choiceworthy than others is that they drive out and expel pain. Human beings especially enjoy it when they simultaneously take pleasure and are separated⁴⁰⁴ from what is painful. The contemplative pleasures and other pure pleasures of the soul itself, if there are any, are unmixed with
 10 any pain. Bodily pleasure seems, then, to be as it were a kind of cure of the painful, and by however much they are excessive they seem that much the more to be kinds of cures. Practically all the bodily pleasures are intense, which is why they are pursued.

Furthermore, everything that appears next to its contrary seems more such as it is, just as white shows up the more so when it is set
 15 beside black. This is why, then, bodily pleasure seems more a pleasure when it is set beside bodily pain.

Now, he said these things against those who believe that bodily pleasure is the most choiceworthy and stands out over all other pleasures. But there are some people who hold the contrary opinion about it [i.e. bodily pleasure] and because of this pleasure about all pleasure: for they believe that no pleasure is worthy. He next discusses <the reasons> for this <error>.⁴⁰⁵ For it is on account of the following two things,
 20 he says, that pleasure seems not to be a worthy thing. One is that there are some actions, that is activities, of a base nature, either from birth, like those of a beast (for the pleasures of the most savage creatures are the most base: such too are those of the most bestial human beings), or from habit, such as those of base human beings. This, then, is one reason why pleasure too has been discredited. The other reason is that
 25 there are some pleasures that are cures, for example those of ill people, and in general those accompanied by replenishment, which are indeed thought to be worthy, because they are cures and replenishments of something lacking; but they believe⁴⁰⁶ that any kind of being in a state⁴⁰⁷ is better than being in process. These pleasures seem to be processes because they occur accompanied⁴⁰⁸ by replenishment. That is why he says that these pleasures are those of people who are being fulfilled: for they are not themselves fulfilments or even processes but rather one's
 30 nature being active⁴⁰⁹ whenever there is process and replenishment. Therefore the bodily pleasures are worthy incidentally.⁴¹⁰ Since activi-

ties of nature only occur when the activity seems not to be worthy because it is unfulfilled <...>.⁴¹¹ The reasons, then, for which pleasures universally are discredited seem to derive from these things.

Having said this he will return again to the reasons why the bodily pleasures are intensely striven after: for they are pursued 'by those who are not able to enjoy other pleasures' (1154b2-3). For since they are inexperienced in and have had no taste of the liberal pleasures, they try to provide for themselves those that arise through the body. That is why they produce thirsts for themselves, so that they may take pleasure in drinking. Some of these, which are harmless, are not to be censured. For even a decent person will try to produce for himself pleasant things and foods and drinks through exercise and exertions. But if they devise these arrangements to their harm, then they are base people and to be blamed, for example those who, when they are full, nevertheless devise for the sake of pleasure ways in which they may again drink or eat or enjoy the pleasure of sex. For they do this because they do not have other things which they enjoy.

What is neither – neither taking pleasure nor feeling pain – <seems> painful to many people, <...>⁴¹² and the fact that it seems to him to be the strongest condition. But, he says, it is painful to many, and this because of nature. 'For an animal is always suffering' (1154b7), as the physicists too say: for Anaxagoras said that an animal is always suffering because of its senses. But he [i.e. Aristotle] says this not by way of agreeing with him, but rather recording it, since it did not seem to them [i.e. the Aristotelians],⁴¹³ in fact, that an animal is always in discomfort. Theophrastus too, in his *Ethics* (fr. 555 FHSG), criticizes Anaxagoras, saying that pleasure, or at least the contrary pleasure, drives out pain, for example the pleasure of drinking drives out the pain of being thirsty; and so too does any pleasure that occurs, that is, one that is strong: thus, sometimes even the pleasure of hearing drives out hunger, when we very much enjoy songs or other kinds of music. And this is why human beings become dissolute: so that they may not feel pain or hurt, they provide for themselves great and intense pleasures.

He says next, what he mentioned earlier, that without pains pleasures do not have excess. These are 'the pleasures deriving from things that are by nature pleasant and not incidentally so' (1154b16-17). He says that those things are pleasant as such which we do not take for the sake of healing or a replenishment, and such are the objects of contemplation: for they are pleasant as such and on account of their own nature, but those that are taken for replenishment are incidental. For since it happens that we are healed and replenished when what is healthy in us – that is, the nature that is in a healthy state – is activated, it is for this reason that they too [i.e. things taken for healing and replenishment] turn out to be pleasant.

He says that 'what produces action of such a nature is naturally pleasant' (1154b20). He said 'action' in place of 'activity'; and by 'of such

157,1 a nature' he seems to mean 'of the best nature', such as the contemplative is. He seems to say 'by its nature' <in>⁴¹⁴ a specific meaning. For he usually calls things aimed at replenishment pleasant by nature as well, if they hold to the middle, because they are the pleasant things of those people who are disposed according to nature, but here he seems to call only those things that are pleasant to the best nature naturally pleasant.

5 He says that the reason why nothing that is always the same is pleasant to us is that 'our nature is not simple but rather there is something else in us' (1154b21-2), on account of which we are perishable. He indicates by these words that our body is not composed of a single body but rather of more; thus, if one part of the activities in us <acts>⁴¹⁵ it is contrary to nature in respect to our other nature, as intensely active heat is to cold (this is a contrary). But when everything
10 is equal, then when something occurs it seems to be neither pleasant nor painful; if one's nature is simple, as is believed to be the case with divine things and stars, they have [always] the same action and activity. That is why the primary god always enjoys a single and simple pleasure, since he is of the most simple nature and substance.

Since it has been said that pleasure is activity, and some people
15 assume that activity is change or a product of change, but the primary god is changeless, he says that activity pertains not only to change but also to changelessness: for activity is a kind of [ideal] form (*eidos*) and perfection. That is also why pleasure exists more in rest than in change. For the most pleasant and truest pleasure is that of someone who is disposed in the same way and who is always active in the contemplation of the most noble things. And what some say – that 'change is the sweetest thing of all' (Euripides *Orestes* 234) – they say about a wicked
20 and easily changeable nature. And such is a perishable nature.

158,1

On Book 8 of the *Ethics* of Aristotle

1155a3-1156a3 'After this, about love' to 'going unnoticed as to how they are disposed toward one another'.

It is most appropriate for one who is investigating character and virtues
5 to discuss love.⁴¹⁶ 'For it is a virtue or connected with virtue', as Aristotle says (1155a3-4). In fact, it is possible to call love one of the virtues just like courage and temperateness and each of the character-based virtues. For, indeed, it too is about feelings and actions like the rest of the virtues, since there are loving actions⁴¹⁷ and loving is a kind of feeling. Furthermore, love might be called a mean between flattery and some
10 nameless disposition, such as a certain fierceness or churlishness that is characteristic of a person who is not naturally inclined to converse with a view to giving pleasure (cf. 4.9, 1128b1). In fact, the flatterer goes to excess in wishing to be extremely pleasing; the friend practises being

pleasing in an intermediate way, being pleasing when one should, and not being so when one should not; while the one utterly deficient in being pleasing is classed under deficiency. It is perhaps also possible to understand differently the one who exceeds and the one who falls short [of the mean]: the former is the kind who engages in loving madly and excessively, as Satyrus is said to have done in respect to his father (he did not even choose to live after his father had died); the latter is completely unfeeling and neither can nor wishes to love; while the friend engages in loving in an intermediate way. 15

Looking to the preceding one might perhaps say that love is a virtue. But insofar as love seems to be a thing characteristic of a virtuous person and to belong to those only who are perfectly good, love would seem rather to be connected with virtue. It is possible to assign it to one of the virtues, namely justice.⁴¹⁸ For justice is a kind of distributive equality and love confers equality upon friends. For it is necessary that those who are really friends be equal, and thus love would be a part of justice. This is why he called love either a virtue or connected with virtue. 20 159,1

Since of good things some are necessary, while others are noble, he wishes to show that love is a good according to both these criteria. He usually calls 'necessary' that without which it is not possible to live (cf. e.g. *Metaphysics* 4.5, 1015a20), but here he takes 'necessary' as that without which no one among those who are in accord with nature would choose to live. For love is such a thing, since no one among those whose nature has not been corrupted would choose to live without it. He says that it is necessary to those who are wealthy and those who hold great positions of power, to the poor and to the young, and to the elderly and those in their prime. The wealthy and those in positions of power have need of friends because there is no benefit from wealth or power if they do not use them; but the use of wealth and power resides in doing services, and the noblest and most trusty service is that toward friends. 5 10

Now, this argument will seem to show not that love is something necessary but rather that it is a noble thing or a cause of what is noble, if, that is, love is causative of service, and service causative of noble things. But one must remember how he is taking 'necessary', namely as that without which one who has his wealth in accord with nature would not choose to live, even if it is possible⁴¹⁹ to live as a wealthy person without doing services: it is of this [capacity to do services] that the friendless person is deprived. Next he shows that love is also quite necessary to one who is wealthy. For great is the power that comes from friends in regard to the protection and preservation of what belongs to those who are wealthy. In poverty too, of course, friends are a refuge and a support. 20

Again, when Aristotle says that friends assist 'the young as well in not erring' (1155a12-13) by correcting them, he would seem to be saying that love is something noble rather than necessary. Perhaps correction is indeed a noble thing, but nevertheless a necessary thing as well, for

25 it prevents one from stumbling into great evils. It is obvious that love assists both the elderly and those in their prime.

Furthermore, nature produces love for offspring necessarily,⁴²⁰ 'not only in human beings' (1155a18) but also in other animals, so that they are nurtured. Here he takes 'love' more generally in the sense of 'a feeling of love' (*philêsis*), which is perhaps a source of love but not yet love itself, since love [in the strict sense] resides in those who love
 30 mutually.⁴²¹ Nature has implanted a love for one another necessarily 'in those of the same species too' (1155a19), so that they may receive support from one another. Love also appertains by nature to all human
 160,1 beings in regard to all others; this is especially obvious 'in travels' (1155a21), for people point out roads to those who do not know them, and they welcome them and give them support, at least if they have not been perverted by greed. Again, in the case of those of the same species, and of human beings in particular, one must take an aptitude and tendency toward love as [equivalent to] love.

5 Love binds 'cities too' (1155a22-3) together, 'for concord is something similar to love' (1155a24-5). For those who are in concord desire a common good, and this is similar to a loving activity (*philikê energeia*).⁴²² 'When people are friends there is no need for justice' toward one another, 'but although they are just they need love in addition' (1155a26-7) because of what has been said concerning the rich and the
 10 poor, the young and those in their prime and the elderly. 'And of just things the most just seems to be a loving kind (*philikon*)' (1155a28). For there are many kinds of just thing, as was said in the accounts concerning justice (cf. *EN* 5.10), for example civic and paternal justice and that of the slavemaster; of these the most just is the civic, which is something similar to the loving kind, for it accords with the equality of the partners. It has been said that love also wishes friends to be as friendly
 15 as possible (cf. 1155a29-30). Perhaps one might also in this way understand that of all just things the most just is that toward friends. For toward these one must above all maintain the loving [relationships] that are called just. He has now made it clear that love is not only just but also noble.

'There is disagreement concerning' love (1155a32). For some say it is
 20 a kind of similarity, since it seems to arise in accord with a similarity of character, but others say that those who are similar are disposed in a contrary way toward each other, while those who are somehow not similar but rather contraries are friends. He has argued each of these positions on the basis of popular opinion, citing what is said proverbially as well as the views of poets and philosophers. Since some of the philosophers, who come at it in too unmanageable a way, say that the
 25 very universe was formed through similarity, while others say it was through contrariety, he puts off these inquiries as pertaining to natural science. But he raises questions about whatever is relevant to a treatise concerning character (*êthikê*), and he puts forward two puzzles: first,

whether it is possible for love to exist among all people, or it is impossible 'for those who are wicked to be friends' (1155b11-12); and next, whether there are several kinds of love or one. One must not suppose that he is inquiring whether there are several kinds of it in the sense that they are classed under one genus, but rather whether, in the several kinds of love, love is just a common name and homonymous term.⁴²³ He will make clear as he proceeds that this is the kind of inquiry he is conducting. 30

Those who think, he says, that love is of one kind 'because it admits of more and less, have trusted in a sign that is not sufficient' (1155b13-14). What he means is something like this. Some think that the fact that it admits of 'more and less' is a sufficient sign that love is not homonymous. Those terms that admit of more and less are under one genus and are synonymous with each other;⁴²⁴ for example the hot, which admits of more and less, is not homonymous, and similarly for the sweet as well.⁴²⁵ Accordingly, since love too is this one more and that one less, that of good people being more and that of evil people less, love would not be a homonymous term. Those who say this in fact trust in a sign that is not sufficient proof of it, 'for things that are different in kind also admit of more and less' (1155b14-15), even though they do not share in the same genus. He says that 'these things have been discussed earlier' (1155b15-16), but it appears that they were discussed in the books that have fallen out of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.⁴²⁶ 161,1 5 10

It is not a difficult matter to show that more and less are found in what is spoken of in multiple senses. For what exists (*to on*) is said *to be* in multiple senses, but its essence *is* more and its attributes *are* less. For it is because of essence that *being* (*to einai*) belongs to the others [i.e. the attributes]. This can chiefly happen when what is spoken of in multiple senses is called such from a term in respect to that same term, as in what exists. It is the same also in the case of love. For it is according to their similarity to the love of good people that the other loves too are so called, and they obtain their name from this one. Concerning this too the matter will be clear later. 15

Since there is love in loving and in being loved (and the lovable is loved), those who have differentiated in how many senses the term 'lovable' is used will know about love too how many kinds there are of it. Now, the lovable is differentiated in three ways: for he says that the lovable is either the good or the pleasurable or the useful. 20

A puzzle is raised concerning this division. For he seems to have cross-divided either the genus by the species or the common term by one of the terms designated by it.⁴²⁷ For if the good is the genus of good things, and the useful is one particular [good] thing, he has cross-divided the genus by the species in saying that the one is good and the other useful (and he has done the same as if one were to say [of two species in a genus] that the one is an animal, the other a human); and if the good is among the terms used in multiple senses, as indeed it 25

seems to be, in this regard too the division is as if one were to say that [of two particulars] the one is an existent and the other an essence. But in fact, he seems not to be cross-dividing here the common term 'good' by the useful, but rather he is supposing that whatever is choiceworthy in itself is individually called good, whether this [i.e. being choiceworthy in itself] alone belongs to it, as in the case of happiness, or it is choiceworthy both on this account [i.e. in itself] and on account of something else, like health, keen senses and virtue. For these are choiceworthy both for themselves and on account of happiness. Here, he has called all these things individually good. What is choiceworthy on account of other things is useful. Wealth too is among the useful things, as he said as well in the arguments at the beginning [of the *Nicomachean Ethics*]. For when speaking about happiness he said, 'wealth is not the good that is being sought: for it is useful, in fact, for the sake of something else' (1.3, 1096a6-7). One need not be perturbed if he calls wealth now one of the simply good things, and now one of the things choiceworthy on account of something else. For it is called simply good because for one who is disposed in accord with nature, I mean for a virtuous person, it is an instrument for noble activities, just as an instrument is called simply musical⁴²⁸ when it is suited to a musical person for activities in music. It is choiceworthy on account of something else, because we choose wealth on account of the use (*khrêsis*) that is derived from it. That is why, moreover, the parts of wealth are called money (*khrêmata*, lit. 'useful things'). He himself makes it clear that what is choiceworthy for the sake of something else is useful. For he says 'what is useful is that by which some good or pleasure arises' (1155b19-20). Although, then, three things are lovable, the good and the pleasing would be lovable as an end, but the useful would be lovable as one of the things that tend and lead to some end.

He next inquires whether human beings love the good or what is good for themselves. For it was indeed said previously that one thing is simply good, another good for someone: what is simply healthful for a person whose body is disposed in accord with nature is called simply good, but what is healthful for a sick body is healthful for someone, for example, surgery, cautery, and the other treatments. And one thing is simply pleasing, another pleasing for someone: simply pleasing is what is pleasing to one who is disposed in accord with nature, but pleasing for someone is what is pleasing, at times, to one who is disposed contrary to nature. For bitter things at times seem pleasant to someone whose taste is ruined.⁴²⁹ For the good person, then, what is simply good is also good for him, and they are not dissonant; in the case of a wicked person, however, they are dissonant. For the same thing is not simply good and good for him, but sometimes and to some people the simply bad becomes good, as is the case with sickness and poverty. For at times these [bad] things have brought <good things>⁴³⁰ to many wicked people.

These things being so, he inquires whether human beings love the simply good or the good for themselves. Each person seems to love what is good for him, or rather what appears to be good for him. For many err on account of appearance. In regard, then, to what is lovable on the grounds that it is the good: is it the simply good or what is good for someone or appears to be so? Differentiating them, now, he says that the simply lovable is lovable on the grounds of being simply good, <and that the good for someone>⁴³¹ or what seems so is lovable for someone. Concerning the pleasurable, on the other hand, even though Aristotle has said nothing, the same things⁴³² may be said: for in the case of what is lovable on the grounds that it is pleasing, what is simply pleasing is simply lovable, and what is pleasing for someone is lovable for someone.⁴³³ 30

After this he distinguishes a feeling of love (*philêsis*) as being other than love. Now, this is evident also from other things: for mothers love their offspring when they are still infants. This is indeed a feeling of love, but in no way is this love:⁴³⁴ for they do not love mutually. Erotic lovers (*erastês*) also love, but it is not always [mutual] love (*philia*): for sometimes they are even hated by their beloveds. He uses a very vivid example: there is a feeling of love toward inanimate things, for example toward wine, but there is not love. 'For there is not a feeling of love in return nor even a wish for good' (1155b28-9) for the other's own sake, for one does not, indeed, wish good things for the wine, or rather if one does, one wishes that the wine be preserved and last for one's own sake, so that one can use it. 163,1 5

Since from what has been said one will think that Aristotle is saying that love is a wish for good for the sake of that one for whom one wishes good things, he says that such a thing is good will. For one who wishes someone good things for his own sake has good will, even if the same does not occur on the part of the other. But love is good will 'in those who feel it mutually'; 'or must one add', he says, 'that it [i.e. the good will] must not go unnoticed' (1155b33-4)? For it is possible that some people feel good will toward one another if they have each found out that they [i.e. the others, respectively] are decent or useful to themselves, but they escape one another's notice that they are so disposed. These, then, one would not call friends, but rather one must say that those who feel good will toward each other and do not go unnoticed [in being so disposed] are friends. In saying this, he will seem to be speaking of love even in the case of people who have never met each other, if only they have good will toward one another, being confident that each is good for the other, and if they know that they are so disposed toward one another. But 'not going unnoticed' must not be understood as residing just in their having found out that they feel good will toward one another, but rather in having met each other frequently as well. For it is necessary, for those who are truly to be friends, to somehow join and fit their souls together through both company and life in common. There 10 15 20

is need also for much experience so that they may trust firmly that they are decent to each other. He himself, when he has proceeded further, says such things about those who are truly friends (cf. 1156b26-32).

- 25 **1156a3-1157a36** 'It is necessary, then, that they feel good will toward one another' to 'for things incidental are not altogether coupled'.

Both from what has previously been said and from what is said here one might suppose that Aristotle defines love as good will that does not escape the notice of those who feel it mutually, and good will as a wish for good for the sake of that very one for whom one wishes the good. If
 164,1 there is a single definition of all love, then the several loves would not be homonymous, as he believes.⁴³⁵ But it is possible to suppose a single notion of what is spoken of in multiple senses, not as an exact definition, but rather as an outline. As to which are the things spoken of in multiple senses of which we said (cf. 161,13-14) that it was admissible to suppose a single notion, it is not unclear that it was of things that are
 5 not very distant. Rather, whenever many things are so called from one term, as a medical book and instrument are so called from a primary term, namely a medical person, it is possible to gain by means of an impression a single notion – medical – of them all, calling medical everything that is derived in any way from medicine. It is in a way the same in the case of love too. For the love of good people who are similar in respect to virtue is, as he will make clear when he proceeds further (cf. 1157a30-1), primary and in the proper sense love, while the others
 10 are called love because of their similarity to this one and take their appellation from this. Thus, nothing prevents one from gaining by means of an impression a common notion of them.

That the several loves are homonymous is also apparent from what is lovable. For they have the good and the useful and the pleasant [as lovable], not the same lovable. In fact, the good is choiceworthy and lovable in itself, while the pleasant and the useful are so incidentally and on account of something else. It is, indeed, because an object is
 15 pleasing or useful to the one who loves, that it is loved, but the good is loved for itself. This is especially obvious in the case of good people. For a good person is loved by a good person for nothing other than for himself, but a useful person is loved not for himself but on account of his usefulness, and a pleasing person on account of pleasure. Aristotle himself extends [the idea of] objects that are lovable to people who are lovable in respect to friendship (*philia*), among whom the good person
 20 is one of the objects that are good and especially choiceworthy in themselves, while the useful person and the pleasing person are so on account of other things.

Now, the definition of love proffered is that of primary love and properly so called. For the definition is good will that does not go

unnoticed among those who feel it mutually, and good will is a wish for good for the own sake of the one for whom one wishes good things. Wishing things that are really good is characteristic of the good person, for he, knowing what good things are, wishes that they belong to his friend. The friend in respect to pleasure or on account of the useful does not invariably wish good things for his friend, for he does not know what good things are, either. Furthermore, wishing good things for the own sake of the other pertains to primary love. In the other loves, people wish good things for their friends by way of referring to themselves: those who are friends because of pleasure wishing good things for their friends so that they themselves can be pleased, while those who are friends because of the useful wish good things for their friends because of their usefulness. Thus, there is no common definition, either, but rather just as primary love is properly so called, while the rest appear so, so too the definition is that of primary love, but it seems to be that of the others too. 25 30

That the definition of the several loves is not common has now been discussed. He says that friends 'wish good things for each other without escaping their notice on account of one of the items mentioned' (1156a4-5), that is, on account of the good or the pleasant or the useful. Now, these [causes of loving] differ from one another. That they do not differ from one another in this way, that is that they differ not by being under the same genus but rather by sharing a name, has been said. Thus, both the several feelings of love in accord with each of the lovable and the corresponding loves will differ in kind, and neither the feelings of love nor the loves will have a common genus with one another. For it is necessary that these too differ if the lovable differ. Now, in what do a feeling of love and love differ? In fact, it is not unclear that in a feeling of love there is no feeling of love in return, but that in love there is. 165,1 5

'Those who love one another wish the good for one another in virtue of the way in which they love' (1156a9-10), good people in virtue of being good (for they love each other because they are good), pleasing people in virtue of being pleasing, and useful people in virtue of being useful.

'Those who love each other on account of the useful do not love others in themselves' (1156a10-11), but rather incidentally. They do not in fact love others on account of themselves (for they would love others in themselves), 'but rather in virtue of some good that ensues for them from one another' (1156a11-12). This is the useful; consequently their love is incidental, for it arises because something happens to ensue from them [i.e. their friends], and not on account of their friends themselves. 'Similarly' and for the same reason those who love 'on account of pleasure' (1156a12) do not love others in themselves but rather incidentally, 'for not by virtue of being such a sort', he says (1156a12-13), do people love witty people. It will seem naive to say that love in respect to pleasure is incidental on this account, namely that they do not love each other because they are good, for it is agreed that these loves are not the 15

- same kind. It would be similar to saying that the love of good people is
 20 incidental, for they are not loved by one another because they are witty.
 But he seems rather to be calling 'such a sort' people who are called so
 in respect to a plain [or absolute] quality, and not in respect to some-
 thing relative. Now, a witty person is 'such a sort' inasmuch as he has
 taken the name from wittiness,⁴³⁶ but a pleasing person is relative: for
 he is pleasing to someone, and even if pleasure ensues as much as
 possible from this [i.e. his wit] for those who love witty people, never-
 25 theless they do not love them in virtue of their being witty people but
 rather in virtue of their being pleasing to themselves. If indeed they
 were witty, but were not pleasing to them, they would not love them,
 either. Both those who love on account of the useful cherish the other
 on account of what is beneficial to themselves, and those who love on
 account of pleasure cherish the other on account of what is pleasing to
 themselves, 'and not in virtue of what the loved person is' (1156a15-16),
 whatever he is, whether witty or wealthy, but rather in virtue of the fact
 that the one affords pleasure and the other usefulness.
 30 'Such loves are in fact easily dissolved' (1156a19), if those who were
 formerly loved do not remain similar [to what they were]. For nothing
 prevents one from remaining still witty or still wealthy. But if the witty
 person is not pleasing to the one who formerly was pleased [by his wit],
 the love is dissolved, and similarly if he should no longer be useful.

- He observes that for the most part love on account of the useful occurs
 in old people, and further in whoever among those in their prime pursue
 35 what is advantageous. He is taking as the old and those in their prime
 166,1 not worthy people but rather the many. The elderly, because they have
 been engaged in much business and have not viewed what is noble,
 highly value making a profit and for this reason acquire friends who are
 useful to this end. Those who are in their prime, if they too are oriented
 toward profit, do not think it worth acquiring as friends any but those
 5 who are useful for profit.

- 'Such sorts do not much live together' (1156a27) with one another.
 For living together cannot occur without taking pleasure in one an-
 other. Those who love because of the useful sometimes do not even take
 pleasure in one another, or do so only insofar as they are useful, but they
 do not possess kindness and pleasantness, which is what joins together
 lives in common. Thus they miss at that time [in their lives] the greatest
 and noblest thing in true loves – living together – and the enjoyment
 10 that comes from living in common with one another.

- The love of young people is for the most part for the sake of pleasure:
 for they live according to feeling, not reason, and pleasure is a feeling.
 Thus whenever they are pleasing to one another, they love one another.
 The love of these too is easily dissolved, for the things that are pleasing
 too change with age, and loves based on pleasing things change with
 these. However, these [i.e. young people] do live pleasurably with one
 15 another, for they obtain as much as possible what accords with the type

of love they have. For it is love based on pleasure, and by living together they most enjoy the pleasure that comes from one another. When he says, 'if such pleasure' alters 'there is a rapid change' (1156a36), he means by 'such' either that based on bare feeling or that based on youth.

He says, 'for⁴³⁷ the young are erotic, too; for most of erotic love⁴³⁸ is on the basis of feeling or on account of pleasure' (1156b1-3). By this he makes it clear that the young are erotic on the basis of feeling only, and not also on the basis of reason as well, as worthy people are. For among good people there arises a certain feeling too for those of the young who are naturally fine, just as there does among horsemen toward those of the colts that are naturally fine; but in them there is also reason bidding them to be concerned about such sorts [i.e. the young]. But the erotic passion of the young is based on feeling, for most of the erotic love of these⁴³⁹ is on account of pleasure. But most of the erotic love of worthy people is based on the benefit and education of the young, for those who pursue this love are especially inclined toward passionate loves for those who are fine by nature. [The sentence] is also written [in some manuscripts] thus: 'for the young are erotic; for [erotic love] is mostly, for those who are erotic, based on feeling and pleasure'.⁴⁴⁰ This reading makes it clear that the young are, understandably, erotic, since for the most part, for those who are erotic,⁴⁴¹ [erotic love] is based on feeling and on pleasure, but reason is of few and in few. Thus, since the young live according to feeling, they are understandably erotic.

Now, the afore-mentioned loves are incomplete. But 'the love of people who are good and similar in respect to virtue is complete' (1156b7-8). For they have everything in regard to the definition of love, for they wish good things for one another on account of those for whom they wish the good things. The other loves are incomplete, for they do not have everything that is in the definition: for they wish for one another the good things that they think are such, but not on account of those who are loved, but rather they love them on account of their own selves. Further, the former love [those they love] in their own right (for they love them by virtue of their being good), while the latter love incidentally: for those who are loved are not loved by virtue of their being witty, as we said, or of their being wealthy, but rather by virtue of being pleasing or useful to them [i.e. those who love]. Now, everything that is such and such in itself is complete, while that which is incidental is incomplete. This [distinction] is itself a sign that the several loves are homonymous. For it is not possible for that which is in itself and that which is incidental to be of like genus. For that which is incidental is posterior to that which is in itself.

The love of good people, then, understandably remains firm, for they love one another because they are good and because of virtue, and virtue is firm and enduring. Now, it is not necessary that those who are pleasing to someone, and are loved because of this, be pleasing absolutely, nor that those who are useful to someone be useful absolutely.

But a good person is both good absolutely and good to his friend. For good people are not only good but they are also beneficial to one another. Now, that they are beneficial to one another follows [logically]: they love one another because they are good. Good people are also pleasing both absolutely and to each other, for to each both his own actions and those similar to these are pleasing, and the actions of good people are either such actions [i.e. good ones] or beyond all others similar to them. Therefore they are also pleasing to one another, and because of this, then, the love of good people is both complete and indeed enduring, for it unites in itself everything that belongs to loves. For every love is either for the good or for pleasure,⁴⁴² and moreover either for what is absolutely good and absolutely pleasing, which pertains to the love of true friends, or for what is good or pleasing to the one who loves, according to a certain similarity [to the love of true friends]. For those who love not on account of what is absolutely good or absolutely pleasing but rather on account of what is good and pleasing to themselves would have a love that is so called according to similarity [to true love], but not that love in the proper sense. But all [the qualities pertaining to friendship] belong to the love of worthy people, for they in fact love in accord with what is absolutely good and good to themselves and what is absolutely pleasing and pleasing to themselves. 'For *by this*', he says, '[good people] are similar⁴⁴³ in the rest of the things also' (1156b22). If the reading is thus, this is what one must say, i.e. '*because of this*';⁴⁴⁴ and he is saying that, because they are good, they are also similar in the rest of the things, being similarly pleasing and useful, not only similarly good. Or else [the reading is]: '*to this* the rest of the things are similar⁴⁴⁵ also', so that the meaning is '*to this love*⁴⁴⁶ the remaining kinds of love are also similar'.

Such loves are rare. For good people are few, and furthermore it requires time for acquaintance and experience. Perhaps, indeed, there are times too when on a brief meeting a worthy person might know someone [to be a friend]. Nevertheless, someone who was merely emitting fine words might escape his notice up to a point. Therefore one needs experience and time. This is why we were saying earlier too (163,16-24), in the definition of friendship (*philia*), when he was calling it good will that does not go unnoticed among those who feel it mutually, that it is necessary to indicate also that they have met each other and in this way know each others' good will. For they could perhaps believe that they had good will toward one another and were good people, <if they trusted>⁴⁴⁷ some other person who had gained experience of them and was good, but how could the matter of acquaintance exist for them if they have not met? One needs this for a love that is to be true and separate from mere emotion.

10 'This, then', – the love of good people – 'is complete in respect to time' (for it is judged over a long time) 'and the rest of the things' (1156b33-4). For it is love in itself, not incidentally, and it has all the qualities: the

good, the pleasing, the useful. The most complete thing of all is in it, namely virtue, or at any rate, by common consent, the most complete good among existing things except for happiness. Further, 'each gets similar things'⁴⁴⁸ from the other, which indeed should pertain to friends' 15 (1156b34-5); for love [between friends] is equality, and it would not occur if they did not love each other similarly. Love 'on account of the pleasant' and 'on account of the useful' (1156b35-1157a2) are so called according to their similarity to this love, for the former sorts of friends are pleasing to each other on account of pleasure and the latter useful to each other on account of the useful.

In what he says next, it is obvious that in these people too loves endure if they attain equality as much as possible, mutually affording 20 one another 'the same thing and from the same [kind of person]' (1157a4-5), whether the pleasing or the useful, and not like an erotic lover and beloved [youth]. He is supposing here a lover and beloved who are not worthy. 'Those who in an erotic relationship give in exchange not the pleasing but rather the useful' (1157a12-13), such as those who couple with their lovers for money, do not love in the proper sense and are easily separated. He calls neither of these a person of the middle 25 sort, who is neither base nor good. He says that this latter person [i.e. one who is good] will be a friend also to a base person: it must be conceded both on account of pleasure and on account of the useful. Further, he says that a person of the middle sort will be a friend both to a worthy person and to a base person.

That a worthy person will be a friend to a base person either on account of the pleasing or on account of the useful is not easy to believe. For neither would a worthy person take pleasure in a base person nor would he wish to be useful to him, nor the latter to himself. Unless, 30 indeed, he is calling 'base' one who is not incorrigible; and the worthy person, observing that he does not have an ignoble nature and has not been thoroughly corrupted, and wishing to correct him, submits to being useful and pleasant to him so that through these means he may win him over and correct him. On account of these reasons he will accept a 169,1 certain pleasure and usefulness from him.

But the love that exists on account of the loved ones themselves arises among worthy and good people only. And only the love of good 5 people is unslanderable (cf. 1157a20-1), for because they have gained sufficient experience of one another they do not trust those who attempt to slander nor do they put up with them when they say such things, but they emphatically trust each other and would never wrong each other. All these things should pertain to love, but they are only in the love of good people, since at times wicked people both trust base people who speak against their friends and distrust their own friends, and some even wrong their friends; hence they are not friends in the proper sense. 10 But since people, seizing upon a certain similarity to what is truly love, call such kinds love too, one must say that such kinds of people too are

friends. But one must recognize the difference and that the several loves are not so called in respect to one genus, but rather that the loves of good people are properly so called, but the others are so according to similarity.

- 15 'These [other loves] do not altogether combine' (1157a33-4) with one another – the one on account of pleasure with that on account of the useful. For what is incidental 'is not altogether coupled' (1157a35). This will seem not true: for the same person could be both blond and musical, and both these qualities are incidental. But he does not seem to be speaking of such things, but rather of cases when something is so called in the primary and proper sense and other things are so called from that: thus, a person is called 'medical' in the primary sense, whereas an
20 instrument or a drug is called so incidentally. For such kinds of accidents are not coupled.⁴⁴⁹ Here too good people are friends in the proper sense, but the rest of the loves are incidental and so called from the primary love. Hence they [i.e. the incidental loves] are not easily combined.

1157b1-1158b10-11 'Since love has been distributed into these kinds' to 'seem to be loves because of dissimilarity to that love'.

- 25 Since love has been distributed into three kinds, friends are homonymous with one another. Now, according to the primary kind base people will not be friends with one another, for decent people love each other on account of virtue, but base people have no share either in virtue or in the love based on it. But base people too might become friends because of pleasure, for it is possible for some wicked people to provide
30 pleasure to one another and through this to attach to one another the love based on pleasure. They might also become friends on account of the useful, for some people are base but turn out to be useful to one another, and base people most of all seek this love. For in order that they may get what they need from certain people, they help them in
170,1 turn in whatever they may be in need of, and such mutual exchange and partnership is called love by mankind. In fact, they do associate with one another to the extent that they are useful and help each other in turn. 'In this way', he says, 'they are similar' (1157b2-3), that is, they are similar in this respect, namely insofar as they are pleasing or useful to one another and in virtue of affording each other pleasure, and are
5 friends on account of pleasure. But they are not simply similar: for the base are not always similar to themselves or to one another. But though they are dissimilar, nothing prevents them, in virtue of the fact that they are human beings, from becoming similar by being providers of pleasure to one another: in virtue of the fact that they are human beings they seem to be similar if they have like characters. For the same reason those too who are friends on account of the useful are alike in this way, that is in virtue of being useful; but good people are friends in them-

selves, for they are so in virtue of being good' (1157b3). That is why these are friends simply and in themselves, but 'the others are so incidentally' (1157b4). 10

How those who are friends on account of pleasure and the useful are friends incidentally has now been discussed, and also that such people are called friends because of their similarity to friends on account of virtue; for since the latter, in addition to being friends in themselves, are also pleasing and useful to one another, they seem in this way to resemble the former. However, good people do not hold either the useful 15 or the pleasing to be the aim of love; rather, these things follow upon them, but they love each other for their own selves. But friends on account of pleasure or the useful hold these to be the ends of love.

'Just as in the case of the virtues some' are called good 'in respect to habitual state and others in respect to activity' (1157b5-6) – in respect to habitual state, such as in the case of people who are sleeping, and in respect to activity whenever people perform actions in accord with their virtue – so too, he says, in the case of love. 'Those who are sleeping, or 20 those who have been separated in their locations' (1157b8-9), are friends in respect to habitual state, while those who live together and delight in each others' company and provide good things to one another are friends in respect to activity. For they actively do the things that accord with love, and especially if they are good and have the complete kind of love. For in fact they will provide good things for the sake of their friends themselves, and they will take pleasure in hearing that they are doing well, and they will grieve if they find out that their friends have 25 fallen upon some hardship. All these things are loving activities. But it is in loving itself that they will be active in the greatest way. For since they are friends on account of themselves and nothing else, it is obvious that, in loving one another, they will actively enough do things that are loving (*philika*).

Aristotle says that love is not dissolved by locations, when friends have been separated, but that the activity based on love is. Not unreasonably, perhaps: for absence dissolves the greatest activity [of a loving kind]. For nothing is so loving (*philikon*) as for friends to live together and to reap the enjoyment of the others' company and conversation and to confer this in return. Perhaps then it would have been safest to speak thus, namely that those who are distant in their locations will not 171,1 actively perform the *most* loving activity. 'But if', he says, 'the absence grows long, it seems to produce forgetfulness even of love' (1157b11-12). He did well to add 'seems' here. For since friends on account of pleasure or the useful do acquire forgetfulness of love if the absence grows long, it seems to the majority that love is such a thing: easily dissolved, and 5 dimmed by absence when it is long. But that of good people is not such, indeed, but is rather firm and enduring, and nothing is stronger than it, neither time nor distance in respect to location.

What has been said in the case of the elderly and acerbic occurs for

the most part when the old people are not worthy. For they become least loving, since all love is connected with pleasure; but the acerbic and old are for the most part pleasing neither to each other nor to others, unless virtue renders them pleasing. That is why those old people who are not virtuous are least loving, but are rather for the most part too sullen, whether because of old age or because they are acerbic by nature.

‘Those who welcome’ and praise ‘each other but do not live together resemble those who have good will rather than friends’ (1157b17-19).

For they wish good things for each other, but they neglect the thing that is greatest and characteristic of love, namely living together. Here he makes clear why he said a little earlier that those who do not live together are not active in respect to love. For he says that ‘nothing is so characteristic of friends as living together’ (1157b19). The word ‘so’ makes it clear that some other things too are characteristic of loving (*philika*), but the greatest is living together. A sign of this is also the fact that those who are really friends and are in the same location do not choose to live apart from one another, since this is the most loving activity. He himself adduces as evidence the fact that happy people desire to spend the day with their friends. For those who are in need and are friends because of usefulness just need aid, and it suffices for them if this eventuates, even if they do not live together with one another. But happy people, and these are the good people, at the same time as they are active in respect to virtue need to spend the day together with their friends, especially with those who are similar in respect to virtue, or if not these, then with those who are fine by nature and of a middle sort. For a human being is not simply a solitary animal like a lion or a wolf or whatever other animal can live by itself, but a civic and communal one. A virtuous and happy person knows exactly that which belongs by nature to a human being, and he needs someone who spends the day and lives together with him: and for this a friend is especially suitable. Thus a worthy and happy person needs a friend and would not choose to live by himself, not even if he were likely to have all other good things. For it is impossible for those who are not pleasing to spend time together with each other, and a friend is most pleasing to a friend. Comradely love too – this is the love of young people and brings comrades together not according to usefulness – is based on this, that they delight both in each other and in the same actions.

‘The love of good people’, as has been said previously as well, ‘is love most of all’ (1157b25). For ‘the simply good’ is simply ‘lovable and choiceworthy’ (1157b26-7), and the simply pleasing is pleasing. But to each is good or pleasing what is so to each, and a good person is, to a good person, a good and pleasing thing.

He says that the feeling of love resembles an emotion, but love resembles a habitual state. However, some feelings of love seem to be habitual states and not just emotions. Temporary motions in the body or soul are emotions, while certain enduring qualities, from which

activities are derived, are habitual states. For we call some people wine-lovers or savoury-lovers when the feeling of love that is in them is a habitual state; I mean that savoury-loving and wine-loving are a habitual state in them. However, Aristotle calls not only a temporary motion but also an emotional disposition 'emotion'; I mean by an emotional disposition that which resides in the emotional part only, and not also in the rational part [of the soul]. For love is in the part of the soul that has reason as well as in the non-rational part, for one acquires a friend when one has both judged him and felt something in regard to him, and a habitual state comes into being in both parts. But a feeling of love according to emotion is engendered according to a bare emotion and is active according to an emotion. For this reason he said that a feeling of love is an emotion, but love is a habitual state. 15

Love is also on the one hand a certain habitual state, on the other an activity. Here he has associated a habitual state with love. That love is a habitual state of the kind we have mentioned – one that is in both parts of the soul – while the feeling of love has been called an emotion because it is a kind of emotional habitual state from which only activities according to emotion arise, he makes obvious when he says that a feeling of love exists no less toward inanimate things, but loving mutually is connected with choice, and choice derives from a habitual state. 20
For through these statements it is apparent that a feeling of love occurs as a kind of emotional disposition toward inanimate things too, for example wine-loving toward wine and savoury-loving toward savouries. From this habitual state according to emotion only, derives the activity of those who are overcome according to emotion, some by wine, others by savouries.⁴⁵⁰ But since love is connected with choice, and choice is a deliberative desire, love would be a habitual state both in the part that has reason and in the emotional part; from this habitual state people 25
wish good things for their friends for their own sakes, not according to bare emotion but rather according to a kind of habitual state in both parts of the soul. 30

In loving a friend they simultaneously love the friend and what is good for themselves. For a friend is good for his friend and they mutually exchange with one another what is equal. For each in fact wishes good things for the other for the other's own sake, and each is pleasing to the other. That is why love is also called a kind of mutual exchange, being that of a friend, and these qualities especially pertain 173,1
to the love of good people. The other loves are so called because of a similarity to it, for the reasons we have mentioned. What he says concerning the old and the acerbic – why they become friends less – and concerning the young – that they become friends more – is both clear 5
and has been discussed earlier.

He says it is not easy 'to be a friend to many according to complete love, just as it is not easy to love many erotically' (1158a10-12); for there is a certain excess in loving, and this is not easy in relation to many, for

excesses are in relation to a few. One must speak here of excess in
 10 respect to what is fine. One might raise the question why, then, it would
 not exist in relation to many; for if there were, by hypothesis, many good
 people, what prevents a good person who has come to be acquainted
 with them from being a friend similarly to all? But one must add the
 reasons he adduces for the fact that not many people will gratify a good
 person. For it is neither possible to be good to many, but rather one must
 be content to meet one or two; nor is it possible to acquire experience of
 many at the same time, but one invariably needs experience for some-
 15 thing to be unslanderable. Further, there is need also for acquaintance,
 for it is this that in addition to virtue unites and familiarizes with one
 another the souls of good people.

However, 'on account of the useful and the pleasing' (1158a16) it is
 possible to be a friend to many, for indeed the stock of such people is
 large, and further there is no need either of much time or of testing, for
 in a short time benefactions in things that are useful or pleasing become
 20 readily apparent, and one may quickly recognize a person who is
 pleasing or useful to him. But when neither of these things obtains any
 longer, the love is dissolved, for, having arisen in a short time, it has a
 brief existence as well.

Of the two types of love – that on account of pleasure and that on
 account of the useful – so called because of their similarity to the
 primary love, that on account of pleasure more resembles the primary
 love whenever each gets what is pleasing from the other. For those who
 25 are really friends must associate pleasurably with and delight in one
 another, which pertains to those who love on account of pleasure.
 Furthermore, it is more liberal than that on account of the useful, for
 they [i.e. those who love on account of pleasure] are not friends on
 account of profit or benefit coming from money or other usefulness, but
 rather because at times they feel emotion for one another or delight in
 the same things, such as exercises or lessons or games. Love 'on account
 of the useful' is more characteristic of 'commercial' (1158a12) and
 30 illiberal people. Evidence of the fact that love on account of the pleasing
 more resembles the true love is that successful and happy people too
 (these are the ones who, in important matters, are active in accord with
 virtue) 'do not need useful friends, but do need pleasing ones' (1158a22).
 For they would most wish to have their friends be more complete in respect
 to virtue and in every way similar to themselves; but if they do not find
 174,1 them available, it suffices for them if people of the middle sort happen
 along who are pleasing to them. For they wish to live together with some
 people, since it is impossible for them to be solitary, as was said previously.

It is impossible to bear very long what is painful, for one would not
 even endure the good itself, if it were painful. How did he mean this?
 For what else is the good itself if not happiness, which cannot be
 5 painful? For as soon as there is something painful there is no longer
 happiness, but nevertheless Aristotle said, on hypothesis: if happiness

renders life painful, no one would wish to be happy. It is obvious, then, both that happiness is something choiceworthy on account of other things and that life in accord with happiness involves pleasure. That is why, he says, human beings seek that their friends be pleasing, on the grounds that love cannot arise without these qualities. But one must seek not only pleasing people as friends but also good people. This is what he is bringing out when he says, '[that they be] good ... and furthermore for themselves' (1158a26), lest it [i.e. the argument] not be appropriate to good people and those who have acquired complete love. For it is not by referring to themselves that they love their friends, even if something good arises for those who love from those who are loved, but rather they love them because those who are loved are good. But these things are fitted to one another and are not disjoined, for a good person is also good for his friend. He bids that a person seek to acquire those who are really good as friends, and these would be those who are simultaneously good and good for their friends.

'Those in positions of power' (1158a27-8) (he means tyrants in positions of power and those who are called kings, but are not really, since they are dissolute) treat those who are termed their friends as differentiated, for some are pleasant for them, others useful. The reason is that 'they neither seek pleasing friends with virtue' (for the same ones would also be useful) 'nor those who are useful for noble things' (1158a30-1) (for the same ones would also be pleasing). For virtuous people are useful for noble things. It has been said that virtuous people are also pleasing; but rulers pursue what is pleasing and acquire witty people as friends, while for their needs they acquire those who are adept at doing what is bidden. These qualities are not coupled in most people, for those who are called witty, but are in reality buffoons, are for the most part useless for actions, while those who are adept and on demand for what is bidden are deprived of all charm and wit. Only a worthy person is simultaneously pleasing and useful, for he is effective for noble things on account of virtue, and pleasing to a good person on account both of the similarity of his character and of his noble actions. But a worthy person does not become a friend 'to one who exceeds him', unless he who exceeds in power 'is also exceeded in virtue' (1158a34-5). One must understand it in this way, 'that the ruler is exceeded' in the sense that he knows and behaves toward the worthy person as toward his better. For thus there will be equality according to proportion, if he thinks that he exceeds in wealth and power, but reveres the good person as surpassing him in respect to virtue. Such a ruler would be naturally fine, an admirer of noble things, and it is obvious that he will entrust his own care to the worthy person. A good person, then, might perhaps put up with becoming a friend to such a person, but he would not endure becoming one to another sort; for a noble person is least able to bear tyrannical arrogance and illiberal obsequiousness. People in positions of power are 'not at all in the habit of being this sort' (1158a36), such as to behave toward worthy

people as if they [i.e. the worthy] exceeded them; therefore good people do not become friends with them [i.e. the powerful].

Since he said that a worthy person will not otherwise be a friend to a ruler, except if the ruler should behave toward him as toward one who exceeds him in virtue, some inquire whether, if a worthy person were in a position of power, another worthy person would then not be a friend to him, since he would not exceed him in virtue. But the puzzle is naive, for this is already agreed, that a good person gladly becomes a friend to a good person. Even if one of them, then, is in power, his power will in no way prevent their love; rather, it is obvious that they will associate as equals in all other things, while in as many things as are lawful in accord with the civic community the one will gladly yield to the other who is in authority. For it is obvious that a worthy person will govern lawfully, and his friend will, accordingly, be governed lawfully. For, more than anything, a worthy person is the guardian of the civic community.

Now, the love of good people is in every way in accord with equality, and the rest of the loves are somehow involved in equality as well. For in fact those who are friends on account of pleasure mutually exchange pleasure with one another and those who are friends on account of usefulness render in turn useful things. But some exchange different for different, for example they confer pleasure but gain a benefit in accord with the useful, such as those who on account of their wit think it right to get money. It has been said that such sorts are both lesser friends and last less long as friends.

What he says next is obvious, that loves seem and do not seem to be such according to similarity and dissimilarity to the same thing. For in the respect in which both the pleasing and the useful pertain to love according to virtue, these loves are believed to resemble the latter; but in the respect in which the love of good people is unslanderable and enduring, while these others admit of slander and do alter, it is easily not the case that they resemble each other. They differ in addition in that the love of good people is love in itself, for they love one another for themselves, while the other things are incidental. And good people are far from wronging one another – indeed they do not even wrong those who are not related – while those who have the other loves would even wrong one another. One could find many other differences in them [i.e. the other loves], too, by virtue of which they are dissimilar to the primary love and do not appear to be loves.

1158b11-1159b23 ‘Another kind of love is that in accord with superiority’ to ‘let these things then be dismissed. For in fact they are rather foreign [to the topic at hand]’.⁴⁵¹

Just as there is what is just according to equality and what is just according to superiority – for example the justice of a father toward a son and of a master toward a slave and of a husband toward a wife⁴⁵²

and in general of one who rules toward one who is ruled – so too there is love according to equality and love according to superiority. For it [i.e. love] somehow resembles justice, and love according to superiority is in the same people in whom there is what is just according to superiority. For the love of a father toward a son and in general of an older person toward a younger (for the older is more sensible, and therefore may rule) and of a husband toward a wife and in general the love of one who rules toward one who is ruled is according to superiority. For it is obvious that what rules exceeds, what is ruled is exceeded. Love too, then, goes with this, that is, with ruling and being ruled. 15

These loves according to superiority differ too from one another. For the same things are not due to parents from children and to those who rule from those who are ruled, nor to sons from parents and to those who are ruled from those who rule. But some services are by nature appropriate to parents from children, and commands and care from parents to children, but those who rule and are ruled have no share in any of these things. The loves too, accordingly, differ in this way. He says that the same things do not pertain 'to a father in regard to a son and to a son in regard to a father, nor to a husband in regard to a wife and a wife in regard to a husband' (1158b16-17). For it is appropriate to parents and to husbands to rule, but not to sons and wives, and this renders their love not one according to equality but rather according to superiority. Now, everyone would concede these things, but the reason that he adduces for that fact that a father in regard to a son and a son in regard to a father, as well as a husband in regard to a wife and a wife in regard to a husband, do not have the same love is highly debatable. For he says as follows: 'each of these has his [or her] different virtue and function' (1158b17-18). But some deny that there is one virtue for a father and another for a son, or one for a husband and another for a wife. 20 25 30 177,1

It suffices to test the argument in the case of husband and wife, for the same things are to be said about a father and a son. They, and above all the Socratics,⁴⁵³ question the view in the following way. – Is it, then, right that the husband be just, but the wife unjust? – No indeed. – What then? That the husband be temperate, and the wife be dissolute? – Not this, either. Proceeding thus by way of each virtue, and supposing that it is necessary for a husband and wife to have all the virtues, they conclude that there is the same virtue for a husband and a wife. 5

What, then, is to be said against these things? One may begin with the one who rules and the one who is ruled, for if the virtue of the one who rules is in ruling rightly, and that of the one who is ruled in being ruled rightly, here there would not be the same virtue for the one who rules and the one who is ruled. And in fact it is a vice on the part of one who is ruled if he does the things proper to one who rules, and a vice on the part of one who rules if he does the things proper to one who is ruled. Thus, it is virtue in a helmsman if he does the things proper to a 10

helmsman and rules the sailors, and it is virtue in the sailors if they are ruled by the helmsman. If ruling and being ruled belong to the same science, this is no obstacle to the argument; for one might object to this too on the grounds that someone will be competent to be ruled but by no means to rule. For those who are accustomed to obeying those who rule would be able to be ruled out of habit, but do not know how to rule. If it should further be posited that the same person knows both, nevertheless that by which he rules is one virtue, and that by which he is ruled another. If there is one virtue for one who rules, and another for one who is ruled (in all the above-mentioned associations there are those who rule and those who are ruled, for a father rules, but his sons are ruled, and a husband rules, but his wife is ruled), there would be a different virtue for each of these.

Now, one must look further into these things. In all rulerships and loves according to superiority it is not only necessary that love be proportional but also that the feeling of love be so. And it is pretty much on account of the feeling of love that love too will be proportional, for if the better and more beneficial person is loved more than the one who is such to a lesser extent, both the feeling of love and the love will be proportional. For just as in political allocations it is necessary that each office be distributed in accord with worth, so too in loves according to superiority being loved must be distributed in accord with worth. For there will be equality if loving and being loved occur proportionally and in accord with worth. This argument shows that parents should be loved more by their sons than they love them, even if it does not happen thus: for they are more beneficial and better. The same argument applies too concerning the others who rule, for by however much they are better, they should be loved the more.

One might inquire concerning loves according to superiority whether they occur in the above-mentioned kinds or whether these are other kinds of love. Eudemus and Theophrastus say that loves according to superiority too occur in the same kinds: on account of pleasure or of the useful or of virtue. For one who rules and one who is ruled might become worthy friends: they will be friends [like equals] in other respects, but they will observe what is lawful in being friends, the one being exceeded in whatever the law bids, and the other exceeding. So too a worthy father and son:⁴⁵⁴ and more than anything the son will concede paternal superiority to his father. Similarly a worthy wife may be so to a worthy husband, for since each of them follows nature one will rule and the other be ruled. Among those who are not worthy, it is obvious that it is admissible for those of the middle sort to be friends both on account of pleasure and on account of the useful, the one exceeding and the other being exceeded, as in the case of one who rules and one who is ruled; and it is possible that both a wife and a husband have love [on this basis].⁴⁵⁵ Concerning a son and a father, one might raise the question whether it is possible for them to love one another in accord with the

useful, or indeed for a father to wish good things for his son on account of anything other than for the son himself, if at all events he loves him according to nature; thus, this seems rather to be a natural kind of love. Perhaps both the pleasant and the useful follow upon such a love whenever it is by nature. One must look into how these things stand.

He says that the equal is not similar 'in things that are just and in love' (1158b29-30); for in things that are just the primary equal is that in accord with worth and the principle that the better not get the same as the worse, while that in accord with quantity is secondary; in other passages [of the *Ethics*; cf. *EN* 5.6, 1134a28] he calls this equal according to number. It occurs whenever all free people get equal things, and those who live in a democracy especially think it right to practise this equality, for because all are free they think it right that they should get the same and similar things.⁴⁵⁶ 'But in love the equal in accord with quantity' is primary (for those who are really friends must be equal to one another), 'and that in accord with worth secondary' (1158b5-7), for love properly so called does not wish to be in a condition of superiority to the other. This is obvious in those in whom the gap between one another is large in certain respects. For a person who is worthless does not become a friend to a virtuous and worthy person, nor do the very lowly to kings, nor again are worthy people and those who are called dear to the gods in fact friends to the gods in respect to love properly so called, I mean that in accord with equality, for there is a large gap in between. But we must be content if we find them [i.e. the gods] favourable and propitious and they are venerable to us. It is apparent, then, that these terms too differ when the situations differ, for we do not say that a friend venerates a friend nor that he is propitious and heedful of one's prayers; but venerating is the mark of a person who is far more lowly, while being propitious is that of one who far exceeds.

One cannot exactly define in argument up to what amount in an existing superiority it is still possible for there to be love, for neither is it possible to define exactly the things to be done in other respects. Nevertheless, when the gap in between is large, love does not arise. Therefore the question is also raised whether a friend will wish the greatest goods for his friend, for example that he become a god. Now, it is apparent that a sensible person will not wish for impossible things, and becoming a god out of a man is such a thing. But on hypothesis, if it were possible to become a god, will he then wish it? For he will hardly wish that his friend not be a friend, so that neither will he [i.e. the friend] have a good. For a good friend – if a friend wishes good things for his friend for his own sake – will wish him to have every excess of good [including friends]. Let these things, then, be raised as a question.

What he says next, when he says that a friend most wishes good things for himself, is not said about those who have the primary love but rather about those who are called friends homonymously. He next

mentions the reason on account of which most people wish to be loved more than to love, for they feel this way because of love of honour, since
 20 they believe that being loved is the same thing as being honoured. But it is different; for people choose to be honoured not 'for itself' but rather 'incidentally' (1159a17-18). For they delight in being honoured by those in positions of power because of the hope of getting things and since they are simultaneously aiming at power, and they delight in being honoured by their sons because they believe that they thereby have witnesses that they are good: they are gladdened, then, by confirming the opinion
 25 they hold of themselves. 'But people delight in being loved in itself' (1159a25). Being loved, then, is a better thing than being honoured, and love is better than honour, for what is choiceworthy in itself is better than what is so on account of something else.

Now, love is in loving and in being loved, but it seems to be more in loving than in being loved. For the activity of each of the friends is in
 30 loving, but being loved is not their activity, and each thing [e.g. love] is connected with that thing [e.g. loving] in connection with which it has its activity. He adduces as a sign of this the fact that mothers too delight in loving, even if they are not loved. For sometimes, if, in fact, they are
 180,1 not recognized by children who have been given to other women to raise, they are not loved; but it is sufficient for them 'if they see that they are doing well' (1159a31). But he has supposed here not love but the feeling of love, for love is in those who love mutually.⁴⁵⁷ But, nevertheless, the feeling of parents toward their children is a trace of love: I say 'trace', because sometimes their sons do not love them in
 5 return; and yet it strongly resembles love, because parents wish good things for their sons for their own sakes, and the chief function of love is in this. If, then, love is in loving more than in being loved in return, and those who love their friends are praised, loving would be the virtue of friends. For to each <...>⁴⁵⁸

* * *

11 Having said in the beginning that contrary pursues contrary, for example 'the parched earth is passionate for the rain' (1155b3),⁴⁵⁹ he loosely brings out the solution to this and says that contrary pursues contrary not in itself 'but rather incidentally' (1159b20). For in itself it pursues the middle, for this is the good. An example of the fact that contrary
 15 pursues contrary not in itself but rather incidentally is, he says, the following: the moist does not wish to be overparched but to go toward the middle. For if the atmosphere should be overmoist, it does not on this account drive the rain downwards, that it may be overparched, but rather so that it may cast off the [overly] plentiful moisture; and
 20 similarly in the case of the hot and the other things.

1159b25-1161b10 <'It seems, according to what was said in the beginning' to 'for many things are common to those who are equal'.>⁴⁶⁰

What was, in fact, said in the beginning, where he said 'and of just things the most just is that which is loving' (1155a28), seems to be similar to what is said here; for love and what is just are about the same things and in the very people who have community⁴⁶¹ – that is, among soldiers⁴⁶² and other fellow-craftsmen. But there is also what is just in these people. For one will not choose to take from these that which is contrary to worth [and hence unjust]. And it is also about the same things: for love among soldiers is about soldierly things. 25

He says by way of constructing an argument that in those people in whom there is love, there is in them⁴⁶³ also what is just; for it seems that in every association there is something just and also love. 'To the extent that they share' (1159b29-30): he says that in respect to those crafts in which they share they are also friends, as, for example, if one person should happen to be both a soldier and a juryman, but the other was only a soldier, they will have both love in respect to that in which they share and also what is just: for in the craft in which they share, they wish to gain that which is in accord with worth. Wealth and possessions and the rest are common to brothers and comrades, but soldierly things are common to soldiers alone, and similarly in the case of the other fellow-craftsmen; and there are more things common to brothers, to the others fewer. And in fact the love of brothers is greater than that of fellow-soldiers, and also what is just too is such, for what is just among brothers and what is so among the rest differs. For what is just acquires an increment by how much the more it is in relation to friends.⁴⁶⁴ Wishing to show this, he argues from the contrary: for if it is more terrible 'to deprive a comrade of money' (1160a5) than a fellow citizen, so too doing what is just in relation to friends is better. If love will be increased, what is just too will be increased, since they are in the same people. 15

The communities of soldiers and the rest are parts of the civic community, and the loves of soldiers follow upon their communities.⁴⁶⁵

* * *

He says that the third kind of government is the 'timocracy', which is so called because it arises out of property valuations (*timêmata*); for they used to acquire rule by giving money: this is why it is called a 'timocracy'. <...> and⁴⁶⁶ they are <...> by the vice of those who rule,⁴⁶⁷ whenever it [i.e. the government] changes from an aristocracy to an oligarchy, and this a base one. For if an oligarchy is good, nothing of the worst will happen.⁴⁶⁸ 'A democracy is least wicked' (1160b19-20): he says that a democracy is a lesser evil than a tyranny and an oligarchy 20

because a democracy, which is just 'government',⁴⁶⁹ deviates a small amount.⁴⁷⁰ But if you look at it in itself, you will find that democracy is worse than the others; for if in a democracy everyone rules, while in a tyranny and an oligarchy few do or one does, it is worse that many base people rule than that few or even one do. Consequently, democracy is worse than the other deviations.⁴⁷¹

- 5 'In each of the governments' (1161a10): mentioning three kinds of government, he says that there is love in each 'in the amount in which there is also what is just' (1161a10-11). For if there is more of what is just on the part of a king in regard to those beneath him, and on the part of aristocrats and 'timocrats' in regard to those under their control, the love too will be better. Paternal love is analogous to kingly love, but the paternal surpasses it in services, for a father 'is causative of the existence [of the child]' (1161a16-17), which is the greatest thing. 'But these things are also attributed to grandparents' (1161a17-18): then either let it be conceded by us that they brought us into being and the rest, although it was not immediate but through our fathers as middle men, or else these things are attributed to our grandparents indeed, but by our fathers, that they brought *them* into being. The love of fathers exceeds that of kings,⁴⁷² and what is just is not the same for a father in regard to sons and a king in regard to those who are ruled, nor is their love similar.

The love of a husband in regard to his wife is similar to aristocracy, for it is in accord with what is fitting. For in fact the husband has more of the good; so too for what is just.

- 20 Having said that the love of brothers is similar to timocracy, he here says that it is similar to comradely love because they [i.e. comrades] are similar to one another, although comradely love is slightly better. The timocratic love too resembles the comradely, for just as those who rule on the basis of [property] evaluations wish to be equals, so too do comrades.

- 25 <...> for in each respect love toward children <exceeds>⁴⁷³ the love that a king has in regard to his subjects and what is just in relation to them. And the love of all grandparents for their grandchildren and what is just in their case is in excess of all others, and if there is still life in those further back⁴⁷⁴ [the more so in their case]. And what is just in these [i.e. parents, grandparents, etc.] is that in accord with worth, not that in accord with equality. That of a husband toward a wife is aristocratic love and aristocratic justness, but the love of brothers resembles the comradely.⁴⁷⁵

- 30 Comradely [love] is that of age-mates and of people similar in character to one another and of those who feel similarly. Such too is that of brothers, for they are more or less of the same age and like in character⁴⁷⁶ and of similar feelings, at least if they do not happen to have been corrupted in their souls. Such too is timocratic love; for in fact those in this government wish to be equal and decent, and though they are not

strict in respect to virtue, they have been brought up liberally and educated in temperateness in accord with the laws. This is why a timocracy is better than a democracy, in which even people who are ordinary and have never shared in a liberal education are in the habit of ruling. In timocracies ruling is by turns and equal. Thus too, then, are the loves – it is obvious that they are equal and not associated with excess. 183,1

‘In the deviations, just as what is just is small, so too is love small’ 5 (1161a30-1): love is least in the worst, I mean of course in a tyranny. For in fact what is just⁴⁷⁷ exists in these tyrannies too. Timocratic people rule by turns, and their love exists by turns: for it exists in those who are ruling. As the deviations have what is just ‘in small amount’, they have love too this way: the tyrant loves not at all, but uses those who are ruled as instruments for vice, and as the body uses the soul;⁴⁷⁸ for 10 just as the body cannot exist without the soul, so too this person cannot exist without those who provide for him. Tyrants, then, frequently love in small amount because they use those who are ruled for vice; for in those cases in which there is nothing common to the one who rules and the one who is ruled, but the one who rules draws off everything to himself and seizes it, there is neither love nor what is just. For there is neither love nor what is just in a craftsman toward his instrument, nor 15 in a soul toward a body, nor in a master to a slave. For those who rule them care for these things and benefit them,⁴⁷⁹ the craftsman carefully disposing his instrument, the soul its body, and the master his slave, but for their own sakes⁴⁸⁰ [rather than that of the things], and so that the things may serve them.

So that it may be obvious how he meant that a master has no love for a slave, he explains further by stating, ‘in that in point of which he is a slave there is no love for him’ (1161b5). <...> equality, but rather that the master commands everything to the slave, referring the usefulness to himself.⁴⁸¹ ‘But in that in point of which he is a human being’ (1161b5-6), he says that they [i.e. the masters] will have a certain love. And some, up to now, have perceived that their slaves are better than the fortune that is theirs, and have acquired them as comrades instead of slaves. 20

In tyrannies too, of course, there are loves in small amount or not at all in the tyrants for those who are ruled, while in democracies love and what is just are greater than in the other deviations. ‘For many things are common to those who are equal’ (1161b10), and where there is community there is also a certain love and what is just. 25

1161b11-1163b28 ‘Now, in community’ to ‘about these things let us be done speaking at this point’.

30

It has been said that all love is in community. ‘But one might distinguish’, he says, ‘kindred and comradely love’ (1161b12-13), or rather separate them as having something that differs from the communal 184,1

loves. He takes as communal those according to some agreement. He makes this clear when he says, 'civic loves and tribal and voyagerly and all such sorts resemble communal loves, inasmuch as they appear to
 5 exist by a kind of agreement' (1161b13-15). If communal love is such a thing, then understandably neither the kindred nor the comradely loves are communal, for kinsmen do not love one another by agreement but rather by being induced by nature; nor again do comrades love by agreement. Now, all loves are in community: he says that fellow-voyagers and those who build ships together and the rest love each other because they share in something, as do citizens and tribesmen; for one
 10 must separate the kindred and the comradely from those sorts. For the love in these latter sorts is not on account of community but rather on account of the noble itself; for all kinsmen love their kinsmen naturally, while comradely love is on account of the good and acquaintance and being equal in age. One might perhaps class hospitality-based love among the communal loves.

Kindred love too is of many kinds, for example that of a father for
 15 sons, that of sons for a father, that of brothers for one another and of the rest of the kinsmen, but these loves have their source from fathers. A father is more specific (*oikeios*)⁴⁸² to his child than a child to his father, and of children nothing is specific to their father. For the sameness in relation to the parents renders brothers the same as one another, because things that are the same as the same thing are also the same
 20 as one another. Blood and root are analogous, for as shoots from the same root bear a similarity both to one another and to the root⁴⁸³ because they are from the same root, so too those from the blood of the same parents bear a similarity to one another because they are from the same blood. They both have a similarity in respect to blood and they are the same as the father although they have been differentiated in regard
 25 to their bodies.

'Cousins and the remaining kinsmen' (1162a1) such as grandchildren and great grandchildren⁴⁸⁴ bear a relationship to one another because they have been begotten from the same brothers. They are the more related in the degree that they are near to the founder of the lineage. 'By the degree', he says, 'that a household is more fundamental than a city' (1162a18-19) and more primary, in that degree is childbearing
 30 fundamental to animals and especially human beings; for just as the city would not arise if the household did not exist, so neither human life nor love would exist if children were not begotten as the dearest things.

A person who inquires about the life of a husband in relation to a wife and that of a friend in relation to a friend (cf. 1162a29-31), inquires about nothing other than if they have justness that is similar;⁴⁸⁵ since
 <if>⁴⁸⁶ they do not have a similar justness, neither will they live in a similar way.

35 'Loves being threefold' (1162a34): having said that love is threefold, that is on account of the good and the pleasant and the useful, in accord

with each love there are equal people and those who exceed.⁴⁸⁷ They are equal, e.g. when both are good, but in accord with superiority when one is good, the other rich – one must add the fact that the rich person knows that by however much he exceeds in wealth, by that much he is exceeded in virtue – or in accord with superiority as when one is good, the other base, but of such a sort that he has not been wholly corrupted, but is able to be led up to the better. Again, they are equal too when the two are witty, but in accord with superiority when one exceeds in wit, the other in wealth. Similarly, they are equal too when they are similarly useful, but superiority occurs when one is more so, the other less. It is necessary that those who are equals in respect to equality on account of the good and the pleasant and the useful be equal also in respect to loving. For if they are equals as good people, they will love as equals, and similarly in the other cases; but if they should be unequal, it is necessary that they grant that the rich person be honoured proportionally as rich, the other as virtuous. No one takes hardly to someone who does him a good turn, but if the one who is done a good turn is gracious, he requites or rather helps his benefactor by doing a good deed for him. 185,1

As he says that what is just is either written or unwritten (unwritten when one is done justice on the basis of custom, written when on the basis of law), so too love on account of the useful is character-based and law-based. Thus people bring an accusation when they are not paid as they contracted. For if someone should give to someone else, as to a friend, fifty coins, saying nothing about interest but contracting in an unwritten way, and then later demands interest, he contracted in one way but strives to be paid in another. Now, the law-based love that is commercial is of this sort, that is, 'take this, give this' [i.e. immediate exchange], but the other [law-based sort] is for a [future] time, for example if I should give⁴⁸⁸ you ten coins until the coming year so that you then give me these plus five more.⁴⁸⁹ It is obvious, then, that the debt is in accord with the liberal law-based love [as opposed to immediate commercial deals]: if the one who has received delays a while and does not pay back, not to demand is a loving thing to do. 15

[To take an example], then, character-based love gives as to a friend, but demands equal or more as if one had not given for the sake of the benefit of the one who receives, but rather as though one had lent in order to make a profit from these things. Having contracted without interest, but striving to be paid with interest, he may bring an accusation. Bringing an accusation and contracting in one way, and being paid in another, occur because some people wish to appear noble: first they give, asking for nothing in return, so that they may seem to be good people; but later they wish to be benefited, and for this reason they bring an accusation. If the one who has received is able, he should pay back 'the value of what was done for him' (1163a2), for one must not make the one who gives⁴⁹⁰ an involuntary friend. It is as though, indeed, 25

when you took in the beginning it was you who erred, because you were done a good turn by someone by whom you ought not have been – since, then, you contracted with an evil person, pay back as if you had agreed on specified terms, even though you did not so agree. But that those who do not have the resources give back – not even the one who gave thinks it right to take back. ‘One must look into it in the beginning’ (1163a8): he says that it is necessary to look to whether one is being done a service by a good person and upon what agreement, so that it may remain or not on these terms.

- 186,1 ‘It is a matter of debate whether’ (1163a9-10) one should trust in the benefit to the one who has been done a service and on this basis give in return, or in the service of the one who has given. By way of solving this, he says that since the love is on account of the useful, the benefit of the one who has been done a service is the measure of the return exchange. For if someone has given someone else ten coins, and that one has made
 5 a profit of a hundred, he should give half to his benefactor; for the benefactor has so given on the basis that the profit will garner equal amounts [for both of them]. The one who has received is the one who needs; if, then, the one who has received has been benefited by a hundred, the one who has given has helped him in this amount, and one must pay back half of the profit or even more. In the case of those who are friends in accord with virtue, it is not possible to bring accusations; for if the choice of the one who has done the good is the measure, and
 10 he who has done it demands nothing, neither will he ever bring an accusation.

Since the loves are three, and they each also have [forms based on] superiorities, there is a difference in the superiorities too. For a better person, or rather a good one, thinks it right that he have more, and the rich person in turn thinks similarly, for in this respect he is more beneficial. For the rich person says that since you are useless in the matter of wealth, it is not right that you should have equal to me: for it
 15 is a benefaction [rather than an exchange] that I alone should give, while you receive on an equal basis as I; and the other in turn thinks similarly. It is necessary, then, he says, to give honour to one who exceeds in wealth or in virtue, and money to one who is in need.

Those who exceed in wealth and who do services for the common-wealth are seen to be honoured in states. Is it not strange, then, both to
 20 receive money and be honoured? For no one chooses the lesser, so as both to give money and to honour others.⁴⁹¹ For one must bestow honour on the one who gives money, and one must give in return honour to the one who does a benefit [and receives]⁴⁹² or leads the way to virtue, insofar as is feasible and possible – for it is not possible to give to all [e.g. to parents or the gods] what is in accord with their worth.

This is why he says that it may be thought not to be possible for a son
 25 to renounce his father; for it is necessary that the son pay back, since he owes, and the son has done⁴⁹³ no deed worth the things that have

been done for him by his father. There is the possibility, accordingly, for the father to disown, to whom indeed the son is in debt. But no one will ever stand aloof from his son, unless he should see that he is wicked. For all people wish that they be helped, but assisting a son [who is wicked] is to be avoided or at least not striven for.⁴⁹⁴ And about these matters I have had these things to say.

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Notes

1. Omitting *theôrêtikê* here, as a gloss inspired by the same word later in the sentence. If it is kept, then render ‘of which first philosophy is contemplative’.

2. Aristotle’s term *methodos* can mean both ‘method’ (in the sense of a way of pursuing an inquiry) and a ‘methodical inquiry’; metaphysics (below) is better understood as a ‘methodical inquiry’ than as a particular manner of conducting such an inquiry.

3. Inserting *de* after *hê*; Rose reads *deiktikê* instead of *deixis* and deletes *kai methodos alêthôs*.

4. Reading *kuriôteron* with the MSS; Heylbut emends to *kuriôtaton*, ‘most authoritative’.

5. i.e. the reference to action and choice, which presuppose rational creatures and hence happiness as their end.

6. This makes little sense, and I propose emending *autou* (which must refer to *telos* or goal) to *autês*, and translating, ‘that it proposes as its own’.

7. Read *poiêtikai* [sc. arts] here for the neuter *poiêtika*?

8. Perhaps read *autas*, modifying ‘arts’, instead of *hauta*, modifying ‘ends’; the latter makes no sense here, but the construction is perhaps *ad sensum*.

9. Reading *diatêrêsas* with Z; Heylbut emends to *diathrêsas*, ‘studies’.

10. Heylbut deletes ‘and they call this same thing also a capacity’; but perhaps *dunamis*, ‘capacity’ or ‘ability’, has replaced some other word, e.g. *tekhnê*, ‘an art’.

11. In the app. crit., Heylbut suggests reading *heurein*, ‘discover’, instead of *erein*.

12. Heylbut notes in the app. crit. that Z indicates in the margin that something is missing after ‘arithmetic’, and this is surely so: gymnastics can hardly count as a precise science.

13. Reading *en* with Z; Heylbut emends to *kai*, ‘and in all of which ...’.

14. Heylbut in app. crit. suggests *phainesthai*, ‘things seem different to different people’, instead of *phereesthai*.

15. Perhaps, for *toutôi*, read *tautêi*, i.e. ‘in contemplation’.

16. ‘Practice’ or ‘action’ (*praxis*) seems the wrong word here; perhaps emend to *doxan*, ‘belief’ or ‘opinion’.

17. Heylbut emends *telos*, ‘the end’, to *teleian*, ‘complete’, modifying ‘virtue’; but ‘complete’ is not in the text of Aristotle, and it makes Aspasius’ next clause redundant.

18. Heylbut inserts *prostassei*, ‘commands’, but it can readily be inferred from the context.

19. Aristotle here quotes *Works and Days* 293-6: ‘He is best of all who understands all things, and good too is he who heeds well him who knows; but he who neither understands himself nor listens to another and deposits it in his heart – he is a useless man’.

20. Probably insert *kai* after *tên timên* (it precedes *tên timên* in N).

21. Endymion is represented as sleeping eternally, after Selene (the Moon) fell in love with him; cf. *EN* 10.8, 1178b19-20.

22. The explanation is fatuous; in addition to 'circular', *enkuklion* means 'popular', and Aristotle uses it to refer to his exoteric works (cf. *De Caelo* 279a30).

23. As Heylbut notes in the app. crit., Aspasius seems to be explaining the word *baios*, 'small', rather than *biaios*, 'constrained'. The second hand in Z adds: 'Perhaps in this sense, that is, as contributing little to happiness, and therefore those who call this [life] happy are constrained'.

24. Deleting the commas after *men* and *diakeimenôî*, and taking the first *tôi* with *harmottein*.

25. Emending MSS *legô* to *legei*; Heylbut emends to *legetai*.

26. Reading *haploun* with N (Z reads *haplon*); Heylbut emends to *haplôs*.

27. There is something seriously awry with the text here. Heylbut punctuates with a full stop, and also reads *kharin* ('for the sake of') in place of the MSS *tautê*, but this makes no sense. Perhaps the sentence went something like *tautêi to allou kharin hairêton* <*kai di' hauto hairêton*>, i.e. 'in this way what is choiceworthy for the sake of something else <is also choiceworthy for its own sake>', the omission being due to haplography. But given the lacuna that immediately follows (the MSS indicate a missing line at this point), rather more might have been lost.

28. The citation from Aristotle is added by the second hand in Z.

29. The Greeks did not count 'one' as a number; the sequence of numbers began with two.

30. There is a lacuna of at least a line here, not indicated in the MSS. 'Having' modifies a feminine noun, perhaps 'category'; the sense is not clear.

31. i.e. beginning with a hypothetical premise, 'if ... then'.

32. i.e. as a syllogistic series of propositions. The terminology here and in the previous note is Stoic; cf. Galen *Introductio Dialectica* 3 = SVF 3.217; Alexander's commentary on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* 390,16 = SVF 3.252.

33. Perhaps read *tôn* for *toutôn*.

34. Reading *hekaterôî*, sc. *logôî*, for MSS and Heylbut's *hekaterai*, which has no suitable antecedent.

35. Reading *horismous*, with the MSS; Heylbut emends to *arithmous*, 'numbers', which may be right. But one was not, for the Greeks, a number.

36. Punctuating with a comma after *aisthêtais* rather than Heylbut's raised stop after *ousias* (and deleting the earlier comma after *tinās*).

37. A substantial lacuna is indicated in the MSS.

38. The citation from Aristotle is added by the correcting hand in Z.

39. Punctuating with a raised or full stop after *aretês*; Heylbut punctuates with a comma.

40. Reading *tautá* instead of *taûta* (MSS, Heylbut).

41. A marginal note in Z reads: 'The paraphraser has skipped over here some of what is in Aristotle'.

42. Retaining MSS *hêmôn*; Heylbut emends to *hêmin*, 'things that are good for us'.

43. From here until 16,9 N is lacking; and Heylbut cites R instead.

44. Or 'with the nature of this inquiry' [*emmethodôs*], as opposed, for example, to an exact science.

45. There is clearly a lacuna here, not indicated in the MSS or in Heylbut; for the feminine forms *pasôn* and *ekhousa* have no antecedent. 'For the political art' is supplied *exempli gratia*.

46. Reading *esti* with the MSS, rather than *eti* (Heylbut following Diels).

47. The supplement is based on what I take to have been the sense of what is lost in the lacuna.

48. Lacuna indicated by Heylbut, probably no more than a few words.

49. Inserting *ou* after *zôiou* (omitted by haplography).
50. Inserting *ei* before *kai*.
51. Punctuating with a raised or full stop after *ekgonoi*.
52. Sharples renders this phrase, 'if the end is one of the goods'.
53. Supplying *ou* before *panta*, as suggested by Heylbut in the app. crit.
54. Supplying *gar oukh* before *hairêtôtera*, and deleting (with Heylbut in app. crit.) *ta*.
55. *to eu proslambanon* is out of place grammatically; perhaps read *to to eu proslambanon*, and transpose it to follow *telos*.
56. Retaining *to ... einai* with the MSS, deleted by Heylbut.
57. This sentence is difficult to construe, and *protithemenou* is strange in the context. For Aristotle (1098a10-11) has *prostithemenês tês kata tên aretên huperokhês*, 'with the addition of superiority in respect to virtue', and I am inclined to think either that Aspasius read *protithemenou* and did his best to interpret it, or that there is some corruption in the text.
58. These words are part of a passage bracketed as a doublet by Bywater.
59. Mercken and Sharples understand *hosos an eiê ho anthrôpos* as temporal: 'as long as a human being exists'.
60. Reading *proagagein* with Aristotle's text (as suggested by Taylor), instead of *periagagein* (Heylbut), which would seem to be a scribal error.
61. Reading *eirêmenoîs* with the MSS; Heylbut emends to *heurêmenoîs*, 'been discovered'.
62. cf. *Posterior Analytics* 93a36-b7; Heylbut, following Diels, emends *mê* to *gê*: 'when the earth produces a shadow', etc.
63. Heylbut marks a lacuna; I follow Diels (in the app. crit.) in inserting *sumbebêke*.
64. Taking *apagôgê* here to mean 'induction'; the usual term is *epagôgê*, and Sharples suggests emending.
65. Perhaps read *tas* instead of *tous*.
66. Heylbut indicates a lacuna; I supply, e.g. <*doxa autou en hosôi legousin tên*>.
67. Sharples renders *en proêgoumenoîs* as 'in favorable circumstances', citing p. 64 n. 220 of his edition of Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Ethical Problems* (London: Duckworth, 1990) for parallels. This sense, however, sits less well with the context here and at 22,35, 24,26, and 26,15 below.
68. I suspect that *kala* is corrupt; either transpose to follow *kat' aretên*, or else delete (as suggested by Taylor).
69. Emending *energeias* (MSS, Heylbut) to *hêdonês*.
70. The text printed by Heylbut is unintelligible; I tentatively emend *kai allou kath' hautas oudenos* to [*kai*] *all' ou kath' hautas oudamôs*.
71. The inscription continues, as quoted in Aristotle's text: 'to be healthy is best, but acquiring what one loves is most pleasant'.
72. Heylbut indicates a crux, and one can only guess at what has fallen out; perhaps external goods were contrasted with bodily goods.
73. I suspect that the repeated *dia ploutou*, which Heylbut deletes, has replaced the word *pateras*; cf. *EN* 1165a1-2.
74. Lawgivers of the seventh century BC, Solon in Athens, Zaleucus in Locris.
75. For this sense of *hetaireô* (which LSJ give only for the middle), cf. (of women) Josephus *Jewish Antiquities* 3.276; Alciphron 4.3.2; (of men) Libanius *Decl.* 12.2.9, 12.2.41, 17.1.71; Aelius Herodian *De Figuris* 35.91.6; Pollux 6.126, 8.45.
76. See previous note.
77. Heylbut supplies *kai*; perhaps supply *kai dê* or the like.
78. The corrector of MS Z has written in the margin: 'this is what he says: that it is possible to say that happiness comes through virtue and training and learning

rather than by chance; for in fact things according to nature are finest, and properly speaking either natural things are [just] so constituted, or are so constituted as to come through learning and training, and not through chance; and likewise things that are products of art and heavenly objects. This is what Aspasius here calls things according to necessity'.

79. Aristotle's text has *epi tosouton diôristhō* rather than *dioristēon*.

80. Heylbut indicates a crux; the sense supplied is at best approximate.

81. I retain the MSS reading *to mê einai empodistikon tēs eudaimonias*; Heylbut emends to *to mê <teleion> einai [mê on] empodistikon* etc. (*mê on* deleted by Diels).

82. Inserted by Heylbut.

83. Reading *eudaimona*; Heylbut reads *eudaimôn* with Z; N has *eudaimon*.

84. *sic*; perhaps insert <or handsome>.

85. Heylbut deletes this phrase.

86. Heylbut deletes 'and its essence'.

87. Inserting *hoi* after *makarioi*.

88. Aspasius has taken 'without fault' to specify a positive sense of 'four-square', rather than as an additional quality of the person who endures misfortune with a firm spirit.

89. Heylbut indicates a lacuna; I have supplied, minimally, <*eudaimona legein, toutesti*>.

90. Heylbut indicates a crux; I read *en hōi teôs elenkhei* (Diels, in the app. crit., suggested *en tōi teôs elenkhei* for the MSS *en hōi teôs ankhei*).

91. Diels' supplements.

92. There seems to be a lacuna here, not noted by Heylbut; I insert, e.g. after *kai <hoti hoi tethneôtes metekhousi tou agathou ê kakou kai hoti esti>*.

93. Reading *ei kai*, with MSS; Heylbut, following the text of Aristotle, emends to *ei de*.

94. Reading *hôte ê* with MSS; Heylbut emends to *hôte mê*.

95. Heylbut indicates a lacuna; I supply, e.g. *tēs eudaimonias*.

96. Retaining the MSS *houtôs*; Heylbut emends to *pôs*.

97. Heylbut, in the app. crit., suggests inserting <*tōi theôi*>, probably rightly.

98. The corrector of MS Z has written in the margin: 'those who are kings by their own resources, as is right, and not through a decree'. But Aspasius' meaning is obscure, and perhaps something has fallen out of the text.

99. The awkwardness is in the Greek; perhaps read *anthrôpôn*, 'human beings', instead of *anthrôpinôn*.

100. Perhaps insert <*to*> before *pan*?

101. Lacuna noted by Mercken; I have supplied, e.g. <*oukh hōs epi ta mathēmatikôn; hegoumetha gar ta mathēmatika logon ekhein*>.

102. The text is corrupt here. I punctuate with a raised stop after *bouletai* (no punctuation in Heylbut), and insert, exempli gratia, <*ho*> before *ouk an* and <*eiê*> following it, the omissions readily explainable by haplography (for the formulation, cf. 11,20 etc.).

103. Correcting the misprint *logou* in Heylbut to *logon*.

104. The Greek is *ou monon*, 'not only', which seems inconsistent with the balance of the sentence.

105. As Heylbut notes, from here on there are no further lemmata in this book.

106. Added by Heylbut.

107. I am not certain I fully understand the meaning of this sentence.

108. Perhaps read *pathêtikai* instead of *psukhikai*, 'emotional pleasures'.

109. I take this, rather than 'appetites', to be the implied subject of *ginontai*.

110. Supplying *enontôn* or the like (genitive absolute); Heylbut, following Diels, indicates a lacuna.

111. Understanding *amoibês* as the noun implied by *toiautês*.

112. A short lacuna is indicated in the manuscripts; in the margin of Z, the corrector has written: 'much is missing in the copy as well'. Aristotle does not discuss 'resentfulness' (*zêlotupia*), but classifies emulation (*zêlos*) as a positive emotion. The final sentence before the lacuna perhaps went on to indicate that the resentment corresponding to emulation and imitation could be positive.

113. Aspasius here apparently uses the term *tetragônismos* in the sense of 'square root'; LSJ gives only the meaning 'square'.

114. Understanding *analogias*; 1 is to the square root of 2 as the square root of 2 is to 2.

115. The side of a square equal in area to a 2x1 rectangle is the square root of two in length.

116. Adopting Heylbut's *epikheirôn* (in the app. crit.) for the unintelligible *kheiron* of the MSS; for *epikheirô eis*, cf. 3,9.

117. Retaining *auton* with Z²; ZN read *autas*; Heylbut deletes.

118. Reading *tharsous*, as emended by Hase; the MSS give *thrasous*.

119. According to LSJ, *tharsos* tends to have the positive sense of 'courage', whereas *thrasos* is more likely to mean 'rashness'; but the root is the same, and Aspasius' argument is tendentious. Curiously, the MSS at line 17 confuse the two; see preceding note.

120. The three are truth, wittiness, and friendliness.

121. Perhaps insert *mê* before *êi*; the construction otherwise is strange.

122. That is, one involving degrees of pleasure rather than of pain.

123. Reading *dispragiais* with Sharples, instead of *eupragiais* with the MSS and Heylbut.

124. Heylbut marks the text as corrupt; if there is a lacuna where I suggest (after *tôn akrôn*), then perhaps sc. something like <the one at the other extreme as most opposite – the profligate being classified at one extreme,>.

125. Six thousand drachmas = one talent.

126. Perhaps emend the first *kai* to *kata*?

127. Aspasius plays on the words *pathos* = 'emotion' and *paskhō* = 'to be affected' or 'suffer', the regular passive form for *poieō* = 'do'.

128. Deleting *ei* and reading *eîê* instead of *êi* with Heylbut in app. crit.; Heylbut marks a crux in the text, and there may be some deeper corruption.

129. Deleting *dia to akonta eirgasthai* (as a gloss on *sungnômên*) with Heylbut, and reading (with the MSS) *agathou tinos tou eidotos*; in the app. crit., Heylbut suggests *agathou tinos politikou eidotos*.

130. Reading *éstin* rather than *estin* with MSS, Heylbut.

131. Reading *sunônumos*, as suggested by Natale; Heylbut reads *homônumon*; the MSS have *anônumon*.

132. *kinoumenoîs* is passive rather than middle ('do not move'); cf. *kinêthêsetai* in line 7.

133. Aspasius takes *ê* in the sense of 'than' (adding *mallon*, 'rather' to make the sense clear), as opposed to 'or'.

134. The sense seems to be that the man has, at the moment of the deed, applied his own hand and hence has acted voluntarily.

135. Either insert or understand a second *hekousioi* before *hekousioi* (which will have dropped out by haplography).

136. Punctuating with a full stop here.

137. Reading *akousion* rather than *hekousion* (Heylbut).

138. Reading *apophainomenous*; Heylbut reads *anaphainomenous* with Z, while N has *apopheromenous*.

139. Added by Heylbut, from Aristotle.

140. Aeschylus was charged with revealing in a tragedy part of the Eleusinian mysteries, and argued that he had done so unintentionally.

141. Whereas *ti* in *peri ti* must be neuter, *tini* in *en tini* may be masculine or feminine as well as neuter, and Kirwan tentatively suggests that the argument here may turn on this distinction (cf. 65,29 below); but since Aspasius goes on to say *peri tina*, where *tina* is evidently masculine, the gender of the pronoun does not seem to be at issue.

142. The language here is exceptionally awkward, and I suspect the text is corrupt.

143. Heylbut rightly indicates a lacuna here.

144. Inserting *dei* after *touton*.

145. Supplied by Heylbut from Aristotle.

146. Inserting *oukh* before *houtôs*, as the sense seems to require. If the MS reading is kept, perhaps one may translate (as suggested by Kirwan), 'At any rate, a sophist does have both *such* contraries'.

147. Lacuna indicated by Heylbut; the Latin translation by Felicianus has (as cited by Heylbut in the app. crit.): 'when we say "I choose or prefer" to farm a field, it means "I wish to", and when we say, "he surely has a good wish", it means "choice and preference".'

148. Supplying *ei* after *epei*.

149. Reading *hotioun*, as suggested by Ramelli, instead of *hoti ou* (MSS, Heylbut).

150. The principal MSS of Aristotle read *bouleusin*, 'deliberation', rather than *boulêsin*. Bywater in the apparatus to the OCT indicates that the latter is an alternative reading in Aspasius' lemma, but Heylbut gives no indication of this.

151. Reading (tentatively) *tin' anoêta* (suggested by Ramelli) in place of the nonsensical *hina noei* printed by Heylbut (so N; Z has *hin' ha noei*), which must conceal some impossible deed as the object of *poiêsei*.

152. Punctuating with a full stop after *agennêtos gar*, and removing the comma after *aidios*.

153. Supplying *ê phusei*, which seems necessary with *amphoterois*.

154. Perhaps read *ataktotera*, 'things that are more irregular', rather than *ataktoteran*.

155. Reading *boulêsis* with N, rather than *bouleusis*, 'deliberation', with Z, Heylbut; deliberation would be included in 'mind'.

156. There may be a lacuna here; not only is the predicate unexpressed, but *men* in 72,9 is unanswered.

157. Or 'luck'; Aristotle's *tukhê* means both.

158. Reading *bouleuomenos* instead of *boulomenos*, 'wishes' (MSS, Heylbut).

159. i.e. well known 'as to how they will turn out'; cf. 73,6 above. The idea here seems to be that if we know something cannot happen, we do not deliberate about it; in the earlier passage, the reference was to things whose outcome was clear.

160. I wonder whether *katholou* here signifies 'general things', in contrast to 'individual things' in the following sentence.

161. 'Wish' is the reading of cod. Marcianus 213; most MSS of Aristotle have 'deliberation'.

162. As Sharples notes, the argument loses sight of the distinction between what is to be wished for and the good that it is apparently intended to illustrate.

163. Lacuna indicated by Heylbut; sc. something like '<what is to be wished for is the end>' (based on Aristotle's text).

164. Supplied by Heylbut.

165. Aspasius' *to prattein kalon hotioun*, corresponding to Aristotle's *to mê prattein kalon on*, seems corrupt (the next clause has *aiskhron on*, as in Aristotle); perhaps emend *hotioun* to *hote on*.

166. Presumably, that virtue is voluntary, although there are other possible interpretations of 'this'.

167. Reading *phaulon telos*; ZN read *phaulon*, Heylbut emends to *telos*.

168. Aristotle here has 'virtues'.

169. The MSS add *mellonta*, 'impending' envy; bracketed by Heylbut (cf. *mellôn* in the next phrase), but perhaps it should be retained.

170. Heylbut notes a lacuna here; his supplement follows the text of Aristotle.

171. The example is commonplace; cf. Plutarch, *On How a Youth Should Listen to Poetry* 29D. It is not certain that Homer meant the difference in behaviours to reflect a moral distinction, since the Trojans' clamour may rather have been a sign of their previous successes in battle, as opposed to the grim comportment of the hard-pressed Greeks.

172. I suspect that *ésti* ('but they are really') should be read instead of *eti*.

173. Reading *autêi* instead of *hautê* (Heylbut); cf. 85,10-11.

174. Punctuating with a full stop after the preceding sentence (Urmson), and reading *to* (with N) <*de*> instead of *tôi* (*tô* Z) with Heylbut (Urmson suggests *tous de*).

175. Reading *hê* instead of *têi* (Heylbut).

176. Reading *kathoson* (Diels, in app. crit.) instead of *ê ison* (MSS, Heylbut).

177. Inserting *tôi* before *to* (Urmson).

178. Aristotle's text reads *hupo tôn kuklôi* rather than *hupo tôn kuklôn*.

179. Or possibly, 'do not need courageous people to become mercenaries' (so Urmson).

180. Like Aristotle, Aspasius means these as examples of pleasures of the soul, not the body; but he expresses himself carelessly, perhaps misled for a moment by Aristotle's own phrasing. Perhaps, however, one should posit a lacuna after 'by way of the body'.

181. Something seems missing here; the previous examples have all to do with food, not sex, which must be an additional thought. Besides, the collocation of *aphrodisiôn hêdonôn* is awkward. The required sense would seem to be that 'the rest of the animals share in these pleasures only incidentally, through the recollection of foods and sex' (e.g. *kat' anamnêsin <brômatôn kai> aphrodisiôn <kai kata sumbebêkos tautôn> hêdonôn monon metekhousi ta loipa zôia*).

182. Perhaps read *prosepipêmekhanôntai*, 'people contrive in addition' for *prosepipêmekhanatai*; the verb seems to occur only in Aspasius.

183. Reading *ho ti d'esti dê hêmeteron* instead of the meaningless *hoitines êdê hêmeteron*, which Heylbut marks as corrupt.

184. The text is corrupt; I tentatively read *kai nosêmatikai* [suggested by Diels in the app. crit.] *tinis* (cf. 91,14) *peri ho êdê idioi eien* instead of *kai noein gar ti kai diatheseôs peri ho êdê idioi eien*, etc. I can only explain *diatheseôs* as a gloss.

185. Reading *akolástôn* (Heylbut wrongly prints a circumflex accent on the final omega). The sentence could also mean, 'These are kinds characteristic of dissolute [people]'. But there is very likely some corruption here, that extends into the following sentence.

186. This sentence, which interrupts the argument, is hopelessly corrupt. My translation presupposes emending *ta* to *to*, and *tagmenôn* to *tetagmena*. But the corruption is likely deeper, and this and the previous sentence may well represent a gloss that was incorporated into the text.

187. Aspasius evidently had a defective text of Aristotle, which reads *mallon ê hôs hoi polloi, ê mê hôs dei*, 'more than as the majority does, or not as one should', etc.; Aspasius 'as one should' make little sense. See next note.

188. Aspasius evidently found or proposed *mê hôs dê* and *hôs dei* as alternative readings, but did not know the right reading, *ê mê hôs dei* ('or as one should not';

see previous note), and so he attached these phrases to the preceding 'more than' (*mallon*) and made the best he could of them. But it may be that the text is corrupt.

189. Reading the pronoun *haí* rather than the article *hai*.

190. Supplied from Aristotle's text by the corrector of Z, and adopted by Heylbut.

191. Supplying *haireisthai has dei ê*; otherwise delete the first *mê* ('not'). As the text stands, the double negative gives the wrong sense.

192. Or perhaps read *hupo*, 'by' (Urmson) instead of *huper*.

193. Deleting the second *mê* (Urmson) at 93,14; but perhaps the double negative is admissible here (contrast 93,6).

194. Supplied by Heylbut, following the corrector of Z.

195. Or 'unchastised'; there is a play on the Greek word *akolastos*, which means both 'unchastized' and 'dissolute'.

196. That is, the reason specific to a slave, which is what tutors in charge of children typically were.

197. i.e. when it should, in what way, etc.

198. Supplied by Heylbut from the Latin translation by Felicianus.

199. I owe to Russell the observation that Aspasius is here drawing attention to the etymology of the term *asôtos*; I had previously toyed with supplying e.g. *dapanêros* on the basis of Aristotle *EN* 1119b31: 'for example someone who is <a spendthrift> and is ruined thanks to himself is a profligate person'.

200. Heylbut rightly brackets *lelêthe* (Z) or *leluthē* (N) at the end of this sentence; my guess is that a marginal note *lelutai*, 'it is solved', crept into the text.

201. Or 'since a human being uses this [i.e. the soul] above all'; the phrasing is ambiguous, but the sense seems to favour the translation in the text (suggested by Russell).

202. Translating Diels' emendation, *kai toiouton hoion ti einai tôn khrêsimôn* (reported in the app. crit.), for the MSS *kaitoi auton hoion te einai tôn khrêsimôn* (Heylbut notes a crux); I think, however, that the transmitted text may be retained and rendered: 'and further that it is possible for it to be among the useful things'.

203. Supplied by Heylbut from the text of Aristotle.

204. Added by Heylbut.

205. Added by Heylbut.

206. Aspasius has misunderstood Aristotle, who by *hêkista lupêron* meant 'not at all painful'.

207. cf. *EN* 6.5, 1140a30-1; but Aristotle does not use the comparative here.

208. Punctuating after *metriôs de*; perhaps read *to <gar> lupoun*, as suggested by Russell.

209. Deleting punctuation after *huperballein* and *dêlonoti* (Heylbut), and inserting commas after *lambanein* and *mikrois* (Russell).

210. Supplied by Heylbut from Aristotle.

211. Supplied by Heylbut.

212. Aspasius evidently finds Aristotle's unqualified use of *epieikeia* here inapt; Ierodiakonou suggests reading <ou> *di' epieikeian* <all> ê, but Aristotle says *dia tina epieikeian*.

213. Inserting after *kata tēn* in 103,18 *lēpsin*, *kai an êi kathorthôtikos kata tēn*; Ierodiakonou suggests reading *lēpsin* instead of *dosin*; Russell proposes reading *kata tautēn* [= *lēpsin*] *monên <ê kata monên> tēn dosin* in the previous sentence, 'for liberality is not thought to be in respect to this [i.e. receiving] alone, or in respect to giving alone'.

214. Aspasius (see below) derives the word *banausos*, 'vulgar' or more properly 'relating to handicrafts', from *baunos*, 'forge'; cf. *Etymologicum Magnum* 187,39-40 Gaisford (Kallierges' pagination). An equivalent in English would be to derive 'vulgar' from 'Vulcan'.

215. *ep' autois* = *eph' hautois*; as Barnes points out, the manuscripts invariably give smooth breathing for the reflexive, which Heylbut in most cases corrects, unnecessarily, to rough.

216. Aspasius here evidently takes this to refer to the substratum, that is, the objects on which the habitual state operates.

217. Reading *hoion* <*hoiai*> *hai energeiai tês oikodomikês, toiautai de tines* <*hai hexeis*> *hai peri oikodomian* (Konstan, Russell); Ierodiakonou suggests *hoiai gar hai energeiai tês oikodomikês, toiautê kai hê hexis peri oikodomian*.

218. Reading *autais* instead of *auta* (MSS, Heylbut).

219. Reading *pragmatôn* (Russell) instead of *aretôn* (MSS, Heylbut); cf. *EN* 2.6, 1106b7.

220. Punctuating with a raised stop rather than a comma.

221. Placing the parenthesis before *enesti* rather than before *mikron*.

222. The temple of Olympian Zeus, in Athens; but Pericles had nothing to do with its construction.

223. Supplying *hoia legomen* from Aristotle's text, which Aspasius is evidently explaining by 'that is'; Heylbut, in the app. crit., suggests deleting *toutesti*.

224. Russell suggests that *talanta* here may be a corruption for *toiauta*, 'such things', in Aristotle (1112b30).

225. Perhaps, as Russell suggests, read *parexei for hexei*.

226. Supplying, e.g. *dôreais eoike* at 107,4; Heylbut does not note a lacuna.

227. Russell suggests transposing *kai ta anathêmata* to follow *pros tas dôreais*: '... and "gifts have something similar to dedications"', he will also be keen in respect to gifts and dedications'.

228. Aristotle has *epei*, 'since', instead of *epi*; Russell suggests that the reading in Aspasius may be due to a copyist's error.

229. For *tôn pelas*, perhaps read, with Aristotle, *tôi pelas*.

230. The conclusion of the lemma is missing.

231. This is my rendering of the term *megalopsukhia*, literally 'great-souledness' or 'greatness of soul'. No English word is entirely adequate; 'grandeur' seems to me to capture the essential idea of justified pride, and like the Greek term includes the idea of greatness or magnitude.

232. Supplied by Heylbut from Aristotle's text.

233. Supplying *ho megalopsukhos dê axios esti megalôn. Ho men oun megalopsukhos*.

234. Reading *axios* with Diels (cited in the app. crit.), instead of *anaxios* with Heylbut and the MSS, which would give 'nor is he unworthy of them'; but Aspasius has just qualified this type of person as wicked, and can scarcely suppose him worthy of civic honours.

235. Heylbut inserts *mikropsukhos*, giving the sense, 'the person classified according to deficiency as diffident is one who ...', etc. The supplement is unnecessary, and in fact I should prefer to bracket *khaunos* ('as conceited') in 110,21 as a gloss.

236. Supplying *aretên* before *kai* in 111,24; or else bracket *kai* (Russell).

237. Correcting the misprint *oligôgêsei* to *oligôrêsei*.

238. Reading *tôn allôn* in place of *autôn*, 'by any of them' (Barnes suggests *tôn ektos*, 'by any external ones'; Russell suspects that *autôn* could refer back to the goods and evils of the body).

239. Reading *sunainôn* instead of *sumbainein* (Russell). Retaining *sumbainein*, I ventured 'it does not on this account escape him that it [i.e. the honour] does not correspond [to his worth]' (understanding *têi axiâi* or the like), but this now seems forced to me.

240. Inserting *ê* (following Barnes).

241. Perhaps delete *autos* (Russell).

242. Reading *kinduneuteon einai* (Russell) for the MSS *kinduneuta men einai* in 112,30 (defended by Barnes); Heylbut adopts Diels' *kinduneuta eneinaí*.

243. *polla gar dei ginesthai* is probably corrupt, but I can think of no satisfactory emendation.

244. Reading (following Barnes) *eipen* instead of *eipein*.

245. Supplying (very tentatively) *tous hêgemonas* (Russell suggests *ta telê*, or perhaps simply *toiouta*). Heylbut, following R, reads *ta idia*, 'private matters', which makes no sense here; Z and N read *ta hêdea*, 'pleasant things', which makes still less. Aspasius is thinking of his own times.

246. Added by Heylbut; Z indicates a lacuna.

247. Barnes notes that Aristotle does not use the word *epieikes* ('decent') here, but Aristotle describes the opposite behaviour as *phortikon* ('vulgar', 1124b22), to which *epieikes* is the contrary.

248. Reading *semmunesthai* for the misprint *sumnunesthai* in Heylbut.

249. Reading *en axiômati* with Barnes for *en megethei* ('in magnitude', Heylbut, Z); perhaps Aspasius had *en megalôi axiômati*, 'in high office'. In any case, punctuate here with a full stop (no punctuation in Heylbut).

250. Reading (following Barnes) *megalopsukhou tou pantôn antipoioumenou* (*megalopsukhou ou pantôn antipoioumenou*, Diels in the app. crit.) for the MSS *megalopsukhou tou pantôs hen ti poioumenou*, retained by Heylbut.

251. Aristotle has 'great honour or deed' (*ergon* rather than *erôs*).

252. Deeds or people? Having read *erôs*, Aspasius seems to be trying to make the best of it.

253. Reading *iskhuos* (Russell; cf. 115,25) instead of the MSS *ê misthous*. Heylbut marks a crux; Diels (reported in the app. crit.) suggests *eumegethôn*, 'magnificent bodies'; I have proposed *megethous*, 'magnitude'.

254. The syntax is somewhat strained, and *epistêmoô* is a very rare verb; there may be some corruption in the text (a change of accent would yield *epistêmôn* = 'one who is knowledgeable', but this loses the connection with conversation). If the MSS reading is retained, perhaps delete *pros*.

255. i.e. by lamenting over the absence of them. Barnes proposes to read *euporein*, 'provide himself with them shamefully'.

256. Perhaps delete *metriôs* (introduced by a scribe who understood *apora metriôs polla hexei* to mean 'he will bear many losses moderately?'); it may have replaced a connective particle, e.g. *men dê* or *men ge*.

257. Reading *aspora* (Russell) instead of *apora* (MSS, Heylbut), 'resourceless'.

258. Inserting *ê* (Russell).

259. Reading *eustathês* instead of *eustathôs* with MSS, Heylbut; alternatively insert *ekhei* (Russell). Diels in the app. crit. suggests *eustathes to mê* etc., but this leaves the following clause hanging.

260. *parepeigêi* is perhaps impersonal, 'unless there is pressing business'; the verb is not in LSJ.

261. Punctuating before *aei* (Russell) rather than after, with Heylbut.

262. Russell suggests deleting *mê* before *prosêkei*, '... honours that are appropriate'; this would indeed describe the deficiency, but Aspasius is describing the person in the middle, who is characterized (for want of a suitable term) as undesiring.

263. Reading *to philotimon*, with the text of Aristotle, rather than *ton philotimon*, 'an honour-loving person'.

264. Inserting *mê*, following Barnes (who suggests *ou*).

265. Reading *pasi* (cf. Z *pas*) with Barnes, rather than *panta* (N, Heylbut).

266. Reading *to te eu kai to mê eu*, with Barnes, instead of *tôi te eu kai tòi mê eu*

(Heylbut), which would mean 'by virtue of being in a good way and a way that is not good'.

267. Aspasius has *amphoterous*; *amphotera* (neuter) would be more natural, but Aspasius sometimes speaks of the person to indicate the virtue or quality.

268. cf. 116.2-8 on diffidence as the true opposite of grandeur.

269. Supplying *mesai*, as suggested by Heylbut in the app. crit.

270. Reading *praxesin*, with Barnes, in place of *hexesin* (MSS, Heylbut); cf., e.g. 47.22, etc.

271. Inserting *anônumous legôn* (Russell) before *onomazei*.

272. If the text is not corrupt (and Z, approved by Barnes, 'reads irascibility ... more than mildness'), the sense seems to be that 'mildness' has already been appropriated for the middle state, and it was in more common use than 'irascibility', a word very probably coined by Aristotle; hence neither extreme of those who 'do not properly feel anger' has a suitable name. But perhaps one should indicate a lacuna, which will also have swallowed up the subject of the following sentence.

273. Supplying *ê* (with Barnes) after *emphainein*.

274. i.e. the term 'irascibility' is itself inappropriate as a label for the vice.

275. Reading *deitai* for *de esti* (Heylbut); *de* seems otiose. Barnes suggests reading *anthekteon* ('one must keep to'), as in Aristotle, in place of *esti*.

276. Reading *anankê* for *anankêi* (Heylbut, probably a misprint).

277. Reading *estokhasmenos* with N, rather than *estokhasmenôs* with Z and Heylbut.

278. Russell proposes, perhaps rightly, reading *to sunêdunein*, 'being pleasing' (cf. 1126b30) here and at 121.18, instead of *to sun hêdonêi* (MSS, Heylbut).

279. Reading *epi* instead of *eti* (N, Heylbut); or perhaps delete *epi* (Z has *esti*).

280. Eliminating the raised stop after *homilein*, and inserting a comma after *pasi* and *de* before *harmotton* (with Barnes).

281. Barnes suggests, perhaps rightly, deleting *ôpheleian*, which produces a neater contrast between *ean te di' hôn* and *ean te dia tôn enantiôn*, but the syntax remains awkward. Perhaps insert *ousôn* after *euskhêmonôn*.

282. cf. the title of Menander's play, *Dyscolus*.

283. So Heylbut, following the text of Aristotle; the MSS read *en tais koinais homiliais*, 'in common socializings'.

284. Aspasius has written *authekastos tis alêtheutikos ôn*, instead of *authekastos tis ôn alêtheutikos*, as in Aristotle's text (1127a23-4), in order to make clear that the sense is 'a forthright person, being truthful', rather than 'truthful, being a forthright person'; at least, this is what I take to be his meaning. Diels (followed by Heylbut) inserted *ôn* before *alêtheutikos* in 122.29, but I wonder whether it ought not rather to go after it.

285. Inserting *proairetikos* after *alêtheutikos* (Barnes).

286. Reading *homologiais* (Russell; cf. 1127a33) instead of *homiliais*, 'socializing'.

287. Inserting *ha*, with Heylbut.

288. Inserting *ê*, with Barnes.

289. Reading *homilian* instead of *homilia* (presumably a misprint in Heylbut); Barnes suggests deleting *homilia*, perhaps rightly.

290. Reading (with Barnes) *ti* (unaccented) instead of *tí* (Heylbut), who punctuates with a question mark.

291. Perhaps insert *toutesti, tas kinêseis*: '... in respect to playfulness, that is, the movements of one's character' (this is a variation on a suggestion by Russell); cf. *EN* 1128a11.

292. Deleting *kai hoia dei* (Barnes suggests deleting *hoia dei* after *akousetai*).

293. Reading *geloion*, 'funny' (Barnes; cf. *EN* 1128a8), in place of *pleon*, 'in excess'.

294. Heylbut in the app. crit. (endorsed by Barnes) suggests reading *ou mikron*, 'matters in no small degree' (from Aristotle's text) rather than *ouden*. But Aspasius is sometimes more prudish than Aristotle.

295. Reading *ton horon* (Barnes) instead of *to akron*, 'the extreme'.

296. Reading *akousai* with the MSS, instead of *parakousai* with Heylbut following Diels.

297. Punctuating with a comma, rather than a question mark.

298. i.e. to the one that says one ought not to be angry with just anyone, etc.

299. cf. the definition of anger or *orgê* in *Rhetoric* 2.2, 1378a31-3.

300. Additions in brackets by Heylbut.

301. Reading *eti* with Sedley instead of *epei* (MSS, Heylbut).

302. Reading *all' ho ephthartai ekei ouk ekhei* with Sedley in place of *all' ephthartai kai ouk ekhei* with MSS, Heylbut.

303. A lacuna is indicated in the MSS. My supplement takes its inspiration from Sedley, but differs slightly from the one he proposed; I suggest something like *<hekateron kakion pôs horômen gar k'an to thêrion dokêi>*.

304. The supplement is Heylbut's, from the text of Aristotle; the MSS do not indicate a lacuna.

305. Adopting Diels' supplement.

306. Filling the lacuna indicated in the MSS with e.g. *ho akratês tous ponous pheugôn diôkei*.

307. Adopting as simplest Heylbut's suggestion in the app. crit.: *ouk anankaiai de hai hyperbolai, homoiôs* etc., which depends on Diels' addition of *hai* before the first *anankaiai*. Other solutions are possible, but the general sense is clear.

308. There are two lacunas indicated in the MSS; the translation supposes, exempli gratia, the supplements *<phusin. khrê gar>* and *<ou mên>*; again, other emendations are possible.

309. Lacuna indicated in MSS; I supply, e.g. *<homoiôs>*. Sedley believes the text gives satisfactory sense as it stands. I also, with Sedley, omit Diels' addition of *tas* in line 13.

310. Fragment 5b Snell.

311. Heylbut's emendation for the MSS 'pleasures', which Sedley would keep on the grounds that it is a plausible inference from Aristotle's text; but Aspasius' next sentence surely requires 'hurts' here.

312. FHSG understand *hôs* here to mean 'overcome by pleasures as the majority are', and since Aristotle says that what is reprehensible is rather to be bested by those the majority can withstand, they believe the passage to be corrupt, unless *hoi polloi* here means 'ordinary people'. But that is not how Aspasius has been using the term. My translation makes sense of the sentence without doing violence to the grammar.

313. A musician in the court of Alexander.

314. Lacuna in MSS; supplying, e.g. *ei tis tôn lupôn hêttatai hôn* (Sedley).

315. Lacuna in MSS; supplying *ê tôn*.

316. Heylbut supplies *tên*, but suspects that one should perhaps read *ton noson*, 'on account of illness', with Aristotle instead of *tou topou*, 'of the region', with the MSS of Aspasius. Sedley objects to *phusin* taking the definite article in the second occurrence but not the first, but in fact the term occurs only once, being replaced by *tên* the second time: there is nothing objectionable in this construction.

317. Adopting Sedley's supplements for the two lacunae indicated in the MSS: *auto paskhein: homoiôs de and iskhuros ôn, halous*.

318. Reading *logos apagoreuôn* with Heylbut (cf. 141.3), for the MSS *logois apagoreuntai*, and inserting a comma after *endidonai*; Sedley retains *apagoreuntai* and translates, 'they are forbidden ...', etc.

319. Supplied by Heylbut.

320. Sedley suggests reading *ei g' ar'* for *ei gar*, but the MSS reading gives adequate sense (cf. 134,4), whereas the combination *ei g' ara* does not occur in Aspasius.

321. Sc. 'and so this aspect does not escape one's notice'; I retain the MSS reading *touto ge*; Heylbut, following Diels, emends to *touto gar ouk*. Sedley emends *eipe to epei*, 'since', but the text can stand as is.

322. Reading *oietai gar* with Sedley for MSS *te gar*; Heylbut, following Diels, reads *ha oietai*.

323. Adopting Sedley's punctuation with *houtoi ... propeteis* in parentheses.

324. Supplying, very tentatively, *arkhên* for the MSS *akrasian*, which is clearly wrong. Heylbut marks a crux, but proposes *eukairian* ('opportunity') in the app. crit.; Sedley suggests *phantasian*, 'appearance'.

325. Adopting Sedley's *ê* for the MSS *hoi*, retained by Heylbut.

326. Inserting *ê* with Diels.

327. Reading *poteron*, with Sedley, instead of *proteron* (MSS, Diels).

328. Reading *ê peri* (Sedley) for *êper* (MSS, Heylbut).

329. Reading *ekstatikoi* (Sedley) for *exetastikoi*, 'given to inquiry' (MSS, Heylbut).

330. The definite article could also be rendered 'its principle', but Aspasius clearly does not imagine wickedness having a principle. But why not? He resorts to the analogy with mathematics to explain why some principles must be indemonstrable, but this does not solve the problem.

331. Retaining *kai*, which is deleted by Heylbut.

332. Reading *agathês* for *agathê* (MSS, Heylbut).

333. Retaining MSS *menôn*; Heylbut emends to *monon*.

334. Aristotle has *allos d' enantios* instead of *allôs d' estin enantios*; Sedley suggests that Aspasius may have read *allôs*, which would then be a *varia lectio* at 1151a26.

335. Aristotle's text reads 'persistent and not carried away because of emotion'. Aspasius has evidently understood 'because of emotion' to apply equally to 'persistent' (conceivably the italicized words were missing in his text), and explains in what follows that 'because of emotion' is shorthand for 'because not mastered by emotion'.

336. So the MSS of Aristotle; editors transpose *mê* ('not') to precede 'false', i.e. 'one who does not persist in reason that is not false and in a choice that is right'.

337. Reading *tês* with the MSS (Heylbut emends to *tas*, taking *epithumias* as accusative plural), and assuming a lacuna (Sedley); supply e.g. *ta aitêmata kai*.

338. Sedley supplies *kath' auto men touto diôkei kai hairêitai* from Aristotle *EN* 1151b1, and takes *ho legei* with the following sentence: 'What he means may become', etc.

339. Supplying something like *oietai agathon einai*.

340. As Sedley observes, this clearly shows that *khaunos* was a *varia lectio* for *asôtos* in the MSS at 1151b7.

341. Inserting *hoi* before *idiognômones*, with the MSS of Aristotle.

342. Retaining the MSS reading *akratous*; Heylbut emends to *akrateis*.

343. Retaining the MSS *epethumei*; Heylbut emends to *epithumei*.

344. Sedley suggests inserting 'not', but it is not necessary.

345. I am inclined to emend *mêde to hêdonêi* and read, 'when reason gives in to pleasure'.

346. i.e. is not inclined to such pleasures, as Sedley notes.

347. Reading *au tais* (Sedley) for the MSS *autais*; Heylbut emends to *tais*.

348. Understanding the definite article *ho* before *phronimos*.

349. Reading *oukh hôs*, with Heylbut (Z has *oude*); cf. 1151a14.

350. Inserting *hôs* before *paskhôn* (cf. 1152a15 and previous note); but there may be some further corruption here.

351. There is no need to insert, with Sedley, *ho* before *poiei* at 141,3.

352. cf. 68,23, *proairesin meta bouleuseôs*, 75,9, etc. But Sedley is probably right to emend *bouleusin* to *boulêsin*, 'wish', since Aspasius is evidently referring to his earlier remarks at 137,24-8. The corruption to *bouleusin* will have been facilitated by *bouleusamenos* in the next sentence.

353. Reading *bouleuomenos* with Heylbut, instead of the MSS *boulomenos*, 'wishes'.

354. The lacuna is indicated by Heylbut; the supplement is *exempli gratia*.

355. Treating this clause as an affirmation, rather than a question with Heylbut.

356. Aristotle derives *makarios*, 'successful', from *khairein*, 'enjoy' (*kar-* < *khair-*); Aspasius goes one better and adds '*mala*' = 'greatly' to explain the element *ma-* in *makarios*.

357. One ought probably to insert *kai* between *tomai* and *kauseis*.

358. Aristotle's text omits the article before '*hêdonên*' = 'pleasure', and so admits of the sense, 'the same thing [or a single thing] is not good and a pleasure'. The argument on this reading seems trivial: since no one thing is both good and a pleasure, then a pleasure cannot also be good. See also the next two notes.

359. Heylbut notes a crux here (*epei mê ésti † tini tauton tini agathôi*), and offers no solution. I propose reading *epei mê ésti* <*tên hêdonên mê*> *tini tauton* [*tini*] <*einai*> *agathôi*. While I have no confidence in my emendation as such, the sense must be this, since, as the sequel makes clear, Aspasius understands the argument here to be that, according to Antisthenes, pleasure could not be the same as a particular good thing. I am inclined to believe that this is how Aristotle's text should be construed as well (see previous note).

360. Although Aspasius mentions the presence of the definite article, he – or a scribe – has introduced a second difference between the first reading and the second, namely that 'the good' (with the article) is here in the dative, while in the preceding citation it is in the accusative. Diels, according to Heylbut's app. crit., considered that the word should be in the dative both times. Aristotle's text has it in the accusative, without the article.

361. Reading <*to*> *tôi mête*, etc., though the corruption is probably deeper, e.g. <*to tên hêdonên*> [*tôi*] *mête* <*tôi*> *gen<ei> einai tôn agathôn*, etc. See also the next note.

362. Reading *genei* (dative singular with *tôi*) for Heylbut's *genê* (accusative plural), which makes no sense in the context.

363. A word is used homonymously when it names different kinds of categories of thing.

364. Aspasius seems to take Aristotle's *holôs*, which in negative clauses means 'at all', in the sense of 'in general', which it can certainly bear, and thus parses it as *katholou*.

365. Hence, since both the process and the goal are goods, and the good is their genus, both process and goal are of the same kind.

366. Reading *peripherousi* with the MSS instead of Diels' *epipherousi*, 'bring in', with Heylbut.

367. Aspasius' text reads *hai de aei, hai de ou; houtôs oude hêdonai eisi*. The MSS of Aristotle at this point read *hairetai d' ou hai d' oud' hêdonai*, which is difficult to construe, and editors have proposed various emendations. To go by Aspasius alone, one might suggest <*hai de aiei*> *hairetai*, <*hai*> *d' ou; hai d' oud' hêdonai*.

368. Reading *kathaper* (Huby), instead of *kaiper* (MSS); Heylbut emends to *hōsper*.

369. The supplement is Heylbut's.

370. Closing the parenthesis here, rather than after the following clause, with Heylbut.

371. The difference is between being able to see, i.e. not being blind, but not at the moment seeing (a habitual state), and actively seeing, as when one's eyes are open (an activity).

372. Heylbut's emendation, based on Aristotle; the MSS of Aspasius read *idiai*, 'proper', rather than *hēdeiai*, 'pleasing'.

373. i.e. not of the missing part that is being replenished.

374. Reading *autōi* with MS N (which has *autō*), rather than *autēi* (feminine) with Heylbut, for which I see no suitable antecedent.

375. Diels' supplement, reported by Heylbut in the app. crit.; Heylbut marks a *crux*.

376. The argument here is not perspicuous, and there may be a lacuna or other corruption in the text; Heylbut brackets some words to facilitate the syntax.

377. The middle portion of this sentence is hopelessly corrupt (my supplement is purely *exempli gratia*), but it is clear what the sense must have been. Heylbut prints *ta de tōn kamnontōn hēdea, hōsper kai † pros tattō, hoti hēdea (MSS éa) kai kata phusin hēdea enantia ekhei*, of which I have translated *ta de tōn kamnontōn hēdea, hōsper ... kai kata phusin hēdea enantia ekhei*; but *hoti* = 'because' makes no sense, and the emendation *hēdea* = 'pleasing' for the nonsensical *éa* of the manuscripts cannot be right. Diels (cited in the app. crit.) cleverly suggests *hōs peperī kai oxos tattei* = 'as he classifies pepper and vinegar' for the meaningless *hōsper kai † pros tattō*, but I doubt it is the right solution; my guess is that the *pros tattō* of the MSS conceals *pros ta tōn* = 'in comparison with those of ...', but beyond this it is impossible to conjecture.

378. Aspasius reads *all' energeiai kai telos* at 1153a10, and is trying to explain why Aristotle would have said here that pleasure is a goal; Douglas Hutchinson deletes *kai telos*.

379. I have inserted *hēdonai* = 'pleasures' to make sense of the argument (all restorations *do* lead to what is in accord with nature) and improve the syntax (*pasai apokatastaseis tines* is odd Greek for the subject of a sentence, as is the construction *eisin eis to kata phusin*).

380. Aristotle's argument, which Aspasius is attempting to interpret, is by no means clear. Douglas Hutchinson plausibly posits a lacuna in Aristotle's text: 'is believed to be a process <...> because it is strictly a good', since on no one's view does pleasure's being a process follow from its being a good.

381. So Heylbut, following Diels; the MSS read, 'that pleasure is not the product of any art', which is perhaps preferable.

382. Deleting *eisin* ('are') after *agathōn tinōn*, 'some goods'.

383. Aspasius is at pains to explain the relevance of the sentence, 'it has been explained in what sense all pleasures are good simply and in what sense they are not good', to the rest of the argument, and indeed the connection is opaque. Douglas Hutchinson, following a suggestion by Stephen Menn, proposes moving these words to 1153b1, where it provides a transition to a new topic.

384. Aristotle's text reads: 'animals and children [some MSS have 'children and animals'] pursue such pleasures, and the prudent man pursues painlessness in respect to these (those that are accompanied by desire and pain ...)'. Aspasius rearranges the sentence for the sake of clarity.

385. For the excesses cause pain.

386. Aristotle's text reads *kath' has ho akolastos akolastos* = 'in respect to which

the dissolute man is dissolute', i.e. is characterized as such. It is possible that Aspasius' copy read simply *kath' has ho akolastos*.

387. The final words in the lemma are taken from the penultimate sentence of Book 7 in Aristotle's text (there is some question whether the final sentence recorded in the manuscripts of Book 7 is in fact by Aristotle, and some editors delete it). The manuscripts of Aspasius give something that on the face of it is quite different: *paraplêsiôn de epi hulês* = 'but similar in the case of matter'. It is not impossible to see this as a corruption of Aristotle's *ou gar haplê oud' epieikês*. But though it is hard to see the relevance of 'similar in the case of matter' to the discussion at hand, it may nevertheless point to something now lost in the conclusion to Book 7.

388. Heylbut marks a crux, and there is clearly a lacuna here; I have supplied, e.g. *thenta hêdonên kai lupên, Aristotelês legei deonta*.

389. Supplied by Heylbut from Aristotle.

390. Heylbut marks a crux; I supply, e.g. *to lêmma* and adopt Diels' *autou* in place of *autên* (MSS, Heylbut).

391. This seems a redundant formulation, even for Aspasius, and I wonder whether the text is right; perhaps read: 'one can say that pleasure is a good thing', substituting *agathon* for *mê kakon*.

392. Aristotle makes a very abrupt transition at this point, and Aspasius evidently assumes he has another target – not Speusippus – in mind here; I do not know who these opponents of pleasure as the end might be.

393. Heylbut notes a brief lacuna in the MSS; I tentatively supply *kalên, autên tên hêdonên*, but I am not certain that I have understood Aspasius' train of thought here.

394. The Aristotelians; or else emend to *enistatai*, 'he [i.e. Aristotle] objects'.

395. Supplied by Heylbut; the MSS note a brief lacuna.

396. There seems to be a lacuna here; as a dative plural *proballousi* could theoretically depend on *gnôrimon*, but the reference is unclear, as is the sense of *mikra*. *Proballô* likely refers to opponents who pose small problems for Aristotle's view.

397. Emending *para* to *kata*; there is no contrast between those that are sick and those that are contrary to nature.

398. Reading *legei* instead of *legonta* (MSS, Heylbut); but there may be some deeper corruption.

399. *tis* is odd; perhaps read *pas tis*, 'everyone'.

400. Heylbut indicates a crux; I supply (inspired by Seel), e.g. *toutôn on oude tis hôs*, and emend the meaningless *enantioun* to *enantion*.

401. One might retain the MSS *exesti* for Heylbut's *hexesi*, and emend *huparkhei* to *huparkhein*: 'for those [habitual states] to which this cannot pertain', etc. But nothing hangs on this.

402. Adopting Heylbut's emendation of *phaulê* to *ho phaulos*, with the MSS of Aristotle.

403. Seel proposes reversing the last two clauses, but the text makes sense as it stands.

404. Adopting Seel's *apartômenoi* in place of *apatômenoi* (MSS, Heylbut), 'deceived', which is meaningless here.

405. Reading *tas d' aitiâs* (Heylbut in the app. crit.) *tautês tês apatês*, instead of the corrupt MSS reading *ap' autês*.

406. Retaining *dokousi*, bracketed by Heylbut.

407. Perhaps read *hopôsoun* for *hotioun*.

408. Reading *meta*, with Seel, instead of *mê* (MSS, Heylbut).

409. Retaining MSS *to*; Heylbut emends to *tôi*, 'by virtue of nature being active'.

410. Punctuating with a full stop rather than a comma, as in Heylbut.

411. There is evidently a lacuna here; Aspasius is explaining why the pleasure accompanying replenishment does not seem worthy to those who insist that only a state, and not a process, can be good.

412. Supplying <*dokei einai* ...>; I do not venture to supply the Greek for the rest of the lacuna, but the sense, I take it, is that Aristotle does not agree that the neutral condition is painful.

413. There is no need to emend *autois* to *autôi*, as the editors of Theophrastus suggest.

414. Heylbut indicates a crux; I supply, minimally, *kata* or perhaps *hôs*.

415. Heylbut rightly supplies *prattêi* from Aristotle.

416. However one renders *philia* into English, the translator is obliged to take a stand on the interpretation of Aristotle's argument in Books 8 and 9 of *EN*. Most often, *philia* in Aristotle is translated as 'friendship', although scholars are careful to note that the extension of *philia* is wider than friendship in the modern sense, and includes relations between kin, fellow citizens, and other associations. It is also commonly held that *philia* represents a condition of mutual obligation that need not entail feelings of affection. Taking *philia* to mean 'love' rejects the latter assumption, and more naturally accommodates the range of relations that the term designates. It does not do justice, however, to the sense of an objective relationship obtaining between two or more parties conveyed by the word 'friendship'. The phrase 'bond of affection' comes closer to expressing Aristotle's meaning, at least in certain contexts, but is awkward and not always exact; when the bond is between friends, 'friendship' renders the idea precisely. The reader is advised to keep in mind the controversial nature of the concept central to this portion of *EN*.

417. i.e. actions based on or motivated by love.

418. One might better render the term as 'justness' rather than 'justice' when it denotes a quality of character or disposition rather than a set of principles; but here I retain the traditional translation.

419. Reading *ésti* instead of *esti*.

420. Understand 'as something necessary to survival', on the assumption that Aspasius is continuing to argue that love is necessary as well as noble; perhaps, however, he means rather that love for offspring is instinctive.

421. Aspasius understands *philia* as entailing mutual affection, in accord with the description Aristotle gives at 1155b27-34, where he treats *philia* as a bond between friends. Aristotle does not consistently use *philia* in this specific sense, however, and his flexible usage, characteristic of classical Greek, has created puzzles – needless ones, in my judgement – for Aspasius and many commentators since.

422. i.e. the actualization of a disposition to love.

423. i.e. a single name applied to different kinds of thing. On Aspasius' technical discussion, which depends on *Categories* 1 and other passages in Aristotle's works (e.g. *Eudemian Ethics* 7.1-2), see Enrico Berti, 'Amicizia e "Focal Meaning"', in Alberti-Sharples, 176-90.

424. i.e. the name under which they are grouped applies to one kind of thing.

425. What is more sweet or less sweet is sweet in the same sense of the term.

426. Aspasius is probably inferring from this reference in Aristotle that books of *EN* have been lost, and is not referring specifically to those books of *EN* incorporated in *EE*; see Francesco Becchi, 'Aspasio, commentatore di Aristotele', in W. Haase, ed., *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* II.36.7 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994), 5365-96, esp. 5368-9. But see Barnes, 'An Introduction to Aspasius', in Alberti-Sharples, 19-21.

427. i.e. he has included the genus or general term in the number of species or particulars.

428. Reading *haplôs* to instead of *to haplôs*.

429. Heylbut in app. crit. remarks that 'the sequence of sentences is disturbed', but the sense is reasonably clear: Aspasius has chosen to insert here, as in the following paragraph, a discussion of the simply pleasant corresponding to that of the simply good.

430. I suspect that *agatha* has fallen out here.

431. Inserting *to de tini* before *agathon*, and deleting as senseless (*to de spanion*) = 'which is rare'; cf. the following account of the pleasant. *To de spanion* is probably an expansion of a copyist's note meaning 'to de is missing'; Aristotle's remark about the rareness of such love at 1156b24 (see below 167,34) no doubt facilitated its intrusion into the text.

432. Reading *taúta* = *ta auta*, which makes sense of the following *gar*, instead of Heylbut's *tauta* = 'these things' or 'the following'.

433. Aspasius does not mention what seems pleasant because (I presume) in the case of the pleasant, as opposed to the good, what is pleasant for someone is the same as what seems pleasant to someone.

434. i.e. *philia* of the kind that obtains between *philoî* or 'friends', as Aristotle describes it; Aspasius here as elsewhere takes this to be the only sense of the term.

435. Homonymy presupposes that the same name is applied to different things or notions, each of which has its own definition.

436. i.e. wittiness pertains to one who is pleasing.

437. 'For' (*gar*) not in Aristotle, who has *de* ('and').

438. Reading *tês erôtikês* (sc. *phílias*) here with the majority of the MSS; Heylbut reads *tois erôtikois* = 'for those who are erotic' with the Aldine edition. Aspasius knew both readings (as do we from the MSS of Aristotle), and he comments on them in turn. Which does he take up first? The MSS are scrambled and inconclusive. However, the antecedent of *tês* in line 25 and *tautês* in 26 must be *erôtikê*, which seems decisive for the precedence of this reading. In 30, furthermore, *oligoi* ('few') contrasts better with the number of *erôtikoî* than with the quality of *erôtikê*. See also the following two notes.

439. Reading *tês toutôn erôtikês* (with some MSS) instead of Heylbut's *tois toutôn erôtikois* = 'for the erotic among these'; Aspasius is here contrasting the young with the worthy or mature, not selecting out a group of the young as worthy.

440. Reading *tois erôtikois* with the Aldine edition; Heylbut reads *tês erôtikês* with the majority of the manuscripts. Barnes (in Alberti-Sharples, 43-50) discusses this crux in detail, and concludes that *tês erôtikês* should be printed throughout. What then was the difference between the two readings Aspasius distinguishes? Barnes concludes that the first reading (see above, n. 438) must have been something like *kai erôtikoî gar hoi neoi kata pathos; di' hêdonên gar to polu tês erôtikês* (p. 50), 'for the young are erotic in accord with feeling; for the greater part of the erotic is on account of pleasure'. Lacey notes that the omission of lines 25-8 in N might suggest that the ending of *erôtikê* was the same in both places.

441. Reading *tois erôtikois* with the Aldine edition, instead of Heylbut's *tês erôtikês* with the majority of the manuscripts.

442. On the omission of the useful, cf. 162,13-15.

443. Reading *homoioi* (masc.); the correct reading in Aristotle is in doubt.

444. Taking *tautêi* as adverbial.

445. Reading *homoia* (neut.).

446. Understanding *tautêi* to modify *philiâi*.

447. Some word has surely fallen out here, unless the corruption is deeper; I have supplied *pisteusantes* as a stopgap, not a textual emendation.

448. Reading *hómoia* instead of Heylbut's *homoía*, which appears to be a misprint.

449. i.e. the same thing is not likely to serve both as a drug and as an instrument, though both are medical items.

450. Reading *tôn de tou opsou* for Heylbut's *tou de tou opsou* (a misprint?).

451. Heylbut has transferred the final sentence of the lemma ('for in fact they are rather foreign') to the text proper, and reads *allotriôteron* instead of *allo-triôtera* with N and B (and the text of Aristotle). This yields the translation, 'For in fact it is rather strange that, just as there is what is just, etc'. But there is nothing at all strange in what follows.

452. The Greek terms may mean simply 'man' and 'woman'; but the parallel with the relationship between father and son, and the fact that, a little later (1161a1-3), Aristotle speaks of undue dominance on the part of heiresses (a situation that cannot obtain between, e.g. brother and sister, since a woman who had a brother would not inherit), as well as the contribution that children make to the solidarity of the bond (1162a27-30), makes it clear that both Aristotle and Aspasius are thinking of the marital relation here.

453. I take it that the 'Socratics' are Cynics, with perhaps a more specific reference to Antisthenes (cf. Barnes, in Alberti-Sharples, 29); this passage is not included in Giannantoni, presumably because it is too vague to warrant attribution. But cf. Plutarch *Virtues of Women* 242F: 'the virtue of a man and a woman is one and the same'; as an Academic, Plutarch perhaps counted for Aspasius as a Socratic. As Barnes notes (ibid., 29-30), the Stoicizing philosopher Musonius Rufus maintained that girls should be educated like boys; however, he does not pose the issue in terms of kinds of virtue.

454. Or 'A father and son too may become worthy friends', etc.

455. Reading *gunaiki de <kai> andri amphoterois esti philian einai*, instead of Heylbut's *gunaika de <kai> andra amphoteros estis philous einai*, 'it is possible that a wife and husband both be friends' (followed in FHSG, p. 354). The MSS are perturbed here: R reads *gunaikes d' andria amphoterois esti philia einai* (*amphoterois* not reported in Heylbut's app. crit.); N reads *gunaika d' andri amphot-? estin philian einai*. In Heylbut's text, *amphoteros* ('both') is pointless. I expect that Eudemus and Theophrastus did not speak of a husband and wife as *philoî* ('friends'), but rather as having *philia* ('love') for one another.

456. cf. *Politics* 5, 1301b29; 6, 1317b4.

457. Aspasius understands *philia* in the restricted sense in which it pertains to the relationship between *philoî* and must be reciprocal.

458. Heylbut indicates a lacuna here; the commentary on 1159a35-1159b19 is missing.

459. Euripides fr. 898.7 (*incerta fabula*) Kannicht.

460. The lemma is missing in the Greek MSS; it is supplied from the Latin versions.

461. Reading *koinônia* instead of *philia* (MSS, Heylbut); a comment by Lacey alerted me to the problem here.

462. Preserving the MSS *stratiôtai*; Heylbut emends to *sustratiôtai*, 'fellow-soldiers'.

463. Reading *autois* with the MSS; Heylbut emends to *tois autois*, 'the same people'.

464. i.e. those who are the more loved or dearer; for discussion of the passage in Aristotle, see D. Konstan, 'Greek Friendship', *American Journal of Philology* 117 (1996), 71-94.

465. Heylbut indicates a lacuna; the commentary on 1160a9-33 has fallen out.

466. A lacuna precedes; the text resumes with the commentary on 1161b12.

467. Adopting Heylbut's emendation *arkhontôn*, following the text of Aristotle, for MSS *anthrôpôn*, 'human beings'.

468. Heylbut indicates a lacuna in the commentary (unnecessarily, in my judgement), corresponding to Aristotle's mention of the change from timocracy to democracy (1161b16-17).

469. At 1160a35 Aristotle remarked that the third type of government, after monarchy and aristocracy, is popularly called simply 'government'; Aspasius' comment on this passage has fallen out in the preceding lacuna. Aspasius may have misunderstood Aristotle's statement at 1160b21-2, 'for the form of the government (*politeia*) deviates a small amount', taking *politeia* here to mean 'democracy'.

470. sc. from its better counterpart, the timocracy.

471. Heylbut indicates an extended lacuna here, unnecessarily in my judgement; Aspasius skips to 1161a10, passing over Aristotle's extended analogy between forms of government and relationships in the household.

472. Emending *kai basileôn* ('and of kings') to *tês tôn basileôn*; cf. 182,22-6 below.

473. Supplying *huperekhei*; cf. 182,15 above.

474. i.e. great grandparents, etc.

475. This paragraph, bracketed by Heylbut, is out of place and seems to duplicate, although with different nuances, the material at 182,9-18, commenting on 1161a19-25.

476. Or perhaps, 'well-acquainted' (*sunêtheis*).

477. Omitting Heylbut's supplement *hêkista*, which gives: 'the just is least in these'. Aristotle (1161b9-10) acknowledges that there may be a small amount of the just in tyrannies.

478. Aspasius has reversed Aristotle's analogy here; but see below.

479. Omitting Heylbut's supplement, *all'ou philousin*, 'but they do not love them'.

480. It is perhaps preferable to read *hautôn* ('their own') for *autôn* ('their'), though Greek usage is loose in this respect.

481. A lacuna has swallowed the beginning of the sentence.

482. The meaning here is not perspicuous, and what is more Aspasius has reversed the use of *oikeios* in Aristotle (1161b22-3), who says that 'a thing that comes from a person [i.e. the child] is his own (*oikeion*) to the one from whom it comes [i.e. the father]'; I suspect that Aspasius has simply been careless.

483. Omitting *alla tên pros allêlous homoiotêta*, which Heylbut brackets as redundant.

484. LSJ wrongly gives the meaning 'second cousins' for *disekgonos* on the basis of this passage.

485. Aristotle's phrasing is obscure, and Aspasius is not any clearer; he perhaps means 'similar to the relationship in question', but I now incline to think that he means 'similar to one another'.

486. Reading *epei d' <ei>*.

487. The anacoluthon is Aspasius'.

488. Reading *dôiên* (Mercken) rather than *dôiê* (MSS, Heylbut).

489. In the discussion of commercial exchange, Aristotle seems to strain the idea of love or friendship, but he is thinking of compacts made between private individuals in which an element of good will or affection is indispensable.

490. Reading *didonta* instead of *deonta* (MSS, Heylbut), 'the one who owes', which makes no sense in the context; Aristotle says simply that 'one must not make an involuntary friend' (1163a2-3).

491. Reading *timan* as corrected in MS B and endorsed by Heylbut in the app. crit., instead of *timasthai*, 'be honoured', which Heylbut retains in the text.

492. These words are probably a copyist's error, unless Aspasius had grown especially careless at this point.

493. Either *poiêsas* or *dedrake* is redundant.

494. The corresponding phrase in Aristotle is often taken to mean ‘assisting [his father] will be avoided or at least not striven for by the son, since he is wicked’; I think this gets it wrong, and that Aspasius understood Aristotle’s words in the sense I have given.

English-Greek Glossary

ability: *dunamis*
absolutely: *haplôs*
abuse (n.): *hubris*
accept: *apodekhomai*
accident: *sumbebêkos*
accomplish: *ergazomai*
account: *logos*
accusation: *aitia*
accustom: *ethizô*
acquaintance: *sunêtheia*
acquire: *lambanô*
act (n.): *ergon*
act (v.): *poieô*
action: *pragma, praxis*
activate: *energeô*
activating: *energêtikos*
active, be: *energeô*
actively: *energeian, kata*
activity: *energeia, energêma*
adapt oneself: *oikeioomai*
add: *epipherô, prostithêmi*
adduce: *epipherô*
adept: *deinos*
admirer: *zêlôtês*
adornment: *kosmos*
advantageous, be: *sumpherô*
affected, be: *paskhô*
affliction: *pathos*
afraid, be: *phobeimai*
aim at: *ephiemai*
alienation: *allotriôsis*
alteration: *alloiôsis*
amateur: *idiôtês*
ambitious: *philotimos*
analogous: *analogos*
analysis: *analysis*
anger: *orgê*
angerless: *aorgêtos*
angerlessness: *aorgêsia*
angry, be: *orgizomai*
animate (adj.): *empsukhos*
animating: *psukhikos*
antithetical: *enantios*
Aphrodite, business of: *aphrodisia*
apparent: *phainomenos, phaneros*
appear: *phainomai*

appearance: *phantasia*
appetite, have: *epithumeô*
appetite, object of: *epithumêma*
appetite: *epithumia*
appetitive, be: *epithumeô*
appetitive: *epithumêtikos*
appropriate, be: *prosêkô*
appropriate: *oikeios*
aptitude: *epitêdeiotês*
architectonic: *arkhitektonikos*
argue: *epikheireô*
argument: *enkheirêsis, epikheirêma, hupotesis, logos*
arise: *gignomai*
arrogant: *hubristês*
art, of: *tekhnikos*
art: *tekhne*
artisanal: *banausos*
associate (v.): *sunoikeioô*
association: *koinôsis*
assume: *hupotithemai, tithemai*
assumption: *hypothesis*
athletic contest: *agônia*
attraction: *oikeiôsis*
attribute (n.): *sumbebêkos*
attribute (v.): *aponemô, nemô, prostithêmi, anapherô*
authority, having: *kurios*
authority: *arkhê, axiôma*
average: *mesos*
aversion: *phugê*
avoidance: *phugê*
aware, be: *ennoeô*

bad action: *duspraxia*
bad: *kakos, phaulos*
balanced: *summetros*
base: *phaulos*
baseness: *phaulotês*
be: *huparkhô*
beauty: *kallos*
become: *gignomai*
beginning: *arkhê*
being: *einai, to*
belief (popular): *endoxon*
belief: *doxa*

belief-based: *doxastikos*
 believe: *dokeô, doxazô*
 benefaction: *euergesia*
 benefactor: *euergetês*
 beneficial: *ôphelimos*
 benefit (n.): *ôpheleia, ophelos*
 benefit (v.): *ôpheleô*
 bid: *prostattô*
 blame: *psogos*
 blameable: *epipsogos*
 blameworthy: *psektos*
 blessed, deem: *makarizô*
 blessed: *makarios*
 boast: *alazoneuomai*
 boaster: *alazôn*
 boastful: *alazonikos*
 boastfulness: *alazoneia*
 bodily: *sômatikos*
 body: *sôma*
 boorish: *agroikos*
 boorishness: *agriotês, agroikia*
 buffoon: *bômolokhos*
 buffoonery: *bômolokhia*
 business: *khreia*
 calamity: *sumphora*
 capacity: *dunamis*
 care: *epimeleia*
 carried away, be: *existamai*
 carried away, easily: *ekstatikos*
 category: *katêgoria*
 causative : *aitios*
 cause (n.): *aitia, aition, arkhê*
 caution: *eulabeia*
 chance: *tukhê*
 change (n.): *kinêsis, metabolê*
 change of heart: *metanoia*
 changeless: *akinêtos*
 changelessness: *akinêsia*
 character, like in: *sunêthês*
 character, similar in: *homoêthês*
 character: *êthos, tropos*
 character-based: *êthikos*
 characteristic of, be: *huparkhô*
 characteristic: *oikeios*
 charm: *kharis*
 chastise: *kolazô*
 cherish: *stergô*
 choice: *hairesis, proairesis*
 choice-based: *proairetikos*
 choiceworthy: *hairetos*
 choose: *haireô, haireomai, proaireomai*
 chooseable: *hairetos, proairetos*
 citizen: *politês*
 civic: *politikos*
 classify: *tattô*
 clever: *deinos*
 cleverness: *epidexiotês*
 coin: *nomisma*

coming to be: *genesis*
 command (n.): *prostaxis*
 command (v.): *prostattô*
 commercial: *agoraios*
 commodity: *khrema*
 common: *koinos*
 commonality: *koinônia*
 commonwealth: *to koinon*
 communal: *koinikos, koinônêtikos*
 communication: *koinônia*
 community: *koinônia*
 company: *sunousia*
 comparable: *sunkritos*
 compare: *sumballô*
 compel: *anankazô*
 compete: *agônizomai*
 competition: *agônia*
 complete (adj.): *entelês, teleios*
 complete (v.): *teleioô*
 compound (adj.): *sunthetos*
 compulsion: *anankê*
 comrade: *hetairos*
 comradely: *hetairikos*
 conceit: *khaunotês*
 conceive: *epinoeô*
 concern: *epimeleia*
 concerned, be: *epimeleomai*
 conclude: *sumperainomai*
 conclusion: *sumperasma*
 conclusional: *sumperasmatikos*
 concord, be in: *homonoieô*
 concord: *homonoia*
 condition: *katastasis*
 confidence (feeling of): *tharros*
 confidence: *tharsos*
 confident, feel: *tharreô*
 confident: *eutharsês, tharraleos*
 confirm: *pistoô*
 confirmation: *pistis*
 confuse: *tarattô*
 conscious of, be: *sunoida*
 consider: *episkopeô, noeô, skopeô, theôreô*
 constituted, be (by nature, naturally):
 pephuka
 constituted, be: *sunistamai*
 constitution: *politeia*
 contemplate: *theôreô*
 contemplation, object of: *theôrêma*
 contemplation: *theôria*
 contemplative: *theôrêtikos*
 contest: *agôn, agônia*
 contrariety: *enantioîsis, enantiotês*
 contrary, be: *enantioomai*
 contrary: *enantios*
 contrast (n.): *enantioîsis*
 contrast (v.): *antitithêmi*
 control, be out of: *akrateuomai*
 control, lack of: *akrasia*
 controversy: *amphisbêtêsis*

conversation: *homilia*
 converse: *homileô*
 co-responsible: *sunaitios*
 correct (v.): *epanorthoô*, *katorthoô*
 correct, be: *katorthoô*
 correction: *epanorthôsis*
 couple (v.): *sunduazô*, *suzeugô*
 courage: *andreia*
 courageous: *andreios*
 coward: *deilos*
 coward-rash: *thrasudeilos*
 craft: *tekhnê*
 craftsman: *tekhnitês*
 cross-divide: *antidiaireô*
 cunning: *deinos*
 custom: *ethos*

 daring (adj.): *tolmêros*, *tolmêtikos*
 dear: *philos*
 debatable: *amphisbêtêsimos*
 debate: *amphisbêtêsis*
 debt: *ophlêma*
 decent: *epieikês*
 decide on: *gignôskô*
 decision: *gnômê*
 decisive: *kurios*
 deed, do a: *draô*
 deficiency: *elleipsis*
 deficient, be: *elleipô*
 define: *aphorizô*, *apodidômi*, *diorizô*,
 horizô, *horizomai*
 definition, give a: *dialambanô*
 definition: *horismos*, *horos*, *logos*
 deliberable: *bouleutos*
 deliberate (v.): *bouleuomai*
 deliberation: *boulê*, *bouleusis*
 deliberative: *bouleutikos*
 delight in: *khairô*
 demonstrable: *apodeiktikos*
 demonstrate: *apodeiknumi*
 demonstration: *apodeixis*, *deixis*
 demonstrative: *apodeiktikos*
 deprive: *stereô*
 desert: *axia*
 desiderative: *orektikos*
 desirable: *orektos*
 desire (n.): *epithumia*, *orexis*
 desire (v.): *epithumeô*, *oregomai*, *potheô*
 desiring: *orektikos*
 determine: *diorizô*, *haireô*, *horizô*
 deviate: *parabainô*, *parekbainô*
 deviation: *parabasis*, *parekbasis*
 differ: *diapherô*
 difference: *diaphora*
 differentia: *diairesis*
 differentiate: *diaireomai*, *diapherô*
 difficult: *aporos*
 diffidence: *mikropsukhia*
 diffident: *mikropsukhos*

dignity: *semnotês*
 dilemma: *aporêma*
 disability: *adunamia*
 disabled: *adunatos*
 disagree: *amphisbêteô*
 discern: *diagignôskô*
 discipline (n.): *mathêma*
 discomfort: *ponos*
 discriminate: *diakrinô*
 dishonour (n.): *atimia*
 dishonour (v.): *atimazô*
 disjoin: *diazeugnumi*
 dispensation: *moira*
 display: *apodidômi*, *protithêmi*
 dispose: *diatithêmi*
 disposed, be: *diakeimai*
 disposition: *diathesis*
 dispute (n.): *amphisbêtêsis*
 dispute (v.): *amphisbêteô*
 dissimilarity: *anomoiotês*
 dissolute, be or act: *akolastainô*
 dissolute: *akolastos*
 dissoluteness: *akolasia*, *akolastotês*
 distance: *diastasis*
 distinction, make a: *diaireô*
 distinction: *diorismos*
 distinctions, draw: *diorizô*
 distinguish: *aphorizô*, *diaireomai*,
 horizomai
 distribute: *nemô*
 distributive: *aponemêtikos*
 divide: *diaireô*
 divine (adj.): *daimonios*, *theios*
 divinity: *daimôn*
 division: *diairesis*
 do: *poieô*, *prattô*
 dyad: *duas*

 eagerness: *spoudê*
 effective: *drastikos*
 elation: *diakhusis*
 embolden: *thrasunô*
 emotion, feel for: *prospaskhê*
 emotion: *pathos*
 emotional: *pathêtikos*
 emotive: *pathêtikos*
 emulate: *zêloô*
 emulation: *zêlos*
 enactive: *praktikos*
 end: *telos*
 endurance: *hupomonê*
 enjoy: *khairô*
 enjoyment: *apolausis*
 ensouled: *empsychos*
 envious: *phthoneros*
 envy (n.): *phthonos*
 envy (v.): *phthoneô*
 equal: *isos*
 equality: *isotês*

- equilibrium: *summetria*
 equip: *paraskeuazô*
 equipment: *paraskeuê*
 equivocal: *homônumos*
 erotic: *erôtikos*
 err: *hamartanô*
 error, in: *hamartêtikos*
 error: *hamartia*
 essence: *ousia, to ti ên einai*
 eternal: *aidios*
 ethical: *êthikos*
 ethics: *êthê*
 evaluable: *timêtos*
 evidence: *tekmêrion*
 evident: *phaneros*
 evil (adj.): *kakos, ponêros*
 evil (n.): *kakia*
 evil, do: *kakourgeô*
 exact: *akribês*
 examine: *elenkhô, exetazô*
 example: *paradeigma*
 exceed: *hyperballô*
 excellence: *aretê*
 excellent: *spoudaios*
 excess: *hyperbolê, hyperokhê*
 excessive, be: *hyperballô*
 exchange (n.): *antapodosis*
 exchange mutually: *antapodidômi*
 exert: *poneô*
 exertion: *ponos*
 exist: *huparkhô*
 existence: *huparxis*
 experience: *empeiria*
 experienced: *empeiros*
 explanation: *exêgêsis*
 extreme (adj.): *akros*
 extreme (n.): *akrotês*
- fake modest: *baukopanourgos*
 fakery: *panourgia*
 fall short: *endeô*
 fallacious: *pseudês*
 fallacy: *pseudos*
 false: *pseudês*
 falsehood: *pseudos*
 falsely, speak: *pseudomai*
 familiar: *gnôrimos, sunêthês*
 fare ill: *kakoprageô*
 fault (n.): *hamartêma*
 fault, at: *hamartêtikos*
 fear (n.): *deos, phobos*
 fear (v.): *phobeimai*
 fearless: *adeês, aphobos*
 fearlessness: *aphobia*
 feel mutually: *antipaskhô*
 feel similarly: *homoiopatheô*
 feel: *paskhô*
 fierceness: *agriotês*
 final: *teleios*
- find out: *elenkhô*
 fine: *khrestos*
 fitness: *epitêdeiotês*
 fitting, be: *prepô*
 flatterer: *kolax*
 force (n.): *bia, dunamis*
 force (v.): *biazô*
 force, by: *biaios*
 forcible: *biastikos*
 foreign: *allotrios*
 forgiving: *sungnômonikos*
 form (n.): *eidos, idea, morphê*
 formation: *sustasis*
 forthright: *authekastos*
 fortunate, be: *eutukheô*
 fortune: *tukhê*
 free: *eleutherios, eleutheros*
 frenzy: *ekstasis*
 friend: *philos*
 friendless: *aphilos*
 friendlessness: *aphilia*
 friendliness: *philia*
 friendly: *philos*
 friends, lack of: *aphilia*
 friendship: *philia*
 frightening: *phoberos*
 fulfilled: *teleios*
 fulfilment: *teleiôsis*
 function: *ergon*
 fundamental: *anankaaios*
- game: *paidia*
 general, in: *katholou*
 general: *katholikos*
 generic: *genikos*
 genesis: *genesis*
 genus, of like: *homogenês*
 give: *antapodidômi, didômi*
 goal: *telos*
 god: *theos*
 good action: *eupraxia*
 good fortune: *eutukhêma, eutukhia*
 good in itself: *autoagathon*
 good luck: *eutukhia*
 good nature: *euphuia*
 good will, feel: *eunoê*
 good will, having: *eunous*
 good will: *eunoia*
 good: *agathos, spoudaios*
 govern: *arkhê*
 government: *politeia*
 gracious: *khariais*
 grand: *megalopsukhos*
 grandeur: *megalopsukhia*
 grandly, think: *megalophroneô*
 grant (v.): *apodidômi, aponemô, nemô*
 grateful: *eukharistos*
 gratification: *apolausis*
 gratify: *areskô*

gratitude: *kharis*
 greatness of soul: *megalopsukhia*
 grief: *algêdôn*

habit: *ethos*
 habitual state: *hexis*
 habituate: *ethizô*
 habituation, acquirable by: *ethistos*
 habituation: *ethismos*
 handsome: *kalos*
 happiness: *eudaimonia*
 happy, be: *eudaimoneô*
 happy, deem: *eudaimonizô*
 happy: *eudaimôn*
 help (v.): *ôpheleô*
 helpful: *ôphelêtikos*
 high-strung: *melankholikos*
 high-tempered: *megalothumos*, *thumikos*,
thumoeidês

hinder: *kôluô*
 homonymous, be: *homônuneô*
 homonymous: *homônumos*
 homonymy: *homônumia*
 honour (n.): *timê*
 honour (v.): *timaô*
 honour, dislike of: *aphilotimia*
 honour, love of: *philotimia*
 honour, unloving of: *aphilotimos*
 honourable: *timios*
 honoured: *timêtos*
 honour-loving: *philotimos*
 hospitality-based: *xenikos*
 human being: *anthrôpos*
 human: *anthrôpikos*, *anthrôpinos*
 humility: *tapeinotês*
 hurried: *speustikos*
 hurry: *speudô*
 hypersexual: *aphrodisiastikos*
 hypothesis: *hupothesis*
 hypothetical: *hupothetikos*

idea: *ennoia*, *logos*
 ideal form: *idea*
 identify: *horizomai*
 ignoble: *agennês*
 ill repute: *adoxia*
 illiberal: *aneleutheros*
 illiberality: *aneleutheria*
 imagine: *phantazomai*
 imitate: *mimeomai*
 impassive: *apathês*
 impede: *empodizô*
 impeding: *empodistikos*
 impetuosity: *propeteia*
 impetuous: *propetês*
 important: *proêgoumenos*
 impossible: *adunatos*
 impression: *phantasia*
 impulse: *aphormê*, *hormê*

impulsive: *hormêtikos*, *oxus*
 impulsiveness: *oxutês*
 inalterable: *ametastatos*
 inanimate: *apsukhos*
 incapable: *adunatos*
 incidental(ly): *sumbebêkos*, *kata*
 incomplete: *atelês*
 indefinite, be: *aoristeô*
 indefinite: *aoristos*
 indeterminable: *adioristos*
 indicate: *sêmainô*
 indication: *tekmêrion*
 indignation: *nemesis*
 individual: *idios*
 induction: *apagôgê*, *epagôgê*
 infer: *epipherô*, *sunagô*
 ingratiating: *areskos*
 innuendo: *huponoia*
 inquire: *episkopeô*, *zêteô*
 inquiry: *skepsis*, *zêtêsis*
 insatiable: *aplêstos*
 insensitive: *anaisthêtos*
 insensitivity: *anaisthêsia*
 inseparable: *akhôristos*
 instrument: *organon*
 insult (n.): *hubris*
 insult (v.): *hubrizô*
 intellect: *dianoia*
 intellectual: *dianoêtikos*
 intelligence (practical): *phronêsis*
 intelligence: *sunesis*
 intelligent: *phronimos*
 intensification: *epitasis*
 intensity: *sphodrotês*
 interpretation: *exêgêsis*
 introduce: *epipherô*
 investigate: *episkopeô*, *zêteô*
 investigation: *methodos*
 involuntary: *akôn*, *akousios*
 irascibility: *khalepotês*, *orgilotês*
 irascible: *orgilos*
 ironic, be: *eirôneuomai*
 ironical: *eirôn*
 irony: *eirôneia*
 irrational: *alogos*
 itself, in: *kath' hautô*

joke (with): *skôptô*
 judge: *krinô*
 judgement: *krisis*
 just: *dikaios*
 justice, do: *dikaioô*
 justice: *dikaiousunê*

kind (n.): *eidos*
 know: *epistamai*, *gignôskô*
 knowable: *noêtos*
 knowledge: *epistêmê*, *gnôsis*, *mathêma*
 known: *gnôrimos*

lack (n.): *aporia, endeia*
 law: *nomos*
 law-based: *nomikos*
 lawful: *nomimos*
 lax: *aneimenos*
 layman: *idiôtês*
 learnable: *mathêtos*
 learning, love of: *philomathia*
 learning: *mathêsis*
 less, be: *endeô*
 lesson: *mathêma*
 liar: *pseustês*
 liberal: *eleutherios*
 liberality: *eleutheriotês*
 licentious, be: *truphaô*
 life, way of life: *bios*
 like: *agapaô*
 limit: *horos, peras*
 live together: *suzô*
 lovable: *philêtos*
 love erotically: *eraô*
 love in return, feeling of: *antiphilêsis*
 love in return: *antiphileô*
 love mutually: *antiphileô*
 love, be in: *eraô*
 love, feeling of: *philêsis*
 love, passionate: *erôs*
 love: *philia*
 lover (erotic): *erastês*
 loving (adj.): *philikos*
 loving (n.): *to philein*
 luck: *tukhê*

 magnitude: *megethos*
 malicious, be: *kakourgeô*
 malicious: *kakourgos*
 mankind in itself: *autoanthrôpos*
 mankind: *anthrôpos*
 marvel (v.): *thaumazô*
 marvellous: *thaumastos*
 mathematics: *mathêmata, mathêmatika*
 matter: *hulê*
 mean: *mesos, mesotês*
 meaning: *sêmainomenon*
 measure (n.): *metron*
 measure (v.): *metreô*
 measure, lack of: *ametria*
 measure, without: *ametros*
 measured: *metrios*
 mention: *hupomnêsis*
 method: *methodos*
 middle: *mesos*
 middlingly: *mesôs*
 midpoint: *meson*
 mild: *praos*
 mildness: *praotês*
 mind (n.): *nous*
 misfortune: *dustukhêma, dustukhia, tukhê*

mode: *tropos*
 model: *paradeigma*
 moderate (adj.): *metrios*
 money: *khremata*
 money-making: *khrematistikos*
 motion: *kinêsis*
 movement: *kinêma, kinêsis*
 munificence: *megaloprepeia*
 munificent: *megaloprepês*

 name (n.): *onoma*
 name (v.): *onomazô*
 nameless: *anônimos*
 native: *sumphuês*
 natural state: *phusis*
 natural: *phusikos*
 naturally good: *euphuês*
 nature: *phusis*
 necessary: *anankaïos*
 necessity: *anankê*
 need: *khreia*
 niggardliness: *mikroprepeia*
 niggardly: *mikroprepês*
 nobility: *kalokagathia*
 noble: *gennaïos, kalos*
 non-rational: *alogos*
 notion: *ennoia, epinoia*
 number: *arithmos*
 nutritive: *threptikos*

 obsequiousness: *areskeia, therapeia*
 observe: *theôrêô*
 obstructing: *empodistikos*
 occasion: *kairos*
 occur: *gignomai*
 office: *axiôma, timê*
 opinion: *doxa*
 oppose: *antitithêmi*
 opposed, be: *antikeimai, enantioomai*
 opposed: *enantios*
 opposition: *enantiôsis*
 orderly, make: *kosmeô*
 origin: *arkhê, genesis*
 owe: *opheilô*
 own (adj.): *oikeios*

 pain: *lupê*
 pain (physical): *algêdôn*
 pain (v.): *lupeô*
 pain, feel: *lupeomai*
 painful: *lupêros*
 painless: *alupos*
 painlessness: *alupia*
 pardon (n.): *sungnômê*
 pardon (v.): *sungnômoneô*
 part (n.): *meros, morion*
 partake of: *koinôneô*
 particular: *kath' hekaston*
 partner: *koinônos*

partnership: *koinônia*
 passion (erotic): *erôs*
 passion: *pathos*
 passionate: *erôtikos*
 pay back: *apodidômi*
 perceive: *aisthanomai*
 perceptible: *aisthêtos*
 perception, keen: *euaisthêsia*
 perception: *aisthêsis*
 perceptive: *aisthêtikos*
 perfect (adj.): *teleios*
 perfect (v.): *teleiô*
 perfection: *teleiôtês*
 perform (an action): *prattô*
 perform: *ergazomai*
 persistence: *hupomonê*
 person: *anthrôpos, prosôpon*
 perturb: *tarattô*
 perturbing: *tarakhôdês*
 philosopher: *philosophos*
 physicist: *phusiologos*
 pity: *eleos*
 plan (v.): *bouleuomai*
 play (v.): *paizô*
 pleased, be: *hêdomai*
 pleasing: *hêdus*
 pleasure in others' misfortune, taking:
 epikhairekakos
 pleasure, feel: *hêdomai*
 pleasure: *hêdonê*
 pleasure-loving: *hêdonikos*
 poet: *poiêtês*
 point: *sêmeion*
 political: *politikos*
 portion: *morion*
 portray: *mimeomai*
 posit: *didômi, tithemai, tithêmi*
 possibility: *exousia*
 potentially: *kata dunamin*
 power: *dunamis, iskhus*
 practicable: *prakteon, praktos*
 practical: *praktikos*
 practice (n.): *epitêdeuma*
 practise (v.): *epitêdeuô*
 praise: *epainos*
 praiseworthy: *epainetos*
 precious: *timios*
 predicate (v.): *katêgoreô*
 premise: *protasis*
 preparation: *paraskeuê*
 prepare: *paraskeuazô*
 prevent: *kôluô*
 pride oneself: *semnunomai*
 primary: *proêgoumenos*
 principle: *arkhê*
 private: *idios*
 privation: *sterêsis*
 process, be in: *gignomai*
 process: *genesis*

produce: *ergazomai, paraskeuazô*
 product: *ergon*
 production, of: *poiêtos*
 production: *poiêsis*
 productive: *poiêtikos, praktikos*
 profligacy: *asôtia*
 profligate: *asôtos*
 proof: *marturion, paramuthia*
 proper: *deon*
 properly speaking: *kuriôs*
 property: *ousia*
 proportion: *analogia, logos, metrion, analogon*
 proportional: *analogos*
 propose: *protithemai*
 prosperity: *euêmeria*
 proud: *semnos*
 prove: *deiknumi*
 providence: *pronoia*
 prudence: *phronêsis*
 prudent: *phronimos*
 punish: *kolazô*
 purpose: *prothesis*
 pursuit: *epitêdeuma*
 puzzle, be or pose: *aporeô*
 puzzle: *aporia*
 qualifier: *prosthesis*
 quality: *poiôtês*
 quantity: *poson, posotês*
 rash: *tharraleos, tharsus, thrasus*
 rational: *logikos, logistikos*
 rationality: *logismos, logos*
 reason (why): *aitia*
 reason fallaciously: *paralogizomai*
 reason syllogistically: *sullogizomai*
 reasoning (adj.): *logistikos*
 reasoning (n.): *logismos*
 reasoning (n.): *logos*
 recall: *anamimnêskô*
 receive: *apodekhomai, lambanô*
 recognize: *gnôrizô*
 recollection: *anamnêsis*
 refer: *anagô, anapherô*
 reference: *anagôgê, anaphora*
 reflect: *dianoemai, skopeô, theôreô*
 regret (n.): *metameleia*
 regret (v.): *metamelomai*
 regret, disposed to: *metamelêtikos*
 regret, not disposed to: *ametamelêtos*
 related: *oikeios, prosêkôn*
 relation: *pros ti*
 relationship (familial): *oikeiotês*
 relationship: *skhesis*
 relative: *pros ti*
 render: *apodidômi*
 repent: *metanoëô*
 replenishment: *anaplêrôsis*

- represent: *mímeomai*
 reputation: *doxa*
 requite: *ameibomai*
 resemblance: *homoiôsis*
 resentment: *zêlotupia*
 respect: *aidôs*
 respectful, be: *aideomai*
 respectful: *aidêmôn*
 responsible: *aitios*
 restore: *epanorthôô*
 retaliate: *antapodidômi*
 return (n.): *antapodosis*
 revenge: *timôria*
 revere: *thaumazô*
 right (adj.): *katorthôtikos, orthos*
 rule (n.): *theôrêma*
 rule (v.): *arkhê*
 rulership: *arkhê*
 rush: *hormaô*
- safety: *sôtêria*
 sally forth with: *sunexormaô*
 sameness: *tautotês*
 satiety: *plêsmônê*
 science: *epistêmê*
 scientist: *phusikos*
 scoundrelly: *panourgos*
 seek: *zêteô*
 seem: *dokeô, plainomai*
 seeming: *phainomenos*
 seemingly: *epieikês*
 self-control, lacking in: *akratês*
 self-controlled: *enkratês*
 self-subsistent: *kath' hauto*
 self-sufficiency: *autarkeia*
 self-sufficient: *autarkês*
 sense: *aisthêsis*
 senseless: *aphrôn*
 senselessness: *aphrosunê*
 sensible: *phronimos*
 separable: *khôriston*
 separate (v.): *khôrizô*
 separate out: *antidiaireô*
 separation: *diastasis*
 seriousness: *spoudê*
 serve: *hupourgeô*
 service (n.): *euergesia, euergetêma, hupourgia*
 service, do a: *euergeteô, hupêreteô*
 set out: *antitithêmi*
 sex: *aphrodisia*
 shame: *aiskhunê*
 shameful: *aiskhhros*
 share (n.): *moira*
 share (v.): *koinônêô*
 show (v.): *deiknumi, epideiknumi*
 sign (n.): *sêmeion, tekμήrion*
 signify: *sêmainô*
 similar, become: *homioiô*
- similar: *homoios*
 similarity: *homoiotês*
 simply: *haplôs*
 slacken: *aniêmî*
 slackening: *anesis*
 slight: *oligôria*
 sociable: *homilêtikos*
 social: *politikos*
 socialize: *homileô*
 socializing: *homilia*
 society: *homilia*
 soft: *malakos*
 softness: *malakia*
 solution: *lusi*
 sophist: *sophistês*
 soul, of the: *psukhikos*
 soul: *psukhê*
 source: *arkhê*
 species: *eidos*
 specific: *idios, oikeios*
 speculation: *theôria*
 speech: *lexis*
 stability: *bebaiotês*
 standard: *kanôn*
 state (n.): *hexis*
 state, be in: *diakheimai*
 stipulate: *horizô*
 strange: *allotrios*
 strength: *iskhus*
 strict: *akribês*
 strictly: *kuriôs*
 strive: *speudô*
 strive after: *spoudazô*
 strive for: *epikheireô*
 structure: *sustasis*
 subject (n.): *hupokeimenon, pragma*
 subject matter: *hulê*
 substance: *ousia*
 substratum, be a: *hupokeimai*
 substratum: *hupokeimenon*
 success: *katorthôsis*
 successful, be: *katorthôô*
 suffer: *paskhê, poneô*
 suitable, be: *prepô*
 suitable: *epitêdeios*
 superiority: *hyperokhê*
 superlative: *hyperthetikos*
 supervene: *epigignomai*
 suppose: *epinoeô, hupolambanô, tithemai*
 supposition: *hupolêpsis, keimenon*
 surpass: *diapherô*
 surprising: *thaumastos*
 susceptible: *epidektikos*
 synonymous, be: *sunônumeô*
 synonymous: *sunônumos*
- take: *lambanô*
 temper (n.): *thumos*
 temper, be in a: *thumoomai*

temperate: *sôphrôn*, *sôphronikos*
 temperateness: *sôphrosunê*
 term (n.): *onoma*
 term (v.): *onomazô*
 terrible: *deinos*
 test (v.): *exetazô*
 test, put to the: *elenkhô*
 text: *lexis*
 theorem: *theôrêma*
 theoretical: *theôrêtikos*
 thesis: *thesis*
 thing: *khreîma*, *pragma*
 think about: *ennoeô*
 think prudently: *phroneô*
 think: *axioô*, *dianoomeimai*, *dokeô*, *noeô*,
phroneô
 thought: *oiêsis*
 time: *khronos*
 timocracy: *timokrateia*
 tool: *organon*
 toughness: *karteria*
 training, acquirable through: *askêtos*
 training: *askêsis*
 tranquil: *eustathês*
 tranquillity: *eustatheia*
 transgress: *parekbainô*
 transgressive: *parabatikos*
 treat (v.): *therapeuô*
 treatment (medical): *therapeia*
 true: *alêthês*, *alêthinos*
 trustworthy: *pistos*
 truth: *alêtheia*
 truthful, be: *alêtheuô*
 truthful: *alêtheutikos*
 truth-loving: *philalêthês*
 typify: *eidopoieô*

ugly: *aiskhros*
 unambitious: *aphilotimos*
 uncontrolled: *akratês*
 undemonstrated: *anapodeiktos*
 underlie: *hupokeimai*
 understand: *apodekhomai*, *epinoeô*, *phroneô*
 understandable: *gnôrimos*
 unfeeling: *apathês*
 unfit by nature: *aphuês*
 unfulfilled: *atelês*
 ungenerated: *agennêtos*
 unhappiness: *kakodaimonia*
 unhappy: *dusdaimôn*, *kakodaimôn*
 unimpeded: *anempodistos*
 universal: *katholou*, *koinos*
 universe: *kosmos*, *to pan*

unjust: *adikos*
 unlimited: *apeiron*
 unnoticed, go: *lanthanô*
 unperceptive: *anaisthêtos*
 unperturbed: *atarakhos*
 unreasonable: *alogos*
 unsociable: *aphilos*
 useful: *kkhrêsimos*
 usefulness: *khreia*, *khreîsis*
 useless: *akhreios*, *akhrêstos*
 utility: *khreia*

valuable: *timios*
 valuation: *timêma*
 value: *axia*
 vengeful: *timôrêtikos*
 vice: *kakia*
 violence, do: *biazomai*
 virtue: *aretê*
 vitality: *euexia*
 voluntary: *hekôn*, *hekousios*
 vulgar: *banausos*, *phortikos*
 vulgarity: *banausia*

want (n.): *aporia*, *khreia*
 want, be in: *aporeô*
 welcome: *apodekhomai*
 well-being: *euexia*
 wicked, be: *panourgeô*
 wicked: *mokhthêros*, *panourgos*
 wickedness: *mokhthêria*
 will (v.): *boulomai*
 willing: *hekôn*
 wisdom (contemplative): *theôria*
 wisdom: *sophia*
 wise: *sophos*
 wish (n.): *boulêsis*
 wish (v.): *boulomai*, *ethelo*, *thelô*
 wish: *ethellô*
 wished for, to be: *boulêtos*
 wishing: *boulêsis*
 wit: *eutrapelia*
 wittiness: *eutrapelia*
 witty: *eutrapelos*
 word: *logos*, *onoma*
 work (n.): *ergon*
 worth (adj.): *axios*
 worth (n.): *axia*, *axiôma*
 worthy: *spoudaios*
 wrong (n.): *adikêma*
 wrong (v.): *adikeô*
 wrong, commit a: *adikeô*
 wrong, do: *adikeô*

Greek-English Index

Note: the references cited are intended to be illustrative of the uses of the terms listed, and do not represent a complete index; where two or more occurrences of a term are clustered in a single stretch of text, usually only one instance is given. References are to page and line numbers in Heylbut.

- adeês*, fearless, 81,30
adikêma, wrong, 50,2; 62,29
adikeô, do wrong, commit a wrong, wrong, 50,12; 62,30; 76,33; 85,32
adikos, unjust, 29,32; 64,1; 102,25; 129,7
adioristos, indeterminable, 73,7
adoxia, ill repute, 81,6; 112,4
adunamia, disability, 5,25; 102,5
adunatos, incapable, disabled, impossible, 1,4; 24,5; 50,26; 69,3; 73,32; 102,5
agapaô, like, 90,33
agathos, good, 3,28; passim
agennês, ignoble, 113,23; 168,31
agennêtos, ungenerated, 71,17
agôn, contest, 25,29
agônia, athletic contest, contest, competition, 78,5; 84,22; 113,33
agônizomai, compete, 22,12; 25,30
agoraios, commercial, 173,29; 185,20
agriotês, fierceness, boorishness, 125,25; 139,31; 158,10
agroikia, boorishness, 54,34; 126,7
agroikos, boorish, 139,3
aidêmôn, respectful, 81,8
aideomai, be respectful, 55,12
aïdios, eternal, 12,6; 13,1; 69,14
aidôs, respect, 51,7; 55,11; 84,2
aiskhros, shameful, ugly, 3,23; 7,10; 21,8; 60,22; passim
aiskhunê, shame, 68,7
aisthanomai, perceive, 28,17; 32,7
aisthêsis, perception, sense, 14,4; 20,1; 39,5; 45,3; 74,20; 88,28; 127,19; 145,3
aisthêtikos, perceptive, 17,35; 145,22
aisthêtos, perceptible, 13,8; 56,28; 74,18; 120,32; 142,33; 147,14
aitia, reason (why), cause, accusation, 7,10; 10,4; passim
aition, cause, 4,4; 9,9; passim
aitios, responsible, causative, 23,3; 64,13; 72,8; 79,8; passim
akhôristos, inseparable, 145,24; 151,27
akhreios, useless, 10,11; 174,27; 186,14
akhrêstos, useless, 94,11
akinêsia, changelessness, 157,16
akinêtos, changeless, 157,15
akolasia, dissoluteness, 10,6; 21,7; 39,25; 80,3; passim
akolastainô, be dissolute, act dissolutely, 50,12; 78,8
akolastos, dissolute, 23,13; 38,1; 78,4; passim
akolastotês, dissoluteness (not in LSJ), 94,8
akôn, involuntary, 59,29; passim
akousios, involuntary, 58,3; 79,18; passim
akrasia, lack of control, 96,26; 127,4; 134,7; passim
akratês, lacking in (self-)control, uncontrolled, 8,14; 35,25; 67,26; 128,6; passim
akrateuomai, be out of control, 129,3; 135,25
akribês, exact, strict, 6,35; 40,30; passim
akros, extreme, 9,8; 50,31; 110,25; passim
akrotês, extreme, 48,29
alazôn, boaster, 54,14; 83,8; 123,31
alazoneia, boastfulness, 54,11; 122,12
alazoneuomai, boast, 123,29
alazonikos, boastful, 124,26
alêtheia, truth, 9,15; 34,16; 54,9; 112,18; passim
alêthês, true, 7,11; 28,31; passim
alêtheuô, say something true, be truthful, 28,33; 123,3
alêtheutikos, truthful, 114,9; 122,16
alêthinος, true, 51,12; 173,31
algêdôn, physical pain, grief, 23,3; 93,11; 130,22
alloiôsis, alteration, 44,31
allotrios, foreign, strange, 55,17; 83,30; 98,1; 111,3

- allotriôsis**, alienation, 44,27; 46,24
alogos, unreasonable, non-rational, irrational, 2,27; 8,8; 17,35; passim
alupia, painlessness, 143,23; 149,13
alupos, painless, 93,17; 143,21
ametamelêtos, not disposed to regret, 131,33
ametastatos, inalterable, 38,33
ametria, lack of measure, 92,35
ametros, without measure, 89,6
amphisbêteô, dispute, disagree, 9,18; 16,22; passim
amphisbêtésimos, controversial, debatable, 20,29; 66,24; 176,29
amphisbêtésis, controversy, dispute, debate, 13,21; 24,1
anagô, refer, 42,13; 46,27; 65,25
anagôgê, reference, 46,14
anaisthêsia, insensitivity, 52,26; 88,35; 140,6
anaisthêtos, insensitive, unperceptive, 53,20; 78,7; 132,3
analogia, proportion, 47,7; 175,3
analogos, analogous, proportional, 55,22; 116,11; 177,26; 182,9
analysis, analysis, 73,25
anamimnêskô, recall, 40,20
anamnêsis, recollection, 89,16
anankaïos, necessary, fundamental, 1,3; 26,16; 58,4; 98,7; 115,1; 131,19; passim
anankazô, compel, 35,33; 62,29; 84,13; 100,32
anankê, necessity, compulsion, 1,17; 5,17; 16,20; 71,25; 87,30; 110,23; 167,14
anapherô, refer, attribute, 32,35; 88,33; 164,28; 183,22
anaphora, reference, 32,26; 87,24
anaplêrôsis, replenishment, 91,9; 142,34; 157,2; passim
anapodeiktos, undemonstrated, 20,28; 136,29
andreia, courage, 7,15; 26,22; 41,13; 51,33; 99,23; 158,6
andreios, courageous, 32,24; 52,6; 80,9; 99,16; passim
aneimenos, lax, 48,8; 56,4; 77,34
aneleutheria, illiberality, 52,32; 96,5; 101,9
aneleutheros, illiberal, 42,2; 52,30; 56,3; 101,29; 175,8
anempodistos, unimpeded, 28,1; 30,33; 43,7; 147,16; passim
anesis, slackening, 50,17; 99,35; 134,1
aniêmi, slacken, leave untilled, 50,24; 115,8
anomoiotês, dissimilarity, 56,9; 175,28
anônunos, nameless, 51,35; 83,5; 92,31; 116,11; 140,2; 158,9
antapodidômi, mutually exchange, give, retaliate, 120,1; 172,33; 186,2
antapodosis, mutual exchange, return, exchange, 170,1; 186,3
anthrôpikos, human, 71,35; 92,29
anthrôpinos, human, 2,12; 5,32; 15,2; passim
anthrôpologos, talker about persons, 114,20
anthrôpos, mankind, human being, person, 5,9; 12,27; passim
antidiairêô, cross-divide, separate out, 18,3; 161,29
antikeimai, be opposed or opposite, 3,4; 45,27; 132,2
antipaskhô, feel mutually, 46,21; 163,12
antiphileô, love mutually, love in return, 159,29; 163,3; 172,24
antiphilêsis, feeling of love in return, 163,6; 165,6
antitithêmi, oppose, contrast, set out, 52,12; 62,5
aorgêsia, angerlessness, 53,6
aorgêtos, angerless, not angry, 53,7; 119,1
aoristeô, be indefinite, 74,27
aoristos, indefinite, 126,5
apagôgê, induction, 21,1
apathês, unfeeling, 158,17
apeiros, unlimited, 8,6; 13,14; 69,16; 74,20; 119,26
aphilia, friendlessness, 81,7
aphilos, friendless, unsociable, 31,7; 159,18
aphilotimia, dislike of honour, 117,19
aphilotimos, unloving of honour, unambitious, 116,26; 118,12
aphobia, fearlessness, 52,2; 83,5
aphobos, fearless, 52,6; 80,33; 87,5
aphorizô, define, 47,24
aphormê, impulse, 8,8; 38,7
aphrodisia, ta, sex, business of Aphrodite, 23,3; 52,22; 90,6; 131,30; 143,28
aphrodisiastikos, hypersexual, 90,29
aphrôn, senseless, 26,5; 113,22; 143,30
aphrosunê, senselessness, 89,5
aphuês, naturally unfit, unfit by nature, 109,29; 116,7
aplêstos, insatiable, 89,9
apodeiknumi, demonstrate, display, 20,25; 106,5; 136,29
apodeiktikos, demonstrable, demonstrative, 37,22; 40,13
apodeixis, demonstration, 3,13; 12,14; 36,5; 48,31; 152,16
apodekhomai, receive, accept, understand, welcome, 7,24; 40,21; 112,9; 171,13

- apodidōmi**, display, render, indicate,
define, give, proffer, grant, pay back,
2,24; 26,12; 39,32; 48,13; 59,15; 70,26;
95,21; 147,16; 185,11
- apolausis**, enjoyment, gratification, 89,20;
127,19; 166,10
- aponemêtikos**, distributive, 158,22
- aponemô**, attribute, grant, 110,34; 182,12
- aporêma**, dilemma, 28,27
- aporeô**, be a puzzle, pose a puzzle, be in
want, raise a question, 8,7; 25,18;
42,13; 115,6; 135,3; *passim*
- aporia**, puzzle, lack, want, 8,32; 28,7;
101,24; 119,33; *passim*
- aporos**, difficult, 51,7; 128,6
- apsukhos**, inanimate, 59,30; 92,31; 130,8;
163,5; 172,26
- areskeia**, obsequiousness, 55,4
- areskô**, gratify, 75,24; 121,31; 173,12
- areskos**, ingratiating, 55,5
- aretê**, virtue, excellence, 1,18; *passim*
- arithmos**, number, 11,22; 82,21; 178,22
- arkhê**, principle, rulership, origin,
beginning, cause, starting point, source,
authority, 7,32; 9,4; 20,13; 26,25; 32,10;
34,3; 59,13; 130,10; 175,19; 177,24
- arkhitektonikos**, architectonic,
governing, 4,28
- arkhō**, rule, govern, 75,12; 84,14; 94,5;
121,26
- askêsis**, training, 14,1; 25,24
- askêtos**, acquirable through training, 25,19
- asôtia**, profligacy, 52,31; 96,5; 104,13
- asôtos**, profligate, unsalvageable, 52,29;
96,19; 138,23
- atarakhos**, unperturbed, 86,11; 119,21
- atelês**, incomplete, unfulfilled, 8,26; 93,32;
99,35; 155,32; 167,3
- atimazô**, dishonour, 2,7; 10,20; 109,2
- atimia**, dishonour, 111,1
- autarkeia**, self-sufficiency, 16,5
- autarkês**, self-sufficient, 16,6; 72,10;
115,8; 150,21
- authekastos**, forthright [*lit.*
'everything-is-itself'], 122,18
- autoagathon**, good in itself, 13,1
- autoanthrôpos**, mankind in itself, 12,32
- axia**, desert, value, worth, 43,30; 95,15;
104,7; 110,32; 185,30
- axiôma**, worth, office, authority, 86,28;
106,30; 111,10
- axiôô**, think worth, think right, think,
5,19; 65,20; 102,15; 108,12; 115,28;
135,29; 175,26
- axios**, worth, costly, 8,17; 44,28; 55,26;
95,17; 105,26
- banausia**, vulgarity, 104,13
- banausos**, artisanal, vulgar, 104,14;
107,31; 151,4
- baukopanourgos**, fake modest, 124,20
- bebaiotês**, stability, 29,16
- bia**, force, 59,2; 71,25
- biaios**, by force, 11,12; 59,8
- biastikos**, forcible, 71,24
- biazô**, force, 60,1; 65,35; 118,29; 123,4
- bios**, way of life, life, 8,6; 16,9; 22,25;
114,16; 151,28; 174,7
- bômolokhia**, buffoonery, 54,32; 125,22
- bômolokhos**, buffoon, 125,18; 174,27
- boulê**, deliberation, 71,23
- boulêsis**, wishing, wish, 67,21; 139,31
- boulêtos**, to be wished for, 75,22
- bouleuomai**, deliberate, plan, 3,26;
134,14; *passim*
- bouleusis**, deliberation, 68,23
- bouleutikos**, deliberative, 3,25; 67,29;
75,7; 100,3
- bouleutos**, deliberable, 71,12
- boulomai**, wish, will, 28,11; 51,13; *passim*
- daimôn**, divinity, 106,14
- daimonios**, divine, 106,13; 157,11
- deiknumi**, show, prove, 16,6; 35,24;
passim
- deilos**, cowardly, coward, 41,15; 52,14; 81,5
- deinos**, clever, terrible, cunning, adept,
31,23; 43,23; 82,34; 101,24; 127,11;
140,29; 174,28
- deixis**, demonstration, 3,17; 150,20
- deon**, proper, 23,13; 36,14; 47,28; 98,35;
passim
- deos**, fear, 67,4; 81,27; 98,28
- diagignôskô**, discern, 64,14
- diaireô**, make a distinction, divide, 2,17;
33,27; 91,3; 121,16
- diaireomai**, differentiate, distinguish,
draw distinctions, 42,29; 69,22; 161,29
- diairesis**, division, differentia, 12,13;
43,13; 59,4; 149,20
- diakeimai**, be disposed, be in a state,
10,12; 75,29; 129,19; 144,29; 162,20
- diakhusis**, elation, 43,18; 46,16
- diakrinô**, discriminate, 78,34; 92,30
- dianoemomai**, reflect, think, 20,10; 148,14
- dianoêtikos**, intellectual, 36,16
- dianoia**, intellect, 71,4
- diapherô**, differ, stand out, differentiate,
make a difference, matter, surpass, 5,6;
9,26; 31,32; *passim*
- diaphora**, difference, 4,15; 31,15; 52,8;
90,16; *passim*
- diastasis**, separation, distance, 55,35;
171,7
- diathesis**, disposition, 46,21; 55,29; 82,5;
92,1; 119,13; 139,15; *passim*

- diatithēmi*, dispose, 116,16
diazeugnumi, disjoin, 174,15
dikaioō, do justice, 185,18
dikaïos, just, 1,4; 7,12; passim
dikaïosunē, justice, 2,1; 20,14; 53,27; passim
diorismos, distinction, 47,26; 82,28; 116,19
diorizō, determine, define, draw distinctions, 4,31; 64,26; 82,21
dustukhēma, misfortune, 25,11
dokeō, seem, think, believe, 2,1; 7,13; 8,30; passim
doxa, opinion, belief, view, reputation, repute, 9,14; 22,2; 26,22; 31,7; passim
doxastikos, belief-based, 40,14
doxazō, believe, have a belief, 69,28; 112,24
draō, do (a deed), 84,13; 186,25
drastikos, effective, 85,19
duas, dyad, 11,22
dunamin, kata, potentially, 18,10
dunamis, capacity, ability, power, potential, force, 3,4; 31,18; 74,10; 113,4; 124,3; passim
dusdaimōn, unhappy, 25,10
duspraxia, bad action, 28,18
dustukhia, misfortune, 16,21; 108,17

eidopoieō, typify, 87,5; 96,11; 109,15
eidos, [Platonic] form, sort, appearance, kind, species, looks, 6,29; 32,16; 43,22; 66,35; 103,11; 152,1; passim
einai, to, being, 48,33; 81,18
eirōn, ironical, 54,17; 122,26
eirōneia, irony, 54,18; 114,9
eirōneuomai, be ironic, 124,18
ekstasis, frenzy, 85,21
ekstatikos, easily carried away, 135,20
elenkhō, expose, examine, put to the test, find out, 11,17; 67,5; 85,7; 120,31
eleos, pity, 46,31; 58,7; 64,24
eleutheros, liberal, free, 42,1; 52,33; 97,11; 138,22
eleutheriotēs, liberality, 15,25; 26,21; 41,33; 87,22
eleutheros, free, 178,23
elleipō, fall short, be deficient, 41,10; 47,10; 89,10; 110,28; passim
elleipsis, deficiency, 41,18; 89,1; passim
emmethodōs, consistent with one's method, 15,3
empeiria, experience, 21,9; 37,19; 81,35
empeiros, experienced, acquainted, 84,21; 173,11
empodistikos, impeding, obstructing, 28,4; 142,1
empodizō, impede, 30,10; 46,14; 142,3
empsychos, animate, ensouled, 59,31; 75,14; 130,8

enantioomai, be opposed, contrary, 68,4; 94,12
enantios, opposed, contrary, hostile, antithetical, 13,26; 31,7; 43,11; 120,14; 138,35; passim
enantiosis, opposition, contrast, contrariety, 55,34; 93,16; 160,25
enantiotēs, contrariety, 55,31; 119,29
endeia, lack, 20,5; 41,6; 101,9; 139,14
endeō, fall short, be less, 49,19; 52,12; 145,14
endoxon, popular belief, 124,17
endoxos, generally accepted, esteemed, 21,25
energeia, activity, active doing, 3,18; passim
energeian, kata, actively, 18,11; 145,13; 170,22
energēma, activity, 39,26
energeō, be active, activate, effect, do, actively do, 6,19; 9,7; 18,7; passim
energētikos, activating, 105,12
enkheirēsis, argument, 159,13
enkrateia, self-control, 1,17; 129,10
enkratēs, self-controlled, in control, 35,25; 67,24; 130,22; passim
ennoeō, be aware, note, think about, 25,9; 88,17; 149,21
ennoia, notion, 117,15
entelēs, complete, 95,23
epagōgē, induction, 3,15; 20,23; 51,19; 143,11
epainetos, praiseworthy, to be praised, 31,2; 49,29; 81,3; 117,1; 139,8
epainos, praise, 32,33; 97,31
epanorthōō, correct, restore, make good, 24,28; 159,23; 169,1
epanorthōsis, correction, 80,1; 159,24
ephiemai, aim at, pursue, 3,31; 64,2; 84,18; 108,30; 153,8; 174,24
epideiknumi, show, 9,2; 116,1
epidektikos, susceptible, 38,15
epidexiotēs, cleverness, 125,29
epieikēs, seemly, decent, fair, 61,4; 76,19; 100,23; 113,27; 141,6; 150,14; 169,27
epignomai, supervene, 41,29; 109,18; 151,21
epikhairekakos, taking pleasure in others' misfortune, 55,16
epikheirēma, argument, 39,12; 56,6
epikheireō, argue, strive for, 39,12; 106,20; 128,14; 151,21; 181,12
epimeleia, concern, care, assiduousness, 1,20; 6,27; 26,4; 142,4; 175,6
epimeleomai, concern oneself with, be concerned about, take care, 1,17; 25,32; 63,30; 99,13; 166,23
epinoeō, understand, suppose, conceive, 52,15; 111,13; 158,14

epinoia, notion, 13,7; 108,15
epipherô, sustain, add, infer, introduce, bring on, understand, make an inference, adduce, bring out, 6,18; 12,18; 28,7; 48,27; 81,25; 90,24; 107,32; 122,28; 142,22; 173,11
epipsogos, blameable, 29,34; 54,26; 116,32; 156,8
episkopeô, inquire, consider, investigate, 14,31; 37,14; 58,4; 142,5
epistamai, know, 55,27; 77,1; 112,27; 160,2
epistêmê, science, knowledge, 1,12; 8,31; 72,28; 105,1
epitasis, intensification, 50,16; 86,18; 99,35; 148,18
epitêdeios, suitable, 8,4; 171,31
epitêdeiôtês, aptitude, fitness, 5,25; 53,12; 160,4
epitêdeuma, pursuit, practice, 19,20; 37,18; 66,16; 79,32; 110,12
epitêdeuô, practise, pursue, 2,6; 6,24; 78,20; 110,14
epithumêma, object of appetite, 89,16
epithumeô, have an appetite for, desire, be appetitive, 42,33; 66,15; 94,16
epithumêtikos, appetitive, 66,30; 94,6
epithumia, appetite, desire, 35,22; 45,5; 66,6; 127,18; 135,19; 149,26
eraô, be in love, love erotically, be passionate for, 124,9; 163,4; 173,7
erastês, erotic lover, 163,3; 168,22
ergazomai, produce, perform, work at, accomplish, 23,9; 104,15
ergon, work, job, function, product, deed, act, 1,9; 2,7; 17,22; 33,30; 39,10; 85,33; 97,29; 148,21; 157,15; 176,30
erôs, passionate love, (erotic) passion, 83,28; 114,5; 166,24
erôtikos, passionate, erotic, 166,18
êthê (pl. of *êthos*), ethics, 1,2
ethellô, wish, 29,34; 174,7; 179,15
êthikos, character-based, concerning character, ethical, 1,6; 6,32; 37,12; passim
ethismos, habituation, 21,5
ethistos, acquirable by habituation, 25,23
ethizô, habituate, accustom, 8,8; 38,1; 93,13; 141,18
êthos, character, 1,5; 8,13; 36,20; 37,8; passim
ethos, habit, custom, 10,2; 21,6; 37,8; 58,11; 101,27; 141,19
euaisthêsia, keen perception, keen senses, 26,16; 34,22; 144,18; 161,32
eudaimôn, happy, 5,17; 142,6; 171,29
eudaimoneô, be happy, 9,12; 152,7; 174,7
eudaimonia, happiness, 2,13; 136,20; 174,5

eudaimonizô, deem happy, 10,28; 124,1
euêmeria, prosperity, 16,28; 25,12
euergesia, benefaction, service, 113,6; 159,15; 186,2
euergêtêma, service, 182,10
euergeteô, do a service or services, 46,28; 98,36; 112,32; 159,17
euergêtês, benefactor, 185,13
euexia, vitality, well-being, 93,1; 144,18; 149,3
eukharistos, grateful, 113,13
eulabeia, caution, 90,21
eunoeô, feel good will, 163,13
eunoia, good will, 46,21; 163,10; 168,4
eunous, having good will, 163,12; 171,14
euphuês, naturally good, naturally fine, 79,13; 110,4; 166,22; 175,6
euphuia, good nature, 79,14
eupraxia, good action, 28,18
eustatheia, tranquillity, 143,23
eustathês, tranquil, 115,13; 143,22
eutharsês, confident, 81,13
eutrapelia, wittiness, wit, 54,31; 125,4; 174,28; 185,7
eutrapelos, witty, 45,8; 125,11; 165,17; 185,6
eutukhêma, stroke of good fortune, good fortune, 30,6; 112,11
eutukheô, be fortunate, 112,2
eutukhia, good luck, good fortune, 25,12; 112,13; 152,6
exêgêsis, interpretation, explanation, 117,24; 142,16
exetazô, examine, establish, test, 9,23; 65,20; 117,26
existamai, be carried away, be beside oneself, 93,9; 137,9
exousia, position of power, possibility, 174,18; 186,26

genesis, process, origin, genesis, coming to be, 37,10; 73,32; 142,33; 155,27
genikos, generic, 42,8; 43,6; 67,7; 74,24
gennaios, noble, gallant, 25,1; 81,37; 175,9
gignomai, become, arise, be in process, occur, 2,3; 4,21; 5,17; 20,20; passim
gignôskô, decide on, become aware, know, 3,7; 77,21; 110,14; 168,2
gnômê, decision, view, 62,12; 79,25
gnôrimos, familiar, understandable, known, 9,30; 15,4; 40,18; 73,6; 138,9; 153,16
gnôrizô, recognize, 8,1; 14,17; 57,6; 80,34
gnôsis, knowledge, 1,7; 35,5; 58,21; 86,30; 115,19; 154,15

haireô, choose, assume, determine, 80,15; 99,19
haireomai, choose, 3,7; 62,9

- hairesis*, choice, 67,1
hairetos, choiceworthy, chooseable, 4,28; 11,15; 61,10; passim
hamartanô, err, be at fault, do wrongly, go wrong, 27,4; 47,31; 77,28; 91,16; 135,31; 185,31
hamartêma, fault, 36,10; 64,10; 91,35; 135,14
hamartêtikos, at fault, in error, 52,28; 103,18
hamartia, error, 82,25; 91,33; 118,16
haplôs, simply, absolutely, 9,9; passim
hêdomai, feel pleasure, take pleasure, be pleased, 22,9; 45,11; 92,34; 140,16; passim
hêdonê, pleasure, 1,16; 14,12; passim
hêdonikos, pleasure-loving, 55,13
hêdus, pleasing, pleasurable, pleasant, 13,1; 22,6; 161,21; passim
hêi, insofar as, by virtue of which, in point of which, 1,4; passim
hekôn, voluntary, willing, 60,21; 93,6; 125,14; 141,2; passim
hekousios, voluntary, 58,3; 93,5; 129,30; passim
hetairikos, comradely, 172,2; 182,19
hetairos, comrade, 54,20; 84,26; 172,3
hexis, habitual state, state, 2,24; 41,26; 48,12; passim
homileô, socialize, converse, 121,8; 158,11
homilêtikos, sociable, 121,7
homilia, socializing, society, conversation, 54,7; 114,25; 121,6; 170,32
homoêthês, similar in character, 182,29
homoethnês, of the same species, 159,30
homogenês, of the same kind, of like genus, 143,7; 167,10
homoioô, become similar, 170,7
homoiopatheô, feel similarly, 182,29
homoiopathês, of similar feelings, 182,30
homoios, similar, like, 5,32; passim
homoïôsis, resemblance, 4,6; 99,4
homoiotês, similarity, 56,9; 83,32; 128,21; 160,19
homonoëô, be in concord, 160,6
homonoia, concord, 160,5
homônumeô, be homonymous, 43,21
homônumia, homonymy, 63,11; 85,14
homônunos, equivocal, homonymous, 35,16; 59,5; 83,2; 160,31
horismos, definition, 19,16; 43,9; passim
horistos, to be defined, 48,33
horizô, define, stipulate, determine, 20,7; 48,16; 74,28
horizomai, identify, distinguish, define, 14,11; 32,11; 59,5; 81,3; passim
hormaô, rush, 36,14; 127,10
hormê, impulse, 3,1; 36,9; 44,13; 139,31
hormêtikos, impulsive, 36,13
horos, definition, limit, term, standard, 13,6; 48,16; 59,3; 117,15; 126,7
hubris, insult, abuse, 61,24; 81,14; 127,11
hubristês, arrogant, 112,20
hubrizô, insult, 31,12; 112,23; 127,17
hulê, subject matter, matter, 6,33; 19,26; 40,21; 105,13
huparkhô, be present, exist, be, belong, be characteristic of, pertain, first begin, appertain, be due, 6,2; 23,24; 48,30; 79,2; 96,7; 105,28; 122,20; 154,12
huparxis, existence, 173,21
hyperballô, exceed, be excessive, 16,17; 24,30; 41,10; 82,16; 101,12; 129,15; 152,8
hyperbolê, excess, 20,4; 41,6; 49,17; 88,33; 108,11; 131,23; 154,12; 183,4
hupêreteô, do a service, serve, 59,21; 84,16; 113,19
hyperokhê, superiority, excess, peak, 18,23; 112,14; 176,6; 185,1
hyperthetikos, superlative, 110,30
hupokeimai, be a substratum, underlie, 6,33; 19,26
hupokeimenon, subject, substratum, 1,12; 42,17; 105,12
hupolambanô, suppose, 9,12; 25,25; 45,9; 157,14
hupolêpsis, supposition, 44,22
hupomnêsis, mention, 20,23
hupomonê, persistence, endurance, 25,25; 93,15
huponoia, innuendo, 125,34
hupothesis, argument, assumption, hypothesis, 52,34; 119,32; 173,10; 179,12
hupothetikos, hypothetical, 12,8; 18,27
hupotithemai, assume, 136,20
hupourgeô, serve, 7,18; 183,19
hupourgia, service, 176,20
idea, ideal form, form, 9,21; 101,10
idios, specific, individual, private, 3,32; 14,19; 33,3; 74,11; 90,27; 118,29
idiôtês, layman, amateur, private person, 19,19; 84,35; 101,19; 121,26
iskhus, power, strength, 26,20; 41,7; 62,21; 99,16; 115,25
isos, equal, 49,6; 56,8; 86,28; passim
isotês, equality, 158,22; 168,15; 175,4
kairos, occasion, right moment, 7,9; 12,23; 29,26; 40,26; 61,11; 110,5; 135,9
kakia, vice, evil, 3,27; 29,11; 38,21; 76,11; 102,11; 181,25
kakodaimôn, unhappy, 29,7
kakodaimonia, unhappiness, 16,21
kakoprageô, fare ill, 109,1
kakos, bad, evil, 13,12; 26,5; 28,17; passim

- kakourgeô**, be malicious, do evil, 78,3;
130,6; 144,14
- kakourgōs**, malicious, 129,31
- kallos**, beauty, 24,25; 111,22
- kalokagathia**, noble character, nobility,
19,2; 111,24
- kalos**, noble, handsome, 3,23; 7,10; 22,11;
passim
- kanôn**, standard, 76,3; 152,23
- karteria**, toughness, 83,30; 132,29
- kataskeuazô**, construct an argument,
dispose, 8,34; 104,3; 180,27
- katastasis**, condition, 93,11; 143,1; 156,12
- katégoreô**, predicate, accuse, 28,31; 59,10;
128,24; 143,15
- katégoria**, category, 11,24
- kath' hauto**, in itself, self-subsistent, as
such, in its own right, 11,25; 63,33;
passim
- kath' hekaston**, particular, 13,19; passim
- katholikos**, general, 51,22
- katholou**, in general, universal, 11,11;
39,32; 51,10; 73,12; 120,34; 155,33
- katorthoô**, be correct, correct, act
correctly, be successful, 47,34; 109,26
- katorthôsis**, success, 73,20
- katorthôtikos**, ensuring of correctness,
right, 54,4; 103,20
- keimenon**, supposition, 32,2
- khairô**, rejoice, enjoy, have enjoyment,
delight in, 23,17; 41,30; 55,17; 88,12;
116,30; 138,34; 153,11; 173,25
- khalepotês**, irascibility, 128,16
- khariais**, gracious, 110,4; 124,27; 185,13
- kharis**, gratitude, charm, 11,3; 35,4;
46,26; 174,28; 185,25
- khaunotês**, conceit, 110,7; 116,5
- khôriston**, separable, 11,12
- khôrizô**, separate, 16,8; 132,15
- khraomai**, practise, engage in, use, treat,
employ, make use of, feel, 2,3; 2,26; 3,1;
passim
- khreia**, need, usefulness, business, use,
utility, want, 9,12; 40,27; 52,35; 96,27;
105,24; 159,10; 183,22
- khrema**, thing, commodity, 64,15; 95,11;
105,16
- khremata**, money, 47,27; 52,27
- khrematistikos**, money-making, 6,9; 15,25
- khrematizô**, engage in business, bring in
items, 95,14
- khresimos**, useful, 11,3; 19,13; 87,27;
106,31; 161,21; 185,9
- khresis**, usefulness, use, 3,12; 15,25;
22,10; 69,1; 95,8
- khrestos**, fine, 136,18; 168,3
- khronos**, time, 19,5; 38,12; 81,27; 120,29;
168,1; 185,21
- kinêma**, movement, 44,24
- kinêsis**, change, motion, movement, 44,22;
59,33; 71,28; 115,9; 144,21; 172,10
- koinêtikos**, communal, 33,5
- koinon, to**, community, commonwealth,
106,14; 186,19
- koinôneô**, partake of, share, 27,13; 35,21;
67,8; 90,8; 121,8
- koinônia**, commonality, communication,
partnership, community, 53,23; 170,1;
177,20; 183,31
- koinônikos**, communal, 16,15; 23,8; 121,4;
171,28; 184,3
- koinônos**, partner, fellow, 19,9
- koinos**, universal, common, 2,20; 11,29
- koinôsis**, association, 181,1
- kolax**, flatterer, 55,6; 101,34; 158,11
- kolazô**, punish, chastise, 58,18; 76,32; 94,1
- kôluô**, hinder, prevent, 8,33; 30,25; 77,2;
87,25; 122,9; 135,4; 173,10
- kosmeô**, make orderly, 44,17
- kosmos**, universe, adornment, 30,16;
69,17; 111,19
- krinô**, judge, 7,17; 61,11; 75,10; 123,8;
168,11
- krisis**, judgement, discrimination, 23,22;
90,15
- kurios**, decisive, having authority, having
control, 6,1; 29,9; 122,21
- kuriôs**, in the proper sense, properly,
strictly, 15,18; 32,6; passim
- lambanô**, take, suppose, gain, acquire,
receive, 2,25; 12,5; 17,11; 21,6; 40,6;
68,7; 94,1; 159,5; 184,1
- lanthanô**, go unnoticed, escape notice,
9,26; 41,4; 64,31; 112,9; 163,19
- lexis**, text, speech, wording, 110,24;
115,12; 149,26
- logikos**, rational, 3,1; 18,1; 35,19; 127,14;
153,8
- logismos**, rationality, reasoning, 3,26;
66,8; 94,10; 129,22; 152,11
- logistikos**, reasoning, rational, 75,2;
172,15
- logos**, reason, idea, argument, definition,
class, discourse, reasoning, logical
status, saying, degree, description,
proportion, account, conversation,
notion, word, 2,11; 2,25; 7,25; passim
- lupê**, pain, 1,16; 30,10; 41,29; 76,7; 118,22
- lupeô**, pain, cause pain, 31,30; 121,10
- lupeomai**, feel pain, 23,4; 42,3; 63,4;
118,28
- lupêros**, painful, 23,5; 61,23; 87,13; 174,6
- lusi**, solution, 149,16; 180,12
- makarios**, blessed, blissful, 24,25; 76,21;
173,31
- makaristos**, to be deemed blessed, 33,22

- makarizô**, deem fortunate, deem blessed, 27,18
- malakia**, softness, 83,29; 133,5
- malakos**, soft, 24,24; 130,23
- marturion**, proof, 38,4; 41,8
- mathêma**, discipline, knowledge, lesson, 7,31; 66,16; 173,29
- mathêmata**, mathematics, 20,11; 73,29; 120,27; 136,27
- mathêmatika**, mathematics, 20,15
- mathêsis**, learning, 14,1; 37,23; 148,20
- mathêtos**, learnable, 25,18
- megalophroneô**, think grandly, 111,22
- megaloprepeia**, munificence, 103,1; 116,12
- megaloprepês**, munificent, 103,31; 107,4
- megalopsukhos**, grand, 108,3; 118,6
- megalopsukhia**, greatness of soul, grandeur, 30,12; 108,2; 116,14
- megalothumos**, high-tempered, 119,7
- megethos**, magnitude, 25,10; 42,19; 82,13; 103,10; 133,9
- melankholikos**, high-strung, 69,38; 134,18
- meros**, part, 5,24; 12,30; passim
- mesôs**, in an intermediate way, middlingly, in the middle, 47,20; 92,32; 119,8; 158,12
- mesos**, middle, mean, midpoint, average, 4,11; 14,24; 47,8; 82,19; 101,25; 157,2
- mesotês**, mean, 20,4; 47,20; 80,7; 116,23; 139,13
- metabolê**, change, 27,23; 44,33; 157,19; 166,17
- metameleia**, regret, 23,4; 135,1
- metamelêtikos**, disposed to regret, 131,32
- metamelomai**, regret, 63,5
- metanoëô**, repent, 63,4
- metanoia**, change of heart, 135,13
- metaphorô**, speak metaphorically, transfer, 90,29
- methodos**, method, investigation, (methodical) inquiry, 2,15; 17,20; 34,20
- metreô**, measure, 95,15
- metrion**, proportion, 12,25
- metrios**, measured, moderate, 94,12; 101,4; 113,27
- metron**, measure, 42,11; 89,4; 152,23; 186,8
- mikroprepeia**, niggardliness, 104,12
- mikroprepês**, niggardly, 105,32
- mikropsukhos**, diffident, 110,8; 116,6
- mikropsukhia**, diffidence, 115,31
- mimemomai**, represent, imitate, portray, 47,2; 83,10; 112,21; 133,2
- moira**, dispensation, share, 25,19; 79,21; 123,4
- mokkhthêria**, wickedness, 54,17; 76,23; 135,6
- mokkhthêros**, wicked, 4,1; 39,3; 52,5; 100,30; 135,16; 162,25; 186,27
- morion**, portion, part, 6,28; 17,26; 172,33; passim
- morphê**, form, 25,4
- nemesis**, indignation, 46,31; 55,22
- nemô**, attribute, grant, distribute, bestow, 33,5; 58,19; 79,34; 111,29; 121,23; 133,24; 169,25; 186,21
- noeô**, think, consider, 10,10; 52,10; 92,1; 143,27
- noêtos**, knowable, 13,9
- nomikos**, law-based, 185,16
- nomimos**, lawful, 77,9; 178,18
- nomisma**, coin, 95,15; 185,17
- nomos**, law, 7,14; 34,5; 64,12; 83,35; 178,7
- nous**, mind, sense, 21,8; 37,5; 68,29; 130,12; 153,6
- oiêsis**, thought, 153,6
- oikeioomai**, adapt oneself, 54,26
- oikeios**, appropriate, characteristic, relevant, one's own, proper, specific, own, of the household, proprietary, related, 8,5; 15,22; 33,8; 47,8; 75,30; 97,33; 133,23; 176,20
- oikeiôtis**, attraction, 44,27
- oikeiotês**, relationship, 184,27
- oligôreô**, make little of, 111,29; 148,8
- oligôria**, slight, 127,11
- onoma**, name, word, term, 3,12; 9,10; 33,28; 43,22; 63,8; 179,3
- onomazô**, term, name, 2,21; 44,28; 88,35; 108,10; 174,20
- opheilô**, owe, 186,24
- ôpheleia**, benefit, aid, 55,5; 121,32; 166,25; 175,25; 186,4
- ôpheleô**, benefit, help, 72,23; 113,17; 183,17
- ôphelêtikos**, helpful, 121,13
- ôphelimos**, beneficial, of benefit, 14,9; 32,6; 64,4; 121,18; 165,26; 186,13
- ophelos**, benefit, 14,20; 159,11
- ophlêma**, debt, 185,22
- oregomai**, desire, 3,26; 46,4; 75,11; 91,8; 116,27; 171,22
- orektikos**, desiring, desiderative, 36,2
- orektos**, desirable, 75,6
- orexis**, desire, 3,25; 43,31; 66,13; 91,21; 128,15; 172,29
- organon**, tool, instrument, 7,17; 32,15; 61,16; 74,9; 162,7; 183,17
- orgê**, anger, 42,31; 53,3; 118,17
- orgilos**, irascible, 53,11; 119,34
- orgilotês**, irascibility, 53,5; 119,11
- orgizomai**, be angry, 46,4; 53,10; 118,31
- orthos**, right, 19,30; 30,3; 72,15; 98,9; 136,14

- ousia**, substance, property, essence,
resources, 11,24; 27,11; 48,27; 93,3;
143,12; 161,12
- oxus**, impulsive, 120,4; 145,35
- oxutēs**, impulsiveness, 134,18
- paidiá**, game, playfulness, 54,30; 125,3;
134,1; 173,29
- paizō**, play, joke, 54,30; 125,11; 133,29
- pan, to**, the universe, 160,24
- panourgeō**, be wicked, 130,6
- panourgia**, fakery, 124,20
- panourgos**, wicked, scoundrelly, 98,29
- parabainō**, deviate, 54,33; 77,29; 99,26;
120,30; 138,5
- parabasis**, deviation, 49,18
- parabatikos**, transgressive, 82,26
- paradeigma**, model, example, 3,16; 14,15;
38,23; 56,18; 83,12; 107,23; 180,14
- paralogizomai**, reason fallaciously, 34,3
- paramuthia**, proof, reservation, 12,1;
150,11
- paraskeuazō**, produce, equip, fashion,
prepare, 106,30; 118,1; 156,4
- paraskeuē**, production, preparation,
equipment, arrangement, 81,30; 85,8;
156,8
- parekbainō**, transgress, deviate, 7,27;
56,26; 92,1; 123,12; 181,26
- parekbasis**, deviation, 57,6
- parepeigō**, press ahead (not in LSJ or
Lampe), 115,5
- paskhō**, be affected, suffer, feel, be done,
7,9; 58,11; 88,10; 113,2; 127,14; 140,33;
179,20; 185,13
- pathētikos**, emotive, emotional, 18,8;
35,17; 44,19; 84,3; 101,3; 118,25; 172,14
- pathos**, passion, incident, emotion,
affliction, 1,5; 8,7; 31,22; 42,22; 58,5;
80,32; 113,13; 118,21; 132,26; 166,11
- pephuka**, be constituted, be constituted by
nature, be inclined by nature, pertain
by nature, be naturally constituted, be
naturally inclined, be by nature, 10,21;
15,7; 35,15; 67,12; 158,10; 171,26
- peras**, limit, 13,14; 81,18
- periarthroō**, articulate (not in LSJ), 19,18
- phainomai**, seem, appear, be imagined,
1,20; 14,29; 30,14; passim
- phainomenos**, apparent, seeming, 21,25;
45,21; 69,35; 75,20; 146,10
- phaneros**, evident, apparent, 9,31; 32,19;
68,8; 82,14; passim
- phantasia**, impression, appearance,
35,13; 45,2; 79,7; 99,11; 127,10; 153,6
- phantazomai**, imagine, 56,2
- phaulos**, base, bad, trifling, 18,22; 32,5;
39,30; 75,23; passim
- phaulotēs**, baseness, 49,27; 130,9
- philalēthēs**, truth-loving, 114,13
- philein, to**, loving, 46,22; 54,8; 121,21;
158,8; 170,27
- philēsis**, feeling of love, 159,28; 180,2
- philētōs**, lovable, 161,18; 172,6
- philia**, love, friendship, friendliness,
46,20; 54,24; 95,19; 121,15; 158,4;
186,11
- philikos**, loving, characteristic of loving,
158,8; 170,26; 185,23
- philomathia**, love of learning, 88,9
- philos**, dear, friendly, 16,20; 31,19; 60,26;
160,15; 184,32
- philos**, friend, 16,13; 24,11; passim
- philosophos**, philosopher, 53,5; 90,21;
114,23; 141,23; 160,23
- philotimia**, love of honour, 88,9; 117,19;
179,19
- philotimos**, lover of honour, ambitious,
honour-loving, 98,28; 116,19
- philotoioutos**, such-and-such-loving,
91,22; 116,28
- phobeimai**, fear, be afraid, 41,15; 80,34
- phoberos**, frightening, 60,20; 81,2; 130,2
- phobos**, fear, 36,8; 45,24; 80,31; 102,18
- phortikos**, vulgar, 54,24; 98,13; 113,28
- phroneō**, think prudently, understand,
think, 14,12; 109,11; 143,25
- phronēsis**, prudence, (practical)
intelligence, 2,1; 20,7; 57,6; 141,27
- phronimos**, prudent, sagacious, of
practical intelligence, sensible,
intelligent, 25,4; 33,5; 48,20; 98,13;
140,22; 176,14
- phthoneō**, envy, 98,12
- phthoneros**, envious, 55,20
- phthonos**, envy, 46,31; 81,14
- phugē**, aversion, avoidance, 84,5; 130,26
- phusikos**, natural scientist, 35,1
- phusikos**, natural, concerned with nature,
by nature, 3,1; 25,33; 35,7; 53,12; 85,29;
109,28; 128,14; 143,1; 176,20
- phusiologos**, physicist, 156,13
- phusis**, nature, natural state, natural
growth, 1,9; 23,1; passim
- pistis**, confirmation, 21,25; 39,9; 76,31;
128,31; 155,5
- pistoō**, confirm, 51,25; 74,22
- pistos**, trustworthy, 74,21
- plēsmōnē**, satiety, 23,13; 91,15
- poieō**, do, act, produce, affect, 2,12; 2,28;
20,19; passim
- poiēsis**, producer, production, 2,23; 143,18
- poiētēs**, poet, 109,10; 128,31; 160,23
- poiētikos**, productive, 2,18; 73,3; 105,10
- poiētos**, to be produced, of production,
20,24
- poios**, of a certain kind, such, such a sort,
6,3; 32,22; 69,26; 130,16; 165,16

- poiôtês*, quality, 165,21; 172,10
politeia, constitution, government, state, 26,28; 74,35; 181,20
politês, citizen, 26,7; 61,27; 181,14
politikos, political, social, engaged in politics, civic, 1,2; 58,5; 83,34; 109,34; 141,22; 160,12; 184,2
polupragmoneô, busy oneself about, 38,13
poneô, exert oneself, suffer, 87,14; 133,1; 154,27
ponêros, evil, 76,21; 141,4; 161,6
ponos, hard exertion, exertion, discomfort, hurt, 12,6; 42,12; 87,11; 130,32; 142,12
poson, quantity, 104,2; 56,26; 109,29; 178,21
posotês, quantity, 100,1
potheô, desire, 160,6
pragma, action, subject, thing, 5,7; 20,10; 48,15; 56,19; 104,2; 135,30; 152,23
prakteon, practicable, to be done, 40,14; 74,28; 141,2
praktikos, productive, practical, a doer, capable of performing, enactive, effective, 2,20; 18,1; 26,27; 51,15; 80,8; 105,10; 140,26; 179,24
praktos, practicable, practicable action, matter of action, in regard to action, to be done, 15,11; 23,27; 56,22; 135,30
praos, mild, 36,19; 119,2
praotês, mildness, 53,4; 118,29
prattô, perform an action, do, 4,2; 18,11; passim
praxis, action, practice, 2,15; 15,20; 39,14; 114,4; 136,9; 153,33; 174,27
prepô, be fitting, suitable, conspicuous, 90,21; 103,10; 125,30; 182,18
proaireomai, choose, 4,3; 40,3; 67,25; 116,21
proairesis, choice, 2,16; 41,32; 64,6; 114,15; 186,9
proairetikos, choice-based, disposed to choose, 48,12; 123,14
proairetos, chooseable, 74,23
proëgoumenos, important, primary, 22,25; 52,34; 96,14; 151,11
pronoia, providence, 71,25
propeteia, impetuosity, 134,7
propetês, impetuous, 134,14; 141,18
pros ti, relation, relative, 5,20; 11,26; 32,22; 103,29; 143,13; 165,23
prosêkô, be appropriate, 2,7; 29,14; 49,19; 78,29; 176,25
prosêkôn, related, 176,2
prosôpon, person, 7,9; 40,26
prospaskhô, feel emotion for, 173,28
prostattô, bid, command, 6,3; 60,22; 127,22; 166,23; 178,7
prostaxis, command, 47,6; 176,21
prosthesis, qualifier, increase, 18,28; 80,21; 127,5
prostithêmi, add, attribute, 7,15; 16,33; 30,17; 79,7
protasis, premise, 12,4; 21,21; 127,16
prothesis, purpose, 58,3
protithemai, propose, prefer, 4,14; 18,23
protithêmi, display, 122,4
psektos, blameworthy, 49,30; 89,5; 116,31; 139,7; 154,20
pseudês, false, fallacious, 123,13; 143,15
pseudomai, speak falsely; 79,19; 123,1
pseudos, fallacy, falsehood, 54,17; 69,22; 122,17; 143,16
pseustês, liar, 123,6
psogos, blame, 29,29; 61,30; 116,30
psukhê, soul, 1,5; passim
psukhikos, animating, of the soul, 21,29; 33,30; 41,9; 76,4; 130,10
sêmainô, indicate, signify, 39,17; 62,23; 103,9; 117,11; 157,6
sêmainomenon, meaning, 38,23; 95,17
sêmeion, sign, point, 20,13; 41,28; 145,26; 160,34; 179,31
semnos, proud, 33,2; 113,29
semnotês, dignity, 113,29
semmunomai, pride oneself, take pride in, 104,21; 113,27
skepsis, inquiry, 9,10; 71,7; 108,5; 134,27
skhesis, relationship, 11,27
skopeô, consider, reflect, look to or at, 7,12; 27,5; 37,11; 50,24; 73,12; 185,35
skôptô, joke with, joke, 125,20
sôma, body, 1,15; 16,20; 44,30; 75,13; 85,3; 102,5; 125,6; 172,10
sômatikos, bodily, 1,19; 22,27; 41,9; 76,4; 88,8
sophia, wisdom, 1,9; 8,31; 22,8; 124,3; 149,4
sophistês, sophist, 54,12; 68,14; 124,10
sophos, wise, 9,19; 35,1; 98,13; 124,11
sôphrôn, temperate, 1,4; 29,31; 41,30; 80,10; 92,23; 139,70
sôphronikos, temperate, 80,9
sôphrosunê, temperateness, 1,17; 20,14; 39,24; 80,16; 129,20
sôtêria, safety, preservation, 45,7; 60,25; 80,17; 159,19
speudô, strive, hurry, 115,13; 137,2; 185,19
speustikos, hurried, 115,10
sphodrotês, intensity, 134,22; 153,15
spoudaios, excellent, worthy, good, 18,19; 54,30; 76,1; 109,7; 143,32; 165,35; 178,30
spoudastos, to be striven for, 186,29
spoudazô, strive after, make an effort, be eager for, 21,14; 106,29; 156,1
spoudê, seriousness, serious effort, eagerness, zeal, 4,8; 54,17; 108,22; 134,1; 151,5

stereô, deprive, 24,24; 115,2
sterêsis, privation, 38,18
stergô, cherish, 121,19; 165,27; 184,11
sullogizomai, reason syllogistically, 127,13; 150,27
sumballô, compare, encounter, 31,3; 59,13; 86,24; 112,11; 130,7; 155,4
sumbebêkos, accident, attribute, 12,3; 161,12
sumbebêkos, kata, incidental(ly), 80,12; 131,7; 155,30; 180,15
sumbiôsis, life in common, 163,21; 166,8
summetria, equilibrium, 1,5; 42,22; 154,22
summetron, to, balance, 20,7
summetros, balanced, 41,12; 71,19
sumperainomai, conclude, draw a conclusion, 7,1; 72,11; 177,7
sumperasma, conclusion, 12,19; 21,20; 49,6; 127,17
sumperasmatikos, conclusional, 49,3
sumpherô, be advantageous, be beneficial, 40,22; 64,5; 123,5; 165,34
sumphora, calamity, 16,12; 27,24; 55,17
sumphuês, native, 102,7
sunagô, bring together, infer, 32,2; 147,31; 172,3
sunaitios, co-responsible, 79,29
sundiêmereuô, spend the day together, 102,29; 171,22
sunduazô, couple, 101,18; 169,16; 174,26
suneimi, couple, associate, 152,21; 173,5; 175,18
sunergos, helpful, help, 19,21; 26,20; 85,18
sunesis, intelligence, 109,28
sunêtheia, acquaintance, 168,1; 173,15; 184,12
sunêthês, familiar, like in character, 121,22; 182,30
sunexormaô, sally forth along with, 68,30; 85,21; 119,20
sungnômê, pardon, 58,7; 77,10; 128,14; 135,29
sungnômoneô, pardon, 77,15
sungnômonikos, forgiving, 119,23
sunistamai, be constituted, be formed, 1,10; 37,14; 160,20; 165,14
sunkritos, comparable, 130,15
sunoida, be conscious of, 23,9; 109,8
sunoikeiô, associate, 7,8; 22,6
sunônumeô, be synonymous, 43,20; 161,3
sunônunos, synonymous, 59,32
sunousia, company, 163,21; 170,22
sunthetos, compound, 19,4; 75,10
sustasis, structure, formation, 33,11; 41,19
suzeugô, couple, 1,16
suzô, live together, 102,29; 123,20; 166,5; 174,1

tapeinotês, humility, 115,27

tarakhôdês, perturbing, 143,22
tarattô, confuse, perturb, 50,2; 70,14; 141,3; 162,6
tattô, classify, subordinate, class, rank, 43,6; 55,16; 84,15; 94,17; 108,10; 146,8; 184,13
tautotês, sameness, 184,18
tekhne, art, craft, 2,15; 14,24; 26,7; 39,7; 72,9; 100,17; 143,29; 181,2
tekhnikos, of art, 2,26; 72,32
tekhnitês, craftsman, 7,4; 104,25; 183,15
tekmêrion, indication, sign, evidence, 6,13; 54,19; 64,11; 135,24; 167,9; 171,21
teleiôô, complete, perfect, 111,19; 148,22; 155,29
teleiôs, perfectly, 110,8; 158,20
teleios, complete, fulfilled, final, perfect, developed, 4,7; 6,20; 10,16; 34,8; 70,29; 109,12; 167,1
teleiôsis, fulfilment, 147,6
teleiôtês, perfection, 4,9; 47,16; 157,16
telos, end, goal, 2,19; 14,19; 61,11; 73,19; 82,34; 118,1; 136,7; 143,7; 162,14
tharraleos, rash, confident, 82,27; 87,4
tharreô, be confident, feel confident, 28,14; 52,1; 81,15
tharros, confidence, feeling of confidence, 51,32; 80,32; 118,25
tharsos, confidence, 42,31
tharsus, rash, 82,7
thaumastikos, prone to marvel, 114,18
thaumastos, marvellous, surprising, strange, 19,23; 51,2; 92,26; 106,10; 186,19
thamazô, marvel, revere, 106,9; 112,23; 175,4
theios, divine, 1,8; 25,19; 99,4; 153,8
thelô, wish, 168,29; 179,13; 185,28
theôrêma, rule, object of contemplation, consideration, theorem, 2,19; 36,5; 64,19; 72,11; 95,5; 140,32; 156,26
theôreô, contemplate, observe, consider, reflect, 1,9; 20,33; 15,13; 33,11; 103,28; 146,24; 154,16
theôrêtikos, contemplative, theoretical, 1,3; 8,25; 28,3; 73,4; 104,30; 145,6; 157,1
theôria, contemplation, contemplative wisdom, speculation, consideration, 1,7; 29,28; 58,4; 108,5; 115,9; 141,22; 157,18
theos, god, 2,2; 30,35; 54,23; 69,4; 106,13; 157,12; 178,30
therapeia, (medical) treatment, obsequiousness, 32,17; 175,8
therapeuô, treat, 27,5
thesis, thesis, 10,29
thrasudeilos, coward-rash, 83,12
thrasunô, embolden, 82,28
thrasus, rash, 41,16; 51,34; 83,7; 138,21
threptikos, nutritive, 17,33; 35,9; 145,8

- thumikos*, high-tempered, 85,14; 128,21
thumoeidês, high-tempered, 66,30; 85,15;
 119,19
thumoomai, be in a temper, 66,15
thumos, temper, 35,22; 44,8; 58,14; 85,17;
 119,17
timaô, honour, reward with honours,
 10,20; 58,19; 138,12; 109,6; 179,20;
 186,21
timê, honour, office, 10,19; 13,28; 84,5;
 98,28; 112,20; 177,28
timêma, valuation, 181,20
timêtos, evaluable, honoured, 95,19; 112,16
timios, valuable, honourable, precious,
 1,3; 29,21; 54,3; 106,8
timokrateia, timocracy, 181,20
timôrêtikos, vengeful, 119,24
timôria, revenge, 120,2
tithemai, suppose, assume, apply, posit,
 set up, 8,26; 22,5; 29,28; 47,1; 63,8;
 117,30
tithêmi, posit, class, present, 12,5; 79,22;
 111,1; 136,31; 146,15
to ti ên einai, essence, 48,28
tolmêros, daring, 85,25
tolmêtikos, daring, 83,20
tropos, character, mode, way, 9,1; 20,30;
 35,18; 48,7; passim
truphaô, be licentious, 133,22; 174,19
tukhê, luck, chance, fortune, misfortune,
 24,5; 55,19; 67,3; 71,33; 108,18; 152,5;
 183,24
tunkhanô, get, happen along, happen to
 be, 18,20; 33,26; 54,8; 64,24; passim
xenikos, hospitality-based, 184,13
zéloô, emulate, 47,2
zêlos, emulation, 47,1
zêlôtês, admirer, 175,6
zêlotupia, resentment, 47,1
zêteô, inquire, investigate, seek, 5,33; 15,5;
 42,27; 60,16; 71,11; 126,1; 137,22;
 160,29; 178,1; 184,33
zêtêsis, inquiry, 73,28; 160,32

Index of Names and Titles

- Achilles, 109,11
 Aeschylus, 64,30; 133,10
 Ajax, 31,28
Analytics, 7,21; 20,18; 49,1; 74,3
 Anaxagoras, 156,14,16
 Andronicus, 44,21,33
 Antisthenes, 142,9
Apology, 54,23
 Argives, 86,32
 Aristotle, 2,11; 2,24; 13,10; 13,22; 24,28;
 33,27; 34,23; 35,23; 44,5; 56,6; 60,12;
 63,17; 66,25; 68,2; 75,1; 77,32; 78,19;
 98,6; 99,2; 104,26; 108,28; 109,4,20;
 110,16; 113,12; 114,10; 119,8;
 133,15,30; 139,12; 150,5; 151,22,26;
 154,20; 158,1; 163,28; 170,29; 174,6
 Aspasius, 158,1

 Boethus, 44,24

 Carcinus, 133,10
 Cercyon, 133,10

 Delos, 23,23
 Demeter, 33,1

 Endymion, 10,26
Ethics (of Theophrastus), 156,17
 Eudemus, 151,26; 178,3

 Hellenes, 53,7; 83,16
 Hesiod, 10,9
 Homer, 44,9; 74,35; 83,12

 Lacedaemonians, 72,1; 86,33,34; 124,25
Laches, 84,27
 Leon, 60,28
 Lycurgus, 24,21; 27,1

 Meno, 54,21

 Minos, 27,2

 Neoptolemus, 133,8; 139,9
Nicomachean Ethics, 151,22; 161,10

 Odysseus, 139,9
 Oedipus, 31,25; 31,28

 Pericles, 106,6
 Peripatetics, 44,20
Philoctetes (of Theodectes), 133,7
Philoctetes (of Sophocles), 139,9
Physics, 9,28
 Plato, 9,29; 27,2; 46,7; 53,4; 54,23; 84,27;
 114,23; 117,4; 119,6
 Polyclitus, 100,18
 Pythagoreans, 2,10; 13,4; 13,11; 47,35

 Satyros, 158,16
 Scythians, 72,1; 133,21
 Sicyonians, 86,32,33
 Socrates, 2,7; 14,7 (bis); 14,23; 54,18,19;
 60,27; 84,23,26,27; 124,18
 Socratics, 177,3
 Solon, 24,22; 28,11
 Sophocles, 31,27; 133,10; 139,9
 Speusippus, 150,3,19
 Stoics, 44,13,23; 45,16

 Theaetetus, 114,24
 Theodectes, 133,7
 Theophrastus, 133,13; 156,17; 178,3
 Thrasymachus, 54,21
Topics, 124,13

 Xenophantus, 133,16
 Xenophon, 24,12

 Zaleucus, 24,22
 Zeus, 10,5; 21,7; 107,6; 137,25

Subject Index

References are to the pages of this book.

- action, and mean, 48; meaning of, 4-5; not admitting of a mean, 49-50
- activity, art of, 149-50; as a good, 148-9; and habitual state, 106; and love, 171; and pleasure, 145-7, 156-7; unimpeded, 28; and virtue, 28, 42
- altruism, and love, 164-6
- ambition, as love of honour, 118-19
- Anaxagoras, on pleasure, 157
- Andronicus, on emotion, 45
- anger, extremes of as nameless, 53
- angerlessness, 53; as vice, 120-1
- animals, not dissolute, 92, 130; and pleasure, 150
- Antisthenes, on pleasure never good, 142
- apparent good, 75-6, 79-80
- appetite, vs. choice, 68; conflict between, 68; and emotion, 44-5; vs. irascibility, 129; kinds of, 92-3; natural, 92-3, 130; and pleasure, 92; and replenishment, 93; and self-control, 67-8, 128-9; vs. temper, 129; and voluntary action, 66
- arguments, kinds of, 10-11, 12
- aristocracy, 181-3; analogous to love between husband and wife, 182
- art, and activity, 149-50; hierarchy of, 6; meanings of, 4; political, 7-8
- belief, vs. choice, 69-70; about impossible things, 69; and truth, 69-70; in one's own worth, 109-12
- benefactions, and love, 185-6
- bestiality, vs. vice, 130-1
- boastfulness, kinds of, 125; vs. truthfulness, 124-5; as a vice, 54, 84
- Boethus, on emotion, 45
- boorishness, as a vice, 55; vs. wittiness, 127
- buffoonery, as a vice, 54-5; vs. wittiness, 127
- capacity, meanings of, 6-7
- chance, vs. deliberation, 72
- change, and pleasure, 158
- children, and dissoluteness, 95-6; and ethics, 9; and happiness, 28; and pleasure, 150; and reason, 9, 28
- choice, 67-76; vs. appetite, 67; vs. belief, 69-70; and character, 69; not in children, 9; definition of, 75; and deliberation, 70-1, 75; and the good, 70; meaning of, 5; about possible things, 69; and rationality, 67; and responsibility, 75; and self-control, 67-8; as a species of the voluntary, 67, 70; vs. temper, 68; vs. wishing, 68-9
- commodities, definition of, 96-7; and liberality, 96-8
- communication, virtues involving, 53-5
- community, love in, 183-4
- conceit, vs. grandeur, 111, 117
- confidence, as cause of courage, 87; as excess of courage, 51; vs. rashness, 53
- contemplation, and happiness, 9-10; and pleasure, 149, 155-6
- contracts, and love, 185-6
- control, *see* self-control; lack of, *see* lack of control
- courage, 51-2, 81-9; compatible with certain fears, 81-3; vs. cowardice, 84; definition of, 82, 84; and emotion, 86; end of, 83-4; and experience, 85-6; vs. fearlessness, 84, 88; five kinds of, 84-8; and ignorance, 88; as a mean, 84; and high hopes, 87; and noble action, 83-4; and pleasure, 88-9; political, 85; and sudden events, 87; and temper, 86-7
- cowardice, 84; as voluntary, 95
- curmudgeonliness, vs. sociability, 123
- death, happiness after, 29-33
- deficiency, and vice, 48-50; in vice, two senses of, 50-1; and virtue, 41-2
- definition, of individual things, 41
- deliberation, and the arts, 72-3; and belief, 73; vs. chance, 72; and choice, 70-1, 75; vs. inquiry, 74; about means, 73-4; vs. necessity, 71-2; vs. perception, 74-5;

- about the possible, 74; vs. scientific truth, 72-3; and self-control, 134-6
- democracy, 181-3; worst form of government, 182
- demonstration, from particulars in practical matters, 51
- desire, species of, 67
- deviation, from good government, 182-3
- diffidence, vs. *grandeur*, 111-12, 117
- dissoluteness, and animals, 92, 130; and children, 95-6; and choice, 132-3; immune to persuasion, 137; as incurable, 135; vs. lack of control, 132-3, 135-6; and pain, 94, 132-3; vs. playfulness, 134; and pleasure, 92-4, 132-3, 155; vs. temperateness, 91-2; as voluntary, 95
- education and judgement, 8-9
- emotion, and appetite, 44-5; and courage, 86; and feeling of love, 172-3; genera and species of, 43-7; and habitual state, 173; and lack of self-control, 134-7, 141; and mean, 47-8; not admitting of a mean, 49-50; and pardon, 136; Peripatetics on, 45; Plato on, 46; and pleasure and pain, 43-6; Stoics on, 44-6; and virtue, 120
- emotive part of soul, 36
- encomium, vs. praise, 34
- end(s), hierarchy of, 6; of human beings, 18-19; kinds of, 11; nature of, 5-6
- envy, as a vice, 55
- equality, in love 169, 176; in love vs. in justice, 179; in accord with quantity, 179; in accord with worth, 179
- erotic love, 167
- ethics, need for, 3-4; and wisdom, 3
- Eudemus, on pleasure, 152-3
- evils, kinds feared, 81-2; and pain, 151
- exactitude, and action, 122; in the arts, 20-1; and the definition of particulars, 41; and method, 8
- excess, absence of, 155; of bodily goods, 155-6; and vice, 48-50; in vice, two senses of, 50-1; and virtue, 41-2
- experience, and courage, 85-6; and love, 168-9, 174
- extremes, opposition between, 55-6
- fear, as cause of courage, 85; as deficiency of courage, 51; definition of, 81; of kinds of evils, 81-2; of superhuman dangers, 83; and voluntary action, 59-61
- fearlessness, vs. courage, 52, 84, 88; and experience, 85-6
- feeling of love, 160, 163; between unequals, 178; for inanimate things, 173; and emotion, 172-3; of mothers for children, 180
- flattery, as a vice, 55; vs. sociability, 123
- force, by, and action, 58-9; definition of, 58; and fear, 59; and pleasure, 62; senses of, 59, 61
- forms, Platonic, 12-13; Pythagorean, 14
- forthrightness, 124-6; *see also* truthfulness
- friendliness, as a virtue, 55
- friendship, as activity, 171; and altruism, 164-6; among base people, 170-1; and experience, 168-9, 174; for a few, 173-4; among good people, 168, 173; as habitual state, 171; and living together, 166, 171-2; as mutual, 163-4, 168-72; and pleasure, 165-7, 171, 174; and separation, 171; and the useful, 165-6, 171, 174; *see also* love and 205 n. 416
- function, of human beings, 18-19
- gods, pleasure of, 158; not to be praised, 33-4
- good(s), as object of actions and choice, 5; as activity, 148-9; apparent, 75-6, 79-80; and arts, 15-16; external, 25-6; and happiness, 10, 25-7; hierarchy of, 18; human, 16-19; and ideal forms, 13; in itself, 14; kinds of, 14-15, 33; and Platonic forms, 12-13; vs. pleasure, 142-4; practicable, 10, 15; simply vs. for someone, 76, 144-5, 162-3; simply vs. useful, 162; of the soul as primary, 22-3; use of, 149; and wishing, 75-6
- good will, and love, 163
- governments, and kinds of love, 181-3; deviations, 183
- grandeur*, 109-17; and belief in one's own worth, 109-12; and competition, 115; vs. conceit, 111, 117; vs. diffidence, 111-12, 117; as extreme, 112; and fortune, 109; vs. good fortune, 113-14; and gossip, 116; and honours, 110, 112-13; vs. love of honour, 119; as mean, 112; and risk, 114; and superiority, 114-15; supervening on other virtues, 110; and truthfulness, 115; uncomplaining, 116; unhurried, 116-17
- habit, and virtue, 38
- habitual state, and activity, 106; and change, 145; and excess, 155; and love, 171-3; and mean, 80; responsibility for, 79-80; simply vs. for someone, 145; and virtue, 40, 80-1; as voluntary, 81
- happiness, and chance, 26-7; of the city, 7; and complete life, 20, 28; and contemplation, 9-10; after death, 29-33; as the end of politics, 6-7, 9-10; and external goods, 25-7; as god-given, 26-7;

- of the gods, 35; as highest good, 10, 16-18; and honour, 35; as learnable, 26; and luck, 153; meanings of, 10-11; and nobility, 24; and pleasure, 23-4, 153; and the political art, 9-10, 27-8; not a praiseworthy good, 33-5; and rationality, 28; and self-sufficiency, 17; stability of, 30-1; and virtue, 23-4, 27; and the well-being of others, 17
- homonymy, 161, 164
- honour, and ambition, 118-19; and courage, 85; desire for (a nameless virtue), 117-19; as the end, 11; and expenditure, 107; and grandeur, 110, 113; and happiness, 35; indifference to, 118; and love, 179-80; love of, 118-19; love of, *vs.* grandeur, 119
- honour, love of, 118-19, 179-80; as a virtue, 119
- hope, and courage, 87
- ignorance, and courage, 88; of the end, 65; of the good, 64; and (in)voluntary action, 58, 62-5, 77-9; of what kinds of things, 64-5; and pardon, 63-4, 78; and punishment, 77-8; responsibility for, 78; two species of, 62
- illiberality, as deficiency of liberality, 53, 97; excessive in receiving, 102-4; as incurable, 103; kinds of, 103
- impetuosity, and lack of self-control, 135-6
- indignation, as a virtue, 55
- inequality, in love, 176-80; kinds of unequal love, 178-9
- ingratiation, *vs.* sociability, 123
- inquiry, *vs.* deliberation, 74
- insensitivity, as deficiency in pleasure, 94; as excess of self-control, 140
- intelligence, practical, 38; and virtue, 37-8
- involuntary, 57-67, 76-80; and appetite, 66; definition of, 58; and drunkenness, 63; and fear, 59-61; and force, 58; and ignorance, 58, 62-5, 77-9; mixed with voluntary, 60, 62; and punishment, 57-8, 77-8; species of, 62
- irascibility, as extreme of anger, 121; as habitual state, 120; kinds of, 121-2
- irony, as a form of boasting, 126; *vs.* truthfulness, 54, 125-6
- justice, and equality, 179; and lack of self-control, 129, 141; and love, 160, 181
- kin, love between, 184
- lack of (self-)control, and cleverness, 141; as curable, 135-6; *vs.* dissoluteness, 132-3, 135-6; and emotion, 134-7, 141; and impetuosity, 135-6; and justness, 129, 141; and knowledge, 136; and the majority, 130, 141-2; and persuasion, 137; *vs.* prudence, 141; *vs.* reason, 137-8; and regret, 132, 135-6; *vs.* softness, 130-1, 133-4; and vice, 136, 140; and weakness, 134-5; *see also* self-control
- liberality, 52-3, 96-104; and commodities, 96-7; and compulsion, 102; about giving and receiving, 104; *vs.* munificence, 104-5; *vs.* neglect of possessions, 100; and pleasure, 99; and receiving, 99-101; in accord with resources, 100-1; and small expenses, 105
- lovable, as homonymous, 164; kinds of, 161
- love, 158-87; as activity, 171; as altruistic, 164-6; for inanimate things, 173; *vs.* being loved, 180; and benefactions, 185-6; between brothers (analogous to timocracy), 182-3; character-based, 185-6; and community, 183-4; complete, 167-9; between comrades, 182-4; and concord, 160; and contracts, 185-6; and contrariety, 160, 180; among the elderly, 166, 171-2; and equality, 169, 176, 185; erotic, 167; and experience, 168-9, 174; feeling of, 160, 163, 172-3, 178, 180; in friendship, 163-5, 168-72; for the good (simply or for oneself), 162-3; among good people, 168, 173; and good will, 163-4; as habitual state, 171-3; as homonymous, 161, 164-5; of honour, 179-80; between husband and wife, 177-9 (analogous to aristocracy), 182; and inequality, 176-80, 185; and justice, 160, 181; among kin, 184; kinds of, 161, 164-5, 178-9; and kinds of government, 181-3; law-based, 185; and living together, 166, 171-2; and the lovable, 161, 164; between master and slave, 183; as a mean, 158-9; mutual, 163-4; as necessary, 159-60; as noble, 159-60; for offspring, 160, 163; for others incidentally, 166, 170; for others for themselves, 166, 169; between parents and children, 177-80, (analogous to monarchy) 182, 186; and pleasure, 165-7, 174-5; with the powerful, 175-6; primary, 164-5, 176; between ruler and ruled, 177-8; and similarity, 160-1; within species, 160; and separation, 171; takes time, 168-9; and the useful, 165-6, 174; and virtue, 158-9, 164-5, 168-9; among the young, 166-7; *see also* friendship and 205 n. 416
- luck, and happiness, 153
- mean, and action, 48; not applicable to all actions or emotions, 49-50; difficult to

- determine, 56-7; and emotion, 47, 49-50; and habitual state, 80; logical status of, 49; opposed to extremes, 56; specific to individuals, 47, 56; and virtue, 48-50, 53-7
- method, of ethics, 8; meaning of, 4
- mildness, as the mean of anger, 53, 120-2; vs. angerlessness, 120; vs. irascibility, 121-2; as unvengeful, 121
- monarchy, analogous to paternal love, 182
- munificence, 104-9; and the community, 107-8; about great expenses, 105-8; about great works, 108; vs. liberality, 104-5; vs. niggardliness, 105; and poverty, 107; proportional to its object, 105; vs. vulgarity, 105
- nameless virtues and vices, 53, 117-19, 122-3, 124
- natural state, and pleasure, 146-7, 153-4
- natural, appetites, 130; pleasures, 130
- nature, by, senses of, 38-9
- necessary pleasures, 132
- necessity, vs. deliberation, 71-2
- niggardliness, as deficiency of munificence, 105
- nobility, and happiness, 24
- non-rational part of soul, 36; double nature of, 36-7; and self-control, 36
- nutritive part of soul, 36
- obdurateness, vs. self-control, 139
- obsequiousness, as a vice, 55
- oligarchy, 181-3
- opinions, commonly accepted, 22-3
- opposition, of extremes, 55-6; with mean, 56
- pain, and dissoluteness, 94, 132-3; and emotion, 43-6; as an evil, 151; and pardon, 134; vs. pleasure, 157
- pardon, and compulsion, 61; and emotion, 136; and excessive pain, 134; and ignorance, 63-4, 78
- Plato, on emotion, 45
- playfulness, vs. dissoluteness, 134
- pleasure, 142-58; as activity, 145-9, 156-7; and art of, 149-50; as base, 152, 156; as best, 152-3; bodily, 89-90, 154-7; and change, 158; in contemplation, 149, 155-6; and courage, 88-9; deficiency of, 94; and dissoluteness, 94, 132-3, 155; divine, 158; and emotion, 43-6; as the end, 11, 147; and excess, 155-6; and force, 62; as good, 144; vs. good, 142-4; neither good nor bad, 154-5; and happiness, 23-4, 153; individual, 94; kinds of, 89-90; and liberality, 99; love on account of, 165-7, 174-5; in misfortunes of others, 55; natural, 93-4, 130; and natural state, 146-7, 153-4; necessary vs. unnecessary, 132; as noble, 139; vs. pain, 157; as perceptible, 148; and political science, 142; as process, 143-4; not a process, 145-8; and prudence, 150-1; vs. reasoning, 144, 149; and replenishment, 143, 146, 156-8; without replenishment, 146-8; simply vs. for someone, 146-7, 150; of the soul, 89-90, 155; and temperateness, 89-92; as unimpeded, 148; unmixes, 156; and virtue, 42
- political art, and happiness, 9-10, 27-8; kinds of, 7-8; and pleasure and pain, 142; and the soul, 35-6; and wisdom, 10
- power, and love, 175-6
- praise, vs. encomium, 34; and happiness, 33, 35; inappropriate of gods, 33-4; reasons for, 33-4; and virtue, 96, 98
- principles, in argument, 10-11; as indemonstrable, 21, 137; as necessary for reasoning, 137; sources of, 22
- process, and pleasure, 143-5, 147-8
- profligacy, as curable, 102-3; as excess of liberality, 52-3, 97; excessive in giving, 102
- prudence, vs. lack of control, 141; and pleasure, 150-1
- punishment, 57-8, 77-8; and ignorance, 77-8
- Pythagoreans, and ideal forms, 13
- rashness, 52; vs. confidence, 53; vs. courage, 84
- rational, senses of, 19; part of soul, 35, 37-8
- rationality, and happiness, 28
- reason, as pleasurable, 149; vs. pleasure, 144, 149; right, 40-1
- regret, 62, 135-6
- reproach, senses of, 37
- right reason, and virtue, 40-1
- self-control, 128-42; of appetite vs. of temper, 67-8, 128-9; and deliberation, 134-6; and emotion, 134-5, 137; vs. insensitivity, 140; and the majority, 131, 141-2; as a mean, 139-40; vs. obdurateness, 139; and persistence of belief, 138; and pleasure, 139; and reasoning, 138-9; vs. temperateness, 140-1; vs. toughness, 131-3; two kinds of, 134-5; and virtue, 139-40; *see also* lack of control
- self-sufficiency, and happiness, 17
- senses, and pleasure, 90-2
- slave, love with respect to master, 183
- sociality, 122-3; vs. curmudgeonliness, 123; vs. flattery, 123; vs. friendliness,

122-3; vs. ingratiation, 123; as a (usually nameless) virtue, 122-3
 softness, vs. lack of control, 130-1, 133-4
 sorites ('heap') puzzle, 57
 soul, good of, 22-3; as object of political art, 35-6; parts of, 19, 36-7; and virtue, 37-8
 Speusippus, on pleasure, 151
 Stoics, on emotion, 44-6
 synonymy, 161

temper, vs. appetite, 129; vs. choice, 68; and courage, 86-7; and reason, 128-9; and self-control, 128-9
 temperateness, 52, 89-96; and animals, 130; about bodily pleasure, 90; vs. dissoluteness, 91-2; and hearing, 90-2; and pleasure, 89-92; in sense of practical wisdom, 110-11; vs. self-control, 140-1; and smell, 90-2; and vision, 90

Theophrastus, on pleasure, 157
 timocracy, 181-3; analogous to love between brothers, 182
 toughness, vs. self-control, 131-3
 truth, as a virtue, 54; and grandeur, 115
 truthfulness, 54, 124-6; in agreements, 125; vs. boastfulness, 125; as forthrightness, 124; as a habitual state, 124; as nameless virtue, 124
 tyranny, 181-3; and love, 183

use, vs. possession, 98; of things vs. virtues, 97-8; of wealth, 98
 useful, vs. simply good, 162; love on account of, 165-6, 174

vice, and absence of knowledge, 136; vs. bestiality, 130-1; as excess and

deficiency, 48-50; vs. lack of control, 136; opposite of virtue, 56; and two kinds of excess and deficiency, 50-1; use of, 97-8; voluntary, 76-7

virtue, and activity, 39-40, 42; and character, 38; definition of, 48; as double, 37-3; and emotion, 120; as the end, 11; and habit, 38; and habitual state, 79-81; and happiness, 23-4, 27; intellectual, 37-8; love as, 158-9; as a mean, 48-50; nameless, 118-19; by nature, 38-9; opposite of vice, 56; and parts of soul, 37-8; and pleasure, 42; as about pleasure and pain, 42-3; and praise, 96; as stable, 30; truth as, 54; as unimpeded activity, 28; use of, 97-8 as voluntary, 76-7, 81

voluntary, 57-67, 76-80; about actions, 57; and apparent good, 79-80; choice as a species of, 67; and courage, 95; and dissoluteness, 95; and fear, 59-61; and force, 59; and habitual state, 79-80; and ignorance, 62-5, 77-9; mixed with involuntary, 60, 62; and injustice, 79; and pleasure, 66; and punishment, 57-8, 77-8; single species of, 65; and temper, 66; and virtue, 76-7
 vulgarity, vs. munificence, 105

wealth, as choiceworthy, 12; as a good, 162; as useful, 98

wisdom, and ethics, 3; political art, 10
 wishing, vs. choice, 68-9; and the good, 75-6
 wittiness, vs. boorishness, 127; vs.

buffoonery, 127; as a virtue, 54-5, 126-7
 worth, belief in, 109-12; and external goods, 112